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I. Introduction
The author extensively studied the characteristics of the Japanese domestic market and the 
global market for civil works infrastructure construction. The contract and conditions of 
contract which govern the execution of civil works infrastructure construction projects in each 
market generally are thought to be a reflection of the industry practices. These practices in 
turn drive and shape the skill sets engineers must learn and practice daily in order to fulfill 
the requirements demanded in such execution successfully.       
Japanese civil works infrastructure is arguably the most extensive per capita in the world. It 
is civil works infrastructure that reflects the highest of technological and engineering 
competency. The construction contracting for civil woks infrastructure projects is governed 
by the Construction Business Law. Under that Law, the Government contracts with 
contractors using the Contract and the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. 
These contract documents are said to reflect the philosophy of the Japanese legal system,
and the contracting approaches that it embraces. In order to understand and evaluate the 
Japanese civil works infrastructure construction market, the author studied the Japanese 
social, cultural and historical developments that have shaped the legal bases therefore and 
to understand what makes Japan and the Japanese market unique.   
The author found that a unique contracting status bestowed by Construction Business Law 
allowed the Government to use the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works to fashion a civil works infrastructure construction industry that has developed 
characteristics that are different from the global market. The Japanese Contract and the 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works, however, has not enabled the 
construction industry to develop either:
 An extensive understanding of construction execution for civil works 
infrastructure in the global market place.
 The project management skill sets (for example, contract administration to 
support a viable disputes resolution process) necessary to fully integrate the 
Japanese civil works infrastructures construction industry into the global 
market construction works.
 A domestic market that meets the criteria for entry to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
On the other hand, the Construction Business Law, the Contract and the Standard 
Conditions of Contract for Public Works, has enabled the Government through the 
uniqueness of the process of the contracting approach they represent to:
 Use the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry to “prime the 
pump” whenever the economic conditions warrant.
 Exclude foreign contractor participation in the domestic construction civil 
works infrastructure market to accomplish its goal. 
The result has been the development of an “insulated” domestic construction industry for 
civil works infrastructure that Japan can sustain no longer. The Government also can no 
longer afford civil works infrastructure as it has in the past. In fact, in light of the demographic 
issues that it faces, Japan has embarked on a long term reduction civil works infrastructure 
construction that has left the industry in a precarious position. For example, Japan faces the 
reality of a population that is declining and aging, while it continues to be the most 
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homogeneous population in the world. The current status of the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction industry is one of crisis. 
The crisis is the result of the Construction Business Law, the Contract and the Standard 
Conditions of Contract for Public Works and the realities of Japan today that do not meet:
 The intent of the legal changes that the Government is enacting.
 The demand of the electorate for the transparency in the process of awarding 
and executing civil works infrastructure construction projects.
 The commitment that the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction 
market will become a part of the global civil works infrastructure construction 
market. 
In contrast, the financing and execution of civil works infrastructure globally is undertaken 
through the use of various types of contracts and standard conditions of contract that are 
understood and accepted by stakeholders that operate in the global market. For example, 
the most widely used forms of contract and conditions of contract for executing civil works 
infrastructure globally is the suite of contracts that is promulgated by Fédération 
Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC). The author identified the skill sets that are 
required in the global market and evaluated the Japanese civil works infrastructure 
construction industry’s need to learn and use the project management skills under the 
current Construction Business Law, the Contract and the Standard Conditions of Contract for 
Public Works. The author also analyzed a comparable Asian market. China has elements of 
social and cultural development that are alleged to be similar to those of Japan. Yet, the 
Chinese have enacted recently laws that will allow it to develop the skill sets that 
stakeholders employ in the global market for civil works infrastructure construction and allow 
foreign competition in their domestic market.    
In Japan, there exist no guidelines for change which would allow the use of contract and 
standard conditions of contract used in the global market to be used for the execution of 
domestic civil works infrastructure construction. Using the 1999 FIDIC Contracts and 
Standard Conditions of Contract (known as the 1999 FIDIC Books or the FIDIC Rainbow 
Series) as an example, the author demonstrates the characteristics that can guide the 
Japanese domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry. For example, it would 
force the necessary contractual experience comparable to what foreign contractors have. It 
also would allow the development of those contract administration skills that will enable it to 
function in the world economy. It would also allow the domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction market to develop in the transparent manner that the Japanese population is 
demanding.
Although Japan is culturally and socially unique with a set of business practices that have 
worked for over half a century, the author recommends from his studies guidelines for 
changes that are necessary to the Construction Business Law and using the global market 
standards for civil works infrastructure construction. The Contract and Standard Conditions 
of Contract for Public Works in conjunction with these guidelines can be used to develop a 
“New Japanese Standard.” In addition, the recommendations will further enable Japan to 
meet its WTO commitments, open its domestic market to foreign competition and enable the 
domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry to compete effectively on much 
larger playing field—the global market. The result will enable Japan to avoid the crisis that is 
facing the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry.
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II. Japanese and Global Civil Works Infrastructure 
Construction Standard Conditions of Contract
A. The Real Issues Facing the Civil Works Infrastructure Construction Industry
Japan’s emergence as a postwar economic power led to the unraveling of the national policy 
of consensus that smoothed over the divisions that existed within the national bureaucracy. 
The policy breakdown began in the 1970’s because of the emergence of Japan as an 
economic and technology power. It seriously complicated the process of formulating 
industrial policy and made it more difficult to achieve cooperation and functionality, the two 
characteristics that allowed phenomenal growth.1 The breakdown in a coordinated and 
managed economy did not happen in the construction industry. It was an instrument of 
keeping the ruling party in power. It was used to serve political needs and continued to 
stimulate the economy until the economic bubble burst in the mid 1980’s. It did not allow a 
preparation the industry to function in the broader global market, as had other sectors of the 
economy. Japanese industrial prowess grew in many other sectors. Foreign competition was 
“controlled” by developing a keen edge in the competitiveness of the global market, 
especially industrial goods and consumer products.
Two Japanese political scientists studied the manner in which the ruling party manipulated 
certain economic policies to enhance its chances for victory at election time.2 They examined 
government spending on construction projects targeted at Japan’s numerous election 
districts for the 30-year period form 1955-1985. They found throughout this period that 
spending on construction projects increased dramatically in the month that an election took 
place. Over 99% percent of businesses qualified under the Construction Business Law 
represented in the voting districts were of small to medium companies, and they employed 
over 80% of the all Japanese construction workers therein. Over this period the ruling party 
enjoyed an average of 12% more support than it had nationally.
The ruling party sent discrete transfers of public resources to members of their support 
constituencies in the same month that an election was held. This largesse was in response 
to certain electoral imperatives. For example, if it is the case that a governing party holds a 
majority of seats in the lower house of its respective parliament that is not in imminent 
danger of being taken away in an upcoming election, then the principal challenge it faces at
election time is getting its core supporters to turn out and vote. The ruling party needed only 
to remind its supporters that it was their benefactor, and that it was the party which had 
protected and advanced their interests by means of the dispensing public resources, and 
that it was in need of their electoral support. While individual-level changes occur in the 
governing parties support base over time, the ability to remain in ruling position occurs in two 
ways. First, is “sector change,” which occurs when party specific shifts come about as a 
result of a substantial number of the electorate no longer were supporting the ruling party. 
The second change is “ecological change,” which occurs when a large number of the ruling 
party’s support group change relative to the size of the support group, especially when 
measured against other socioeconomic groups. The party that has ruled Japan for all but 
two of the last 55 years faced both changes as Japan entered the last decade of the 
twentieth century.
The best way of handling the kinds of dislocations that occur from such electoral support 
changes that necessitate policy adjustments that are required is to hide the social dislocation 
that results and sacrifice a specific sector of the economy. In the 1990’s the ruling party 
faced a stagnating economy that had resulted from the end of the “bubble” economy. The 
Government chose to use the Construction Industry, and specifically the civil work 
infrastructure portion that it had historically employed to stave off their dwindling support.  
From 1990 to 1999 it announced ten stimulus packages aimed at forcing a rebound from the 
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resulting surge in civil works infrastructure construction spending. It was hoped that 
spending would do the same thing that that it had accomplished from 1955 to 1985—
guarantee the reelection of the ruling party. But, it required the Government to protect the 
civil works infrastructure construction industry at a time when the rest of the world was 
clamoring for entry and participation in that domestic market sector.
The legal foundation of Japan is based on Civil Codes of France and Germany, and the 
Common Law of the US (and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom). Europe, Australia, the 
Americas, Africa, and the rest of Asia generally have one or the other of these same legal 
foundations. Yet, civil works infrastructure contractors from these seemingly disparate legal 
traditions can compete against each other and function acceptably in the global market for 
civil works infrastructure construction projects.  Japan’s contractors, however, cannot 
compete in such a global market because the domestic market has a basic difference. 
Japan has created a form of industry practice that is based on the Construction Business 
Law that creates an exception to the basic forms of contract that are allowed under its Civil 
Code. The Construction Business Law recognizes the dominance of the Owner/Employer—
the Government for essentially all of the civil works infrastructure construction market. The 
Construction Business Law requires the use of a written contract that incorporates the 
principle that: “parties executing a contract for construction work shall conclude a fair and 
equitable agreement in mutual good faith”3 –-a concept of “mutual trust” in the fairness of the 
dominant Government as Owner/Employer. The Construction Business Law gives the 
Government the authority to determine disputes unilaterally, but in practice the 
Owner/Employer frowns upon disputes in the civil works infrastructure construction industry. 
The Construction Business Law requires the contractors to engage in the subterfuge of 
pointing out changes and then awaiting the unilateral determination of Owner/Employer as to 
the value and time consequences of such changes. This principle has allowed the 
Government to manipulate the industry to its own ends, and in return it has protected the 
industry from foreign competition. Faced with the need to rebuild the Japanese economy 
recently, the Government under the guidance of the ruling party now has embarked in a 
program of legal restructuring in most sectors of the economy to better prepare Japan to 
better meet the situation and conditions that it now faces. It is doing so through changes in 
the laws that govern economic sectors except for the civil works infrastructure construction 
that is subject to the Construction Business Law from which almost all of the current issues 
originate.
The Japanese Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works are based on 
and reflect the Construction Business Law. The Contract and Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works have been used for over fifty years. The basic provisions have 
been altered only eight times, but the revisions have been relatively minor and reflect minor 
revisions. The efforts that the Government has made in the last decade to comply with the 
commitments under the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement have been 
cosmetic, as described below, and the Government has not changed the Construction 
Business Law. The current Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works 
are used to protect the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry from foreign 
competition still. In the past, the system has been used for maintenance of the ruling party in 
power, used in ill-fated attempts at economic stimulus, and now in an attempt to save a 
significant sector of the economy from global competition. The Government and the 
domestic civil woks infrastructure construction industry are “casting about” and bemoaning 
their future and that of the industry. The Government and the civil works infrastructure 
construction industry are attempting to use a varied composite of ideas that are used in 
various European and US infrastructure construction markets, but it is achieving little 
success. To define the problem, some of the issues that are characteristic of Japanese civil 
works infrastructure construction, which are at odds with the rest of the world, must be 
explored. Japan’s response to the challenges and changes that began twenty years ago was 
first one of retreat and denial. Then it was of pragmatic utilization of new rules and 
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circumstances to continue policies of promotion and protection. Today it is one of accepting 
global standards and policies in general, but it is not doing so in the civil works infrastructure 
construction industry. The manner in which the domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction industry can change will be dependent on revisions Construction Business Law, 
and the Contract and the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works to reflect global 
standards and policies. Such change will avoid a crisis and can lead to results which will 
provide the domestic construction infrastructure construction industry with a future it so 
desperately needs.
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B. The Fundamental Legal Basis for the Japanese Standard Conditions of Contract for 
Civil Works
In Japanese society, the law historically has a limited function. It becomes one small part of 
the mechanisms for social control. For example, where there are conflicts and/or disputes, 
societal resort to formal law and institutions is not usually the first course of action of the 
Japanese. Today, however, there is an astonishing amount of change afoot, and a 
considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the future. The Japanese Government and 
companies generally have become major players in global markets. The Japanese 
managers of companies go forth and strive to become masters of the cultures in which they 
compete. The Japanese people have become world travelers. They are regularly exposed to 
different ideas and cultures. Communications, the great equalizing influence of the new 
century, has led to a blending of cultures at an increasing and irreversible rate. Now that 
Japan is facing economic problems, a questioning and re-evaluation of the practices that it
has cherished has commenced in a manner and depth that it never occurred before.
The uniqueness of Japanese law and the approach to doing things is formed by the broad 
belief of the Japanese in their “uniqueness.” The widely held view concerning the special 
and superior nature of “Japanese” is expressed in the word “Nihonjinron (日本人論).” At one 
level it represents racial purity and nationalism. At the opposite extreme, it is the social and 
cultural cohesion which binds the people together and it has an immense psychological 
power. More importantly, it represents a defensive ideology against foreign influence and 
intervention.4 These principles underlie the domestic civil works infrastructure construction 
industry—specifically the Construction Business Law—which the Government has used with 
provisions of other Japanese laws to govern civil works infrastructure construction market. 
Little has changed with respect to these laws. Foreign technology has been sought, and then 
improved upon, especially with respect to the desire to build a world class civil works 
infrastructure. But always such civil works infrastructure was guided by the application of 
these unique laws.
The Japanese Legal System appears familiar. The constitution has characteristics of the 
American constitution. The parliamentary system appears to blend the Anglo-American 
systems. The Japanese Code appears modeled after the French and German codes. Yet, 
the Japanese Legal System is a series of apparent contradictions that blends these apparent 
outside influences with Japanese traditions.5
Since the Japanese legal system is such an enigma to those brought up in other cultures, 
and especially so Western culture, it is important to consider ideas of culture and identity. 
Such is the case with the Japanese legal system. Understanding the Japanese legal system 
is illustrated by the use of cultural anthropology and the concept of “giri (義理)” in the work of 
Ruth Benedict, 6 and the cultural aspects in Kawashima’s work on Japanese “legal 
consciousness.7
The Japanese Legal System is a function of a recognizing the institutional context in which 
the construction industry must function. The presence of law as an object of interest rather 
than an instrument actively to be used implies the existence of some other rules for the 
management of society and settlement of disputes. In a broad sense these are the rules of 
“giri (“義理 ”).” These rules involve the individuals’ obligation and duty to the group 
(community), as well as, encompassing notions of reciprocity. Furthermore, “they are rules of 
conduct, and do not presuppose the existence of any relationship of clearly defined and 
quantitatively delimited rights and duties between subjects whose conduct they regulate.”8
Sanction is psychological and is found in the expression of “honor” and “loss of face.” As 
Ruth Benedict said, Japan is a “shame culture” and “not a guilt culture” characteristic of 
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Western cultures. She drew a distinction between a shame culture which “is a reaction to 
other people’s criticism” and a guilt culture which “have an internalized conviction of sin.” 
Thus, Japanese society maintains in harmony, “wa (和),” in the family and community by 
ignoring a person’s mistake rather than seek a formal sanction, as an individual’s shame is 
the group’s shame.
The traits of giri (“義理”) are decreasing with the ascendancy of a younger generation. Young 
engineers do not know the full detail of giri (“義理”), yet they profess to have the same 
mental outlook. The Japanese often have accepted Western ideas which have enriched the 
Japanese spirit, particularly with respect to rationality and objectivity. Adopting such 
approaches has not prevented the Japanese spirit from retaining its congenital 
characteristics. The Japanese spirit will change over time, but it will always be Japanese. 
The restructuring of government that is currently underway requires a change. Present 
indications are that the Japanese attitude on law is changing to become more westernized 
and it is showing signs of doing so.9 The Wall Street Journal recently reported the trend of 
firms to use the courts is growing. It reported:
“Japanese companies historically have negotiated their differences in closed door 
meetings, sometimes refereed by banks or business partners with stakes in the 
companies. That system worked well while companies held big chunks of each other. 
As the cross-shareholding system has unwound, companies started making use of 
the courts. Westerners have believed that that the Japanese people are not litigious. 
But once the Japanese become comfortable with the idea of fighting in court, which 
may be a function of the government re-structuring and court/legal services reforms 
that are underway, such as, speeding up the process, the Japanese will become very 
aggressive.”
Consistent with this concept, the Japanese Civil Code regulates the obligations under 
contacts in almost the same way as the French Civil Code, but in practice these contracts 
are not regulated as they are in France.10 For example, the practice is for the contractor to 
petition the Owner/Employer (the Government) in case of Civil Works infrastructure 
construction projects requesting the Owner/Employer (the Government) to the fulfill the 
Owner/Employer’s (the Government’s) contractual duties, that is, consider the contractors 
petition for impacts from change in what the contractor agreed to provide by a date certain 
and for the lump sum amount. 
To begin with, construction contract law is an amalgamation of several specific laws, the 
principal ones being:11
 Civil Code, Articles 632 through 642 (Minpo ”民法,” Law No. 89, 1896) covering 
the “Contract for Works” (Ukeoi-Keiyaku “請負契約”).
 Commercial Code (Sho Ho ”商法,” Law No. 49, 1899) dealing with commercial 
transactions.
 Construction Business Law (Kensetsu Gyo Ho ”建設業法,” Law No. 100, 1949) 
dealing with construction business, the contractual requirements and its licenses;
 Public Accounting Law (Kaikei Ho “会計法,” Law No. 35, 1947) setting forth the 
bidding requirements for public construction projects;
 Building Standards Law (Kenchiku Kijyun Ho “建築基準法,” Law No. 201, 1950) 
setting out the construction standards and practices;
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 Budget Order: Order concerning Budget, Settlement of Account and Accounting
(Yosan-Kessan oyobi Kaikei Rei “予算‐決算および会計令,” Government Order 
No. 165, 1947) prohibiting undue restraints of trade and unfair business 
practices.
Although there are several forms of contract, construction contracts generally are considered 
Contract for Works (Ukeoi Keiyaku “請負契約”) under the Civil Code. Article 632 of the Civil 
Code provides that a “Contract for Works” shall become effective when the contractor 
agrees to complete certain works and the employer agrees to pay to the contractor 
remuneration for the result of such works. Unlike the most countries, either civil law or 
common law, Art. 633 of the Civil Code, provides that such remuneration shall be payable to 
the contractor in return for delivery of the completed works. Under most other jurisdictions, it 
is typically the commitment by the contractor to complete and deliver such works.
The Civil Code does not favor contractors. Lawmakers, taking into account the situations 
where an individual-employer desires to build his own houses, assumed that the employer 
would be a layman and the contractor would be a professional. Before the Civil Code was 
enacted in 1896 at the start of the modern construction industry, the “Great Court of 
Judicature” (Daishinn In “大審院”), the predecessor to the Supreme Court, ruled in favor of 
the Owner/Employer in the Takenaka case, which involved one of the biggest contractors in 
Japan at the time.12 The court denied the contractor’s claim for extra costs and damages 
caused to it by unusually rushed work, inflation and design variations. The case put the 
contractor in the even more awkward position of making a claim for extra costs by means of 
litigation, arbitration or any other third-party dispute resolution process relying on the 
variation clauses under either public or private construction contracts. Such one-sided 
construction contracts existed until the end of the World War II, especially in civil works 
infrastructure construction, where the contractor tended to rely on the Owner/Employer’s 
grace (onkei “恩恵”) in response to its petition (tangan “嘆願”) without any clear grounds. In 
1949, The Construction Business Law was enacted to facilitate the making of construction 
contracts “in a fair and reasonable manner,” but the practice of relying on a making petition 
was retained for civil works infrastructure construction.13 The Construction Business Law
also prescribed the preparation and use of standardized construction contracts, 14 and the 
Contract and Standard conditions of Contract for Public Works was issued initially in 1950.
Chapter 3 of the Construction Business Law has modified the Civil Code provisions relating 
to “Contract for Works” to promote sound development of the Japanese construction 
industry. The Construction Business Law still holds construction contracts, however, within 
the basic framework of the “Contract for Works” concept in the Civil Code, but in practice the 
actual construction contract is different than the provisions of the Civil Code. Most authorities 
have expressed the opinion “is that a customary construction contract in Japan does not fall 
within any of the thirteen kinds of typical contracts (tenkei keiyaku)” defined in the Civil Code.
It is neither a “Contract for Works” nor “Mandate Contract” (Inin Keiyaku “委任契約”), but 
should be considered as falling with another category of contract and is called “sui 
generis”.15 Thus, the form and process used in the civil works infrastructure construction is 
not a recognized contract under the Civil Code.
The “Lump-Sum” (Souka ”総価”) construction contract is used for civil works infrastructure 
construction. With respect to the “Cost-Reimbursable” (Jippi-Seisan “実費精算”) construction 
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contract, most authorities suggest it is governed by the provisions regarding “Mandate” or 
“Quasi-mandate” under the Civil Code.16 A Cost Reimbursable Contract is different from 
“Contract for Works” in terms of payment conditions, allocation of risks between the 
contracting parties, extinctive prescription period for the right to claim damages, etc. The 
contract does not match actual practice. The “Unit-Price Contract” (Tanka Keiyak “単価契約”) 
and the “Cost-Reimbursable Contract” have rarely been used by Owner/Employers (the 
Government) for civil works infrastructure construction. Thus, 99% of civil works
infrastructrure construction projects are contracted as lump-sum.17
The Construction Business Law establishes the practice of the Owner/Employer paying for a 
substantial portion of the contract price to the civil works infrastructure contractor before the 
works are completed and turned over to the Owner/Employer, unlike the Civil Code 
requirements. The concept of giri (“義理”), however, is retained. The Construction Business 
Law, Chapter 3: Contract for Construction, Section 1: General Provisions, Article 18: 
Principle of Contracts for Construction Work states:
“Parties executing a contract for construction work shall conclude a fair and equitable 
agreement in mutual good faith.” 
The resulting Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works recognizes 
specifically that in effect the relationship arises from the Owner/Employer who is the 
contractor’s patron and the contract documents are a reflection of the fact. At the same time, 
the status of master or employer (the Government) is presumed patriarchal and is not to be 
despotic. In other words, the Government as the Owner/Employer is not only to dominate, 
but also to patronize, and therefore to consent to the request of its servant or employee. 
There is a strong expectation that a dispute should not and will not arise. Even when 
disputes do arise, it will be resolved by “mutual consultation or mutual understanding.” The 
concept is thus based on a presumption and belief that the Owner/Employer (the 
Government) and the contractor have a “mutual trust” in each other. Thus, there is no reason 
for the majority rule in the global market that the parties need to be governed by concepts of 
“mutual mistrust.”18 Under the Construction Business Law, parties are not expected to 
become involved in any serious differences in the future. This concept is consistent with the 
concepts of giri (“義理”) and premised on the belief that the parties are supposed to be 
friendly enough not to consider eventual disputes. The Contract and Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works provides that in the case of disputes, parties must negotiate with 
each other. As provided specifically in the Construction Business Law in Chapter 3-2, only if 
negotiation fails then there is a prescribed process for settling disputes.
Reflecting the Construction Business Law, the two Contract forms and Standard Conditions 
of Contract for use with lump-sum construction were promulgated:
(1) Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Construction Works (Koji Ukeoi 
Keiyaku Yakkan “工事請負契約約款”). These Conditions are mainly applied to private 
projects and were initially published in 1923 jointly by four organizations of 
contractors and architects (previously known as “Four Associations’ Unified General 
Conditions” (Shikai Rengo Kyotei Yakkan “四会連合協定約款”)) which had been 
influenced by the 1903’s text of R.I.B.A. (Royal Institute of British Architecture) and 
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during the subsequent six (6) revisions have been somewhat reflective of the A.I.A. 
(American Institute of Architecture) Forms. The most recent revision is the April 1, 
2000 and is used for private works.
(2) Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works (Kokyo Koji Hyojun 
Ukeioi Keiyaku Yakkan “公共工事標準請負契約約款”), which was prepared using as 
reference the General Conditions of 1 above and initially published in 1950 by the 
Central Council on Construction Industry of the Ministry of Construction (Chuo 
Kensetsu-gyo Shingikai “中央建設業審議会”) and most recently revised as the 8th
edition in 1995.
These Contracts and Standard Conditions of Contract are used for virtually all construction 
works in Japan, where the normal process is for the design to be provided by the 
Owner/Employer. In the Japanese construction industry as a whole, individual forms for 
Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract have been prepared and issued by the 
Government for civil works infrastructure construction. The first of these contract forms is the 
guide used by major private organizations for construction undertaken in the private sector. 
Articles 19(1) and (2) of the Construction Business Act also require a formal written 
document for important provisions and amendments. The provisions cover the contract 
price, completion time, security for due performance, payment terms, variations, risk of loss, 
warranty, dispute resolution, etc., whenever a new public construction contract or its 
amendments is made, except where the contract amount does not exceed ¥1.5 million (¥2 
million for a contract awarded outside Japan).19 The requirement for written contract is 
considered to be a non-mandatory part of the Law for the purpose of avoiding possible 
disputes on the contract conditions, and hence enforcement of the contract does not 
necessarily depend on the written document.20 On the other hand, the Public Accounting Act 
mandates that the main contract between the Owner/Employer (the Government) and the 
successful bidder on civil works infrastructure construction does not become binding until 
executed by both parties.21 With respect to private construction contracts, no such specific 
law exists in practice. However, it has been a common practice for construction contracts to 
be formalized in writing.
For the past three (3) decades, joint venture contracting also has been promoted by the 
governmental agencies to enhance the technical and financial abilities of small or medium-
sized contractors. As a result, approximately one-third of all construction projects in Japan 
are implemented as a joint venture or consortium (kensetsu kyodo kigyotai “建設共同企業”).
The Ministry of Construction (now the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport–MLIT) 
published two model forms for joint ventures: (i) a joint venture or type A (ko-gata “甲型”) 
which is a consolidated type and (2) a consortium or type B (otsu-gata “乙型”) which is an 
unconsolidated type. In consolidated type arrangements, all partners contribute capital, 
personnel, materials, equipment, work and service which are consolidated under a single 
organization and all profits and losses are shared at a predetermined ratio. In 
unconsolidated type arrangements, the works are divided into two or more portions in which 
each partner undertakes to complete his pre-allocated portion of works and has his 
respective contract amounts at his own responsibility and risk. The Ministry of Construction, 
however, promoted the use of the joint venture or type A form of joint ventures. Because 
authorities22 and legal precedents23 consider construction joint ventures a quasi-partnership
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(kumiai “組合”) under the Civil Code,24 joint venture partners do not owe a joint and several 
liability to creditors. This result is modified by the joint venture or type model form that is 
used. Thus, under a Type A model form each partner assumes joint and several liability 
(rentai sekinin “連帯責任”) to the Owner/Employer for their performance of the construction 
contract. Such joint and several liability owed to the Owner/Employer is independent from 
any internal liability relationship between the partners. In regards to civil works infrastructure 
construct, the MILT requires use three company joint ventures for a majority of civil works 
infrastructure construction projects.25
Given this legal foundation, the Construction Business Law and the promotion activities of 
the Government that it accommodates, are out of sync with the rest of the Civil Code.  
Today, the public questions the “transparency” of the civil works infrastructure construction 
process because of decades of ruling party abuse. As has been stated by the authorities, the 
dominant and patronizing Owner/Employer for civil works infrastructure allowed by the 
Construction Business Law assumes: “The Employer is always clean, fair, and right….[The 
Government] is far from being involved with collusion affairs of contractors.” 26 The 
Construction Business Law requires the Owners/Employers (the Government) and the 
contractors to deal in a cooperative manner, that is, because it is believed that the 
Owner/Employer (the Government) has “to make a fair and right selection, because [the 
Owner/Employer (the Government)] is bound by the logical restriction of actions or laws and 
regulations which always force the most suitable obligations and answers.” This contracting
approach is supposedly a furtherance of the concept of giri (“義理”), but in practice it has 
resulted in the abuses that are a part of the history and practice of the Japanese civil works 
infrastructure construction industry for the past fifty years.
For example, the Construction Business Law has been interpreted to allow use of a 
“Competition System by designated Tender,” in which the Government designates the 
bidders. Yet the Public Accounting Law, Article 29.3, provides that contracts for civil works 
infrastructure contracts require the use of general tenders to achieve a competitive system. 
A “Nominated Tender System” is only to be used in exceptional situations. In the case of civil 
works infrastructure construction contracts, the process of deciding the nominated bidders is 
not specifically defined, and only the result of the nominations are announced. Similarly, a 
tender and what goes into such a tender are not even defined. For civil works infrastructure 
construction the Government estimates its value or cost. The nominated tenders need only 
submit a single sheet of paper with the amount of its bid. If no nominated bidder submit a 
price that is equal or are less than the Governments estimated value, the nominated bidders 
are requested to give another number until the a the bid price is submitted by one of the 
bidders that is equal to or a lesser number than the Government’s estimated value. The 
system enables the perception and often the reality that the contractors ultimately bid what 
the Government desires, even though the estimate is not published in advance. Using the 
recently enacted electronic tendering system the MILT now accepts bid under its CALS 
system. The tender that is required is not much different than before, it just requires the bid 
submittal via the internet. The award of the contract in most cases still is made on the basis 
the resulting acceptable bid amount.
In case of Governmental projects, once the winning tender is accepted, 40% (in case of local 
government projects it will be 30% or 40%) of the accepted tender is paid as advance 
payment when the contract is executed for a civil works infrastructure construction project.
The justification is that contractors need a certain amount of the contract amount which 
enables them to purchase necessary equipment and materials. Originally, such an advance 
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payment was indeed made to contractors for purchasing necessary equipment and 
materials. However in the Japanese domestic civil works infrastructure construction market 
of today, the reality is that construction equipment can be rented on a daily basis and 
materials are readily available from suppliers with little delay.
There is the fundamental difference of understanding regarding a claim between the 
Japanese and English languages, for example. The Japanese dictionary says that a claim 
has the same meaning as “a complaint,” but not meaning a demand for something that is
rightfully due to a party. This language dichotomy results in a different basis for handling 
contractual matters, such as, claims. Even though the Construction Business Law allows 
the contractors to submit claims (called petitions), contractors seldom submit to the
Owner/Employer (the Government) official claim letters and other documents during the 
project execution. Hiding behind the concepts of dominance and a patronizing superior, the 
contractors do not submit claims based on allegations that the Owner/Employer (the 
Government) is demanding something for which the contractor has not bargained. Instead 
the letters or petitions appeal to the pride and the defined role of authority to do what is 
“right.” Typically the petitions are couched in terms of suggested or offered changes to what 
the Owner/Employer (the Government) originally intended or desired. In essence, claims in 
the domestic civil infrastructure construction market are “sekei henkou“設計変更”” which 
originally meant “design changes”. The reason why contractors use the “design change” is to 
convey to the Owner/Employer (the Government) that it changed the original design 
unilaterally and thus it needs to give the contractor the additional cost (and a time extension, 
if necessary). Thus, there are not claim documents submitted. The Owner/Employer (the 
Government) then calculates the value of time and cost for such acceptable changes 
according to its own unilateral figures and notifies the contractors accordingly. Thus all 
matters are settled on or before the final payment is made when the contractor formally 
“delivers” the executed project. The contractors are “forced to accept” this payment given the 
“design changes” that resulted from the contractor’s “proposed changes.” Despite the 
Construction Business Law, and the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works providing that the Government and contractor will “mutually agree,” must cases of 
civil works infrastructure construction actually are one-sided and settled by “the intentions” of 
the Government, and the contractors are seldom invited to participate in an official 
negotiation processes. Everyone usually is “satisfied” with the result, especially, since the 
Owner/Employer (the Government) is the source of 99% of civil works infrastructure 
construction.
Stakeholders who are not part of the paternalistic arrangement do not have any assurance 
of the “Transparency” of the process. In an attempt to give stakeholders, namely the public, 
a sense of transparency, the Government since 1995 has issued “reformed” laws that 
govern the way the domestic construction industry operates. The reforms were enacted in:
 April 1995: the Construction Industry Policy Codes
 July 1999: the Construction Industry Revival Program
 April 2002: the Reorganization Plan for Construction Industry
These reforms have only been cosmetic at best for civil works infrastructure construction, as 
discussed later. Little progress has been made in “upgrading transparency.” Little 
discernable progress has been made in achieving a system that assures the actual abuses 
or the perception of stakeholders that abuses will not occur in the future. The Construction 
Business Law is unaffected. The US Trade Representative has asserted that the reformation 
actions that these laws provide have led to conditions that have not changed, and the 
practices have not flowed down to the local governments.27
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Even in the realm of enforcement of these cosmetic changes to the laws governing 
construction of civil works infrastructure projects, the efforts of Japan to properly and 
effectively enforce the Antimonopoly Law by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)
still require change. Despite new laws that have allowed a more rigorous enforcement, the 
JFTC still has not exhibited a corresponding increase in enforcement. JFTC only initiated 
seven criminal prosecutions since 1990 (only one since 1999).28 There is continued use of 
vertical administrative guidance to individual companies, but which has the effect of 
encouraging horizontal acts, is only given a verbal lashing. For more than 50 years, 
government agencies have covered the illegal activities of businesses to prevent intervention 
by the JFTC by serving as a neutral arbiter and enforcers of cartel behavior. Nowhere has 
this been as effective as in the construction industry. For example, there has been progress 
in curtailing bid rigging, so called dango “談合”, but not in the construction of civil works 
infrastructure construction. The MILT issued new rules on bid rigging requiring nationwide 
suspension, if a Board of Directors and/or a senior manager of a contractor are complicit in 
bid rigging activities (whether for the MILT or not). Suspension under was increased from 9 
to 12 months by the Bid Rigging Involvement Prevention Act. Yet, harsher treatment has 
been provided in other government contexts under the Antimonopoly Act. A mandatory 
clause in all contracts for construction and design/consultation issued by the MILT states
that a mandatory pre-established damages of 10% of the contract value to be paid to the 
MILT for bid rigging. Among the actions taken to assuage critics, the MILT recently took 
measures to prevent the Economic Research Association and the Construction Research 
Institute from engaging in bid rigging.29 Yet, the source and abuse of administrative guidance 
in the construction industry is the MILT itself, even with the slight increase in the penalties, 
the results are not a deterrent and have not increased transparency in the civil works 
infrastructure construction market.
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C. The Fundamental Legal Basis for Global Standard Conditions of Contact for Civil 
Works
Most countries have socio-economic systems that embody some form of Western legal 
philosophy. These systems have been adopted or forced on countries all over the world. 
Most of the revolution that has globalized commerce in the last two centuries is based on 
Western legal principles. When the global community or individual countries have funded or 
financed civil works infrastructure projects, contracts and conditions of contract are similarly 
based on principles that underlie Civil Law and Common Law. One can immerse himself or 
herself in the idiosyncrasies in the study of comparative law between the laws of one country 
that is based on the Civil Law and of another country that is based on the Common Law. 
There is certainly a role for those who do so. But to work in the global market and engage in 
commerce does not require an understanding of such idiosyncrasies. In most countries of 
the world, civil works infrastructure construction is governed by the contracts and conditions 
of contract which are based on Civil Law and Common law. Although there are differences 
in the manner that Civil Law and Common Law jurisdictions reflect the legal principles, there 
really are few differences that are meaningful, and contracts based on one or the other are 
recognized and administered the same. Thus, these principles have shaped the manner in 
which Owner/Employers and contractors expect the other to act. A body of practice and 
expectations has developed for civil works infrastructure construction, and has evolved into 
“industry standards.”
There are a number of principles that underlie contracts and conditions of contract for civil 
works infrastructure construction. A fundamental one is that the parties to a contract are 
recognized as equal. One party is not more dominant than another. It underlies all contracts, 
particularly contracts for construction. Even where one of the contracting parties is a 
government, the contractor is recognized as being equal. Unlike the Japanese Construction 
Business Law, the one party is not superior to the other. One party is not to “dominate, but 
also be patronizing” at the same time. There may be some provisions, however, for the 
protection of one party, where the other possesses superior knowledge or has an inherent 
capacity to gain the knowledge. Such clauses, however, are the exception rather than the 
rule.
A contractor merely commits to executing and delivering the constructed project. The 
Owner/Employer has an obligation to see that it receives that for which it will pay. The 
contractor only has to deliver a project that the Owner/Employer or his agent (the Engineer) 
that was has defined, in other words, the scope and quality in the design documents, and 
time specified. The contractor can expect that the design on which it is asked to give a price 
is based on that scope, quality and desired time of performance. It is presumed 
“constructible.” If that is in error, the contractor is entitled to a demand of change to the 
scope, quality, time of performance, and/or cost. The Owner/Employer and the contractor 
agree not to interfere with each other, purposely or not. The Owner/Employer will provide 
interim payments provided the contractor performs and meets the interim measure –
normally either on a percentage completion or some other measurable milestone.
The fundamental basis of contracts in global market is a concept if “mutual mistrust.” What is 
meant by “mutual mistrust” is the Owner/Employer believes that the contractor inherently will 
try and execute and deliver some less than that for which is obligated; that is, the contractor 
will provide less scope or quality and/or take longer. The contractor believes that 
Owner/Employer will demand more than the contractor has agreed to execute and deliver; 
that is, the owner wants more scope or quality and/or delivery in less time. The 
Owner/Employer and contractor are expected to “protect” the benefit of their “bargain,” as 
there is not “anyone who will do so for it.” The allegedly injured party has an obligation to the 
offending party to give reasonable notices of its failure or the presumed failure to “live up to 
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the bargain.” The noticed party can agree, negotiate a solution, or dispute the assertion. 
Because the Owner/Employer and the contractor may have different interpretations of what 
each committed in the consummation of their bargain, there is a presumption that the 
allegedly injured party may go to courts to recover the benefit of its bargain. When a party 
does so, it is entitled to the bargain to which it agreed, nothing more or nothing less. The civil 
works infrastructure construction industry, however, has substituted for “resort to the courts” 
various alternative means of resolving such disputes, whether that is negotiation, 
determination, mediation (conciliation) and/or arbitration. Also, there is often means in the 
contract and conditions of contract of guaranteeing the other party is capable of living up to 
its bargain, such as, performance and payment guarantees. 
These legal principles are reflected then in the contract and are defined by the terms or 
conditions of such contract. Although there are many form contracts and standard conditions 
of contract that accompany them used in the global market, one of the most widely accepted 
are promulgated by the Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils or FIDIC. The 
World Bank and its affiliate banks (for example, the Asia Development Bank and Japan Bank 
for International Corporation ) require the use of a version of FIDIC contract for civil works 
infrastructure construction projects for which it provides some or all of the funding. Thus, 
must civil works infrastructure construction projects built in developing countries use the 
FIDIC documents, but with slight modification.  The Standard Conditions of Contract 
primarily applicable to the World Bank’s funding of construction and engineering of civil 
works infrastructure are those set out in its Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and 
IDA Credits (“Procurement Guidelines”).30 The form of contract required for Bank-financed 
projects, under the Procurement Guidelines, borrowers are required to use: “the appropriate 
Standard Bidding Documents (SBD’s) issued by the Bank with minimum changes, 
acceptable to the Bank, as necessary to address country and project specific issues.” As of 
January 2004, the SBD’s of primary relevance to the procurement of construction and 
engineering works were:
 “Procurement of Works” (January 1995; latest revision March 2003 (SBDW));
 “Procurement of Works – Smaller Contracts” (January 1995; latest revision 
March 2003); and
 “Supply and Installation of Plant and Equipment” (November 1997, latest 
revision March 2003). 
The use of the FIDIC contract and accompanying Standard Conditions of Contract assures 
the bank that most countries (even the under-developed and the developing countries) and 
the contractors who operate in the global market have a familiarity with their requirements. 
The parties are assured of having the same legal/commercial culture of “mutual mistrust.” 
Similarly, the World Bank is concerned with assuring “transparency” in the process of 
making and administering grants and loans that are used to finance civil works infrastructure 
construction projects globally. The concepts of “mutual mistrust” are equally used in assuring 
transparency among Owner/Employers and contractors. The fiscal year that ended June 30,
2004 culminated several years’ effort to mainstream new functions and a culture of “mutual 
mistrust” within the World Bank Group. This work was undertaken against the backdrop of
concerns raised by events in the United States, such as, the corporate scandals of Enron 
and WorldCom, as well as, the Parmalat scandal in Europe. These events drew increased 
attention to corporate governance issues, money laundering, and terrorist financing, and 
resulted in legislation, such as, the Sarbanes-Oxley statute in the U.S. The World Bank is 
trying to assure transparency by vigilance and training. The World Bank and its affiliates 
assume there is corruption or bribery in financing and execution of projects. Internationally, 
anticorruption instruments, such as, the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention and the U.N. 
Convention Against Bribery have demonstrated the international community’s determination 
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to fight fraud and corruption. Transparency International and other organizations have also 
played a significant role in raising awareness of the issue of corruption in the political arena. 
All of these developments focus attention on the use of development funds. It is through 
efforts by the World Bank and others to engage in an atmosphere of “mutual mistrust” and 
empowerment of stakeholders to intervene, that assures a culture that combats fraud and 
corruption and increases “transparency” of the process itself.
The World Bank published an Annual Report which summarizes the nature and the volume 
of the institutional integrity activities and investigations of the World Bank Group. The most 
recent is the report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2004. 31 In that report, the World Bank 
reported it has made significant progress in its capacity building and execution of these 
activities over the past five years. The World Bank established in April 2001, the Department 
of Institutional Integrity (INT) has handled over 1,300 cases and currently has over 300 
active cases. The Bank now has a budget of US$10 million for work in this area, making it by 
far the leader in resources committed among international institutions in the fight against 
fraud and corruption. As a result of these activities, the Sanctions Committee heard 16 cases 
involving alleged fraud and/or corruption by parties involved in Bank projects, leading to the 
debarment of 55 firms and 71 individuals in fiscal 2004.
On the internal side, the World Bank continued vigilance to ensure that the Bank’s own 
house is in order. The World Bank said that its “staff must be beyond reproach in their 
personal and professional conduct.” In terms of the Bank’s lending activities, the diversion of 
funds from development projects through fraud and corruption is considered an injury to the
ability of the Bank, its partners and its borrowers to achieve the goals that have been set for 
poverty reduction. Resources lost to fraud and corruption are considered an unacceptable 
drain on development effectiveness, not to mention the damage to the credibility of lending 
institutions, such as, the World Bank itself. The money to pay a bribe must come from some 
part of the civil works infrastructure construction project; as a result, prices may be raised, 
and/or quality and performance lowered. Less qualified bidders win by bid rigging while 
qualified bidders become discouraged and stop bidding. In addition, citizen awareness of 
unchallenged corruption undermines trust in government and public institutions leads to
acquiescence to poor quality and performance in public services and civil works 
infrastructure construction projects – and to an unwillingness to report fraud and corruption.
All of these effects must be considered in assessing the true impact of corruption on publicly 
financed civil works infrastructure construction projects.
The Japan Back for International Cooperation (JBIC) likewise demands that contracts and 
conditions of contract which govern the use JBIC ODA funds for civil works infrastructure 
construction employ concepts of “mutual mistrust.” As of March 1, 2004 JBIC described 
mission as one “to contribute to the sound development of Japan and the international 
economy and community through undertaking lending and other financial operations; for the 
promotion of Japanese exports, imports or Japanese economic activities overseas; for the 
stability of international financial order; and for economic and social development or 
economic stability in developing areas.”32 The Bank in 2005 revisions to its Handbook for 
Procurement under JBIC ODA Loans, declared that the revisions “will contribute to a 
transparent and stable operation of the system, facilitate procurement procedures, and 
enhance capacity building in borrower countries.” Thus, JBIC ic committed to the spreading 
the “transparency” goals that are a part of today’s emerging global market.
In the recommendations on the Standard Conditions of Contract that are to be used for civil 
works infrastructure projects, JBIC built in the principles of “mutual mistrust” by requiring the 
use of FIDIC Standard Conditions of Contract. The reasons proffered for the use was “to 
facilitate perusal by bidders and review by JBIC.” The Bank only lends in the global market. 
Thus, recipient countries and global contractors would either know or learn about these 
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principles. JBIC even goes so far as to state that the full Table of Contents of the FIDIC 
documents is to be used as presented and then exceptions reflected in a separate section. 
The legal principle of “mutual mistrust” is thus inherent in the global market, essential to 
international commerce, and fundamental to civil works infrastructure construction. In 
addition the principles of “transparency” enable abuses in the global civil infrastructure 
construction market to be minimized by adherence to codes of conduct and the 
empowerment of stakeholder to challenge the processes that are used. 
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D. How Global Standard Conditions of Contract Establishes Principles of “Mutual 
Mistrust”
The required use of Standards Conditions of Contract that are based on legal principles of 
“mutual mistrust” in turn require users to become familiar with the processes and skill sets 
which enable parties to function under terms that are familiar. It forces parties, whether 
owner/employers or contractor, to behave in an expected manner. Where there are 
variances from that bargain reached, parties must learn to measure change and how to 
present a case for resolution. 
The Standard Conditions of Contract almost universally reflect the principle of “mutual 
mistrust” by weaving into the fabric of the obligations set forth therein. For example, the 
contract is defined as being all the documents which define obligations, project scope, 
project quality, the time of performance and the price. A typical provision would read:
“Contract” means the Contract Award, the Letter of Acceptance, the Letter of Tender, 
these Conditions, the Specification, the Drawings, the Schedules, and the further 
documents (if any) which are listed in the Contract Agreement or in the Letter of 
Acceptance.” 33
The “Letter of Tender” typically requires extensive commitments by the contractor to 
demonstrate his understanding of what the Owner/Employer requires. The “Specifications” 
and the “Drawings” describe what the Owner/Employer desires in terms of the scope and the 
quality. The “Schedules” include the details on the pricing, such as, unit prices and/or the 
lump sum amount, and a programme or schedule which demonstrates how the Contractor 
plans to execute the works. These submittals document that the contractor has included all 
scope and will meet the Owner/Employers timing. The Owner/Employer will provide defined 
quantities, if the contract is based on unit prices. The various commitments are thus defined 
as the basis of commitment by both parties. The “Letter of Acceptance” is the 
Owner/Employer’s acknowledgement that all is as requested and acceptable. The 
documents include the “Conditions” of Contract defining the obligations of the parties. The 
total package on a large global civil works infrastructure project can total thousands of pages 
of documents as to define what the Owner/Employer desires and thousands of pages in 
response by the contractor. Defining the bargain is the basis for “mutual mistrust.” It is in the 
preparation of the documents by the Owner/Employer and the contractor respectively that 
defines the assumptions and to what each has committed and represents their “bargain.” 
Most civil works infrastructure projects take an extended period of time. Despite the effort 
that has gone into the preparation of the documents, change will happen. Under “mutual 
mistrust” the parties are given various mechanisms to inform the other party of changes, 
knowingly or unknowingly committed or required, which affects the bargain that a party made 
or thinks that it has made. The change may affect scope, the quality required, the time to 
execute the work, or the cost that can be charged. So, for example, the “Conditions of 
Contract” allow the parties to give notice to the other party of alleged or actual deviations or 
change. The notices are required to be in writing:
“Whenever these Conditions provide for the giving or issuing of approvals, 
certificates, consents, determinations, notices and requests, these communications 
shall be: … in writing and delivered … as stated in the Appendix to Tender …”
Written notice must contain sufficient detail to give the party receiving the notice sufficient 
detail to take action. 
“The Contractor shall give notice to the Employer whenever the Works are likely to 
be delayed or disrupted if any necessary drawing or instruction is not issued to the 
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Contractor within a particular time, which shall be reasonable. The notice shall 
include details of the necessary drawing or instruction, details of why and by when it 
should be issued, and details of the nature and amount of the delay or disruption 
likely to be suffered if it is late.”
Typical contract clauses address give the Owner/Employer rights and require monitoring of 
the contractors performance all through execution:
“If the Contractor fails to carry out any obligation under the Contract, the Employer
may by notice require the Contractor to make good the failure and to remedy it within 
a specified reasonable time.”
Similarly, the Contractor is given comparable rights:
“If the Contractor considers himself to be entitled to any extension of the Time for 
Completion and/or any additional payment, under any Clause of these conditions or 
otherwise in connection with the Contract, the Contractor shall give notice to the 
Employer, describing the event or circumstance giving rise to the claim. The notice 
shall be given as soon as practicable, and not later than 28 days after the Contractor 
became aware, or should have become aware of the event or circumstances.”  
This notice gives the other party the opportunity to respond and/or take actions that are 
appropriate. But, the party must be diligent or the right is extinguished. Thus, for example, 
the Owner/Employer can have restrictions equally on its ability to object the contractor’s 
portrayal of its commitments if the Owner/Employer believes the contractor is changing the 
terms of bargain. Such a clause regarding the programme or schedule would state:
“Unless the Employer, within 21 days after receiving the programme [project 
schedule], gives notice to the Contractor stating the extent to which it does not 
comply with the Contract, the Contractor shall proceed in accordance with the 
programme, subject to his other obligation under the Contract.”
Conversely, the Contractor will lose his right to costs and/or a time of performance 
adjustment if he does not give timely notice. Such a restriction is contained in clauses such 
as the following:
“If the Contractor fails to give notice of a claim within such period of 28 days, the 
Time for Completion shall not be extended, the Contractor shall not be entitled to 
additional payment, and the Employer shall be discharged from all liability in 
connection with the claim.”
As can be seen in the above clause, the principle of “mutual mistrust” dictates that the party 
giving notice and the party receiving notice must do so in a prescribed time. The right is not 
unending, thus the party has to constantly monitor the assumption or desires that underlie 
his commitments. So even in cases where one party is given a right, it can also be contained 
by the actions of the injured party. In the following clause the contractor is given the right to 
claim additional time of performance and/or cost from an error in the Owner/Employers 
requirements. But, the right is only exercisable if the error could not be found or seen by a 
contractor of experience: 
“If the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs Cost from executing work which was 
necessitated by an error [in the Employers documents], and an experienced 
contractor could not reasonably have discovered such error and avoided this delay 
and/or Cost, the Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer and shall be entitled … 
to 
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(a) an extension of time for any such delay …
(b) payment of any such Cost plus reasonable profit”
Also, when a noticed party responds, a similar commitment is placed on the original noticing 
party, such as, in the following:
“The Contractor shall give notice to the Employer whenever any work is ready [for 
inspection] and before it is covered up, put out of site, or packaged for storage or 
transport. The Employer shall then either carry out the examination, inspection, 
measurement or testing without unreasonable delay or promptly give notice to the 
Contractor that the Employer does not required to do so. If the Contractor fails to give 
the notice, he shall, if and when required by the Employer, uncover the work and 
thereafter reinstate and make good, all at the Contractor’s cost.”
“Conditions of Contract” thus force the parties to be always alert to what the other party is 
doing with respect to its obligations and commitments. A party must protect its bargain at all 
times or it suffers the consequences. Vigilance is mandatory. The timing and associated 
actions are mutual and equal. The Owner/Employer and the Contractor is each assumed to 
be knowledgeable and capable to protect its interests. The “Conditions of Contract” thus 
create an actual execution context of “mutual mistrust.”
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III. Project Management, Contract Administration and the 
Requirements of Standard Conditions of Contract for 
Civil Works in the Global Market   
  
A. What Is Required and What Skill Sets Are Required of Personnel Operating in a 
Culture of “Mutual Mistrust”  
 
When the “Conditions of Contract” are standardized, then both parties are aware of the 
“mutual mistrust” obligations from experience with the forms. Both parties can train 
personnel in the means of monitoring, controlling, and executing its performance to assure it 
receives the benefits of the bargain made. Also, the same is true in monitoring and notifying 
the other party of its failure to live up to the bargain, whether inconsequential or significant. 
The question then becomes, “given the requirements of ‘mutual mistrust,’ what are the 
proper skill sets for personnel in either the employ of the Owner/Employer or a Contactor to 
possess?” And the next question is then: “do personnel in the Japanese construction 
industry, and specifically the civil works infrastructure construction segment, possess these 
skills sets?  
 
In order for a party to monitor its bargain, the party must record the definitions and/or 
assumptions that its bargain represents in the contract that was consummated. The contract 
documents and/or the “source” documents that were “rolled up” must establish what it 
intended. Thus, the Owner/Employer relies upon the “drawings and specifications” in the 
Contract to define what it required as far as scope and quality. The Owner/Employer “source 
documents” will include documents that are “code” requirements. The code provisions are 
legal requirements that are defined by reference to the actual building or construction code, 
such as, a code for a particular concrete mix or its use in a particular circumstance. These 
code requirements are included by reference in the language of the specifications. The code 
requirements typically are used to define the quality that is expected. In addition, Conditions 
of Contract in international construction may require performance to “High International 
Standards” or some variation, such as, “good industry practice,” “perform to internationally 
used practice,” etc.1 Contractual language for civil works infrastructure projects require that 
actual performance meet this standard, but with little additional definition or guidance.  A 
recent global civil works infrastructure project provides typical language regarding such a 
performance standard: 
 
“…the exercise of that degree of skill, diligence and care including compliance with 
all Directives which would reasonably and ordinarily be expected from a skilled and 
experienced contractor, equipment manufacturer or operator engaged in the same 
type of undertaking under the same or similar circumstances.” 
 
The standards are recognized internationally by the parties that are active in the global 
market, so that there is a metric against which performance is measured. The Contractor 
equally must have standards. They exist in the global market, are recognized internationally 
and are a basis for measurement or a “metric.”  
 
For the contract documents, the Contractor must respond to the requirements of the 
Invitation to Bid. For example, the Owner/Employer may require a schedule of unit prices be 
developed. The Contractor relies on the quantities that are given in the Invitation to Bid. 
Then the Contractor must define the “means and methods” and resources (equipment, 
materials, labor, etc.) that it will use to execute what the Owner/Employer has specified in 
the Drawings and Specifications. The costs that will be incurred to provide the resources 
must be related to the unit price quantities and to the time the Owner/Employer demands or 
that it plans to execute the works. The Contractor is typically required to produce a 
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programme or a schedule that logically records the timing of the resource use, and 
demonstrates what actions of the Owner/Employer are required and when in order to meet 
the scheduled dates. The costs are recorded in the unit prices based on the timing and the 
resources that are used. The “source documents” are the recordation of this information. 
This information may become part of the submittals that the Contractor submits in his tender, 
or become the records that the Contractor submits at various defined intervals in the 
Conditions of Contract. Either way, the documents record the assumptions that the 
Contractor assumed were necessary to meet the Owner/Employer’s scope, quality, or time 
of performance. 
 
Once the bases of the bargain are recorded, then the process of executing the project 
begins. The systems of monitoring for conformance or change from that which either party 
defined or assumed must then be used during project execution to monitor the other parties 
performance. This monitoring becomes a metric for measuring the deviations from the 
project in a timely manner that is the essence of “mutual mistrust.” It also becomes the 
means for providing timely notice that is built into most civil work infrastructure project 
Conditions of Contract. Collectively, these two steps of preparing a base and monitoring are 
known as Contract Administration.  
 
These techniques of Contract Administration became the backbone of a new international 
profession called “Project Management.” In the 1950’s project management was recognized 
as a separate management function and specialized management methodology different 
from management methods employed in government or corporate business.  Now, half a 
century later, project management has evolved into global standards that are generally 
accepted and employed.2 
 
With globalization, practitioners in all sectors, but especially civil works infrastructure 
construction projects, demanded the need for even greater project management 
development and standardization. This clamor was greatest in the areas of Contract 
Administration because it is fundamental to successfully operating under the principle of 
‘mutual mistrust” which is required in the global market.  For example, standardization must 
follow a uniformity of a body of knowledge that can be employed in accomplishing suitable 
education and practical training, and most importantly project execution.  The benefits of 
standardization are continued development of Contract Administration and project 
management knowledge, education, training and execution based thereon.  There is, 
however, another tangible result is achieved.  Parties of diverse cultural and commercial 
backgrounds develop common understandings and common execution-performance 
expectations.  Both understandings and expectations lead to anticipatable management 
approaches, communication, and efforts.  Ultimately, improved project management leads to 
reduced risk of execution problems and disputes.  Management and commercial decision 
making becomes reasonably prudent and vastly improved. The result: Projects are 
successful and parties meet their goals. 
 
A standard, as commonly defined by the International Standards Organization (ISO), is a 
non-mandatory and non-legal compilation of generally accepted and used practices.  A 
standard assumes there is a generally common body of knowledge. Thus, the question first 
becomes: is there a global, generally accepted common body of knowledge for project 
management that reflects the Contract Administration needs of the global market for civil 
works infrastructure construction?  
 
Project management professional organizations and the academic community globally have 
reached consensus on project management standards that flow from a body of knowledge.  
Although professional organizations have evolved in the last half century to serve the 
developing profession, only in the last two decades has there been effort to establish 
standards through development of a body of knowledge by such organizations.  In 1999 the 
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Global Project Management Forum Steering Committee representing a growing group of 
such organizations began the laborious process of developing a global standard. Ultimately 
they formed the Global Working Group to develop a globally agreed body of knowledge for 
project management as the knowledge base for a transferable global competency standard 
for project management. 
 
The Global Working Group identified existing generic standards after defining “attributes for 
being global.”  The specific attributes included whether the standards were: 
 
• Relevant 
• Useful 
• Acceptable 
• Applicable 
• Meaningful 
• Used 
• Valued.3 
 
These criteria are “generally accepted industry practice” and as such represent the generally 
accepted civil works infrastructure construction practice in the global market – practice that is 
based on “mutual mistrust.”   
 
The Global Working Group chose the PMBOK Guide (Project Management Body of 
Knowledge Guide published and updated by the Project Management Institute). The Project 
Management Institute (PMI) is composed of global members who engage in the 
management of projects, as distinct from general management of industrial functions. The 
PMI certifies members who are competent in these Contract Administration techniques and 
engage in the profession of Project Management. Since 1996 the certification of PMP’s and 
its professional recognition have grown almost exponentially.  As of April 2004 there were 
140,000 PMP’s4 around the world with new certifications growing currently by several 
thousand per month.  The current PMBOK Guide is available in five languages.5  In 
September 2005 the PMP examination will expand to the next PMBOK Guide update which 
was released in late 2004. 
 
Also, as noted in late 2001, the PMBOK Guide  
 
“…is concerned with the processes and knowledge areas for managing a single 
project.  That is very different from developing the organizational capabilities that 
underpin the enterprise wide processes for managing the totality of projects in an 
organization and linking those projects to the corporate strategy. To address this 
broader concern, PMI [issued] a group of projects organized as the Organizational 
Project Management Maturity Model (OPM3) as a PMI standard…[since] there is a 
growing recognition that project management involves more than the skillful and 
competent management of individual projects.  It [is a] set of the systems, processes, 
structures and capabilities that enable an organization to undertake the right projects, 
and to support them organizationally.”6  
 
This additional OPM37 standard adds to the body of knowledge and expands global 
standards to include organizational aspects of those firms or organizations actually involved 
in the execution of multiple projects at any one time in the global market. Thus, there exists 
globally recognized and accepted body of knowledge that represents standards that will 
enhance the execution of projects globally within organizations and as an organization. 
OPM3 meets the key challenge facing parties in a “mutual mistrust” project execution world, 
that is, the availability and use of these standards provides metrics against which 
performance can be evaluated. The standards are used concurrently with execution or in 
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hindsight to judge whether project management contract administration meet required “high 
international standards.” 
 
These standards are being used to certify professional competence of organizations and of 
personnel that are engaged in the global market. The author in 1984 was one the first 44 
individuals to be certified as a Project Management Professional (PMP) based upon the 
standards that had been promulgated in the first edition of the PMBOK. Today, every PMP 
must continue to be certified every two years to the latest edition of the PMBOK. As of mid-
2005, there are 120,000 PMP’s globally, and the number is growing monthly. Today, PMI 
holds annual global congresses in Asia; North America; Europe, the Middle East and Africa; 
Latin America (Central and South America). The author has been involved in the global 
standards development through his peer reviewed papers and lectures. As a PMP, the 
author uses PMBOK standards and evaluates contract administration and project 
management practices in relation to civil works infrastructure construction projects globally. 
The author actively promotes PMBOK’s use to improve the execution of projects on six 
continents and to see that these global standards of contract administration and project 
management in fact are generally accepted and used in global civil works infrastructure 
construction projects.  These standards reflect best of global industry practice in fulfilling the 
needs of parties in the global market who are executing the projects in a “mutual mistrust” 
environment. In the following sections of this chapter, the use of these PMBOK standards to 
perform project management and contract administration is explained and developed 
through actual examples from the global market.  
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B. Project Management and Contract Administration Requirements 
 
The standards for defining Project Management and Contract Administration define what is 
expected in the global market. The natural tension that must exist for parties to successfully 
manage a project under the conditions of contract results in expected behaviors which are 
existent and expected as a result. Thus, the Guide to the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK) is the generally accepted and internationally recognized basis for 
project organizational theory and project management philosophy in use today.8 The 
PMBOK establishes a general systems theory of project management and provides the 
global market’s accepted framework for developing project management structures and 
practices for executing large, complex projects, such as, civil works infrastructure 
construction projects.  
 
PMBOK provides the general and broad definition of project management: 
 
“Project Management is the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and 
techniques to meet project requirements. Project management is 
accomplished through the use of the processes such as: initiating, planning, 
executing, controlling, and closing. The project management team manages 
the work of the projects, and the work typically involves: 
 
 1. Competing demands for: scope, time, cost, risk and quality. 
 2. Stakeholders with differing needs and expectations. 
 3. Identified requirements.”9 
 
Every project involves dynamic tension between parties. Each party enters the project with a 
preconceived set of assumptions, demands and expectations as to its own role in the 
project. Each party also enters a project with a preconceived idea of the roles that others will 
play in that project. These internal and external expectations tend to be somewhat 
competitive in nature. For example: an Owner/Employer’s desire to contain or reduce cost 
yet the Owner/Employer specifies a code requirement that defines an acceptable level of 
quality for which the Contractor gave a fixed price. A potential conflict results over the 
bargain, namely, the Owner/Employer’s desire to use higher grade materials than necessary 
without regard to the Contractors cost. These competing demands and expectations must be 
kept in balance, if the project is to fulfill the expectations of any of the parties involved. It is 
the role of the project manager to establish and maintain a dynamic balance between the 
stakeholders. Without strong, competent project management, the natural tensions which 
exist within a project based on “mutual mistrust” will quickly lead to situations in which the 
balance between stakeholders and project constraints is broken. 
 
Using PMBOK as the framework, discrete elements of project management are used to 
evaluate the development and application of project management procedures and project 
execution. The nine Project Management Knowledge Areas identified within the PMBOK are: 
 
• Project Integration Management   
• Project Scope Management 
• Project Time Management 
• Project Cost Management 
• Project Quality Management 
• Project Human Resource Management 
• Project Communications Management 
• Project Risk Management 
• Project Procurement Management  
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PMBOK is thus a means of managing a particular stakeholder’s role in a project, and in 
evaluating a stakeholder’s performance. In all cases it establishes the expected behavior, 
and the parties are expected to protect the benefits of the bargain. 
 
The process of protecting the benefits of a bargain begins with the project management 
personnel using the tools and the data to record and develop the assumptions for execution 
and for management of the project. Contract Administration under a culture of “mutual 
mistrust” is a process of continuously evaluating and trending of “how the project is doing” 
when measured against the plan. When the project if found to be trending or deviating from 
plan, the project management team must identify the potential causes and the party 
responsible. For example, if the Owner/Employer’s project management team through its 
Contract Administration efforts finds the cause and responsible party to be the 
Owner/Employer, then it is up to the project management team to identify and implement 
actions to minimizes the impacts, that is, manage the result. It is the function of Contract 
Administration to spot the trend or the issue as early as possible. If the application of 
Contract Administration leads the Owner/Employer project management team to conclude 
the Contractor is causing and is responsible for the potential impacts, proper notice as 
required by the Conditions of Contract, must be timely given to the Contractor. Further, the 
Owner/Employer’s project management staff must prepare analyses that demonstrate the 
non-compliance with the Owner/Employer’s requirements – the benefits of its bargain.  The 
converse is equally true of the Contractor’s project management team. Therefore, a primary 
responsibility in the global market for civil works infrastructure construction projects is 
Contract Administration throughout the project duration. The types of requirements for 
Project Management under PMBOK and the Contract Administration examples are 
organized by the nine PMBOK knowledge areas.  
 
1.  Project Integration Management 
 
According to the PMBOK, Project Integration Management concerns processes intended to 
ensure that a project has been thoroughly defined, that an execution management plan is 
developed and implemented, and that changes are controlled according to set procedures at 
the onset of the work. PMBOK states:  
 
“The Project Integration Management Knowledge Area includes the 
processes and activities needed to identify, define, combine, unify, and 
coordinate the various processes and project management activities. … 
integration includes characteristics of unification, consolidation, articulation, 
and integrative actions that are crucial to project completion, …other 
stakeholder requirements and managing expectations.’ 10 
 
The integration effort defines interactions and relationships among the project management 
processes. For instance, project scope changes may affect the budgeting, scheduling, 
quality and other management processes. Project integration requires that these processes 
are linked through established plans and procedures. Integration continues throughout the 
entire duration of the project as revisions to the integrated plans and systems are made in 
recognition of changes which occur in actual project conditions. It is an iterative endeavor 
that first involves creating a realistic and comprehensive project plan, and managing 
changes to the plan through a change management process. Adhering to the plan and 
following change control procedures developed during the project planning is essential to 
maintaining control of scope, cost, schedule, and product quality. For example, scope, time, 
cost and quality tradeoffs are often competing performance objectives that must be 
managed, controlled and weighted against each other to achieve project objectives. 
Balancing these competing objectives and tradeoffs, and building priorities into the project 
plan is essential at the onset of the Project. 
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PMBOK characterizes Project Integration Management as having seven discrete, but 
interconnected and overlapping management processes: 
 
1. Develop Project Charter 
2. Develop Preliminary Project Scope Statement 
3. Develop Project Management Plan 
4. Direct and Manage Project Execution 
5. Monitor and Control Project Work 
6. Integrated Change Control 
7. Close Project 
 
From a Contractor’s perspective, the PMBOK notes that the Project Charter is concerned 
with documenting the Owner/Employer needs, the Contractor’s current understanding of the 
product or service, and the intended project outcome. Regarding the Development of a 
Preliminary Project Scope statement, PMBOK requires the development of a preliminary 
initial project scope statement objectives; service requirements and characteristics; 
acceptance criteria; boundaries; requirements and deliverables; constraints; initial project 
organization; initial defined risks; schedule milestones; a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS); 
an order of magnitude cost estimate; configuration management requirements; approval 
requirements; etc. The contractor establishes all the assumptions that went in to its 
commitments or were necessary to define its bargain under the contract.  The 
Owner/Employer may require these assumptions (not usually to the same level) in the tender 
documents to assure that the contractor is committing to deliver what it desires. The 
Development of a Project Management Plan assures the Owner/Employer and the 
Contractor respectively, it has the tools and processes established and that are necessary to 
execute the project and deliver required notices. Thus, for example, a typical Project 
Management Plan and its subsidiary plans will include: 
 
• The project management processes selected by the project management 
team; 
• The level of implement of each selected process; 
• The descriptions of the tools and techniques to be used for accomplishing 
those processes; 
• How the selected processes will be used to manage the specific project, 
including the dependencies and interactions among those processes, and the 
essential inputs and outputs; 
• How work will be executed to accomplish the project objectives; 
• How changes will be monitored and controlled; 
• How configuration management will be performed; 
• How integrity of the performance measurement baselines will be maintained 
and used; 
• The need and techniques for communication among stakeholders; 
• The selected project life cycle and, for multi-phase projects, the associated 
project phases; and 
• Key management reviews for content, extent, and timing to facilitate 
addressing open issues and pending decisions. 
 
The Owner/Employer and the Contractor will each prepare a Project Manual that contains 
procedures, etc. that it will use on the project. In fact, this requirement is what the PMBOK 
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OPM3 standard addresses: systems, processes, structures and capabilities that enable it as 
an organization to undertake the right projects, and to support them consistently as an 
organization. A Project Manual typically would define: 
 
• Project Management Plan 
• Project Orientation Package 
• Vendor Document Management Plan 
• Project Communications Control Program 
• Project Quality Plan 
• Project Engineering Execution Plan  
• Procurement and Erection Specifications  
• Computer-aided Design and an Information Technology  Execution Plan 
• Project Procurement Plan 
• Material Management Plan 
• Construction Execution Plan 
• Site Safety and Health Plan 
• Site Environmental Plan 
• Startup Plan 
• Project Controls Execution Plan  
• Change Management  
• Project Closeout Plan 
• Requests for Change Order 
 
The Project Execution Plan defines what the party expects to perform and what it will record 
to monitor its execution and the other parties’ execution. Thus, PMBOK requires that a party 
define execution, such as, the following tasks: 
 
• Perform activities to accomplish project objectives and supply project 
deliverables; 
• Expend effort and spend funds to accomplish the project objectives; 
• Staff, train and manage the project team members assigned to the project; 
• Obtain quotations, bids, offers, or proposals as appropriate; 
• Select sellers by choosing from among potential sellers; 
• Obtain, manage and use resources including materials, tools, equipment, and 
facilities; 
• Implement the planned methods and standards; 
• Create, control, verify and validate project deliverables; 
• Manage risks and implement risk response activities; 
• Control project scope and requested changes; 
• Implement change requests; 
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• Implement corrective action; 
• Implement preventive action; 
• Adapt approved changes into the project’s scope, plans and environment; 
• Establish and manage project communication channels, both external and 
internal to the project team; 
• Collect project data and report cost, schedule, technical and quality progress 
and status information to facilitate forecasting; 
• Collect and document lessons learned, and implement approved process 
improvement activities. 
 
 The Owner/Employer or the Contractor is required to similarly monitor such execution. 
PMBOK defines such monitoring processes to include: 
 
• Comparing actual project performance against the project management plan; 
• Assessing performance to determine whether any corrective or preventive 
actions are indicated, and then recommending those actions as necessary; 
• Analyzing, tracking and monitoring project risks to made sure the risks are 
identified, their status is reported, and that appropriate risk response plans 
are being executed; 
• Maintaining an accurate, timely information base concerning the project’s 
products and their associated documentation through project completion; 
• Providing forecasts to update current cost and current schedule information; 
and 
• Monitoring implementation of approved changes when and as they occur. 
 
Objective monitoring to assess performance and implementation of corrective actions in a 
timely manner to bring Project performance in line with the Project plan, or make necessary 
revisions to the project plan is essential.  According to PMBOK: 
 
“The project management plan, the project scope statement, and other 
deliverables must be maintained by carefully and continuously managing 
changes, either by rejecting changes or by approving changes so those 
approved changes are incorporated into a revised baseline.”11 
 
Finally, the PMBOK states in regards to Project Integration Management that:  
 
“The Close Project process involves performing the project closure portion of the 
project management plan.”12    
 
The result for both the Owner/Employer’s or the Contractors project management personnel, 
Project Integration Management is assurance the it has recorded the basis of the bargain to 
which it committed, the means of monitoring its and the other parties compliance with the 
bargain, and managing the execution of the project as a result. 
 
Thus, when a Contractor on a civil works infrastructure construction project presents a notice 
to the Owner/Employer the Contractor’s project management staff has to establish what it 
assumed in his bid or tender documentation. For example, the author determined for the 
Contractor’s project management staff in the preparation of a claim for extra compensation 
as a result of the actual execution conditions would that were experienced on a civil works 
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infrastructure construction project in Mexico13 submitted the following to demonstrate what it 
had anticipated and what the Owner/Employer actually had caused during the execution of 
the project: 
  
The lump sum Engineer-Procure-Construct (EPC) approach to executing a civil works 
infrastructure project was an appropriate delivery method for this Project. Many of the 
characteristics of this Project reflect the reason a lump sum EPC approach was employed. 
The Owner/Employer’s primary interest was to commence operation of the Project to incur 
the benefits as soon as possible in the geographic region. The lump sum EPC contract 
approach enabled the Owner/Employer to set its performance and quality criteria, to 
determine requirements and technologies, purchase long lead main equipment for its 
chosen technologies, and to have a single entity to which it looked to provide the completed 
Project with minimal oversight, interference and changes by the Owner/Employer. The 
Contractor’s responsibility was to perform engineering, procurement and construction 
necessary to meet the contract criteria employing its professional judgments. 
 
The Owner/Employer had engaged a separate engineering company to provide it with the 
necessary project management expertise. The Contract describes the consultant’s project 
management role, called the ‘Supervisor, as: 
 
 “14.2 Authorized Representatives of the Owner/Employer 
 
14.2.1 Supervisor. Before commencement of the Work, Owner/Employer shall 
appoint the resident supervisor ("Supervisor"), who shall be directly responsible and 
who shall have full power and authority, either personally or through his designated 
deputies, to inspect, oversee, monitor, and review the Work and the compliance by 
the Contractor with its obligations under this Contract. The designation of the 
Supervisor may be made to a third party. Except as otherwise specified in this 
Contract or in a written notice issued by the Owner/Employer Project Management, 
The Supervisor shall serve as the direct representative of the Owner/Employer to the 
Contractor and to third parties for matters associated with the performance of the 
Work at the place where it is being carried out. The Contractor shall provide its full 
cooperation to the Supervisor or to the designated deputies of the Supervisor during 
any inspection of the Work, and shall provide any information or assistance 
reasonably requested by said Supervisor.” 
 
Using a matrix first presented at an international congress to assist Owner/Employers in 
selecting the proper project delivery method and project contract type for various execution 
conditions and contexts, the author presented what the parties expected by adding an 
additional column that was specific to the projects and shading various selection criteria that 
were similar. The selection criteria shaded demonstrated what the criteria used would 
communicate to the global civil works infrastructure construction industry about the projects 
characteristics and the execution conditions and context that could be expected. These 
considerations are set forth in the following Table III.B.1.1. The final column reflected the 
execution conditions and context that the Contractor reasonably would have expected from 
the Owner/Employer issued contract for preparing the contractor’s bid and documents 
included in the Contractor’s tender, and then indicated through the highlighting items that 
were common.  
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TABLE III.B.1.1 
PROJECT EXECUTION CONDITIONS AND CONTEXT EXPECTATIONS  
 
Choosing the Preferred Project Delivery System and Contract Type 
Resultant Industry Expectations14 
Project Delivery System Contract Type 
 
Conventional 
Tender on a 
Completed 
design 
EPC Lump Sum 
Unit 
Price 
Cost 
Reimbursable 
This 
Project’s 
Expected 
Conditions 
and Context 
Owner Considerations and Requirements 
Cost Control is Major 
Consideration 
  
9 
 
9 
   
9 
Owner to Control 
Contingency 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
 
 
Bid Competition 
Required 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
  
9 
Maximum Owner 
Involvement 
 
9 
    
9 
 
Minimum Owner 
Involvement 
  
9 
 
9 
   
9 
Owner Has No 
Oversight Capabilities 
  
9 
 
9 
   
 
Single Source 
Responsibility 
  
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
Contractor Provides 
Project Funding 
  
9 
 
9 
 
 
  
 
Project Scope and Parameters 
Clear Scope Definition 9 9 9   9 
Minimal Scope Definition  9    9  
Scope/Complexity 
Defined, Quantities 
Uncertain 
 
9 
 
   
9 
  
 
Minimal Scope Changes 
Expected 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
Potential for Large 
Scope Changes 
 
9 
  
 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Tight Schedule  9 9 9 9 9 
Volatile Project 
Environment 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
 
Stable Project 
Environment 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
Large Complex Project 9 9 9 9  9 
Primarily New 
Technology 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
 
 
The contractor was shown by the author to have expected a Lump Sum Turnkey, EPC 
contract. By using the actual Unit Prices, the contract was converted into a lump sum price. 
The contractor could only used the unit prices for ‘extraordinary work’ and for actual 
quantities that could only exceed those specified in the contract documents.  Thus, the 
author showed the Owner/Employer had communicated to the contractor that it should 
assume that the Project was well defined, scope changes would be minimal, the aggressive 
schedule (programme) could be met, and the Owner/Employer and Supervisor involvement 
would be directed at assurance only and cooperating in achieving the result contracted – the 
bid documents suggested a basis for the bid that was consistent with the expectations 
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shown in the above table. Another words, the Contractor had the reasonable expectation 
that the characteristics set forth by the highlights in the Table III.B.1.1 would prevail during 
the project execution.  
 
Based on industry practice, the nature of this delivery system and this type of contract, the 
author demonstrated that the Contractor would reasonably expect that: 
 
• The Contract Documents it was asked to tender defined a complete and 
accurate scope of work. 
• The obligation of the Contractor would be to provide only what was specified 
in the documents in a cooperative context with reasonable levels of the 
supervisors involvement. 
•  If the Owner/Employer or its Supervisor demanded changes, the Contractor 
would be granted time and compensation. 
• The Contractor could use an approach to project execution that would not 
require a large project team, such as, would be necessary for reimbursable 
contract that inherently had a great amount of Owner/Employer or its 
Supervisor’s involvement and consequent large contract administration 
needs. 
• The Owner/Employer and the Supervisor would cooperate and not interfere 
with the completion of the work, and if it did interfere, the Contractor would be 
granted commensurate time extensions and compensation for the impacts 
that resulted. 
• The Owner/Employer would timely provide all required information, 
Owner/Employer equipment, and other project interfaces required by the 
Conditions of Contract. 
 
The Author then summarized the responsibilities the Owner/Employer had undertaken by the 
Conditions of the Contract and that they were consistent with industry practice, and further 
that the expectations of the contractor were consistent with the Table III.B.1.1 for a fixed 
price EPC contract. The Author prepared Table III.B.1.2 that listed all such responsibilities 
that the Owner/Employer failed to perform (presented in part below):    
 
 
 
TABLE III.B.1.2 
SUMMARY OF OWNER/EMPLOYER KEY RESPONSIBILITIES 
UNDER THE CONTRACT  
THAT WERE BREACHED 
 
Description 
of the 
Owner/Employer 
Responsibility 
Responsibility 
of the 
Owner/Employer
Owner/Employer 
Assurance 
Role 
Owner / 
Employer 
Information / 
Cooperation 
Role 
; Responsibility Defined or Implied by Contract   Conditional upon Circumstances 
Accuracy of bid documents ; ; ; 
Inconsistencies between 
contract documents and 
instructions given to the 
Contractor 
; ; ; 
Discrepancies and divergence 
between contract documents 
; ; ; 
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TABLE III.B.1.2 
SUMMARY OF OWNER/EMPLOYER KEY RESPONSIBILITIES 
UNDER THE CONTRACT  
THAT WERE BREACHED 
 
Description 
of the 
Owner/Employer 
Responsibility 
Responsibility 
of the 
Owner/Employer
Owner/Employer 
Assurance 
Role 
Owner / 
Employer 
Information / 
Cooperation 
Role 
Divergence between 
contractually specified work and 
the Supervisor’s instructions 
;  ; 
Errors and inconsistencies in the 
contract documents 
; ; ; 
Divergence between 
international statutory 
requirements and the contract 
documents 
; ; ; 
Discrepancies and divergence 
between the contract documents 
and descriptive schedules 
; ; ; 
Obligation to modify the 
Contract as per Clause 5 
; ; ; 
Errors and omissions in 
information included in the 
specified work 
; ; ; 
Errors in quantity or description, 
or omission in bills of quantity 
; ; ; 
Discrepancies in 
Owner/Employer-specified 
requirements 
;  ; 
Ambiguities and discrepancies 
contained in drawings and 
documents 
; ; ; 
Owner/Employer additions, 
omissions and substitutions of 
the work 
;  ; 
Owner/Employer and Supervisor 
failures to provide information, 
drawings and instructions to suit 
the Contractor’s actual progress 
; ; ; 
Failure to provide OFE in 
accordance to contractual dates 
; ; ; 
Failure to ship OFE assembled 
as required by Contract 
; ; ; 
Failure to issue OFE in good 
working order 
; ; ; 
Failure of Owner/Employer or 
the Supervisor to reply to 
communication within specified 
time period 
; ; ; 
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TABLE III.B.1.2 
SUMMARY OF OWNER/EMPLOYER KEY RESPONSIBILITIES 
UNDER THE CONTRACT  
THAT WERE BREACHED 
 
Description 
of the 
Owner/Employer 
Responsibility 
Responsibility 
of the 
Owner/Employer
Owner/Employer 
Assurance 
Role 
Owner / 
Employer 
Information / 
Cooperation 
Role 
Owner/Employer or Supervisor 
delay issuing instructions, 
drawings, and other info 
; ; ; 
Owner/Employer or the 
Supervisor’s  failure to provide 
information, drawings and 
instructions in accordance with 
the time schedule or at a time 
reasonable in all the 
circumstances 
;  ; 
Delay or cost caused by the 
Owner/Employer or others (e.g., 
Owner/Employer 
subcontractors) which impacted 
the Contractor and its suppliers 
and subcontractors 
;  ; 
Owner/Employer interference 
that precluded the Contractor’s 
execution and completion of 
work in a specific order 
; ; ; 
Owner/Employer restriction of 
access to any part of the site 
;  ; 
Unreasonably inaccurate 
approximated quantities, 
particularly in steel tonnage 
estimates 
; ; ; 
Errors in position, levels, 
dimensions and alignment of the 
works 
   
Necessary corrections and 
modifications to assumptions 
relied upon by the Contractor 
that defined the scope of work 
; ; ; 
Alterations to standards of 
materials and goods 
;  ; 
Changes in position and 
dimensions of the platforms 
; ; ; 
Changes imposed upon the 
Contractor’s and its intended 
sequencing of works 
; ; ; 
Necessary postponement and 
suspension of work for safety 
reasons due to the 
; ; ; 
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TABLE III.B.1.2 
SUMMARY OF OWNER/EMPLOYER KEY RESPONSIBILITIES 
UNDER THE CONTRACT  
THAT WERE BREACHED 
 
Description 
of the 
Owner/Employer 
Responsibility 
Responsibility 
of the 
Owner/Employer
Owner/Employer 
Assurance 
Role 
Owner / 
Employer 
Information / 
Cooperation 
Role 
Owner/Employer or its subs 
 
As the contractor set forth in its claim document, ultimately the civil work infrastructure 
construction project execution conditions and context took on the characteristics of a cost 
reimbursable contract while the Owner/Employer demanded that the Contractor compliance 
that was consistent with a lump sum contract. The Contractor alleged the Owner/Employer 
used the lump sum contract as means for not compensating the Contractor fully for the time 
and cost impacts that the Owner/Employer’s performance failures caused.  
 
The Author then demonstrated through following Table III.B.1.3 that the conditions and 
context that the Contractor alleged matched a different delivery method and contract type, 
based upon the actual execution conditions and context, The Author employed the same 
original table as material that was used in Table III.B.1.1 and this time added a different last 
column   and highlighting. The last column now reflects what actually occurred as the Project 
was executed. The actual conditions and context reflect the precise reasons and 
expectations that would have been the case if a reimbursable contract had been used, as is 
highlighted in Table III.B.1.3 below. 
 
 
 
TABLE III.B.1.3 
PROJECT ACTUAL EXECUTION CONDITIONS AND CONTEXT    
 
Choosing the Preferred Project Delivery System and Contract Type 
Resultant Industry Expectations 
Project Delivery System Contract Type 
 
Conventional 
Tender on a 
Completed 
design 
EPC Lump Sum 
Unit 
Price 
Cost 
Reimbursable 
The Actual 
Project 
Conditions 
and Context 
Experienced 
Owner Considerations and Requirements 
Cost Control is Major 
Consideration 
  
9 
 
9 
   
 
Owner to Control 
Contingency 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
 
9 
Bid Competition 
Required 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
  
9 
Maximum Owner 
Involvement 
 
9 
    
9 
 
9 
Minimum Owner 
Involvement 
  
9 
 
9 
   
 
Owner Has No 
Oversight Capabilities 
  
9 
 
9 
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TABLE III.B.1.3 
PROJECT ACTUAL EXECUTION CONDITIONS AND CONTEXT    
 
Choosing the Preferred Project Delivery System and Contract Type 
Resultant Industry Expectations 
Project Delivery System Contract Type 
 
Conventional 
Tender on a 
Completed 
design 
EPC Lump Sum 
Unit 
Price 
Cost 
Reimbursable 
The Actual 
Project 
Conditions 
and Context 
Experienced 
Single Source 
Responsibility 
  
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
Contractor Provides 
Project Funding 
  
9 
 
9 
 
 
  
9 
Project Scope and Parameters 
Clear Scope Definition 9 9 9    
Minimal Scope Definition  9    9 9 
Scope/Complexity 
Defined, Quantities 
Uncertain 
 
9 
 
   
9 
  
9 
Minimal Scope Changes 
Expected 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
   
 
Potential for Large 
Scope Changes 
 
9 
  
 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
Tight Schedule  9 9 9 9 9 
Volatile Project 
Environment 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
 
9 
Stable Project 
Environment 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
   
Large Complex Project 9 9 9 9  9 
Primarily New 
Technology 
 
9 
 
9 
   
9 
 
 
As the Project unfolded, by the Author demonstrated the contractor correctly was asserting 
that its Project tender reflected reasonably expectations (see discussion re: Table III.B.1.1) 
that were not experienced as reflected in Table III.B.1.3 because of the Owner/Employer 
refused to abide by the bargain that the Contractor had assumed. The one party (the 
contractor) was giving notice that under a culture of “mutual mistrust” the other party (the 
Owner/Employer) had not lived up to bargain that had been reached and for which the 
parties had contracted. 
 
2.  Project Scope Management 
 
Project Scope Management concerns with what is and is not within the project’s scope and 
then controlling it. Thus, whether project management is done for the Owner/Employer or the 
contractor, there is a natural tension in civil works infrastructure construction projects 
between the parties. The scope goes to the essence of the bargain between the parties. The 
PMBOK requires the following elements: 
 
1. Scope Planning  
2. Scope Definition  
3. Creation of a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)  
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4. Scope Verification 
5. Scope Control  
Scope Planning is the process for an Owner/Employer defining what the scope is desired, 
what will be included in a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), and what is required for 
verification  For the contractor Scope Planning is how define the scope required will be 
defined, how a WBS will prepared, and how the verification of the scope will be provided. 
Scope Definition for an Owner/Employer set forth the deliverables, and for contractor sets 
forth what work will be required. The two efforts then are required or reflected in a detailed 
WBS that is used to organize the full scope of a civil works infrastructure construction 
project. The Owner/Employer may require a higher level WBS and the contractor will use a 
lower level (or more detailed level) of a WBS. Scope Verification is really the inspection 
required to assure that the Owner/Employer is getting delivered what is required and the 
contractor to assure that not only is it delivering what is required, but that the contractor is 
not delivering more than that for which it bargained. Scope Control is contained in both the 
reporting that the Owner/Employer requires and the monitoring that the contractor performs. 
Reporting and procedures relating thereto typically include: scope statement updates; WBS 
updates; WBS dictionary updates; scope baseline updates; change requests; recommended 
corrective actions; organizational process assets updates; and procedures or processes to 
monitor, measure, manage and report project scope.       
 
The PMBOK thus requires a party’s project management team to take the responsibility to 
control and manage changes in project scope. This requirement is placed upon the party 
under the “mutual mistrust” principle because the party is in the best position and has the 
incentive to protect the benefits of the bargain, or give notice with support, such as, the basis 
of his assumptions, to the other party where the other party’s interpretation is deficient or 
exceeds what the complaining party believes such bargain required. Thus, Contract 
Administration becomes an essential focus in monitoring scope related issues. 
 
As an example, the Author evaluated a series of civil works infrastructure construction 
projects in several locations globally for the contractor. Management of scope became a 
critical issue for the development of the multiple civil works infrastructure construction 
projects by an Owner/Employer who had entered into a contract with a major bank to provide 
several water treatment plants using the EPC format in both developed and developing 
countries for a fixed price per plant.15 The Owner/Employer was to operate the plants for an 
extended term. The Owner/Employer decided to engage a single contractor who would 
Engineer-Procure-Construct first project in a place called San Roque, Spain. The 
Owner/Engineer would then enter into a separate contract for up to eight additional plants in 
new locations for the same fixed scope and price, except for changes that were required by 
the local building code and for foundation conditions. The Owner/Employer decided upon a 
“replication” format for the projects that was based on a template design that the Contractor 
had completed and constructed in san Roque. Then the Contractor would reduce the price 
actually incurred on the San Roque project by 10%, subject to adjustments negotiated for 
the local building code and the ground conditions for the additional eight projects. 
  
The concept of Contract Administration includes recognition by the Owner/Employer of 
nature of change on civil works infrastructure construction projects. It was widely accepted 
within the global industry that:  
 
“The additional cost of the changed work will ordinarily be covered by the changes 
clause or a similar contractual provision. But implementing a major change, or a 
large number of minor changes, will also frequently increase the contractor’s cost of 
performing the unchanged work. The contractor may, for instance, find it necessary 
to disrupt or delay the unchanged work, or may be forced to perform the unchanged 
work in a different manner or in a different sequence than originally planned.”16 
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Additionally, change in a construction setting takes on an importance that is not readily 
understood in other industries:  
 
“In most industries and business transactions, it would be unheard of to allow one of 
the contracting parties to unilaterally change the terms of the contract without the 
consent of the other party. In both the public and private sectors of the construction 
industry, unilateral change orders are widely accepted as part of almost every 
standard contract form.” 
 
And that unilateral right to change the terms of the contract is restricted to only one of the 
parties:  
 
“… the owner is given the right to issue changes within the general scope of the 
contract, by adding or deleting work, and this right is not dependent on the consent of 
the contractor to the change.” 
 
In the event the contract provides that the Owner/Employer has the unilateral right to direct 
changes to the work does not mean that the Owner/Employer is given carte blanche to make 
changes without accepting the responsibility for the cost of those changes or the cost of the 
impacts that the introduction of those changes might have on the contractor’s time or budget. 
Under the various cost-reimbursable contracting formats, the Owner/Employer almost 
automatically pays the direct and indirect contractor costs of any change because the 
contractor is compensated for its actual direct costs plus overhead. Under any fixed price 
EPC contracting system, change is usually handled more formally:  
 
“… Most construction contracts contain changes clauses that give the contractor the 
right to be compensated (money or time, or both) for a change and the procedures 
(e.g., timing and manner of notice, submission of supporting information, etc.) for 
presenting the change to the owner.” 
 
The Contract for the projects between the Owner/Employer and the contractor provided that 
for the contracts for the individual projects during their execution contain a changes clause 
that stated:  
 
“At any time during the course of the WORK, CONTRACTOR or the EMPLOYER 
REPRESENTATIVE may propose changes in the PROJECT scope together with a 
firm price adjustment to the lump sum CONTRACT PRICE or a fixed time adjustment 
to the project schedule. If such proposals are accepted by both parties, the change 
will be made and the lump sum price and/or project schedule adjusted accordingly. 
Such changes will be made only by numbered Change Orders in writing, with the 
necessary changes in drawings and specifications. Additionally, the EMPLOYER 
REPRESENTATIVE may authorize services to proceed on a reimbursable cost basis 
to develop cost estimates for complex proposed changes. Such cost shall become 
part of the lump sum cost of the change if accepted, but will be billed as reimbursable 
if rejected. WORK on changes or reimbursable change proposals shall not proceed 
without the written approval of the EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVE. The 
CONTRACTOR will be notified in writing of all such changes.” 
 
Because fixed price projects are based upon the understanding that the scope of work, price 
and schedule are firm and fixed, to introduce change into a fixed price contract requires that 
a formal procedure be followed. Since fixed price contracts are firm and fixed, the parties 
entering into fixed price contracts assume minimal change. When changes do occur in a 
fixed price project, both the Owner/Employer and the contractor assume those changes are 
discrete and, thus, can be priced on an individual basis. Fixed price projects are founded on 
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the basic concept that everything that was necessary to design, procure, and construct the 
project has already been identified by the Owner/Employer prior to having contractor’s 
estimating, bidding, and receiving award of the project:  
 
“… [Fixed Price EPC Contract] success does depend upon the quality and 
completeness of the plans. Plans that are not sufficiently complete,… would not 
support the use of the lump-sum price. Thus, it is best used where the owner has 
completely defined the scope of work and the plans and specifications are 
complete.”17 
 
Fixed price EPC contracting is not the best project execution methodology in any instance 
where changes to the scope of work are probable or expected. A study undertaken and 
published by The Construction Industry Institute (CII), which is the construction industry’s 
research organization in the US, succinctly noted that: 
 
“Owners should not employ fixed-price contracting when they know the project will be 
subject to numerous changes. If they do, they can expect that excessive 
management attention will be consumed in change administration and claims.”18 
 
In a later study, the CII also reported on what it identified as the “hidden costs” of changes 
on a project: 
 
“Hidden costs are defined as costs not readily apparent or missed when evaluating 
project change implementation. A major problem with the execution of project 
change is failure to consider all the costs associated with implementation. Direct 
costs such as material, equipment and labor or established indirect costs in the form 
of overhead are fairly easy to identify and account for in project change estimates. 
The more difficult task is estimating or predicting the hidden cost associated with 
change implementation; i.e., delays, lowered productivity, poor communications or 
rework 
 
The first research objective was to identify and quantify the hidden cost of change. 
We quickly discovered that it was impossible to accurately estimate all hidden costs 
associated with implementing change prior to change implementation. Even after 
project change is implemented, it is difficult to capture and account for the “ripple 
effect” …”19 
 
The CII then published a paper entitled “Quantitative Effects of Project Change,” which 
discussed the cumulative effect of small changes: 
 
“One possible explanation is that estimates and pricing for individual changes are 
produced under time pressure, and the scope definition of the change may not be 
complete. If each change estimate fails to identify items of work associated with a 
scope change, multiple changes will compound the difference between the adjusted 
budget and the actual requirements of the work.… 
 
However, many small changes accumulate, the project schedule is not adjusted, and 
the additional work is executed by means such as short-term hiring, overtime and 
double or split shifts, which are inherently less productive than normal, well-planned 
methods. 
 
… projects cannot endure numerous changes without suffering a decline in overall 
project cost performance.”20 
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The Owner/Employer recognized that it could not let changes ruin the benefit of the bargain 
that it had negotiated for the eight additional projects. As a general rule, the Author found 
that the Owner/Employer recognized in a “replication white paper” it prepared, 
Owner/Employers and contractors both tend to underestimate the impact of change on a 
project. That is true for both parties for the same reason: the practical difficulty that exists in 
forecasting exactly how any particular change will disrupt the fixed scope of work upon which 
the price and schedule were planned. 
 
A common statistic quoted is that a normal project should expect to encounter changes 
which amount to 5 percent and 10 percent change of the total value of the project. There are 
three immediate problems with that statistic: 
 
1. The absolute value of an individual change may bear no direct relationship to the 
disruptive impact of the change. For example; a large standby diesel generator 
may cost many millions of Yen. However, because it is intended to be a stand-
alone piece of equipment to be placed outside the primary operating center of the 
facility with only minimal connections to the primary operating system, it may 
have no direct disruption impact on the critical project systems. Conversely, a 
relatively inexpensive change to a control instrument, if made late in the project 
and in an area already too densely packed to accommodate the instrument 
change, may have a tremendous disruptive impact on the project. 
 
2. Changes are not done in isolation from one another or in isolation from the 
original fixed scope of work. One must consider such things as the gross number 
of changes made; the fundamental nature of each change being made (an entire 
process subsystem or a simple change in wall color); and, the location of the 
change (in the heart of the process flow or in the parking lot). For example: it is 
entirely possible in complex civil works infrastructure construction projects to 
have multiple changes in the same area that each impact the Contractor’s ability 
to execute the original fixed scope of work, yet each of the individual changes 
may have a relatively minor direct cost. 
 
3. Finally, the hard money value of a particular change does not address the type of 
change made. Neither does it address the timing of when the change is 
introduced into the project or of the total change flow rate when a particular 
change is initiated. 
 
Of the three problems, the most often overlooked by Owner/Employers and contractors 
attempting to assess the disruptive impact of changes is Number 3 above, in particular the 
timing of a change in comparison to the current status of the project and the overall project 
change flow rate. Change flow involves the rate at which change is introduced into a fixed 
scope of work as charted over the full life cycle of the project. Thus, both parties in 
performing their Contract Administration in a “mutual mistrust” environment are required to 
monitor and measure the Change Flow Rate. In the first two projects that were a part of the 
replication of the water civil works infrastructure construction projects, Holland and 
Argentina, the parties had to measure the changes and judge the impacts. The timing of the 
changes relative to changes that the Owner/Employer made on the template project, San 
Roque, was critical. The Owner/Employer felt that the changes, although large in number, 
were not very significant. The contractor felt that the timing of the change introduction into 
the project scope meant that the changes had a significant effect and were very costly. The 
contractor gave notice, but could not determine the impacts other than the individual costs of 
each change. The Owner/Employer denied that the changes had any impact. At the end of 
the project, the contractor asserted a claim for the cumulative impacts. The Author first 
addressed the Contract Administration issue of what the contractor had planned by 
presenting the number of changes that occurred in what stage of the project execution, and 
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then related the timing of the Owner/Employer’s template project and the two projects that 
flow relative to change flow. For a fixed price EPC contract the Author first defined the 
phases of an EPC project, as shown in Figure III.B.1.1:  
 
 
 
The change flow involves the rate at which change is introduced into a fixed scope of work 
project, as charted over the full life cycle of the project. If changes were initiated at a steady, 
constant pace (i.e., one change every three weeks for the full duration of the project) the 
impact of it would be a simple task to ascertain the disruption impact on a project by 
assessing a particular change through the remaining work on the project. However, change 
usually is not spread evenly along the entire project life cycle; at some points in the project 
there may be little or no change, while at other points in the project life cycle the number of 
changes initiated may be significant.  
 
The CII studies on change impact during projects21 generally allude to two periods in time 
when changes are most prevalent during projects:  
 
• During late design and engineering, when designs are finalized, reviewed and 
approved for construction (or procurement) by the Owner/Employer. 
Generally referred  to as the “approved for construction” peak; and 
 
• During final construction, testing, startup and commissioning, when the 
operational systems are undergoing in-service directed modifications to 
improve performance, generally referred to as the “operational 
commissioning” peak. 
 
From the CII studies, the Author then constructed the Figure III.B.2.2 which represented the 
project overall execution duration from the combined phases in a typical EPC contract as 
previously shown Figure III.B.2.1 and superimposed from the CII data the two peaks 
described above.  
 
SEQUENCE OF WORK ACTIVITIES IN A TYPICAL EPC LSTK
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 
Final Completion
Construction
Procurement
Commissioning 
Final Completion
Engineering and Design 
FIGURE  III.B.2.1
Start Total Project Execution Period from Start to Completion
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Each of the peak periods has its own associated problems. The approved for construction 
change peak is at a point of conjunction among several subsequent activities involving 
procurement of long lead equipment and materials and the initiation of construction activities. 
A hold on any particular design in order to accommodate a change made late in the design 
process can lead to a day-for-day disruption in either procurement or construction, or both, 
depending upon the nature of the change. Changes made during the approved for 
construction peak can have two disruptive impacts: (1) direct impact on the subsequent 
activities dependent upon the completion of that particular design (and rippling through that 
logic chain to even more subsequent dependent activities); and (2) the erosion of float from 
the project’s schedule or programme. Because there is nothing tangible or physical in place, 
owners and contractors often have difficulty visualizing and forecasting disruption unless it 
happens to involve a primary piece of process equipment. In addition, as the bulk of the 
project time is still in the future, there is a tendency to assume that any time lost can be 
made up during construction. The fallacy with that assumption is that the EPC Contractor 
has less control over impact conditions in the field than in the office setting within which the 
design is prepared. If the EPC contractor cannot recover the time in the climate-controlled 
office, it is even more unlikely that it will be able to make the time up at the construction site. 
  
The Author then plotted the calculated change flow rates and timing of the changes for the 
three projects as in Figure III.B.2.3 and the Author compared the plots with the generic plot 
as shown in Figure III.B.2.2: 
 
 
FIGURE III.B.2.2
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The three profiles of the change flow were not typical for an EPC type contract as the CII 
data had established. The Author found that the three projects had no similar pattern of 
change, yet the projects were to have been identical, in other words, the projects should 
have exhibited a typical EPC project change flow profile and very little change because of 
the use of a replicated design.  The Owner/Employer had directed changes and the 
contractor gave notice of such changes as indicated. Author thus proved through the use of 
the change flow rates for the projects and the timing of the changes that the contractor had 
incurred serious impacts for were different the conditions that it had based its bid upon.  The 
Author then could relate the changes and the impacts that the contractor actually had 
incurred through the project records that the contractor had maintained during project 
execution. The result was that the contractor was shown to have sustained the impacts from 
the late changes, and further shown that it had been forced out of the basis and benefit of its 
bargain, that is, the basis of the replication concept for which the contractor had given its 
reduced fixed price. 
 
3. Project Time Management 
 
Project Time Management concerns the project schedule or programme development and 
control functions necessary to assure timely completion of the project. They can either be 
the requirements of the Owner/Employer or a means and method of the contractor to assure 
that it fulfills the timing requirements.22 The Owner/Employer either develops its own 
schedule or programme or more typically requires the contractor to submit an original or 
baseline schedule or programme and periodic updates. Today in the global market for civil 
works infrastructure construction projects, Project Time Management functions have become 
the predominant Contract Administration need. The functioning of their respective project 
management teams is tied to the use of Critical Path Method (CPM) scheduling.23  
 
The CPM scheduling is a standard project tool used on construction projects in the global 
market to plan and control the work in a manner that ensures that the contractors’ activities 
FIGURE III.B.2.3
COMPARISON OF SAN ROQUE, ARGENTINA, HOLLAND PROJECTS’
CHANGE FLOW RATE PROFILES
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can be completed by a stipulated date, defined in the contract. CPM schedules identify and 
describe the activities to be performed and the time it will take to complete them. The 
schedule serves as a plan that indicates the date on which specific work must commence, 
the duration of the work, the sequence of the work and the date by which specific work must 
be completed to ensure timely completion of the project. It can be used to monitor progress 
by measuring actual work completed against the schedule as a baseline. 
 
CPM methodology employs certain terms of art to describe schedule concepts. Among these 
are: “activities,” “duration,” “logic,” “early start,” “early finish,” “late finish,” “late start,” “critical 
path,” “float” and “baseline schedule.”  
 
A CPM schedule is a graphical network which identifies the work on a construction project by 
dividing the work into discrete tasks referred to as “activities.” Activities identified on a CPM 
schedule are often grouped together to show how a particular aspect of the work will be 
completed, i.e., excavation, concreting, etc. Although the grouping of activities is often 
natural, the most important goal is to define the activities in a manner that permits the work 
to be managed and controlled. The “duration” of an activity is the length of time, typically 
measured in days, that is required to complete the activity. 
 
The “logic” of a CPM schedule describes how an activity is linked to other activities by 
determining those activities that must logically precede or follow it. Obviously, not all tasks 
can be performed at the same time; some activities must be completed before other 
activities can begin. For instance, if work on Activity B cannot commence until the work on 
Activity A has been completed, the relationship between Activity A and Activity B is defined 
as having a “finish-to-start” logic relationship. However, some activities are independent of 
others and can proceed concurrently. For example, if the work on Activity B can begin on the 
same day as Activity A, the logic between the two activities is described as “start-to-start.” 
The logical connection of activities then determines the sequence in which the activities will 
be performed. 
 
A CPM schedule calculates four dates for each activity. The “early start” of an activity is the 
earliest date when it can possibly start, determined by the linked logic with its preceding 
activity. The “early finish” is the earliest possible date an activity can finish, and is 
determined by adding the activity’s duration to its early start date. The “late finish” of an 
activity is the latest date when it can finish and still allow the project to complete by its 
agreed date. The “late start” of an activity is the latest date an activity can be started, if the 
project completion date is to be met. The late start date is calculated by subtracting the 
activity’s duration from its latest finish date. A schedule’s “critical path” is the longest path of 
logically connected activities which, when the individual time durations of each activity are 
added, equals the overall duration of the project (or the agreed-upon time for completion). 
When an activity is critical, it must be completed within its allotted duration. If a critical 
activity is delayed, it delays the entire project by the exact same number of days. 
 
“Float” is the amount of time the completion of an activity can be extended beyond its early 
finish date before it impacts the critical path. Float is determined by subtracting an activity’s 
early start date from its late start date. By definition, critical activities cannot be extended 
beyond their late finish date. They are, therefore, said to have zero float. Since critical 
activities that have been delayed actually add time to the critical path, these delays create 
negative float. Non-critical activities have additional days beyond their early finish date when 
they can be completed before they become critical. This additional time is referred to as total 
float. For example, if an activity has 10 days within which it can be completed before it 
becomes critical to the project, that activity’s total float is 10 days.  
 
Although there are no formalized standards with regards to scheduling, it has become 
industry practice in the global market for civil works infrastructure projects that any float that 
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is reflected in a project schedule belongs to all the parties to the project in the absence of a 
specific and affirmative statement in the conditions of contract that the float belongs to a 
specific party. For many years there were arguments between Owner/Employers and 
contractors as to which of them “owned” the float.  In the global market the argument has 
been settled in the last decade. Total float is always considered for the benefit of the project, 
as float results from calculations made to activity durations, sequences and logic that have 
already taken into account consideration of productivity, and other execution factors. Thus, 
any party involved in the execution of the project – including the contractor, engineer and 
owner – has use of the available float. All the standard contracts and conditions of contract 
used today in the global market for civil works infrastructure construction projects have taken 
this position.24 
 
Thus, the process of providing Contract Administration uses CPM scheduling as the detailed 
manifestation of impacts or definition of the project, it is the primary metric for establishing 
the details of what was planned and then the vehicle for monitoring performance, and 
ultimately measuring divergence from the plan.25 Today, in the global market for civil works 
infrastructure construction projects, CPM scheduling or programming is the primary tool 
employed by both Owner/Employers and contractors to accomplish the Contract 
Administration that is required to successfully manage and protect the benefits of their 
bargain in an atmosphere of “mutual mistrust.” The logic, timing, scope, cost and resources 
required are “loaded” onto activities. It becomes the primary IT (information technology) tool 
for both parties. The project schedule or programme in effect becomes the source of defining 
the major requirements or assumptions initially and monitoring a party’s performance during 
execution. As a result, Project Time Management has become the controlling or managing 
function of both parties with respect to protecting their positions with regards to the bargain 
that is reflected by the contract.  
 
There are six major processes in developing and controlling the project schedule or 
programme that interact with each other and also between the other PMBOK areas as well: 
 
1. Activity Definition 
2. Activity Sequencing 
3. Activity Resource Estimating  
4. Activity Duration Estimating 
5. Schedule Development 
6. Schedule Control 
 
Activity Definition identifies the specific schedule or programme activities that need to be 
performed to produce the various project deliverables in a civil works infrastructure 
construction project. Usually the WBS is employed to create the lists. Activity Sequencing 
involves identifying and documenting the logical relationships among schedule activities. 
Proper activity sequencing is imperative for developing a realistic schedule. There are 
several methods for constructing a project network diagram, which can be performed 
manually or by using project management software. The inputs to the activity sequencing 
typically are: 
 
• Project scope statement 
• Activity list 
• Milestone list 
• Approved change requests 
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Five different methods can be used as tools and techniques to determine and represent the 
activity sequencing and construct a schedule network diagram for a project: 
 
• Precedence Diagram Method (PDM) – PDM includes four types of 
dependencies or precedence relationships: Finish-to Start, Finish-to-Finish, 
Start-to-Start, Star-to-Finish; 
• Arrow Diagram Method (ADM); 
• Schedule Network Templates; 
• Dependency Determination – three types of dependencies to determine the 
sequence among the activities: Mandatory, Discriminatory and External 
dependencies are typically recognized; and 
• Applying Leads and Lags. 
 
The outputs from the activity sequencing are: 
 
• Project schedule network diagrams 
• Activity list (updates) 
• Activity attributes (updates) 
• Requested changes 
 
After the activity description process is complete, the relationship between the activities 
should be established, which will allow creation of the network diagram. The task of 
sequencing all activities in a civil works infrastructure construction project in the global 
market becomes critical for the contractor as it involves more coordination among multiple 
subcontractors and their individual schedules. 
 
Estimating schedule activity resources involves determining what resource (persons, 
equipment, or materials) and what quantities of each resource will be used, and when each 
resource will be available to perform project activities. The Activity Resource Estimating 
process is closely coordinated with the Cost Estimating process that is part of Project Cost 
Management. According to the PMBOK the inputs for the Activity resource estimating are: 
 
• Enterprise environmental factors 
• Organizational process assets 
• Activity list 
• Activity attributes 
• Resource availability 
• Project management plan 
 
The tools and techniques for activity resource estimating are:  
 
• Expert judgment 
• Alternative analysis 
• Published estimating data 
• Project management software 
• Bottom-up estimating 
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The outputs from the activity resource estimating are: 
 
• Activity resource requirements 
• Activity attributes 
• Resource breakdown structure 
• Resource calendar 
• Requested changes 
 
Activity Duration Estimating involves typically includes: 
 
• Activity list 
• Constraints 
• Assumptions 
• Resource requirements 
• Resource capabilities 
• Historical information 
• Identified risk 
 
The outputs from the estimating of the activities durations are: 
 
• Activity duration estimates 
• Basis of estimates 
• Activity list updates 
 
Estimating the accurate duration of activities is another requirement to provide a realistic 
schedule. The activity duration is based on the estimated quantity and the resources applied 
to the activities, which is tied to Project Cost Management and Project Procurement 
Management. Using mathematical analysis from an IT system during schedule development 
of today’s global civil works infrastructure construction project, the programmer or scheduler 
calculates early and late start and finish dates. There are ten tools and techniques used for 
schedule analysis: Schedule Network Analysis, Critical Path Method (CPM), Schedule 
Compression, What-If Scenario Analysis, Resource Leveling, Critical Chain Method, Project 
Management Software, Applying Calendars, Adjusting Leads and Lags, and Schedule 
Module.26 
 
The inputs for the schedule developing are: 
 
• Organizational Process Assets 
 
• Project Scope Statement 
 
• Activity List 
 
• Activity Attributes 
 
• Project Schedule Network Diagram 
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• Activity Resource Requirements 
  
• Resource Calendars 
 
• Activity Duration Estimates 
 
• Project Management Plan 
 
The outputs from the schedule development are: 
 
• Project schedule 
• Schedule Model Data 
• Schedule Baseline 
• Resource requirements (Updates) 
• Activity Attributes (Updates) 
• Project Calendar (Updates) 
• Requested Changes 
• Project Management Plan (Updates) 
 
According to the PMBOK,  
 
“Schedule control is concerned with:  
 
1. Determining the current status of the project schedule 
2.  Influencing the factors that create schedule changes  
3. Determining that the schedule has changed  
4. Managing the actual changes when and as they occur”27  
 
The inputs to the schedule control are: 
 
• Schedule Management Plan 
• Schedule Baseline 
• Performance Reports 
• Approved Change Requests 
 
Due to known and unknown circumstances, every project schedule changes throughout the 
project execution. Therefore, it is very important to have an effective schedule control plan in 
place. Based upon the baseline schedule, performance reports, the various change 
requests, and the schedule management plans, the contractor should develop tools and 
techniques for Schedule Control. The Tools and Techniques for Schedule Control include: 
 
• Progress Reporting 
• Schedule change control system 
• Performance measurement 
• Project management software 
• Variance analysis 
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• Schedule Comparison bar chart 
 
As a result of the implementation of the tools and techniques, the contractor would be able to 
prepare schedule updates and revisions, take corrective actions and prepare “Lessons 
Learned” which will be used in the development of future projects and are part of the outputs 
from the schedule control: 
 
• Schedule Model Data (Updates) 
• Schedule Baseline (Updates) 
• Performance Measurements 
• Requested Changes 
• Recommended Corrective Actions 
• Organizational Process Assets (Updates) 
• Activity List (Updates) 
• Activity Attributes (Updates) 
• Project Management Plan (Updates) 
The project records kept in the “normal course of business” during project execution in the 
global market by the Owner/Employer and the contractor are used by their respective project 
management teams to demonstrate, as required, the deviations and/or changes from the 
detail of the bargain they had reached. Contract Administration is used measure divergence 
from plan, the cause for the deviations, required notice, and to demonstrate impacts. Since 
civil works infrastructure construction projects take place over an extended time, and the 
“loading” and measuring of plan and actual resources by activity on the CPM, project 
management teams use the schedule or programmes and related data to perform their roles 
using the Best Practices. Therefore, knowledge and the proper application of Project Time 
Management practices are essential to performing in the global market for civil works 
infrastructure construction markets. 
     
Using the example of the of the Owner/Employer and contractor who contracted for the 
multiple water treatment plants based on the template San Roque plant described earlier, 
the Author evaluated the time (delay and acceleration) impacts the contractor alleged the 
Owner/Employer had caused through the use of all the tools and data it had gathered during 
project execution.28 Under the Conditions of Contract the contractor prepared a CPM 
schedule and used the schedule to plan and execute project works and through submittal to 
the Owner/Employer allowed the Owner/Employer’s project management team to monitor, 
measure, and evaluate progress on it own.  
 
Under the Conditions of Contract, the Author established that the contractor submitted a 
CPM schedule to the Owner/Employer shortly after the Notice to Proceed was issued. This 
schedule was the “baseline schedule” against which the contractor measured actual 
construction progress. This comparison process is referred to as updating the schedule. The 
contractor uses the CPM schedule to proactively plan and executes its work as described by 
the PMBOK.  As noted above, the PMBOK core and facilitating processes that define 
programming, execution, duration and resources (for example, labor, equipment, 
construction materials, etc.) requirements planning include: 
 
• “Activity Definition – identifying the specific activities that must be 
performed to produce the various project deliverables. 
• Activity Sequencing – identifying and documenting interactivity 
dependencies. 
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• Activity Duration Estimating – estimating the number of work periods that 
will be needed to complete individual activities. 
• Schedule Development – analyzing activity sequences, activity durations, 
and resource requirements to create the project schedule. 
• Schedule Control – controlling changes to the project schedule.”29 
 
The evaluation process then results in a CPM schedule that becomes a management tool to 
enable the contractor to execute its work in a more effective manner, and is used by both the 
contractor and the owner to monitor progress on the project. As progress occurs, depending 
upon actual events, the planned schedule dates may change. Thus, it is important for the 
contractor’s project management team to understand the project status at any point in time, 
in order to make timely decisions relative to the overall completion of the project. To 
determine the status, CPM schedules are “updated” by inputting the “actual start” and “actual 
finish” dates, and “percentages complete” of various activities into the scheduling software. 
The computer program then “reschedules” the project by recalculating the activities’ early / 
late start and finish dates to identify the new total float for each activity, based upon actual 
progress to date. 
 
Updating a schedule reveals whether activities on the critical path are proceeding as 
planned. Updated schedules indicate not only which activities are falling behind schedule, 
but also how far they are lagging at any given point. In addition, the actual progress 
information, once entered in the network and recalculated (rescheduled), may cause the 
critical path to change. Updating a schedule also depends on what was known at the time 
when the update was prepared and is thus based on contemporaneous events against a 
baseline which is again predicated on known parameters at the time the baseline is 
prepared.30 
 
For the Holland and Argentina projects, the Author demonstrated that the first project 
schedule was the Milestone Schedule SD-1 that the Contractor created as required by the 
Conditions of Contract to track progress and serve as a payment mechanism (discussed 
under Project Cost Management below). The Master Project schedule was a “bar-chart” form 
of the SD-1 schedule that the contractor used for summary purposes in one of the periodic 
reports the Contractor was required to submit to the Owner/Employer by the Conditions of 
Contract, the Monthly Progress Reports (MPRs).  The Author then demonstrated from the 
project records maintained by the contractor that this schedule was based upon the San 
Roque schedule and served as the initial framework for the SD-2.  For both the Holland and 
the Argentina projects, the Author found that the planned project durations were actually one 
month less than the planned duration of the San Roque Project.  This created an initial 
project schedule with very little flexibility or float.  The contractor also used the SD-2 
schedule to track engineering and procurement and turnovers that were a part of the 
completion process. The first SD-2 schedule for the Argentina Project contained 9,106 
activities and had details about individual drawings for example. The Author established that 
the contractor then used this schedule to develop the SD-3 schedule to track engineering, 
procurement, construction, mechanical completion and commissioning, thru the projects’ 
completion with monthly updates.  
 
During the period after the initial SD-1 schedule was issued and the Owner/Employer’s 
approval of the SD-2 schedule, the Owner/Employer made changes to group completion 
dates as shown below for the Argentina project, as a sample.  The Author established that 
by changing the turnover dates, the Owner/Employer was shown to have changed the 
Contractor’s preliminary detailed planning. The Owner/Employer also was shown to have 
interfered with the contractor’s initially chosen means and methods by adding functional 
checkout activities to the schedule and dictating logic changes. Analyzing these changes, 
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the Author demonstrated for the contractor that a consequential deviation from the San 
Roque project template.  
 
The Author quantified the delay incurred by the contractor, including the specific time period 
of delay and to what activities the delay occurred using a Window Analysis methodology.31 
Separate analyses for the Argentina and Holland projects’ critical paths where performed, 
each project’s respective system turnover dates and each project’s evolution to 
independently identify and quantify the true project completion delays to each project. The 
Author was one of the original developers of the Window Analysis methodology, which is 
widely recognized and accepted in the global market for civil works infrastructure 
construction projects as a contemporaneous method of quantifying delay, and thus 
demonstrating the deviations and delay projects:  
 
“In principle, there is no reason why window analysis methodology should not 
be used to analyse [sic] any delay, whether it be a delay to the critical path or 
otherwise. The essence of window analysis is not what is analysed [sic] or 
how, but in the point at which it is analysed [sic]. The methods of discovering 
the relationship between a delaying event and its effect previously discussed 
have been based on an appreciation of the effect on the total contract period. 
Window analysis is based not on the whole contract period but particular 
‘windows’ in time. It is based on analysis of the effects of delays over the life 
of a project by looking at the events which have affected progress within each 
‘window’ of the contract period sequentially. …. 
 
Because the ‘window’ method of analysis focuses on sequential periods of 
project performance and on the contemporaneous critical path, this method of 
analysis has significant benefits over those that deal with the project period as 
a whole. …”32 
 
And:  
 
The clear weight of authority (case authority, contract clauses, and agency 
manuals) [for over 30 years] has been to give credence to the dynamic nature 
of the CPM process and require that the determination of delay affecting the 
critical path, as well as the quantum of such delays, should be developed 
contemporaneously as the project history unfolds, utilizing the updating 
process as the point of reference. …. 
 
[The authorities on Contract Administration best practices in the global market 
for civil works infrastructure construction projects] recognize the necessity to 
use CPM schedules which evaluate delays contemporaneous with the events 
as they occur on the project to establish time extensions.”33 
 
The Window Analysis methodology thus analyzes the delays at the moment each impacts 
the critical path of the schedule. In any project of the size, complexity and duration of the 
Argentina and Holland projects, the critical path may change through the course of time. As 
is inherent in any major project that spans a number of years, external and internal 
circumstances (not anticipated at the onset) may change the project schedule. These 
changes may necessitate revisions to the logic, elimination or addition of activities, and/or 
deletion or creation of activity dependencies on the schedule. Therefore, throughout the 
course of a civil works infrastructure construction project, schedule updates may be issued 
regardless of whether the overall completion dates change.  
 
The Window Analysis methodology breaks the project into specific consecutive time periods 
known as “Windows,” which are defined and bound by the major schedule changes or 
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events. The Window Analysis utilizes actual project schedules that were used as a basis to 
plan and monitor the work. Thus, this delay analysis methodology bases delay criteria upon 
contemporaneous project records. Each Window starts with a contemporaneous plan for the 
future and ends when that plan is significantly changed by a schedule update. A window is 
defined as the calendar period between these schedule changes. By utilizing a Window 
Analysis approach, the delays are identified on the then-current critical path. The Window 
Analysis approach best reflects the reality of the project at the time, based upon the 
contemporaneous project schedule and the delays that were occurring at that time. Thus, 
the Window Analysis approach compares the work planned versus actual, using the most 
current project schedule for each window. 
 
The Author defined the window periods for the Holland and the Argentina Project by 
significant changes to the critical path in the Contractor’s schedules as submitted to the 
Owner/Employer. The schedules were conveyed to the Owner/Employer at least monthly 
through the SD-1 milestone schedule included in the Monthly Progress Reports (MPRs). The 
delays and gains to the Project schedule were determined based upon the logic of the 
schedules according to four possibilities: Start Gain, Production Gain, Start Delay and 
Production Delay. Each is defined as follows:34 
 
• Start Gain: The number of days an activity actually started prior to its planned 
logic start. 
 
• Start Delay: The number of days an activity actually started after its planned 
start (contingent upon the schedule logic, as other activities' actual starts or 
completions may alter this direct comparison). If an activity started prior to the 
start of the Window being analyzed, then there can be no start delay in the 
Window for that activity. If an activity is scheduled to start in the Window, and 
to continue through the end of the Window into the next Window, but has no 
actual start in this Window, the delay is calculated from the scheduled start 
only to the end of Window. Further delay is immaterial to this Window, as it 
would not further delay contract completion due to a new critical path framing 
the next Window period. 
 
• Production Delay: The number of days an activity takes from start through 
completion in excess of the number of days allowed in the schedule during 
the Window. In other words, if the actual duration is greater than the planned 
duration (i.e., it may have been planned that an activity would take three days 
to complete, but if it actually takes five days, there would be a two-day 
production delay). Production delays are limited to, and contingent upon, only 
those portions of the planned and actual durations that are within the Window. 
Production delay can only be calculated when an activity is complete. If the 
activity is completed in the next Window, it will be analyzed there, but only if it 
is still on the critical path. Like start delay, production delay is contingent upon 
schedule logic as other activities' actual starts or completions may alter a 
direct comparison with the plan. 
 
• Production Gain: The number of days for an activity, from start through 
completion (the duration), which is less than the scheduled number of days. In 
other words, a production gain is realized when the actual duration of an 
activity is to be less than the planned duration for the Window period being 
analyzed. 
 
Only delays to critical activities on the project have an impact on the overall schedule. 
Therefore, the Conditions of Contract required “extensions of time” had to be shown to have 
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delayed critical activities and thus the project completion date. The Window Analysis depicts 
not only the critical activities, but the near critical activities, within in a time period or window, 
because non-critical activities can become critical and/or draw resources away from critical 
work, which can be significant to the completion of the project – those activities that could 
have an impact on project completion within each Window were analyzed by the Author with 
the assistance of the contractor’s project management team. After the identification of which 
critical activities experienced delay or gain in the consecutive windows, and how much the 
amount of delay or gain was for each critical activity, the Author then determined and 
presented the cause for the delay or gain, and the party responsible for the impacts. The 
Conditions of Contract required the use of Primavera35 programming software by the 
contractor, which is a common requirement because the software is the most widely used in 
the global market for civil works infrastructure construction projects. The schedules and their 
updates thus used Primavera as the basis of the Author’s analysis. Additionally, the Author 
supported analysis of causation and responsibility with the contractor actual project records 
kept in the normal course of project execution.    
 
To illustrate the Contract Administration required, the Argentina project is used as an 
example. The Author continued presentation of the impacts and determination of the 
responsible party from the project records. On May 17, 1995, the Owner/Employer supplied 
the contractor with the preliminary schedules and scope definitions for the Argentina project, 
noting that the only difference between the proposed plant and the San Roque project was 
that the contractor would be responsible for the Basic Engineering Package (BEP), as well 
as the lump sum E-P-C contract. Within the scope definition, the Owner/Employer stated that 
the majority of the design for the plant would be a duplication of San Roque project design. 
The Author found that the contractor accordingly created and submitted to the 
Owner/Employer the preliminary “Project Execution Program” for the Argentina project in 
July 1995 as required by the Conditions of Contact. This contractor-produced program 
outlined assumptions that were fundamental to the success of the Project:  
 
• Same process technology as San Roque project 
 
• Same utilities conditions as San Roque project 
 
• Optimize the overall Plot Plan assuming no space limitations in the Site 
 
• Maintain same Plot Plan and layout as the San Roque project for individual 
areas 
 
• The Plant will have different raw water chemistry than the San Roque project  
 
Based upon these requirements, the Author demonstrated that the contractor began work on 
the Argentina project. 
 
On October 2, 1995, the contractor presented the “Project Execution” plan to 
Owner/Employer at which time the Owner/Employer affirmed the high degree of replication 
that the Contract required. The Contractor also divided the plant into systems and equipment 
that could be duplicated from San Roque project by varying degrees and detailed the 
equipment to be included in each category: 
 
Category A 
Systems/Equipment which were composed of duplicated equipment that a minimum 
or no variations.  
 
Category B 
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Systems/Equipment that had to be modified to meet the local conditions.  
 
Category C  
Systems which did not exist in the San Roque project, or required a complete new 
design. 
 
The Job Specification grouped the defined systems into areas of the project: 
  
TABLE III.B.3.1  
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
SYSTEM GROUPS DEFINED 
Area Group 
Area A Electrical Systems 
Area B Utilities Distribution 
Area C Tank Farm  
Area D Water Processing Phase 1 
Area E Water Processing Phase 2 
Area F Water Conveyance 
Area G Miscellaneous Systems 
Area H Water Processing Phase 3 
 
The date of the turnover of the last system in each of the above groups defined the Group 
Completion Dates and the Conditions of Contract provided that the Contractor was 
responsible to achieve specific Group Completion Dates and the Project Final Acceptance 
Date or risk Liquidated Damages (LDs), on or before January 12, 1997. Thus, the systems 
turnover sequence was critical information that would define the completion dates for each 
system, which in turn would establish the eight Group Completion Date milestones. These 
dates defined the completion of the schedule and determined which activities would be on 
the critical path. Missing or changing parameters would change the planned schedule or 
programme which the contractor had submitted the Owner/Employer as required by the 
Conditions of Contract. The Author found that ultimately the Argentina project was delayed 
by three primary reasons: Force Majeure events, changes in the Customs procedures and 
untimely, constant and pervasive changes made by the Owner/Employer. For illustrative 
purposes, the Author will focus on only the last reason in illustrating the extent of Contract 
Administration required. The other two causes were adequately rebutted by the 
Owner/Employer’s project management team. 
 
By the time the Notice to Proceed for the Argentina project was given on March 1, 1996, the 
San Roque project had reported detailed engineering to be 97.4 percent complete. At that 
level of engineering completion, the contractor considered that the “template” upon which the 
Argentina project had been based was fixed, and that the assumptions it had presented to 
Owner/Employer and used as the basis for the Argentina project estimate, schedule and 
execution plan were correct. What the contractor did not know, and could not have known at 
the time, was that there were still 93 changes that would be made by Owner/Employer to the 
San Roque project before it was complete, commissioned and in production. Each of those 
93 changes would, when implemented, necessitate changes in the Argentina project. Every 
change in the San Roque project template made subsequent to the contractor’s contractually 
set cost and schedule estimates for the Argentina project reduced the probability that the 
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contractor would meet the cost and schedule requirements. The Author on behalf of the 
contractor had to demonstrate to the Owner/Employer the impacts. As presented above in 
regards to Project Change Management, the fundamental basis of the bargain from the 
contractor’s and Owner/Employer’s perspective was replication of the San Roque project.  
 
At the end of the San Roque project, Owner/Employer and the contractor created an “End of 
Project Report” that detailed some of the lessons that were learned regarding the project 
management of the Project. It noted that there were very many scope changes introduced by 
Owner/Employer at the end of the San Roque project construction because Owner/Employer 
wanted to incorporate its latest technology and lessons learned from previous projects – 
some 83% of the total scope changes affecting the completion of systems were made during 
the last four months of construction. The report further noted that Owner/Employer’s 
operations experts’ recommendations were also incorporated in the last months of 
construction and had the contractor had to dismantle and rebuild many parts of the project. 
The Author concluded that the formal changes to the San Roque project template, combined 
with the “Lessons Learned,” created a moving target for the contractor and never allowed the 
Owner/Employer’s concept of replication to be implemented or employed on the Argentina 
project. The effect of the continuous stream of changes made by Owner/Employer at the 
San Roque project was an immense impact on the Argentina project that the Author on 
behalf of the contractor had to demonstrate with the data and records maintained in the 
exercise of Contract Administration during project execution the contractor’s project 
management team. 
 
The Author constructed Figure III.B.3.1, Argentina Project Delay Days vs. Change Flow Rate 
Profile, to illustrate the eventual the cumulative delay versus the number of approved 
changes. Figure III.B.3.1 has the same profile of the change flow rate calculated for 
Argentina that was constructed for Figure III.B.2.3 – the shading. The number of days that 
the Argentina project schedule was showing delay is superimposed on the graphic. The 
Author found that when changes to the Argentina project were initiated at the beginning of 
the project, the contractor executed the changes by absorbing them into the schedule 
without impact to the project completion date, but at the expense of additional engineering 
hours. This result was shown by the horizontal cumulative delay line through September 
1996. When combined with the monthly reports on resource use submitted by the 
contractor’s project management team, the impact on engineering hours was obvious. The 
Author found there was sight delay in October 1996 and the contractor’s project 
management team developed a plan to save project time (illustrated by the vertical line for 
that month). Engineering was thought to be essentially complete (95 %) in January 1997, 
and although there was delay reported.  Even though the Project completion date was not 
affected by these early changes, the available float in the schedule was eroded until the 
schedule could not absorb any additional changes. By March 1997, the schedule had 
reached the point that each change from that date forward had a direct impact on 
construction and on the Argentina project completion date. The figure further shows that 
when a large number of changes were initiated by Owner/Employer, after an appropriate 
implementation period, those changes caused delays. It also shows the high volume of 
changes that occurred on the Project after the planned engineering 95 percent completion 
date of January 1997. The Owner/Employer’s project management team, however, 
continued to make a vast number of changes. The contractor continued to report cumulative 
delay until November 1997, when the Owner/Employer demanded that the contractor 
employ additional resources. Despite these additional resources, the period of 
commissioning exhibited continued changes and a slight worsening of the delay.       
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Based on the Project Time Management records from the Argentina project, the prepared 
four Windows reported in Table III.B.3.2 in its analysis: 
  
TABLE III.B.3.2  
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
SUMMARY OF WINDOW DATA 
Window 
No. Schedule Start Date End Date 
Number of 
Calendar 
Days 
1 SD-1 - Milestone schedule Mar 1, 1996 Oct 30, 1996 244 
2 71AG - Network schedule Oct 31, 1996 Feb 28, 1997 121 
3 71AL - Network update recovery plan Mar 1, 1997 Sep 14, 1997 198 
4 71AJ - Network update Sep 15, 1997 Dec 26, 1997 103 
5 71AE - Network update Dec 27, 1997 Apr 17, 1998 112 
 
Using Widow No. 3, for example, the Contractor concluded that from March 1, 1997, to 
September 14, 1997, it experienced a total of 132 calendar days of delay to the Project 
during the 198 calendar days of Window No. 3. The delay for Window No. 3 was found to be 
FIGURE III.B.3.1
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primarily a result of the changes introduced by the Owner/Employer that continued to disrupt 
productivity. During the Window No. 3 period the contractor decided that, to finish the 
Argentina project by the Contract completion date, a recovery schedule was necessary as a 
result of the high number of disruptive changes occurring on the project. Using the analysis 
illustrated above under the Project Change Management, as of March 1, 1997, 66 changes 
had been approved on the Argentina project and 129 on the San Roque project. During 
Window No. 3, Owner/Employer approved an additional 62 changes on the Argentina project 
and eight changes to the San Roque project template. The Author demonstrated first that 
engineering was planned to reach the 95 percent before January 1997, so the number of 
changes on the Argentina project should have been diminishing or non-existent, not 
increasing. 
 
The Author then demonstrated through the same figure, Figure III.B.3.1, Argentina Project 
Delay Days vs. Total Approved Changes, that multiple changes initiated and approved by 
Owner/Employer during Window No. 3 contributed to the 132 days of delay for the Project. 
Also shown in Figure III.B.3.1, there are 24 days of recovery at the beginning of Window 
No. 3 (shown by the vertical direction of the Cumulative Number of Delay Days), which 
indicate that initially the recovery schedule was performing as expected until the next wave 
of changes occurred. The Author then analyzed every activity that was critical during the 198 
calendar days, the results of which were presented in Tabular form as Table III.B.3.3 as 
follows:  
 
TABLE III.B.3.3 
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
WINDOW NO. 3 CRITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Activity ID Activity Description 
Planned 
Start 
Planned 
Finish 
Actual 
Start 
Actual 
Finish 
Start 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
Production 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
00007110 
1712b L.V. Power 
Cables -Fabr & 
Deliv (P126) 
Feb 
22,1997 
Jun 
03,1997 
Feb 
22,1997 
Jun 
03,1997 0 0 
00000492 
1464b/C 
Expansion Joints - 
Fab&Deliv 
Bap(P127) 
Feb 
26,1997 
May 
18,1997 
Feb 
26,1997 
Jul 
05,1997 - 46 
00000493 
1464b/C 
Expansion Joints - 
Customs & 
Tz(P127) 
May 
19,1997 
Jun 
01,1997 
Jul 
07,1997 
Jul 
18,1997 1 (2) 
F01410260 
Off Class - 
Electrical 
Installation 
Jun 
04,1997 
Jul 
28,1997 
Outside 
Window 
Outside 
Window 58 - 
00007302 
1781a Electrical 
Tracing -Fabr & 
Deliv (P) 
Mar 
05,1997 
Jul 
02,1997 
Feb 
10,1997 
Sep 
16,1997 (4) 75 
E01280135 
Regeneration 
Syst. - Electrical 
Installation 
Jul 
03,1997 
Aug 
21,1997 
Aug 
18,1997 
Outside 
Window (28) - 
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TABLE III.B.3.3 
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
WINDOW NO. 3 CRITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Activity ID Activity Description 
Planned 
Start 
Planned 
Finish 
Actual 
Start 
Actual 
Finish 
Start 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
Production 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
00005011 
1591za Process 
Steam Traps - Bid 
And Award(P) 
Jan 
22,1997 
Mar 
04,1997 
Jan 
22,1997 
Mar 
25,1997 - 17 
00005012 
1591za Process 
Steam Traps - 
Fabric& Deliv(P) 
Mar 
05,1997 
May 
28,1997 
Mar 
26,1997 
Jul 
16,1997 0 28 
00005052 1592zf Arrestors - Bid And Award(P) 
Nov 
21,1996 
Mar 
02,1997 
Nov 
21,1996 
Mar 
03,1997 - 0 
00005054 
1592zf Arrestors - 
Fabrication & 
Deliv 
Mar 
03,1997 
Jul 
05,1997 
Mar 
04,1997 
Jul 
04,1997 0 -2 
D00040090 
Feed./Screen.- 
Instrument 
Installation 
Jul 
13,1997 
Sep 
10,1997 
Sep 
27,1997 
Outside 
Window 46 - 
00005121 
1599a Three Way 
Valves  - 
Fabric&Deliv 
Bap(P121) 
Feb 
06,1997 
Jun 
13,1997 
Feb 
06,1997 
Jul 
04,1997 - 21 
00005122 
1599a Three Way 
Valves  - Customs 
& Tz(P121) 
Jun 
14,1997 
Jun 
27,1997 
Jul 
05,1997 
Jul 
16,1997 - (2) 
D00190095 Mix/Feed Tks- Piping Erection 
Jun 
24,1997 
Jul 
07,1997 
Aug 
05,1997 
Outside 
Window 23 27 
D20190110 
Feed Tks - 
Instrument 
Installation 
Jul 
19,1997 
Sep 
01,1997 
Outside 
Window 
Outside 
Window 36 - 
B0950090 
Nitrg. 7.0 Distrib.-
Iin Line 
Instruments Install 
Jul 
08,1997 
Aug 
06,1997 
Outside 
Window 
Outside 
Window 45 - 
G0810010 
HVAC Process - 
Equipment & Mtls 
Procu& Deliv 
Feb 
24,1997 
May 
08,1997 
Feb 
24,1997 
Apr 
18,1997 0 (20) 
G0810016 
HVAC Process -
Control Room  
Coils Install 
May 
09,1997 
May 
29,1997 
May 
01,1997 
Jul 
04,1997 9 0 
G0810023 
HVAC Process - 
C. Room Duct 
Install(El107.320) 
May 
09,1997 
May 
29,1997 
May 
19,1997 
Jul 
25,1997 18 0 
G0810027 
HVAC Process -
Break Off. Duct 
Install(El111.130) 
May 
16,1997 
Jun 
05,1997 
May 
26,1997 
Jul 
18,1997 0 33 
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TABLE III.B.3.3 
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
WINDOW NO. 3 CRITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Activity ID Activity Description 
Planned 
Start 
Planned 
Finish 
Actual 
Start 
Actual 
Finish 
Start 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
Production 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
G0810031 
HVAC Process - 
MCC Room Duct 
Install(El115.390) 
Jun 
06,1997 
Jun 
19,1997 
May 
19,1997 
Jul 
25,1997 (61) 0 
G0810033 
HVAC Process -
MCC Room 
Climate 
Install(El115.390) 
Jun 
06,1997 
Jun 
26,1997 
May 
26,1997 
Jul 
25,1997 7 0 
G0810035 
HVAC Process - 
MCC Room 
Vct1200 Inst 
(El115.390) 
Jun 
06,1997 
Jun 
19,1997 
May 
26,1997 
Jul 
25,1997 0 47 
G0810037 
HVAC Process - 
MCC Room Tve-
18 Inst 
(El115.390) 
Jun 
20,1997 
Jul 
03,1997 
Jul 
21,1997 
Outside 
Window (5) 42 
G0810039 
HVAC Process - 
S.G.Room Duct 
Install(El119.215) 
Jun 
20,1997 
Jul 
03,1997 
Jul 
21,1997 
Outside 
Window 63 0 
G0810041 
HVAC Process - 
S.G.Room Fan 
Install(El119.215) 
Jun 
20,1997 
Jul 
03,1997 
Jul 
21,1997 
Outside 
Window 0 42 
G0750006 
U/G Industr.W. - 
Yu-G-19 Fabric & 
Deliv.(P6) 
Feb 
05,1997 
Jun 
21,1997 
Feb 
05,1997 
Sep 
24,1997 - 85 
00007126 
M.V.Capacitor 
Bank -Fabr & 
Deliv (P) 
Mar 
18,1997 
Jun 
25,1997 
Sep 
23,1996 
Jun 
24,1997 (18) 15 
A0600022 
Sub2 (6600) - 
M.V. Capacitor 
Bank Installation 
Jun 
26,1997 
Jul 
09,1997 
Jul 
01,1997 
Jul 
02,1997 6 (12) 
A0600050 Begin T/O For -Sub 2 (6600) 
Jul 
10,1997 
Jul 
10,1997 
Jul 
18,1997 
Jul 
18,1997 15 0 
A0600052 Joint Punchlist Walk 
Jul 
11,1997 
Jul 
12,1997 
Jul 
18,1997 
Jul 
21,1997 (1) 2 
A0600054 Complete Punch List Work 
Jul 
13,1997 
Jul 
19,1997 
Jul 
23,1997 
Aug 
22,1997 1 24 
A0600056 Punch List Verification Walk 
Jul 
20,1997 
Jul 
20,1997 
Aug 
25,1997 
Aug 
25,1997 2 0 
A0600058 
Electrical & 
Instrument 
Testing 
Jul 
21,1997 
Aug 
03,1997 
Aug 
26,1997 
Aug 
27,1997 0 (12) 
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TABLE III.B.3.3 
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
WINDOW NO. 3 CRITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Activity ID Activity Description 
Planned 
Start 
Planned 
Finish 
Actual 
Start 
Actual 
Finish 
Start 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
Production 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
A0600060 
Accept - 
Substation 2 
(6600) 
Aug 
04,1997 
Aug 
04,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 0 0 
A0580060 
Accept - 
Substation 5  
(380) 
Aug 
05,1997 
Aug 
05,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 (1) 0 
A0610070 
Accept - 
Substation 1 (380) 
Distribution 
Aug 
06,1997 
Aug 
06,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 (1) 0 
A0560064 
Accept - 
Substations 2/3 
(380) Distribution 
Aug 
07,1997 
Aug 
07,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 
Aug 
28,1997 (1) 0 
G0670094 Accept - Lighting Outdoors 
Aug 
08,1997 
Aug 
08,1997 
Outside 
Window 
Outside 
Window 17 0 
C0790094 
Accept - 
Grounding Tank 
Farm 
Aug 
10,1997 
Aug 
10,1997 
Outside 
Window 
Outside 
Window (7) 0 
00000576 
S.S.Fittings - 
Delivery P-58 
Rev3 
Feb 
25,1997 
Jul 
05,1997 
Feb 
25,1997 
Aug 
12,1997 0 38 
E01240100 Piping Prefabrication 
Jun 
20,1997 
Jul 
19,1997 
May 
02,1997 
Outside 
Window 0 19 
E01270015 
Absort.Beds Sn-
K-33a/B -  Fabr. & 
Deliv. Ba(P27) 
Jul 
10,1996 
Apr 
14,1997 
Jul 
10,1996 
Feb 
24,1997 - (45) 
E01270300 Absort.Beds - Sn-K-33a/B.Erection 
Apr 
29,1997 
May 
03,1997 
Apr 
08,1997 
May 
02,1997 24 20 
E01270075 
Absort.Beds Sn-
K-33a/B - 
Instrument 
Installat 
Jun 
28,1997 
Aug 
24,1997 
Outside 
Window 
Outside 
Window 80 - 
00005118 
1599a Three Way 
Valves  - 
Fabric&Deliv 
Bap(P120) 
Feb 
06,1997 
Jul 
16,1997 
Feb 
06,1997 
Jul 
15,1997 (1) - 
00005119 
1599a Three Way 
Valves  - Customs 
& Tz(P120) 
Jul 
17,1997 
Jul 
30,1997 
Jul 
20,1997 
Aug 
09,1997 - 6 
H1160165 HTM Heater - Piping Erection 
Jun 
30,1997 
Aug 
13,1997 Not Dates N/A N/A 
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TABLE III.B.3.3 
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
WINDOW NO. 3 CRITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Activity ID Activity Description 
Planned 
Start 
Planned 
Finish 
Actual 
Start 
Actual 
Finish 
Start 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
Production 
Delay / 
(Gain) 
H1160175 
HTM Heater - 
Instruments 
Installation 
Jul 
21,1997 
Sep 
03,1997 
Outside 
Window 
Outside 
Window 46 - 
G1540070 
Softening Ys-Z-02 
Fabr&Deliv Bap 
(P51) 
Jun 
28,1996 
May 
10,1997 
Jun 
28,1996 
Jul 
05,1997 - 51 
G1540071 
Softening Ys-Z-02 
Customs&Tz 
(P51) 
May 
11,1997 
May 
24,1997 
Jul 
07,1997 
Jul 
21,1997 1 1 
G1540130 
Softening 
Equipment 
Erection 
May 
25,1997 
Jun 
07,1997 
Jul 
22,1997 
Outside 
Window - 41 
00005800 Pipe Rack Nº1 - Piping Erection 
Apr 
21,1997 
May 
04,1997 
May 
19,1997 
Outside 
Window 26 105 
B0540144 Steam Boiler - 3º Piping Mto 
Mar 
01,1997 
Mar 
07,1997 
Apr 
01,1997 
Apr 
07,1997 28 - 
B0540145 
Steam Boiler Syst 
- Piping Mtls 
Delivery 
Feb 
17,1997 
Jun 
05,1997 
Feb 
17,1997 
May 
09,1997 (38) (27) 
B0540200 
Boiler Syst - 
Piping 
Prefabrication 
May 
16,1997 
Jun 
05,1997 
Jun 
16,1997 
Outside 
Window 59 71 
G0970012 
Saf.Shower-Yu-Z-
02 Potable W.T. 
Fabr&Del B.A.(P) 
Mar 
05,1997 
Jun 
22,1997 
Mar 
01,1997 
Jul 
15,1997 (4) 22 
G0970013 
Saf.Shower-Yu-Z-
02 Potable 
W.T.Customs&Sit
e(P) 
Jun 
23,1997 
Jul 
02,1997 
Jul 
16,1997 
Jul 
21,1997 0 (4) 
G0970040 
Potable W.T. 
Plant - Yu-Z-02 
Erection 
Jul 
03,1997 
Jul 
16,1997 
Jul 
28,1997 
Outside 
Window 6 35 
Total Net Delay Window No. 3: 132 Calendar Days 
 
 
As indicated earlier, the total net delay during the Window No. 3 period was 132 days (taking 
into account the concurrency of activities, since there can only be one day of gain or delay 
per calendar day). Figure III.B.3.2 is the Author’s graphical illustration of Window 3. 
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The timing of approval for the changes was also critical. The Owner/Employer continued to 
approve and implement changes after the activities had been completed causing the 
Contractor to re-engineer and rebuild items. Again, this is one of the key lessons learned 
outlined in the San Roque project’s “End of Project Report” that could have been used if the 
template had been complete. The Author then related the individual delays for each system 
to the changes thereto.  The following Table III.B.3.4 summarized the Author’s findings on 
behalf of contractor by relating the changes to the systems: 
 
TABLE III.B.3.4 
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
 CHANGES AFFECTING WINDOW NO. 3  
CRITICAL PATH SYSTEMS (BY GROUP) 
Area / System Group Critical Path System Change Number 
A0560 – Substations 2/3 (380) Distribution 71, 89-1, 89-2, 94, 122, 127 Area A - Electrical Systems 
A0610 - Substation 1 (380) Distribution 71,89-1, 89-2, 94 
B0540 - Steam Boiler 2, 10, 37, 106, 118 
B0890 - Cooling Water Solid Stating 41 
B0950 - 7.0 Distribution 32, 86, 116 
Area B – Utilities Distribution 
B1890 - Cooling Tower & Distribution 10, 34, 116 
Area C – Tank Farm and Truck C0150 - Virgin E.G. Tank 10, 27, 74 
FIGURE III.B.3.2
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TABLE III.B.3.4 
ARGENTINA PROJECT 
 CHANGES AFFECTING WINDOW NO. 3  
CRITICAL PATH SYSTEMS (BY GROUP) 
Area / System Group Critical Path System Change Number 
Unloading C0790 - Grounding Tank Farm 41 
D0019 - Mix/Feed Tanks 10, 74, 79*, 85, 86, 116  
D0040 - Spray MD-C-30 10, 19, 57, 74, 79*, 84, 91, 117  
Area D – Water Processing 
Phase 1 
D2019 - Mix/Feed Tanks MW-C-52/53 10, 53, 74, 79*, 85**, 86, 91, 116 
E0086 - Civil / Architecture 85**, 96, 111, 112, 118, 134 
E0124 - Reactor SE-C-05 21, 60, 97, FCR 035
E0127 - Absorption Beds SN-K-33 A/B 116, FCR 053 
Area E – Water Processing 
Phase 2 
E0128 - Regeneration System 10, 43, 79*, 86, 125, FCR 027 
F0106 - Convey Systems 7, 8 & 13 89-1, 89-2 Area F – Water Conveying 
Systems F0135 - Convey Systems 10, 12 & 14 88, 89-1, 89-2 
G0640 - DCS C. Room, I/O Room & 
Remote I/O Panels 
23, 84, 89-1, 89-2, 
90, 92, 108, 127, 
136 
G0690 - Lighting Yards 34, 41 
G0750 – U/G Industrial Water 10, 29, 74, 81 
G0970 - Safety Shower 10, 79*, 103, 108, 118 
G0980 - Industrial Water (A/G) 34, 79*, 81 
Area G – Miscellaneous 
Systems 
G1540 - Softening Water Plant 10, 38, 102, 118, 141 
Area H – Water Processing 
Phase 3 H1160 - HTM Fired Heater MH-F-01 
19, 73, 81, 99, 107, 
116 
 
The Author had demonstrated to the Owner/Employer on behalf of the contractor that the 
impact to time was caused by that the Owner/Employer’s failure to live up to the bargain the 
parties had reached originally in the contract thru the failure to exercise a common Contract 
Administration process used by project management teams – both the data and the actual 
analyses that project management teams can prepare easily.  
 
4.  Project Cost Management 
 
Project Cost Management concerns cost estimating, management and control of project 
costs. Sources of input information come from Project Scope Statement, the WBS, the WBS 
Dictionary and the Project Management Plan. The Owner/Employer must develop an 
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approximation of the costs of the resources required to complete project activities that civil 
works infrastructure construction project. The processes are initiated with preliminary cost 
estimates early in the project life cycle. Cost estimates must formally revised and updated 
when more accurate cost, activity durations and scope descriptions are available, to adjust 
for changes in risk and contingency, or to reflect changes in scope, resources, schedule and 
project constraints. Similarly a contractor needs to record the cost for the project it has 
committed the deliver. Additionally, the contractor has to continuously record the costs 
during project execution. Both the Owner/Employer and the contractor will use cost as a 
basis to create the base from which to measure the impact of change and to allow the giving 
of proper notice that “mutual mistrust’ envisions.   
 
According to the PMBOK there are three major processes in developing the project cost that 
interact with each other and also between the other knowledge areas as well:36 
 
(1) Cost Estimating 
(2) Cost Budgeting 
(3) Cost Control 
 
Most Owners/Employers and contractors for civil works infrastructure construction projects 
have systems, procedures, and accounting processes that fulfill the needs. The project costs 
are then a resource that is applied to the project schedules or programmes in Project Time 
Management. Regular updating then makes the potential or actual impacts from change of 
any type observable. In addition, the contractor usually will record the bases for the costs 
that it estimated in the bid or submitted with the tender, including the specific resources that 
were planned. 
 
Using the civil works infrastructure construction project in Mexico described in Project 
Integration Management above,37 the role of Contract Administration can be illustrated with 
regards to the Indirect Costs of project management and the Financing Cost increase. The 
Contractor had set a foundation for what would be expected in the global market, and as a 
result of the fundamental changes that the Contractor had incurred. The contractor, as part 
of its proposed bid, had to submit an Execution Plan that described its project management 
plan. The Execution Plan was included in the Indirect Costs estimated (quantity and 
duration) in the Contractor’s Unit Price portion of its bid. If the Owner/Employer admitted it 
caused a day of delay, the indirect percentage would have been revised. Unless the Indirect 
Costs percentage was adjusted for any Owner/Employer caused growth in indirect resources 
quantity or duration, the contractor would never be compensated such Owner/Employer 
caused cost impacts when the Unit Prices bid were used to pay the contractor for the 
impacts. The following list, for example, summarizes the primary findings of the Author 
developed in the detailed analyses relative to the proposed contractor Execution Plan and its 
interface with the Supervisor: 
 
• The contractor had organized its project management team to perform its contractual 
scope of works. That organization was changed and disrupted with the 
Owner/Employer’s dismissal of its Supervisor in late October 2000. Established 
norms for project controls and approval procedures including the interface with the 
Supervisor were not continued with the Owner/Employer employees who replaced 
Supervisor. The Contractor’s indirect expenses increased in trying to adapt to the 
‘new’ way of working with the Owner/Employer, e.g., language, administration 
cultures, changed requirements, and re-evaluation of already received approvals. 
 
• The Owner/Employer’s Supervisor, despite its contract with the Owner/Employer 
indicating differently, had zero authority to approve and authorize changes, yet made 
or refused interpretations to address errors and omissions in the very engineering 
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that it had produced for the Owner/Employer to issue as bid documents.  All Change 
Notices (CN’s) required signature by the “Representative of Owner/Employer” and as 
such, the Supervisor simply became the messenger between the Contractor and the 
Owner/Employer, which voided the commercial role the Supervisor had been 
assigned by the Conditions of Contract. This lack of authority caused significant 
approval delays where any change had potential cost impacts.  
 
The Owner/Employer required the contractor to submit and obtain the Owner/Employer’s 
approval of revised Execution Plan and the new schedules, related WBS structure, and 
resource changes. These accepted changes increased the contractor’s Indirect Costs 
through extension of project management resources (personnel, facilities, etc.) and the 
addition project management resources as the Owner/Employer’s involvement in project 
execution became greater than was the industry practice for a fixed price EPC contract and 
as a result became more intrusive. These resource extensions and increases were then 
further exacerbated by the Owner/Employer changes from the Supervisor to itself. 
Nonetheless, the contractor only was allowed to use Unit Prices for changes that reflected 
the expectations in the defective bid documents. Additionally, the impacts from the 
Owner/Employer’s breaches and failure were never priced at any rate as the Owner/Employ 
did not recognize causes and impacts.  
 
The contractor used the regularly recorded project records to price these impacts. Despite 
the Owner/Employer’s evaluation and acceptance of to-go changes in the Execution Plan, 
the Owner/Employer only allowed the contractor to use of the originally bid Unit Prices. 
Thus, the Owner/Employer forced use of Unit Prices that only had Indirect Costs based on 
the expectations presented by the bid documents. The contractor incurred significantly 
increased Indirect Costs from all these Owner/Employer-caused execution issues.  The 
Author directed the contractor’s project management team to summarize the actual detail 
from the Project Cost Management records it maintained, and the Author then compared 
each of the Project Execution Plans and the project management resources each contained 
to the Indirect Cost detail from the first Project Execution Plan that the contractor had 
submitted. The Author prepared the following Figure III.B.4.1 to emphasize and summarize 
the total impact: 
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The Author then summarized the Indirect Costs that the contractor was seeking in Table 
III.B.4.1, which had been tied to the various Project Execution Plans the contractor had 
submitted (after the Author had removed those Indirect Costs for which the contractor was 
responsible for causing): 
 
TABLE III.B.4.1  
INDIRECT COST DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE OWNER/EMPLOYER 
Description ¥  
Total Actual Indirect Costs 106,750,900,000 
Less: Total Owner/Employer Payments (45,366,945,000) 
Less: Contractor Caused Indirect Costs  (5,054,862,000) 
Total Contractor Indirect Cost Caused by the Owner/Employer 56,329,093,000 
 
Similarly, the Author using the same Contract Administration records which the contractor 
had submitted to the Owner/Employer as required by the Conditions of Contract, further 
demonstrated to the Owner/Employer the amount Financing Cost the contractor was forced 
to incur as a result of the changed and extended execution it had experienced. The 
Contractor was a joint venture company that was formed to bid for and execute the project. 
The Owner/Employer’s bid documents recognized that successful bidders would have to 
finance some of the costs it would incur before payment was earned, in contrast to World 
Bank financed projects which recognize an advance payment of up to 10% of the contract 
value. The Contractor was required to submit an expenditure schedule versus payment 
schedule as part of its bid that would support the financing level at a bid rate that was to be 
spread across all the Unit Price’s. The cost and payment schedules provided the 
Owner/Employer with indication of its cash flow needs over the project as well.  With each 
executed omnibus change, the Financing Cost schedules had to be updated for the 
expected to go work, even though the costs the Contractor incurred for the changes covered 
Figure III.B.4.1
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therein could not be paid until the omnibus change was executed.  The negotiation of 
omnibus changes took 6 to 12 months typically. Thus, even the projected periods of 
financing submitted to support the changes that were incorporated were never met from this 
lag. As with Indirect Costs, the use of a fixed financing cost percentage to be applied to 
direct costs in the Contract Unit Price’s was based on the original bid document scope and 
execution period. The Author in Figure III.B.4.2 illustrated the variance between the 
contractor’s planned cost and the Owner/Employer’s actual payments that had to be covered 
by financing in the Contractor’s proposal and bid. 
 
 
 
The Contractor tied its payments to expected progress and its planned cost incurrence. This 
approach would minimize the amount of financing that the contractor would have to incur. 
Thus, the partners would not have to finance significant funds early in the Project execution. 
If the Project schedule was maintained, financing would be a small percentage of the costs 
that had to be recovered when payments were received. From the date of award, the Author 
found that the contractor’s financing plan was frustrated by the Owner/Employer changes to 
the execution conditions, yet the contractor’s project management team had shown what it 
had reasonably anticipated. The Author in Figure III.B.4.3 summarized the actual Financing 
Cost it incurred, excluding the costs impacts the Author has determined the contractor 
caused itself from the records the contractor maintained throughout the project. 
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The Financing Cost that the Author demonstrated what not anticipated by the contractor’s 
project management team presented for the Contract Administration records maintained was 
summarized in Table III.B.4.2 as follows:  
 
 
TABLE III.B.4.2 
FINANCING COST DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE OWNER/EMPLOYER 
Description Financing Costs ¥ 
Initial Operating Funds Loan Financing Cost 205,221,880,000
Operating Line Loan Financing Cost 348,989,490,000
Total Actual Financing Cost 554,211,370,000
Less: Owner/Employer Payments (161,884,500,000)
Less: Financing Cost for the Contractor Caused Direct and Indirect 
Costs (20,895,540,000)
Total Financing Cost Damages Caused By The Owner/Employer 371,431,330,000
 
The Owner/Employer’s project management team would contest the amount of the Indirect 
Costs and the Financing Costs incurred in total, and particularly the amount that the 
contractor attributed to its own account. Even if the Author on behalf of contractor had 
Figure III.B.4.3
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proven the basis for it’s seeking the to achieve the level of the bargain first reached, the 
Owner/Employer’s project management team in a culture of “mutual mistrust” would assume 
the Contractor was seeking more than it was entitled from the changed conditions. 
 
5. Project Quality Management 
 
Project Quality Management concerns the processes required to ensure that the project will 
satisfy the needs for which it was undertaken. PMBOK® states: 
 
“Project Quality Management processes include all the activities of the 
performing organization that determine quality policies, objectives, and 
responsibilities so that the project will satisfy the needs for which it was 
undertaken.”38  
 
There are three processes for Project Quality Management: 
 
(1) Quality Planning 
(2) Perform Quality Assurance 
(3) Perform Quality Control 
 
Relevant regulations, codes and standards applicable are typically included in the 
Specifications and the Conditions of Contract. International Standards Organization (ISO) 
requires conformance to codes and standards all around the world and local codes may 
supplement the requirements. There are rigorous inspection requirements and recordation 
requirements that have been established in the global market for civil works infrastructure 
construction projects. Key is the documentation that the Owner/Employer establishes for the 
project quality requirements and the contractor needs to demonstrate the level of quality that 
it included in its bid; that it will meets such quality during execution and in the end result; and 
that it can be used to demonstrate variances.  
 
The types of Contract Administration records that are maintained typically are designated in 
the standards that are incorporated in the specifications or referenced therein. Always there 
are specific record requirements that must be recorded and filed with appropriate 
government officials and/or are required by the Owner/Employer. The role of Contract 
Administration in these Project Management Process processes is to provide adequate 
planning and assure that the work is performed, inspected and tested in compliance with 
such designated standards and laws. In a civil works infrastructure project in Venezuela that 
the Author39 evaluated, the Owner/Employer sought bids under a fixed price Engineer-
Procure-Construct contract. During the project execution the contractor gave a notice for 
changed work when the Owner/Employer insisted that certain work be performed. The 
Owner/Employer countered that the work as planned by the contractor was of deficient 
quality and should therefore be re-performed to correct the deficiencies. The Author 
ultimately prevailed in the demonstration that the contractor’s planning and execution did not 
meet the standards for the work required and that it did not maintain the records that were 
required.   
 
The contractor submitted the engineering plan (Project Engineering Plan – PEP) that was 
required as part of its bid, but an updated the plan within the time specified in the Conditions 
of Contract was not provided.  The Introduction to the PEP stated: 
 
"The description of the `Project Engineering Group', how it will function, the 
procedures it will follow, and the documents it will develop are described in 
this PEP. It will also serve as a reference document and valuable tool to 
                                                                   III-                                         Kris R. Nielsen 
 
50
assist project engineering personnel in the systematic planning and 
completion of their responsibilities."   
 
The Author demonstrated that the PEP was issued the week after the contractor had 
submitted the first required engineering submittal, the basic engineering, the transmittal for 
which certified that the engineering submittal met all the requirements of the 
Owner/Employer.  The contractor’s PEP noted that an accurate and complete project basic 
engineering was essential to establish control over the detailed engineering: 
 
"The Project Engineering Group will execute/compare the detailed 
engineering of the complete project facilities from `Basic Engineering' process 
design, preliminary studies and design specifications, and detailed 
engineering supplied by the Contractor  from [a similar] project."   
 
The similar project was the basis upon which the Owner/Employer had awarded the contract 
to the contractor. The purpose of the PEP was described as follows: 
 
"The purpose of the...[Project Engineering Plan] is to assure that the 
execution of the engineering phase of this project is carried out in such a 
manner as to comply with: 
 
• The Project Technical Specifications  
 
• [the Contractor’s proposed design in the bid] Arrangement [defined in 
the PEP as the required performance requirements, codes, and 
standards] for Execution 
 
• All Contractual Agreements 
 
• Stated Schedules 
 
• Administration Policies and Procedures developed to engineer, procure, 
manage, monitor and document all phases of the project." 
 
The contractor expressed in the PEP that its Detailed Engineering philosophy was  
 
"...to perform quality detail engineering work on or ahead of schedule and within 
budget…  a safe and reliable project will be the prime importance in the everyday 
events of the project engineering group."   
 
Essential to this expressed contractor philosophy was a decreasing priority of parameters to be 
considered, with safety, operability, and maintainability in the top half of the priorities.  The Author 
delineated issues of the contractor’s adherence to this stated engineering philosophy in the 
response to the notice of changes the contractor had issued. The contractor’s PEP had no detailed 
procedures for assuring engineering quality. "Checking" was required to be performed on all 
calculations, specifications, and all drawings, but detailed procedures on how to check were not 
provided. All that was required in the contractors PEP was: 
 
• Regarding Calculations: 
  
"Calculations shall not be considered valid until they have been checked by 
the discipline Lead Engineer (checker) or his designee...." 
 
• Regarding Specifications: 
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"...The discipline Lead Engineer will be responsible for reviewing, checking 
and approving all specifications, with final approval by the Project and 
Paragon Project Engineering Managers." 
 
• Regarding Drawings: 
 
"All Drawings will be completely checked by the discipline engineers before 
being issued.  The following checking procedure will be used for checking all 
drawings. 
 
- The discipline checker reviews and checks the drawing for accuracy and 
correctness..- A final review and check is conducted by the discipline Lead 
Engineer... 
 
- When all errors and/or omissions have been corrected to the 
satisfaction of the discipline Lead Engineer, the drawing is circulated 
to the other disciplines for a coordination check.  Any comments 
resulting from this coordination check are reviewed and incorporated 
where applicable. 
 
The coordination check procedure is repeated as necessary until all 
inter-discipline queries are resolved."   
 
The Owner/Employer’s project management team cited the standards that were referenced 
in the Conditions of Contract which had been provided in the specifications. The Author then 
presented that customary industry practice in preparing design documents, review and 
checking is typically done within a particular discipline, that is, piping drawings are checked 
for internal consistency and correctness.  Thus, a pipe for a system must meet flow 
requirements amongst others, but also must be drafted as the same diameter on all 
drawings.  A "Coordination Check" or interdisciplinary check is required to avoid 
interference, that is, to assure that drawings do not have multiple pieces of work from 
different disciplines in the same location.  For example, a coordination check assuring that a 
physical location is not shown on a piping drawing as containing a pipe and then shown on a 
vent duct drawing with a duct in the same location then shown on a structural drawing with a 
steel column in the same location, etc.  No detailed procedures were provided as to how 
checks, reviews, and coordination were to occur.  If not specified, then typically some form 
of engineering quality assurance is established to make certain the checks, reviews, and 
coordination had been performed, but that was something that the contractor could not 
demonstrate. 
 
The contractor also specified and engineering quality assurance strategy in the PEP: 
 
"The project is on a `FAST TRACT' [sic.] schedule, meaning that shortcuts 
may have to be taken to meet the very difficult schedule completion date.  
However, `shortcuts', does not mean sacrificing engineering quality.  
Sacrificing engineering quality on the front end of the project would only 
cause problems during construction and after plant start-up.  The quality of 
internal engineering is the responsibility of all professionals involved.  Normal 
internal engineering checking and inter-discipline checking procedures are 
defined in [engineering documents and drawings]...The design of one 
discipline which may affect the design of other disciplines will be discussed 
and properly coordinated.  Discipline design inconsistencies will be resolved 
under the Project Engineering Manager's direction and supervision, as 
required....As stated, the discipline engineering sections will check and review 
the basic design documents to ensure that all inputs necessary for completing 
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the project design are available, that they are accurate and consistent with 
project specifications and requirements, and they are in compliance with local 
regulations and standards.  If further information or clarifications are required, 
the Project Engineering Manager will resolve the issues....Design verification 
will be done through regular internal design review meetings attended by 
engineering personnel.  In addition, internal design audit will be conducted, 
under the direction of the Project Engineering Manager at the completion of 
major engineering milestones.  Meeting notes of the design review meetings 
and audit findings will be published and transmitted for resolution and 
incorporation by the responsible engineering personnel."   
 
Thus, the Contractor in the PEP placed responsibility with Engineering Manager, for ultimate 
assurance of engineering checking and interdisciplinary coordination.  The PEP did not 
provide detail or procedures on how checks, reviews, coordination, or the Engineering 
Manager's verification would be performed. Concurrent with the late transmittal of the PEP, 
the Contractor issued to the Owner/Employer’s project management team the project Quality 
Assurance Manual stated that: 
 
"The goal of the QA/QC Program is to assure that design, procurement, shop 
fabrication, erection, inspection, testing and turn over activities are performed in 
accordance with the Owner/Employer’s documented requirements, applicable codes, 
governmental regulations and proven good practices.  The contents of this plan are 
intended to describe what is to be done to support achieving this goal, how it will be 
done and how it will be documented and reported to the Owner/Employer. QA/QC 
System for this project is based on a quality management approach to achieve quality 
and addresses the total range of E-P-C activities.  The goal is to build quality into the 
way the Contractor’s project management team defines, plans and executes each 
task in every phase of the project so that non-conformances can be minimized before 
they have an opportunity to impact cost or schedule.  The specific objectives we seek 
to achieve on the Owner/Employer’s project are as follows: to work jointly with 
Owner/Employer to plan and execute the work `right the first time' so that 
unnecessary rework, delays and expense can be minimized."   
 
The Contractor’s Quality Assurance Manual covered engineering Quality Assurance/Quality 
Control (QA/QC), but it referred back to the incomplete PEP.  The Contractor defined the 
purpose and procedures of the Engineering QA/QC Program primary objectives: 
 
"...to be achieved in implementing the Project QA/QC Program during the 
planning and detailed engineering phases of the project are to design safe, 
operable facilities in conformance with Owner/Employer’s performance 
requirements, the PEP, and other requirements, and to control the quality of 
the engineering process so as to minimize error and discrepancies. The 
Contractor’s strategy for defining the details of how engineering tasks are to 
be conducted is established in the PEP. Engineering QA/QC Procedures 
describe how the deliverables (e.g., drawings, specifications, studies) 
produced by each engineering discipline are to be prepared, reviewed, 
checked and approved."   
 
The Contractor detailed various planned quality management activities during engineering: 
  
"QA/QC activities during engineering will be implemented in two stages. 
 
The purpose of the first stage is to ensure that design and engineering tasks 
are performed by qualified personnel with a level of knowledge and 
experience appropriate to the complexity of the task.... 
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The purpose of the second stage of the Engineering QA/QC process is to 
ensure that the quality objectives defined in the Project QA Plan and this plan 
have been satisfied.  This is accomplished as follows: 
 
─ Engineering deliverables are produced, checked, reviewed and 
approved by the Discipline Main Engineers, Discipline Department 
Heads and Engineering Staff in accordance with the procedures 
described in the QA Procedures and Engineering Practices applicable 
to this project."   
 
In the Contractors QA/QC Manual the Author found, the contractor tied the project’s 
engineering quality assurance activities to those the contractor defined in the PEP.  No 
detailed procedures on how activities, such as verification, reviews, checking, and 
coordination, were included in the QA/QC Manual or PEP. The Owner/Employer then 
detailed specific deficiencies in the engineering that the contractor has issued to the 
Owner/Employer and to subcontractors the contractor was using. These were the 
deficiencies that the subcontractors who had made fixed price bids on drawings and 
specifications that had clashes, and related problems were claiming as extras. Thus, under a 
culture of “mutual mistrust,” the Owner/Employer’s project management team had shown 
that the root cause of the problems was in the defining the assumptions on which the 
contractor had based its proposal and the contractor’s failures with respect thereto.  
 
To further illustrate the role of Contract Administration in a project’s overall project 
management plan, the Author perform an analysis of the Owner/Employer project 
management team in a civil works infrastructure construction project in the Philippines in 
which the Owner/Employer terminated the Contractor after 19 months of a planned 48 
months execution.40 Using the lack of performance of the contractor in meeting the Project 
Quality Management requirement of PMI and the Contract, the Owner/Employer’s project 
management team justified the Contractor’s termination. The Contractor completely failed to 
meet the Contract requirements established in the Conditions of the Contracts, and 
international standards, regarding implementation of a Quality Assurance and Quality 
Control program for the project.  As the PMI standards for project management establish, a 
key component of project planning is the QA/QC approach.  Its timely implementation is 
essential to prevent poor workmanship and the impact of resultant repairs, corrections or 
replacements. QA/QC is an integral part of the management and construction process that 
ensure that the project will be a quality final product, built to specifications.  An effective 
program promotes quality both within the organization and in the completed project.  QA/QC 
is a program that must be implemented internally by the organization and must be ongoing 
to maintain quality in work practices and product in order to achieve the best possible results 
on the project.  The QA/QC plan for this Project was required by the Conditions of Contract 
to be submitted for approval and implementation within 6 months of the Notice to Proceed.  
 
Under the EPC Contract, the Contractor was to provide, implement, and administer a Quality 
Assurance/Quality Control program (QA/QC) for both design and construction of the work.  
The Conditions of Contract provided that the Contractor had to: 
 
“Perform all inspections, expediting, quality surveillances, and other like 
service required for performance of the Work, including inspecting all 
materials and equipment that comprise the Project that are to be used in the 
performance of the Work.” 
 
and: 
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“Use effective quality assurance programs, acceptable to Owner/Employer in 
performing the Work.  Within ninety (90) days after the Notice to Proceed 
Date, Contractor shall provide to Owner/Employer a Notice describing such 
programs to be used by Contractor in the performance of the Work.  Owner 
shall have the obligation to promptly review and comment on such programs 
as described in Contractor’s Notice hereunder; provided, however, that 
Contractor shall remain solely responsible for performing the Work in 
accordance with this Contract.  If Owner/Employer fails to comment within ten 
(10) Business Days after receipt of such Notice, Owner/Employer shall be 
deemed to have accepted such programs.” 
 
The EPC Contract detailed the contractor’s QA/QC responsibilities: 
 
“Contractor shall develop and implement a general QA program covering the 
Work and field quality control program and field procedures in order to ensure 
that the Work is performed in accordance with contract drawings, 
specifications and all other applicable code requirements as specified in the 
Contract documents.  Such program shall be submitted to Owner/Employer 
for review and approval pursuant to the Conditions of Contract. 
 
Contractor will verify that the in-progress and final inspections and tests are 
performed and documented as required. 
 
Contractor will maintain accurate and legible records of the quality related 
activities readily available for review by Owner/Employer. 
 
Contractor shall arrange and facilitate Owner/Employer’s inspections in 
Contractor’s and Vendor’s facilities and in the field in accordance with the 
Conditions of Contract.” 
 
To complete the planning aspects, an experienced and competent international EPC 
contractor on a civil works infrastructure Construction project would also have readily 
available, off the shelf, a set of procedures and programs to guide the implementation of a 
project plan.  As part of the Project, for example, the contractor was to provide, implement, 
and administer a Quality Assurance/Quality Control program for both design and 
construction consisting of, but not limited to, the following elements: 
 
1. Develop a design QA/QC manual that will establish guidelines for the 
Engineering/design sub-contractor both for home office as well as site 
engineering work. 
 
2. Develop a Construction QA/QC manual that will establish quality 
control documentation and inspection requirements. 
 
3. Appoint a Quality Control organization which has independent authority 
outside of the project organization and which is staffed with a QA/QC 
Manager and support staffed. 
 
4. Conduct QA/QC inspections prior to initiation of any work, during the 
course of work and at completion and issue deficiency reports as 
appropriate. 
 
4. Establish and implement procedures for corrective action including 
“stop work” orders. 
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5. Provide the Owner/Employer periodic QA/QC reports. 
 
The Author demonstrated from the project records that the Owner/Employer’s project 
management team had maintained that the Contractor disregarded quality management 
from day-one, as evidenced by their disregard for submittal of a QA/QC program in a timely 
manner as required by the EPC contract. Prior to mobilization on site, the Owner/Employer’s 
project management team was given specific notice of the QA program requirements.  Four 
months later, the contractor had to be reminded it required an approved program because 
concrete and road work were being installed, and this work required QA/QC records.  The 
contractor was notified after eleven months by the Owner/Employer was warned that its 
QA/QC practices must improve.  The contractor, however, continued to fail to provide any 
form of QC on the work in progress.  Quality in the work performed was compromised 
without a QA/QC program. 
 
It was not until nearly a year had elapsed that the contractor finally submitted a QA/QC plan, 
but that plan did not meet the minimum standards that the contract required and the 
Owner/employer required re-submittal. The Owner/Employer required the contractor, as part 
of a Recovery Plan, to contact with an independent third-party to supply QA/QC engineers.  
The contractor took another two months to contract with a third party to undertake to its 
QA/QC program responsibilities. A final edition of the QA Program was submitted for use in 
construction of the project 15 months after NTP. 
 
Lack of QC was evident from the start of the first work on site and road work.  The main 
access road work was completed without any QC.  Then the access roads to Adits were 
being constructed with noted quality problems with the sub-base, rip rap, water, slope 
stabilization, grades, culvert and drain sizes, and maintenance.  The road construction was 
completed without engineering or quality control efforts.  The result was wash out of culverts, 
wing walls and severe erosion.  The condition and quality of the access roads affected 
progress of the TBM Adit (an access tunnel for the TBM) and the delivery of cement for the 
batch plant. It became evident that the contractor was not conducting QA/QC inspections nor 
maintaining any documentation, even after the receipt of the QA/QC program from the third 
party.  
 
When the contractor began producing concrete for the batch plant it had erected on the site, 
the contractor was mixing concrete directly on the ground or in a backhoe bucket almost 
guaranteeing out of specification concrete. Additional quality problems were noticed in letters 
with the concrete operation by the Owner/Employer’s project management team: coarse and 
fine aggregates were out of specification, dirty (unwashed) and poorly stockpiled.  Despite 
numerous warnings, these conditions remained a constant problem.  The contractor was not 
following the design mix proportions and went as far as not allowing their QC engineers at 
the batch plant to supervise the concrete quality procedures. 
 
The Author demonstrated that the Owner/Employer’s project management team was acutely 
aware that it had entered into a design-build/EPC contract and could not appear as 
interfering with the Contractor’s means and methods. It continued to give notices of the 
Contractor’s Project Quality Management failures during its execution. In spite of the 
requirements that all work be performed to strict QA/QC standards on the Project, both 
temporary and permanent, the Contractor never established a viable QA/QC program for 
any of the works up to the time it was terminated.  The contractor’s designated QC System 
Manager wrote over 14 months after the site mobilization: 
 
“...since this is the first opportunity to prepare the Monthly QC Report, all QC 
matters from the beginning of the project to the end of [the first 14 months of 
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the project] will be contained to the Report.  QC matters before are the 
submittal of drawings for approval.” 
 
Quality management is a fundamental element of any project management approach.  The 
EPC contract required compliance with requirements that are typical of international projects.  
The Contractor failed completely to meet its QA/QC requirements or to meet fundamental 
international project management standards. After five months of using the QA/QC 
procedures, the contractor was still not submitting the data to the Owner/Employer that the 
EPC contract required. The contractor was also beyond any hope of recovery on the 
schedule or programme and the Owner/Employer’s project management team had 
documented the Contractor’s failure to meet the Conditions of Contract which established 
the bargain the Owner/Employer had made. The contractor was terminated. The Author 
established that the Owner/Employer had been diligent since the inception of the project in 
performing Contract Administration, giving the Notices required under the Conditions of 
Contract, and allowing a reasonable time to correct deficiencies. The Owner/Employer had 
protected its bargain and the contractor had failed.  
 
6.  Project Human Resources Management 
 
Project Human Resource Management concerns the processes required to make the most 
effective use of the people involved with the project. PMBOK states:  
 
“Project Human Resource Management includes the processes that organize 
and manage the project team. The project team is composed of the people 
who have assigned roles and responsibilities for completing the project.”41 
 
The four Project Human Resource Management processes include the following: 
 
1. Human Resource Planning 
2. Acquire Project Team 
3. Develop Project Team 
4. Manage Project Team 
 
The Author similarly demonstrated the contractor on the civil works infrastructure 
construction project in Mexico (see Project Integration Management above) developed the 
unit prices for engineering that the Owner/Employer required in the bid. The Contractor 
submitted the categories and hours for each discipline in an Appendix to the Contract. Thus, 
the assumptions on which its bid was based were recorded. When it prepared a Work 
Breakdown Structure and loaded it on to the schedule that it submitted monthly to the 
Owner/Employer, the contractor’s project management team was appropriately using 
Contract Administration to define its assumptions and updated/statused those assumptions 
monthly throughout the project execution.  To demonstrate the impact on its detailed 
engineering, the Author summarized detailed analyses as follows when it was impacted by 
the OFE (the equipment that was to be provided by the Owner/Employer). 
 
The Author produced Figure III.B.6.1 that showed the distribution of engineering man-hour 
overruns for all engineering over the entire Project. The piping overruns account for half of 
the total engineering overruns and structural engineering accounts for 24 percent. Process 
engineering shows a small 2 percent value which is deceptive because the process 
engineering drives all subsequent design and procurement activities.  
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Figure III.B.6.1 
Percent Distribution of the Eight Engineering Categories that Comprise 90% of the 
Engineering Man-hour Overruns 
Engineering Manhour Overage Percentages
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8% 0%
Structural Process Piping Mechanical
Loss Control Instrumentation Electrical Architectural
 
 
Next the Author presented the “Cumulative Distribution and Primary Disciplines for 
90 percent of Engineering Man-hour Overruns for the time period at issue.” The 90 percent 
value for all engineering manhours was selected to reduce the number of activities to 
analyze from the Working Schedule. Of the more than 1,200 activities identified as having 
either started late or completing in a longer time than planned, just 447 of those activities 
represent 90 percent of the man-hour overage for the time period.  
 
Whereas piping accounts for the greatest man-hour overage for the Project as a whole, 
Structural Engineering and 3D CADD (computer aided design) proved the greatest overrun 
from April 17, 1999 to January 14, 2000 as illustrated by the Author in Figure III.B.6.2: 
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Figure III.B.6.2 
Cumulative Distribution and Primary Disciplines  
for 90% of Engineering Man-hour Overruns for the Project Period 
April 17, 1999 to January 14, 2000 
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The contractor kept both the Owner/Employer and the third party Supervisor informed of the 
delays to engineering work and reasons for delays throughout the project execution. Minutes 
to the monthly review meetings, wherein all parties were represented, documented the 
issues that delayed engineering during this project period. Also, the project records 
demonstrated the contractor’s willingness, and actual efforts to ameliorate the difficulties 
encountered, which difficulties were largely attributable to the Owner/Employer. Causation 
was demonstrated by the Author from those records regarding each piece of OFE and that 
the contractor reported to the Owner/Employer through Contract Administration efforts that 
reported monthly the delay/acceleration and the impact on the human resources that the 
contractor had bid through the WBS and the unit prices. Results of the Author’s analysis are 
shown in following Figure III.B.6.3 and Figure III.B.6.4. The project records that were 
supplied monthly relative to the impacts caused by late OFE data and changes support the 
results the Author found. 
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Figure III.B.6.3 
Causation Breakdown for Engineering Manhours in Project Period 
 
 
The Author demonstrated on behalf of the contractor to the Owner/Employer that incomplete 
OFE and lack of OFE vendor data combined comprised more than 55 percent of the man-
hours overrun that it experienced in this period. Design errors and changes due to bid basis 
errors that were caused by the Supervisor and other Supervisor changes collectively 
accounted for about one-third of the impacted man-hours in the period. The Author’s 
analysis also demonstrated that the contractor’s own error & omissions and inefficiencies 
impacts as well – 3.9 percent of the engineering man-hours.  Costs associated with these 
inefficiencies were deducted from the amount that the contractor claimed for the period or 
window being analyzed. 
 
Despite the accountability for some of the engineering man-hours, the contractor’s 
acceleration efforts during the project period brought engineering to about 85 percent 
completion versus 88 percent planned (or to 97-percent of plan). The Contractor had 
reported in the prior project period that engineering was only at 60-percent of plan. The 
Author demonstrated that the contractor had undertaken significant efforts to recover 
impacted man-hours imposed upon it by the Owner/Employer’s and its Supervisor’s errors of 
late OFE engineering data. The total engineering manhours expended in this project period 
accelerated as was shown by the Contractor to have increased by a factor of over two in 
comparison to the original plan.  
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Figure III.B.6.4 
Actual Engineering Acceleration vs. Plan and Adjusted Plan 
 
 
The overall gains realized were a logical byproduct of acceleration to each of the 
engineering disciplines. The contractor had shown that actual engineering man-hours had 
been expended occurred at a rate 6.5 times greater than planned using the WBS as it was 
loaded on to the contractor’s schedules. A summary Table III.B.6.1 was then presented by 
the contractor that compared the original planned rate of progress versus the actual 
progress rate achieved for each of the engineering disciplines. As the Author had shown, the 
contractor accelerated every engineering discipline whether compared to the original 
planned manhours. 
 
 
Table III.B.6.1  
COMPARISON OF PLANNED VS. ACTUAL PROGRESS RATES FOR 
ENGINEERING* 
Engineering Discipline Original Plan vs. Actual Progress Rate Achieved 
Process 6.5 
Structural 1.5 
Piping 2.7 
Instrumentation 2.3 
Electrical 2.0 
Mechanical 1.9 
Loss Control 3.2 
Architectural 3.4 
Total Engineering 2.1 
Notes: 
*  Values greater than 1 indicate the Contractor’s acceleration 
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The contractor had applied the concepts of Contract Administration in all of its project 
management processes. The contractor had defined in a thorough manner the assumptions 
it had based its bid and proposed engineering man-hours. The Contractor’s project 
management team was ever alert to the erosion of the basis of its bargain, and then report 
and kept the Owner/Employer informed. The Owner/Employer had the same data then as 
the contractor, and it used the data to show that the attribution of man-hours for the 
contractor’s errors and omissions was reported at too low a level. Ultimately, through good 
Contract Administration the parties succeeded in keeping a bargain that reflected the 
changes through a process of “mutual mistrust.”    
 
7. Project Communications Management 
 
According to the PMBOK: 
 
Project Communications Management is the Knowledge Area that employs 
the processes required to ensure timely and appropriate generation, 
collection, distribution, storage, retrieval, and ultimate disposition of project 
information.”42 
 
The Project Communications Management processes include the following: 
 
• Communications Planning 
• Information Distribution 
• Performance Reporting 
• Manage Stakeholders 
 
The PMBOK requirement thus covers the timely reporting in information from one party to 
the other party that the Conditions of Contract require. Both the Owner/Employer and the 
Contractor must be familiar with the specific Conditions of Contract regarding the timing of 
notice. As noted above, a party can lose its bargain by giving notice in an untimely manner 
or an incomplete (unsupported) manner. Similarly, the failure to respond within the time the 
Conditions of Contract require or in an unsupported or incomplete manner may cost the 
party the benefits of its bargain. Additionally, the project management teams of both parties 
in exercising Contract Administration must record and distribute information sufficient for 
their respective project management personnel and the senior management personnel to 
make informed decisions. Thus, for example, regarding the civil works infrastructure 
construction project in Mexico discussed above, the contractor’s project management team 
recorded in a detailed fashion the assumptions that under laid the bargain that it made with 
the contract, and shared information regarding items, such as, monthly scheduling 
performance (both delay and acceleration), the failures of the information provided by the 
Owner/Employer (or its third party Supervisor), the details of the impacts, etc.  As a result, 
the Owner/Employer and its project management team were fully informed on a continuous 
basis, thus affording the Owner/Employer the opportunity to correct deficiencies and 
minimize the impacts.  
 
Conversely, with regards to the civil works infrastructure construction project in the 
Philippines that the Author evaluated (see Project Quality Management above), the 
contractor totally failed in its Project Communication Management responsibilities and did 
not in any way meet the communication or documentation requirements. The extensive 
notices that the Owner/Employer sent to the contractor were not answered, were answered 
orally by personnel who were not recognized or authorized by the Conditions of Contract, 
answered orally and not followed by confirmation in writing, or exhibited no evidence of 
making any change as result of such notice.  Although the PMBOK recognizes the existence 
on most projects of “informal lines of communication” and oral communications, the current 
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trend in the global market is to confirm in writing all oral communications in order to establish 
a documented written trail which records the action of the party. Today, the extensive use of 
emails as an acceptable form of communication is recognized. Email communications have 
an “almost life of their own,” as emails exist somewhere in the ethos of the web and are 
never really deleted. In some jurisdictions, however, there is still a need to formally transmit 
a written communication, although it appears to be a function tied to the law specified in the 
Contract. Ultimately, with respect to the Philippines civil works infrastructure construction 
project, the Author showed that the contractor’s project management team recognized its 
obligations as contained in the Conditions of Contract (both the proper project management 
personnel authorized to communicate and the timing responsibility) through its internal 
emails. The contractor’s internal emails further had established an intent to deceive the 
Owner/Employer by getting the Owner/Employer’s personnel “off their back” by telling them 
what “they wanted to hear.”      
 
Within the global market, there is a belief that the informed Owner/Employer or the informed 
contractor is a party with whom the other party has entered into a partnership of “mutual 
mistrust,” but they should not be agonizing over facts, merely the consequences or impacts. 
Thus, the requirement of Contract Administration is for the project management team to 
produce for its party a communications manual that guides the party in the communications 
that it is required to meet the requirements of the Conditions of Contract regarding the 
timing, the personnel who receive communications, and how often or when they are 
required.    
 
8. Project Risk Management 
 
According to the PMBOK: 
 
“Project Risk Management includes the processes concerned with conducting 
risk management planning, identification, analysis, responses, and monitoring 
and control on a project; most of these processes are updated throughout the 
project.”43 
 
The Project Risk Management Processes include the following: 
 
1. Risk Management Planning 
2. Risk Identification 
3. Qualitative Risk Analysis 
4. Quantitative Risk Analysis 
5. Risk Response Planning 
6. Risk Monitoring and Control 
 
Every party to a civil works infrastructure construction project holds a particular and unique 
position relative to the risk elements for which it assumes responsibility during the execution 
of that project. The civil works infrastructure construction global market recognizes two types 
of risk management: 
 
• Traditional insurance risk management, which is concerned with the 
management of the party’s insurance program (i.e. builders risk insurance, 
hazard insurance and liability insurance). 
 
• Execution risk management, which is concerned with the management of 
specific events or conditions which may inhibit or prevent the achievement of 
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project cost, schedule and/or quality goals (i.e. design defects and 
construction delays). 
 
The PMBOK is concerned primarily with the latter. Risk typically is defined as an element or 
factor arising during project execution which inhibits or negates the achievement of stated 
project cost, schedule or quality goals.  Risk is both a potential condition and a specific 
element or event which may result in that condition. Project Risk Management is composed 
of systematic process by which risk elements or conditions may be identified, evaluated and 
avoided, mitigated or eliminated, in order to preserve the achievement of project cost, 
schedule, and quality goals. Project Risk Management is the common term for a systematic 
program by which a party to a construction project identifies, evaluates, and acts to avoid, 
mitigate or eliminate risk elements or factors which threaten the successful achievement of 
project cost, schedule, scope, quality, and goals. 
 
The bases of Project Risk Management are measures of success or failure, extremes 
between which many permutations of partial success are most likely.  Project management 
research has addressed metrics in many forums which generally focus on measurable 
functionality, scope, cost and timeliness.44 In the practical reality of projects, the success is 
more likely perceived than measured by most stakeholders. Recent research suggests that: 
 
“…each stakeholder assesses project success on the basis of evaluation dimensions 
that fit within his own agenda or within the interests of the group he 
represents….Perceptions may sometimes be incorrect representations of reality, but 
perceptions are the [stakeholders] sole possession and are the very basis upon 
which he makes his decisions.”45  
 
The typical stakeholder representative as a consequence develops metrics and measure 
success in terms that satisfy the stakeholder’s project’s goals. 
 
Risk reduction and risk management is the key to improved project management and 
developing success metrics. Project and stakeholder success can be demonstrated through 
risk reduction and resultant impacts as risks emerge.  Thus, risk management currently is 
heralded as a panacea for reduction in project execution problems and impacts.  Proper use 
can go a long way towards achieving much of the risk reduction that is desired.  Project Risk 
Management standard is the most recently developed knowledge area of PMBOK, but 
broadly based risk management tools over the life of a project are not widely understood and 
their application recognized by most project stakeholders. As a result, effective Project Risk 
Management on projects has evolved dramatically over the last two decades.  Early 
techniques were heavily focused on theoretical statistical techniques, but the current focus is 
on practicality in application and has driven much of current Project Risk Management use 
and techniques being applied on civil works infrastructure construction projects globally.     
 
Using a pipeline for an example, Project Risk Management provides the ability to identify 
risks, determine characteristics of risk emergence, measurement through control systems, 
and application of enhanced project management methods for improved achievement of 
project and stakeholder goals throughout the life of a pipeline project.46 As shown in Figure 
III.B.8.1, the life of every civil works infrastructure construction project has what can be 
likened to seasons:  
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Figure III.B.8.1 
 
 
 
 
Risk management is essential to recognize and develop input to meet the different needs for 
the project and respective stakeholders success throughout the seasons of a project’s life – 
a Project’s Spring season (from the identification of a possible need that may become a 
Project to its financing/funding), a Project’s Summer season (Project execution), a Project’s 
Fall season (project use), and a Project’s Winter season (sustainable recycling). As 
employed throughout a project’s life, risk management requires focus and appropriate 
management techniques. Throughout a project’s life there are organizations with a stake in 
the Project who’s project management personnel or the equivalent are responsible for 
assuring goals are met and ever-present risks are managed. With project risk management 
processes becoming a growing part of successful project management processes, 
stakeholders must identify and use risk management tools that are applicable to the risks 
faced and assure effective return in managing those risks should the potential risks actually 
begin to affect the project. 
 
Again using the pipeline example to illustrate civil works infrastructure construction projects 
in the global market,47 ranging from water distribution to gas pipelines, provides insight into 
the type of Stakeholder risks that must be considered and addressed. Project records 
employed include risk assessments, risk profiles, risk management audits, project controls 
reports, and management reports. Generally, during the project’s “Spring,” risks are focused 
on assuring the proper balance between project specific risks (e.g., technology applicability) 
and context specific risks (e.g., cultural-social issues) to assure that the capital investment is 
not wasted.  As the project delivery (design, procurement, construction, and commissioning) 
occurs in the project’s “Summer,” risks reflect typical engineering and construction 
implementation issues.   Following commissioning, projects enter the long “Fall” of its use.  
Risks typically involve proper maintenance, improvement, and changing needs in light of 
evolving societal/demographic or operation/economic conditions.  During its “Winter,” the 
project increasingly faces the changing requirements on sustainability and recycling in an 
evermore environmentally sensitive world.  Thus, Project Risk Management tools enable 
project management teams to identify, monitor and execute appropriate project management 
processes to meet the challenge of minimizing risk emergence impacts in a “season.” 
 
During the project’s life, current global practice focuses Project Risk Management on both 
the project itself and the environment in which it is conceived, executed, operated and 
terminated.  The key step of identifying risks that potentially may affect the pipeline project 
and its stakeholders come from many sources and change over time.  Using socio-
economic, commercial, and related trends in civil works infrastructure construction projects, 
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the Author has defined specific project factors and context specific factors enable necessary 
focusing on risk.  Typical risk factors include:  
  
Project Specific Factors: 
 
• Delivery/Operation Risk. The ability to overcome the risk of delivering and 
operating the project as conceived. This risk factor involves those issues or 
concerns associated with actual engineering, procurement, construction 
execution and operation of the project, including non-traditional approaches 
such as a public owner’s use of design-build contracts. 
 
• Technology Risk. The ability to overcome the technological risks of the 
project. This risk factor involves those issues or concerns associated with the 
technologies involved in the execution methods and operational technology of 
the project. 
 
• Financial Risk. The ability to overcome the financial risk of the project through 
to final completion and operation. This risk factor involves those issues or 
concerns associated with the financing of the project, including the execution 
period and operations or equity financing. 
 
• Procurement-Contractual Risk. The ability to overcome the risks associated 
with the procurement of, or contracting for the execution and operation of the 
project. This risk factor involves those issues or concerns associated with the 
contractual and procurement approaches – systems - processes used for 
both project execution and operation. 
  
Project Context Factors: 
 
• Political Risk. The ability to overcome the political risk of the project, including; 
local, state and national political opposition, and code and regulatory 
impediments. This risk factor involves those issues or concerns associated 
with the local, regional and national political and regulatory situation 
confronting the project. 
 
• Environmental Risk. The ability to overcome the environmental risks of the 
project. This risk factor involves those issues or concerns associated with the 
environmental problems, concerns and activities confronting the project 
during the project execution and the project operation. 
 
• Social Risk. The ability to overcome the social risks of the project. This risk 
factor involves those issues or concerns associated with the social and 
cultural impacts of the project to the community and region within which it is to 
be located. 
 
• Economic Risk. The ability to overcome the economic impact risks of the 
project. This risk factor involves those issues or concerns associated with the 
macro economic impact of the project to the community and region within 
which it is to be located. 
 
All civil works infrastructure projects start as an idea; that is, a concept that will fill a specific 
need, within a specific time, and at a specific location. Thus, the primary party involvements 
are those of the owner-operators, financing sources, and users. Since there are essentially 
no limits or boundaries on concepts – if it can be imagined, someone can turn the concept 
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into a project.  But, there are enormous risks involved in moving a project from concept 
through feasibility to financing. It is no longer enough to have a “good idea” upon which to 
seek funding or financing. In today’s global economic structure the “good idea” must be 
backed by analysis and examination of the multitude of risks involved in executing and 
assuring a useful life. As projects become increasing complex and as competition for a share 
of the finite pool of global capital resources (public and private) to undertake projects 
increases, financing-funding sources must make well based decisions on which investments 
have the best chance of a significant return (economic or social). These decisions are tied to 
identifying potential risks and managing those risks. 
 
However, not every concept should be or is transitioned into a project. Therefore, early in a 
project’s life, the stakeholders test the project’s assumed physical, technological and 
expense parameters versus the potential project’s need, feasibility and return on investment.  
A civil works infrastructure project concept at least must pass three tests to be practical:48 
 
1. Can the project be physically engineered and constructed? 
 
2. Does the technology exist to engineer and construct the project to meet the 
purpose intended? 
 
3. Does the expected benefit of the project justify the cost of engineering, 
constructing and operating the project? 
 
If a concept fails any of the three tests, realistically it should not be built. Ancient to recent 
history is full of examples of projects which never should have been undertaken because the 
concepts failed to pass one or more of these three tests. Yet, there still are examples of 
projects being built in almost any location in the world which fail one or even all of the tests. 
Similarly, the tests must be applied to stakeholders, since the execution of those projects 
that fail one or more tests also have serious economic or social side affects, some intended 
and some unintended. Ultimately, risks from not balancing stakeholder goals can become 
“locked in” if the project is financed or funded to begin the “Summer” of its life, and risk 
impacts are assured. 
 
Project Risk Management tools used in a civil works infrastructure construction projects 
include risk models and data that allow a rating of potential risks and provide input to shape 
project management processes as the project moves into its execution phase. Such Project 
Risk Management tools focus on providing developers (public and private) and financing-
funding decision makers with the means for determining risks from the typical project and 
context specific conditions noted above. Additionally, in the competition for financing-funding 
from limited capital, modeling compares the civil works infrastructure projects to other 
potential projects and their capital use demand.  For example, typical of current oil and gas 
pipeline risk issues being addressed includes: 
 
• Reserves Risk (an Operations Risk Factor): Addresses the extent of reserves 
and contingency to be transported, and not only the anchor field, but also 
reserve risk associated with the prospects and discoveries in the area. 
 
• Credit Risk (a Financial Risk Factor): Customer credit risk is a new risk issue 
stemming from the large inflow of small cap independents and the formation 
of many LLC's (Limited Liability Corporations) without any real assets. 
 
• Engineering Risk (a Technology Risk factor): The Exploration and Production 
requirements continuously are pushing the deepwater envelop. A large risk 
consideration is that the meteorological-ocean data (current and waves) 
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is empirical and is changing with new measurement information becoming 
available every year. 
 
• Materials Risks (a Procurement Risk Factor): The huge costs of pipeline 
projects are driving the search for the cheapest material that meets 
specification which is to be fabricated in a location that has the least cost – 
often in different countries. 
 
• Weather Risks (an Environmental Risk Factor): Loop currents and named 
storm risks are plaguing many off-shore projects, yet are increasingly 
uninsurable or not assignable. 
 
• Insurance Risks (an Economic Risk Factor): The global reinsurance market 
currently has severe capital restrictions that are restricting access to project 
insurance. 
 
• Customer Project Risks (a Political Risk Factor): Pipelines are a 
transportation system that relies on customer projects for its need and use. 
Political stability underpins many such projects and their market viability. 
 
• People Risks (a Social Risk Factor): Changing social relationships and forced 
cultural changes of linear projects, like pipelines, are destabilizing local 
support and long term operability conditions.    
 
Resulting risk model information typically is summarized graphically as in following Figure 
III.B.8.2 which has been hypothesized from an Analysis by the Author of a proposed pipeline 
project designated “Kobe.” It demonstrates the areas of risk to be managed and addressed. 
Financing-funding organizations can assess the risks and evaluate Project Management 
capabilities to address the risks and meet goals. With financing-funding the “planned” Project 
becomes a real Project to be executed and the Project moves into the “Summer” of its life. 
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Figure  III.B .8 .2
P IPELIN E  PR O JEC T R ISK  A SSESSM EN T R ELA TIO N A L R A TIN G S G RA PH
 
For Owner/Employers and contractors that have entered into a contract for a civil works 
infrastructure construction project the risks are typically in not achieving the project scope, 
quality, functionality, cost and/or time that is the bargain that they made. Similarly, they both 
also must recognize how, what, when and where the risks of their not meeting project 
objectives means, and thus the benefits of the bargain that they respectively made. The 
amount of risk each party undertakes is different at different points in the project, The 
following Figure III.B.6.3 prepared by the Author illustrates for the Author’s experience how 
risk flows throughout engineering and construction process plotted against the options the 
parties have available to influence or manage that risk.  The deeper into the project each 
party goes, the fewer risk management options available.   Wait too long and its only option 
is a claim or a dispute.  
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Fig u r e  III.B. 8.3
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The role of Contract Administration in the Project Risk Management processes is one of 
“mutual mistrust,” that is, anticipating where the other party and/or the project will be at risk 
in achieving project success.49 There is a definitive shift in the functional, management and 
control focus of risk management passing from the Owner/Employer to the contractor which 
occurs during the Bid Award phase of the project duration. The Project Formation stage of 
the typical project life cycle consists of the following activities: 
 
• Concept – during this phase the Owner/Employer identifies the need for the 
civil works infrastructure project and establishes the initial outer limit 
parameters of the project in terms of function, location, and preliminary 
funding and timing targets. 
 
• Feasibility – during this phase the Owner/Employer establishes the 
fundamental design and construction attributes of the concept of the 
infrastructure project and prepares an order of magnitude cost estimate and 
schedule for completion of the project based on those fundamental design 
and construction attributes. 
 
• Financing – during this phase the Owner/Employer secures financing or 
dedicates funding for the project based upon the order of magnitude cost and 
schedule estimate, the comparative need for the project (evaluation and 
ranking of all capital projects identified to attain a priority ranking), the total 
capital funds available, the feasibility of completing the project as planned and 
the cost to benefit ratio expected as a result of placing the completed 
structure of facility into its intended service. 
 
• Strategy Formation – during this phase the Owner/Owner finalizes the primary 
cost, schedule and quality goals for the project, selects the project delivery 
system, identifies the contractual and payment methods, drafts the contract 
document set, sets the basic design or performance specifications for the 
structure or facility, and establishes it’s own project management and control 
processes, procedures and organization. 
 
• Bid Award – during this phase the Owner/Employer develops and issues a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) or similar notice against which contractors will 
respond. During this phase the contractor will examine the RFP, develop a 
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project execution plan, estimate the cost to complete the full scope of work 
delineated, prepare the project schedule for completion of the scope of work, 
and undertake all of the other activities required within the RFP.  
 
As can be seen in list, the Owner/Employer bears the sole responsibility for completing all of 
the Project Risk Management functions for the entire civil works infrastructure construction 
project until the Bid Award phase at which point the contractor begins to develop its own 
Project Risk Management plans in response the tender. Every project risk management 
action taken during the Project Execution stage is based upon and flow directly from the 
decisions made by the Owner/Employer and winning contractor during the Project Formation 
stage. 
 
From the Owner/Employer’s perspective, a civil works infrastructure construction project is 
successful when the Owner’s cost, schedule, quality, scope, and functionality goals are met. 
The Owner/Employer is at the top of the project risk management structure. If the 
Owner/Employer’s project management does not practice sound risk management, then it is 
almost a given that risks will be unidentified, misevaluated, unallocated, misallocated, and 
mismanaged during the execution of the construction project. How an Owner/Employer 
manages risk, and the Project Risk Management that it requires of the other parties that it 
brings into the construction project, will determine whether or not a project is successful. In 
the end, every risk element which is not actively managed and controlled has the potential to 
preclude the achievement of the Owner/Employer’s goals for the project.50 
 
Until the point at which an Owner/Employer takes deliberate action to involve other parties in 
the execution of a civil works infrastructure construction project, all of the risk inherent in that 
project is the sole responsibility of the Owner/Employer. Once the Owner/Employer has 
decided to pay another party to assume specific elements of risk, it has a series of important 
decisions to make, such as which risks to allocate and which to keep; which project delivery 
method will provide the most suitable management of the inherent risk; which contractual 
provisions and payment methodologies are most compatible to the project delivery method 
and best suited for controlling the risk elements inherent in the infrastructure project. There 
are certain elements which are common to every sound Project Risk Management program: 
 
• Project Risk Profile Development 
 
• Project Risk Element Allocation 
 
• Project Delivery System Selection 
 
• Project Contract Form and Provisions 
 
The core of every formal Project Risk Management program is a process by which all project 
risk elements are identified, evaluated and action plans prepared. A Project Risk Profile is an 
amalgamation of all the risk elements which are inherent in the civil works infrastructure 
construction project. Within that Project Risk Profile risk elements are identified, evaluated, 
and specific actions plans are established for addressing each of the risk elements 
contained within the profile. An Owner’s Project Risk Profile should attempt to identify and 
evaluate every risk inherent within the project to be executed. Execution risks on any 
construction project flow from a variety of sources, which include: 
 
• Construction Industry Environmental - certain risk elements exist simply 
because of the nature of the construction industry environment as a whole 
(i.e. construction is a physical undertaking and is thus exposed to natural 
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phenomena and conditions which can impact any element of the construction 
project). 
 
• Facility or Structure Specific - certain risk elements are inherent in the type of 
infrastructure facility or structure to be constructed (i.e. a large water 
treatment facility vs. a high speed highway interchange). 
 
• Legal Environment – certain risk elements are inherent to the legal jurisdiction 
within which the structure or facility is to be built (i.e. legislative funding 
limitations or restrictions on procurement methods). 
 
• Decision Specific – certain risks are built into the project by the decisions or 
actions (or failures to act) of the Owner/Employer and Contractor during the 
civil works infrastructure construction project (for example, deciding to 
execute the project as fixed price EPC contract or employing a fast track 
schedule to completion). 
 
Regardless of the source from which a particular risk element may flow, once the risk 
elements are in place within the body of the project they become inherent to that 
construction project. Regardless of which party to a project is ultimately responsible for the 
control, management or liability of a particular risk element, the risk element continues to 
exist as a threat to the successful execution of the project as a whole.  
 
The Owner/Employer’s position in managing risk on any civil works infrastructure 
construction project is concerned, it is important to remember that what it does not know can 
hurt it. An Owner/Employer has generally three options relative to those elements of risk 
which are inherent within an infrastructure construction project: 
 
• Retain and manage risk elements. 
 
• Allocate the responsibility and liability for managing risk elements to other 
parties to the project. 
 
• Insure against the impact of risk elements. 
 
A risk element must be allocated contractually or legally or insured against by the 
Owner/Employer. Consequently, an Owner/Employer cannot exercise its option to either 
insure or allocate those risk elements which it has failed to identify. And any risk element 
that an Owner/Employer fails to identify and then properly allocate remains, by default, the 
responsibility of the Owner/Employer during the execution of the project. Thus, however, the 
simple act of allocating various risk elements to other parties does not eliminate those risk 
elements as a factor within the body of the project. What an Owner/Employer is allocating to 
other parties is the responsibility for managing the risk element and liability for the impact to 
cost, schedule or quality created if that risk element does manifest during the execution of 
the project. If a risk element manifests itself during the execution of the project, the 
manifested risk will impact scope, cost, schedule and/or quality. While an Owner/Employer 
may have passed liability on to another party, the mere fact that cost, schedule, scope, and 
quality were impacted will have some effect on the Owner/Employer’s own goals. 
 
Each risk element poses a different level of threat to the attainment of project cost, schedule, 
scope, and quality goals. At a minimum a risk element evaluation should consider the 
likelihood of the risk element manifesting on the project and the impact to cost, schedule 
and/or quality should that risk impact the project. A risk element evaluation can be done on a 
simple matrix format which categorizes a risk as having a high, medium or low probability 
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and a high, medium or low impact on the project goals should it manifest. At the other end of 
the evaluation spectrum one can utilize sophisticated computer generated probability 
models, such as, a Monte Carlo simulation in order to actually model a risk element to attain 
detailed statistical analysis of probability over a range of scenarios. The evaluation method 
used is a matter of choice by the Owner/Employer with each method having definite 
advantages and disadvantages that an Owner/Employer should take into consideration as it 
develops its Project Risk Management program. Regardless of the method used, however, 
risk elements must be evaluated simply to ensure that an Owner/Employer has focused the 
right amount of attention on the right risk elements as it makes the thousands of decisions 
which go into the strategic planning of the civil works infrastructure construction project. 
 
From that evaluation process an Owner/Employer identifies those risks which pose the most 
significant threat to the successful completion of the project and the full attainment of the 
project goals. Using the results of that evaluation an Owner/Employer can make informed 
decisions as to risk allocation among the project parties and establish the level of control or 
monitoring it should establish for each risk element during execution. Decisions as to 
whether to retain, allocate or insure a risk element depend upon the evaluation of an 
individual risk, the rule of thumb being that a risk should be assigned to the party in the best 
position to manage or control that risk. Thus: 
 
• An Owner/Employer should retain those risk elements which it is in the best 
position to manage or control. For example: Owner/Employer’s may retain the 
right to initiate and approve changes to the design of a civil works 
infrastructure construction project. 
 
• An Owner/Employer should allocate those risk elements which another party 
to the project is in the best position to manage or control. For example: An 
Owner/Employer may allocate the responsibility to meet all applicable codes 
and regulatory requirements to the contractor. 
 
• An Owner/Employer should consider insuring against the impact of the risk 
element should it manifest during execution of the project, if a risk element is 
beyond any party’s ability to manage or control. For example: an 
Owner/Employer may secure insurance against the possibility of a typhoon 
destroying the structure or facility prior to the completion of construction. 
 
Understanding the nature of the risk, the likelihood of a risk element occurring and the 
possible impact to cost, schedule, scope and quality, if the risk element occurs, are all 
factors that the Owner should consider during the Project Formation of the project. 
Decision’s as to how to manage and control those risk elements which have been identified 
and evaluated are the some of most important that an Owner/Employer will make over the 
course of any civil works infrastructure construction project. 
 
Only the Owner/Employer gets to choose which party to a civil works infrastructure 
construction project is allocated which risk element inherent within that infrastructure project 
and allocation of risk elements is one of the most important management decisions an 
Owner/Employer will make during the entire project life cycle. In the most recent past the 
theory was that an Owner should divest itself of as much risk as possible either through 
insurance or allocation of risk to other parties to the project. The theory was that the more 
risk allocated to others the less risk faced by the Owner/Employer. Unfortunately, the 
concept of total risk divestiture under any project delivery system was based on the mistaken 
assumption that once a risk element was allocated to others it (1) ceased to be a concern to 
the Owner/Employer and (2) had no impact on the Owner/Employer’s cost, schedule, quality 
or quality goals. However, those assumptions have been proven false.  
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Therefore, the trend for civil works infrastructure construction projects is to allocate risk 
elements on the basis of identifying the party within the project structure which is best 
equipped and best positioned to manage that particular risk element. For example: the 
parties best equipped and best positioned to handle risks associated with meeting local, 
state and federal laws, regulations and codes are the contractors under a fixed price EPC 
contract. Therefore the responsibility and liability should be allocated as appropriate to the 
contractor under such a contracting approach. However, the party best equipped and 
positioned to manage and control changes to the project is the Owner/Employer. Therefore 
the responsibility and liability to manage and control change should be retained by the 
Owner/Employer. 
 
Owner/Employers should take in account previous experience with similar civil works 
infrastructure construction projects when identifying various risks that it should consider. On 
a project the Author evaluated, for example, the Owner/Employer took previous experience 
into consideration when considering the risks to adequately handle in a follow on civil works 
infrastructure construction project in Australia.51 The Project was a major infrastructure 
improvement undertaken by an Owner/Employer (a concessionaire and a government 
agency) to transform a congested and inadequate road network with new tunnels, urban 
expressways, elevated roadways, bridges spanning major rivers, and state-of-the-art 
electronic traffic management systems. The primary goal was to reduce traffic within a major 
city and to reduce traffic congestion and travel time to and from the City’s international 
airport. The Owner/Employer contracted with a Concessionaire under a Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI).52 The Concessionaire and the government agency together acted as the 
Owner/Employer under the fixed price EPC contract.  
 
One element evaluated for the risk assessment was the Project construction schedule as 
prepared by the contractor, which was retained by the Concessionaire. The evaluation 
revealed that the Critical Path Method (CPM) schedule, which consisted of more than 10,000 
activities, was being subjected to thousands of constraints. It was further learned that there 
was no contractual or optional relationship for the constraints. Specific areas of risk and 
potential impacts from the manually applied constraints to activities on the CPM schedule 
included:  
 
• Potential risk of forcing activities on or off the critical path, which could, in 
turn, indicate project delay and responsibilities that might not reflect the actual 
critical path or the actual delay occurring to the project. 
 
• Potential risk that project reporting based upon schedules with multiple non-
contractual constraints could misrepresent the actual planned or forecasted 
progress dates, which in turn could result in the owner’s inability to effectively 
monitor the Project. 
 
• Potential inability to mitigate or eliminate the impacts of issues that might 
arise on the Project. 
 
•  Multiple non-contractual constraints not corresponding with International 
Scheduling Practices could raise unnecessary reviews or questions, which 
could further divert attention from the real issues that need to be addressed 
by the Project parties. 
 
The Owner/Employer addresses lessons learned in the follow-on civil works infrastructure 
construction projects by: employing a Project Risk Management system to assure success, 
as Owner/Employer it would be able to quickly identify the constraints placed in the CPM 
5/2/2007                                                   III-                     Thesis of Kris R. Nielsen (DRAFT)                           74
schedule, which then could serve as the starting point of commentary regarding the CPM 
schedule and changes that were necessary. 
 
But the contractor has no Project Risk Management role in a civil works infrastructure 
construction project until the point at which the Owner/Employer issues the RFP requesting 
bids or tenders. Then the contractor must engage in Project Risk Management.53 The first 
step that a prudent contractor should take will be exactly the same as that taken by the 
Owner/Employer: prepare a profile of the risk elements which have been allocated by the 
Owner/Employer to the contractor. From the contractor’s perspective the risk elements 
include the discrete items delineated within the project scope of work (i.e. deliverables). The 
contractor must: 
 
• Develop plans for executing the scope of work (deliverables), taking into 
account those risk elements which will pose a threat to the completion of 
those deliverables. 
 
• Develop the schedule for completion of the scope of work taking into account 
those risk elements which will pose a threat to the completion of those 
deliverables as scheduled. 
 
• Prepare a bid cost estimate for the completion of the scope of work taking into 
account those risk elements which will pose a threat to the completion of the 
these deliverables as estimated. 
 
The contractor works under two significant disadvantages: 
 
• It has a very limited time within which to prepare bid or tender which 
significantly restricts the depth to which it can conduct any analysis of the risk 
elements inherent within the project; and 
 
• Its initial cost to prepare the bid or tender is, in itself, a significant risk to the 
contractor, as the contractor must invest money which it may never recover in 
an attempt to win a competitively bid project award.  
 
Executing those steps noted above can be costly and time consuming, yet must be well 
done if the contractor is to have a chance to win the bid for a civil works infrastructure 
construction project. The contractor always walks a very fine and precarious line between 
over-investing and under-investing in the preparation of the bid and there is no simple 
formula that the contractor can apply that will tell it what the “right” level of investment might 
be. If the contractor invests too little and thus fails to correctly establish the risk profile for the 
project it runs the risk of winning a project only to find it has underestimated the cost and 
time it will take to successfully execute the scope of work. If the contactor invests too much 
in preparing the bid or tender it may accurately identify the risk elements but attempting to 
recover its “sunk cost” of bidding may result in submittal of a price which is non-competitive 
and thus lose the award of the project. 
 
Once the decision has been made to bid or tender, a contractor has a definitive risk 
management role to play in the project, the results of which can potentially win or loose the 
award and just as importantly, lead to the success or failure of the Owner/Employer to 
achieve its cost, schedule, scope, and quality goals. The contractor must exercise a 
consistent approach and in exercising its probable Contract Administration role under the 
anticipation that it will win the bid. As a result, the contractor must rely on those documents 
issued by the Owner/Employer and its own civil works infrastructure construction project 
experience in order to prepare a definitive risk profile for the infrastructure project it is 
5/2/2007                                                   III-                     Thesis of Kris R. Nielsen (DRAFT)                           75
bidding. The typical first step is a straight forward exercise: the contractor must abstract all of 
the risk elements allocated by the Owner/Employer to the contractor via the RFP document 
set (including the Conditions of Contract).  
 
The second typical step, however, is somewhat more difficult in that the contractor must first 
identify those risk elements within that document set which appear to be missing. Second it 
must identify those risk elements which are presented with conflicting contractual provisions, 
for example, allocation of the schedule risk to the Contractor while the Owner/Employer 
retains of the approval of all schedule means, methods and activity sequencing. Third,  it 
must identify those risk elements which from its own experience it will encounter during 
execution of the project, for instance, an Owner/Employer’s desire to impose late changes in 
the project design. 
 
Having identified all of the risk elements, the contractor must conduct its own evaluation of 
those risk elements in much the same manner and using much the same tools as the 
Owner/Employer had used during the earlier Project Formation stage. After that point, 
however, a contractor faces different decisions relative to how it will manage and control risk 
as the contractor does not have the option of cleanly allocating risk to another party that it 
might bring into the project. Although a contractor may pass through a particular 
performance risk to a subcontractor, if the risk element manifests and the project suffers an 
impact the Owner/Employer will not seek recovery from that subcontractor. The 
Owner/Employer will look no further than the contractor for recovery. From a practical 
standpoint, the contractor remains responsible to manage and control all of the risks which 
have been allocated to it by the Owner/Employer. 
 
The contractor does have choices it may make concerning risk: 
 
• If the total risk load is too high or there are a few significant risk elements 
which the contractor is unable to undertake, it can choose not to bid the 
project. 
 
• If a risk element is likely to manifest during the execution of the project, the 
contractor can add money in the form of direct cost or contingency intended to 
cover the impact of the risk to the project. For example: it is not unusual for a 
contractor facing liquidated damages to assume a limited number of days of 
delay and add the cost of the expected liquidated damages for those delay 
days to their total bid or tender. The contractor can impose back-to-back (the 
terms of the subcontract mirror those of the contractors) the liability on 
subcontractors and vendors which, while it will not protect the contractor from 
the Owner/Employer, will enable the contractor to recover at least a portion of 
the impact cost generated by the risk element. 
 
• A contractor can propose alternatives to the Owner/Employer which may 
reduce or remove a risk from the contractor in return for a lower price or 
shorter time to completion of the project. This alternative is not generally 
available in the global market.  
 
Risk elements which an Owner/Employer has allocated to the contractor are a fact of life in 
the civil works infrastructure construction industry. In the end the contractor must price, 
schedule, control and manage risk if it is to be successful. Like the Owner/Employer, the 
critical first step is for the contractor to identify as much of the risk possible, evaluate that risk 
as accurately as possible, and then establish its alternatives for managing and controlling 
that risk. 
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For example, the following Table III.B.8.1 Pegasus Risk Identification Checklist™ (a firm 
which the Author founded and serves as the chief researcher) was compiled for a multi-
national contractor for use in preparing bids on civil works infrastructure construction projects 
in the global market.54 
 
TABLE III.B.8.1 
SAMPLE RISK IDENTIFICATION CHECKLIST™ 
Following is a list of typical areas that give rise to risk for the Contractor.  This checklist is 
intended to assist in the identification of risks to be addressed in the project risk assessment 
and risk management plan.  It is not a comprehensive list and identification, assessment and 
management of project specific risks must be carried out by qualified personnel. 
 
1.0 NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
i) Prior experience with Owner/Employer (the Contractor and any joint venture 
partner). 
ii) Background check if new Owner/Employer. 
iii) Prior experience with major partners and proposed relationship on this contract. 
iv) Background check on new partners. 
v) Credit checks findings (Owner/Employer and partners). 
2.0 OWNER/EMPLOYERS’S CRITERIA FOR AND DEFINITION OF SCOPE OF 
PROJECT. 
vi) Verify project financing is in place. 
vii) Project phasing and schedule. 
3.0 LIST OF EPC DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 
viii) Design 
ix) Construction 
x) Optional services including any operations or maintenance responsibilities.  
xi) The Contractor’s responsibilities in association with others (this will include 
information on the Contractor’s share of any joint venture and a description of 
how risks are allocated within the joint venture).  A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) should be developed at this stage and submitted at least in 
draft form. 
4.0 LIST OF OWNER’S DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 
5.0 RESPONSIBILITY FOR OBTAINING VARIOUS PERMITS. 
xii) Environmental 
xiii) Right of way acquisition. 
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xiv) Utilities. 
xv) Construction site access. 
6.0 SUBCONTRACTING AND PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT/MATERIALS. 
xvi) Small or disadvantaged business requirements/penalties. 
xvii) Set aside or offset requirements. 
xviii) Owner/Employer furnished equipment/materials. 
xix) Consequences of Owner/Employer’s rejection of subcontract or a subcontractor. 
7.0 SCHEDULING AND MILESTONE DATES. 
xx) Clear definition of interim and completion milestones. 
xxi) Consequences of early/late completion (liquidated damages and/or early 
completion bonus). 
xxii) Identify agreed to or anticipated caps. 
8.0 CHANGE ORDERS AND CLAIMS PROCEDURES AND ENTITLEMENT. 
xxiii) Force Majeure clause. 
xxiv) Time limits for Owner/Employer decisions and approvals including any owner 
requested reviews. 
xxv) Conditions for allowed change orders. 
xxvi) Claim procedures, arbitration. 
xxvii) Dispute resolution board. 
xxviii) Law governing. 
xxix) Appropriate unforeseen/changed conditions clause. 
9.0 CONSTRUCTION AND PERFORMANCE WARRANTIES. 
xxx) Limitations based on Owner/Employer-supplied information, equipment, 
resources (as applicable). 
xxxi) Time limitations. 
xxxii) Limitation to performance test (if applicable). 
xxxiii) Warranty reserve included in price - it is not the Contractor’s policy to provide 
a warranty. 
10.0 COMPENSATION 
xxxiv) Amount/formula for payment. 
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xxxv) Mobilization payment. 
xxxvi) Granted by contract. 
xxxvii) Amount if stipulated. 
xxxviii) Arrangement within the project management team. 
xxxix) Progress payment procedures. 
xl) Substantial/final completion procedures and consequences. 
11.0 CLAUSES TO ENFORCE PAYMENT. 
xli) Limitation and extent of right to audit to cost-plus/reimbursable items. 
xlii) Interest and attorney’s fee. 
xliii) Escrow of disputed sums. 
12.0 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. 
xliv) Limitation to fixed sum, percent of contract sum or formula. 
xlv) Limitation of liability to corporate entity. 
xlvi) No, or limited liability for consequential damages - this item requires early 
discussion. 
xlvii) Exclusivity of remedies clause. 
xlviii) Limitation of damages to required insurance limits and waiver of subrogation. 
xlix) Reimbursement for Owner/Employer required design modifications. 
l) Limitation of Liquidated Damages. 
li) Damage attribution for Owner/Employer’s delays. 
13.0 ENVIRONMENTAL 
lii) Responsibility for hazardous waste. 
liii) Pre-existing (known). 
liv) Pre-existing (unknown or found during construction). 
lv) Compliance with other environmental regulations (list major governing regulations 
and party responsible). 
14.0 INDEMNITY PROVISION AND LIMITING OBLIGATION TO INSURABLE RISKS. 
15.0 INSURANCE PROVISIONS. 
lvi) Professional liability insurance. 
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lvii) Design/builder’s insurance. 
lviii) Builder’s risk insurance. 
lix) Other insurance including any insurance associated with operation. 
lx) Waiver of subrogation. 
16.0 BONDS/LETTERS OF CREDIT. 
lxi) Bid bond (amount, release date, provisions for call). 
lxii) Completion bonds (amount, release date, provisions for call). 
lxiii) Performance bonds (amount, release date, provisions for call). 
lxiv) Payment bonds (amounts, release date, provision for call). 
lxv) Letters of credit (amounts and purpose). 
17.0 COSTS/COST SHARING. 
lxvi) RFQ total costs and the Contractor portion (include copy of any cost sharing 
agreements). 
lxvii) RFP total costs and Contractor portion (include copy of any cost-sharing 
agreements). 
lxviii) Negotiation of total costs and Contractor portion (include copy of any cost-
sharing agreements). 
lxix) Mobilization costs. 
lxx) Design cost. 
lxxi) Construction cost. 
lxxii) Warranty cost - it is not the Contractor’s policy to provide a warranty. 
lxxiii) Contingencies (describe). 
lxxiv) Other costs not included above including cost of delays. 
lxxv) Degree of participation of parties in cost proposal preparation. 
lxxvi) Cost proposal type. 
xii) Not-to-exceed price with shared savings. 
xiii) Guaranteed maximum price including when finalized. 
  xiv) Fixed price (lump sum). 
18.0 OPERATIONS AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES. 
lxxvii) Maintenance required of design/builder (explain). 
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lxxviii) Operations required of design/builder (explain). 
19.0 OWNER/EMPLOYER RETAINAGE: 
lxxix) Basis 
lxxx) Amount (percent of payments or other) 
lxxxi) Duration 
lxxxii) When released 
lxxxiii) Conditions of release 
lxxxiv) Securities allowed as cash substitute 
lxxxv) Type of securities 
lxxxvi) Ownership of securities interest 
20.0 CLEAR LIST OF INFORMATION: 
lxxxvii) Any items for which Owner/Employer is responsible and on which the 
Contractor may rely. 
lxxxviii) Of areas where the Contractor can provide substitutions and VE submittals. 
21.0 STANDARD OF CARE FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. 
lxxxix) Professional services performed in accordance with standard of care. 
xc) Responsibility for changes in codes or interpretations. 
22.0 OWNERSHIP OF PLANS. 
xci) Limitations on use. 
xcii) Hard copy, not electronic medium, as official copy. 
xciii) Warranty/indemnity against copyright/patent infringement. 
23.0 APPROPRIATE CREDIT AND PUBLICITY AND USE OF PROJECT FOR 
PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES. 
24.0 DISPUTE RESOLUTION. 
xciv) Step negotiations. 
xcv) Mediation. 
xcvi) Arbitration. 
25.0 TERMINATION PROVISIONS. 
xcvii) By Owner/Employer during selection phase. 
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xcviii) By the Contractor for cause. 
xcix) By Owner/Employer for cause. 
c) Premium for premature termination for Owner/Employer’s convenience. 
ci) Consequences of temporary suspension. 
26.0 LEGAL BOILERPLATE. 
cii) Governing law. 
ciii) Integration clause. 
civ) No waiver/severability clause. 
27.0 PROJECT CASH FLOW ANALYSIS. 
cv) Amounts and timing. 
cvi) Linkage of payments to milestones. 
28.0 DESIGN 
cvii) Percent complete by Owner/Employer at RFP stage. 
cviii) Owner/Employer’s role/participation during D/B process. 
cix) Joint venture partner (contractor) role/participation. 
cx) Constructibility procedures by joint venture partners. 
29.0 CONSTRUCTION 
cxi) Owner/Employer’s role/participation during construction. 
cxii) QC roles and responsibilities. 
cxiii) QA roles and responsibilities. 
cxiv) Material testing roles and responsibilities. 
cxv) Sources of labor, responsibility and associated labor risks. 
30.0 PROJECT COST FUNDING 
cxvi) Source of funds. 
cxvii) Funding schedule if not fully funded. 
31.0 OTHER ITEMS 
cxviii) Value engineering provisions/clauses/articles in RFP, if any. 
cxix) JV operating committee/board of control structure. 
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cxx) Organization chart showing key staff. 
cxxi) Attach copy of RFP. 
cxxii) Attach copy of Owner/Employer’s organization chart. 
cxxiii) Attach copy of joint venture, or other similar agreement. 
cxxiv) Attach copy of Owner’s contract for D/B. 
cxxv) List of other potential concerns. 
The Owner/Employer’s or contractor’s project risk management plan never controlled, 
avoided or mitigated a risk. A cost contingency cannot cover the total impact to a project, if 
the actions upon which the contingency amount was set are never taken by the contactor. 
And unless the Owner/Employer and contractor actually manage risk during the execution of 
the infrastructure project then all of the risk management efforts taken during the Project 
Formation will have been wasted. Managing risk during the Project Execution is one of the 
primary responsibilities for both the Owner/Employer and the contractor, since risk elements 
pose a threat to the successful completion of the infrastructure project. 
 
To actively manage retained risk elements an Owner/Employer’s risk management plan 
must be as complete and detailed as that which it would expect from any other project 
participant.55 That plan should include predicting when each retained risk element is most 
likely to manifest during the project and establish a matrix of responses from which the 
Owner/Employer can choose an appropriate response to the manifestation of that risk 
element. Risk management action plans can be identified as either avoidance or mitigation 
based. Avoidance action plans are applied when the best way in which to control the risk 
element in question is to preclude the conditions which will result in the manifestation of the 
risk from every occurring. For example: if the Owner/Employer has retained the risk to obtain 
the required environmental permits by a certain date within the project schedule, its risk 
management plan should focus on the steps necessary to secure the permits at a specific 
date well in advance of the scheduled “need dates” established for those permits. Obtaining 
the permits as scheduled will avoid any ripple impact delay to the contractor’s schedule 
which would flow from those permits being obtained later than planned. 
 
Mitigation action plans are predicated on the assumption that a particular risk element will, at 
some time during the execution of the project, manifest and rather than attempting to avoid 
the risk the best response is to initiate actions which are directed toward reducing (or 
mitigating) the impacts of that risk element on the project. For example: Owner/Employers 
make changes in structures and facilities as they are designed and constructed. Rather than 
try to ban changes, an Owner/Employer would be better served by managing a change 
control process which limits the number of changes, streamlined the processing of changes 
and closely monitored the cost and schedule impact of each change on the project as a 
whole. 
 
An Owner/Employer’s management actions relative to the manifestation of a risk element 
should be based on specific actions taken in a timely manner so that impact to the total 
project will be minimal, otherwise it will be the Owner/Employer which suffers from its 
inability to manage and control the risk.56 The risk profile of a civil works infrastructure 
construction project changes over time as a project is executed. Every decision made and 
event which occurs during a project has the potential to add, delete or modify the risk 
elements which comprise the risk profile. A part of every Owner/Employer’s risk 
management plan should be to periodically audit the project risk profile to ensure that the 
any changes to that profile have been recognized and the risk profile has been modified to 
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accommodate those changes. Every contract has enforcement provisions in the Conditions 
of Contract which are specifically intended to be used by the Owner/Employer in the event 
that the contractor is not managing and controlling those risk elements for which it has 
bargained, as noted above. To monitor risk on a project the Owner/Employer must have 
cost, schedule, scope and quality control systems in place which enable it to track the 
activities and progress on the project.  
 
During the Project Execution stage of a civil works infrastructure construction project the 
contractor’s project management team in contrast, however, has three primary Project Risk 
Management functions, however all are critical to the ultimate success of the project and to 
maintain the benefits of the bargain: 
 
• Management and Control of Allocated Risk. 
 
• Updating of the Risk Profile and Risk Management Plans. 
 
• Project Completion. 
 
From the point in time when the civil works infrastructure construction project is awarded and 
the contract executed between the Owner/Employer and the contractor, Project Risk 
Management becomes a functional requirement of the project. The contractor has been paid 
to manage, control and bear the liability for that allocated risk and, in effect, now “owns” the 
allocated risk. The contractor has only two options open to it relative to that risk burden: 
 
• Ignore the risk trusting to luck that the risk will not manifest. 
 
• Actively manage the risk in order to control the manifestation or the impact of 
the risk. 
 
A common misconception of contractor’s is that the risk contingency established within a 
project budget and the schedule adjustments made to acknowledge possible risk impact are, 
in themselves, adequate risk management actions. That concept is false. The contingency 
amount was set primarily to fund those management actions that will be necessary to 
manage and control the risk element should it manifest, not to cover the liability of the risk 
element impact. Likewise, schedule adjustments were made to enable the contractor to 
overcome delays attributable to the manifestation of a risk element by giving it the flexibility 
to re-sequence activities or work around the risk impact, not to cover the liability of the risk 
element schedule impact. In short, contingency and schedule adjustments made during the 
bid phase were established as risk management tools, not as liability buffers. 
 
During the Project Execution the contractor must have a proactive risk management 
program which flows from the risk profile and is based on monitoring risk to the same degree 
that it monitors physical progress on an infrastructure project. The contractor should prepare 
a “risk schedule” which places each of the major risk elements in relation to the overall 
execution schedule of the project. For instance, the most likely time to encounter equipment 
delivery problems is after issuance of the purchase order to the vendor and before expected 
delivery. That risk element therefore should be “scheduled” for close monitoring and 
management action during that period. The risk element should come off the “risk schedule” 
and risk profile when the risk opportunity has passed (for example, the equipment is 
delivered). The risk schedule technique keeps the contractor’s project management team 
focus on the present and future risk elements and keeps the risk profile current to the 
progress point of the project. Note that a risk schedule is not akin to a critical path schedule 
and, in fact, many risk elements will never be on a projects critical path unless and until they 
manifest themselves on a project. In many instances risk elements should be closely 
5/2/2007                                                   III-                     Thesis of Kris R. Nielsen (DRAFT)                           84
monitored and actions taken in an effort to assure that those risk elements never become 
part of the project critical path. 
 
The contractor should also have in place risk monitoring systems specifically intended to 
track those conditions which may lead to the manifestation of a particular risk element. For 
example: if there are dates certain by which specific equipment specifications and designs 
must be finalized to support phased procurement and construction, progress on those 
specific designs should be isolated from the more general “design progress” curve and 
tracked on a more frequent basis. Focused frequent tracking will highlight any trend towards 
delay and enable the contactor to take avoidance or mitigation actions well in advance of the 
risk element having any actual impact on the execution of the project.57 
 
The Project Risk Management project control tools are designed to track cost or progress (or 
any other parameter) on a real time basis and immediately identify any variation from the 
planned execution curves. The Project Risk Management control tools are also focused on 
individual pieces of the scope of work (the individual risk element) and not a whole element 
(such as design) or total project progress. As risk elements are closed, the risk management 
control tools are constantly refocused on the current or upcoming risk elements. Early 
detection of a risk element manifestation allows the contractor to take appropriate avoidance 
or mitigation action, using project cost and schedule contingency to effectively control the 
risk element and limit its impact on the project as a whole. More so than any other project 
execution function, Project Risk Management is a forward looking function that depends 
upon the contractor to implement avoidance and mitigation actions in anticipation of a risk 
element manifestation. If a contractor waits to act on a risk element until the point at which 
that risk element has manifested itself, then all that can be done is to bear the liability for the 
impact created by that risk element. Risk elements may increase or decrease in importance 
or they may disappear off the risk profile completely depending on events and decisions 
made during the execution of the project. To be of any use, the contractor’s project 
management team must constantly update the risk profile and the management plans in 
place to monitor, manage and control those risks must be adjusted to accommodate that 
changing risk profile. 
 
Turning once again to pipeline projects for examples of civil works infrastructure construction 
projects, Owner/Employers and contractors face enormous risks in engineering and 
constructing the projects.  Effective use of risk management tools enables project 
management to eliminate or minimize the impacts of risks as they emerge.  As an example, 
from the engineer-constructor perspective, a risk identified during preparation of the bid or 
proposal, but forgotten during execution is essentially a disaster waiting to happen. It is not 
enough to identify the risks which exist in a contract or project. Using the pipelines example 
from above, the pipeline’s execution must be monitored constantly to ascertain when those 
risks identified do emerge and then to assure the project management team is addressing 
the emerging risk reasonably and timely. Risk management tools are the key to minimizing 
the impacts of emerging risks, mitigation of potential claims and achieving maximum project 
success. Current pipeline project risk management programs address: identification of 
potential risks in a prioritized manner; development of protocols  that define and monitor 
execution;, monitoring systems that recognize risk emergence; applying the tools most 
applicable to managing a risk as it evolves; auditing performance periodically to assure 
effectiveness, etc.  Such elements of risk management program are developed into the Risk 
Profile addressed above, and it is updated as needed.   
 
Pipeline projects continue to face both traditional risks and newly evolving risk factors, 
including: 
 
• Interface Risks (a Delivery Risk Factor): The risk of several different 
contractors working on different segments of a project is not being managed 
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in the design phase as more work must be executed on a fast track basis 
under design-build delivery methods. 
  
• Underground Risks (a Technology Risk Factor): The unknowns underground 
will always be a source of risk that affects execution resources and 
methodologies. 
 
• Joint Venture Risks (a Financial Risk Factor): The cost of many pipeline 
projects requires many stakeholders to be joint ventures to spread financial 
risk which also is forcing differing institutional approaches and cultures to 
clash and increasing, not diminishing financial risk sharing, although such risk 
issues are not fundamentally analyzed when JV’s are established. 
  
• Design-Build Risks (a Procurement/Contractual Risk Factor): Execution 
management practices that are not accustomed to design-build stakeholder 
expectations and industry practices are reducing design-build benefits and 
exacerbating impacts of risks as they emerge during pipeline execution, 
especially since many of the key “players” are over committed. 
 
• Security Risks (a Political Risk Factor): Pipeline projects of all types are 
required in many unstable parts of the world, but the militant/terrorist threat 
and sophistication is well beyond that heretofore experienced. 
 
• “Green” Risks (an Environmental Risk Factor): Pipeline projects experience 
increased environmental concerns in developed, developing, and under-
developed countries with equal ferocity that impacts acceptable construction 
methodologies and resource use. 
 
•  Right of Way Risks (a Social Risk Factor): ROW issues are increasingly 
causing delay as pipeline routing through indigenous populations 
experiencing broader democratic approaches are asserting rights to extract 
social improvement with consequently larger cost to pipeline projects. 
 
• Payment Risks (an Economic Risk Factor): In both developing and under-
developed countries, water and wastewater pipelines are financed privately 
through concessions that require payment for the commodity transported, 
which requires both a risky impact on the economy and a culture shift from 
the perception of having to pay for what is considered a right.    
  
Frequently, the risk management needs are organization wide for many Owners/Employers 
and contractors, not just project specific. Another significant tool that the Author developed 
and that is currently demonstrating results is a GAPP Analysis™ to ascertain current and 
needed risk management practices for improving the effectiveness of project management in 
the organization. The following Table III.B.8.2 is a typical summary work product from such a 
GAPP Analysis™. Table III.B.8.2 summarizes the analysis of project management 
processes that led to focusing on the risk management practices that needed attention within 
a contractor organization that includes execution of pipeline projects, for example. Project 
management processes were identified systematically for improvement that reduced impacts 
that were causing projects to not meet goals of this contractor. This GAPP Analysis™ was 
prepared for an international engineer-constructor with operations and business units 
globally. The GAPP Analysis™ defined its terms as follows58: 
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• Process – identifies each different methodology used to accomplish the Work 
Process.  An assessment is made as to whether the process meets Industry 
Best Practices (IBP). 
 
• Practice – evaluates each step in the Method as it is applied that requires the 
exercise of judgment.  If there are not adequate formal parameters on how 
judgment is exercised, there may be so much variation in the work process 
output that it makes the Risk Management system unreliable and 
uncontrollable. 
    
• Uniform (U) – for each Method reviewed under the “Process” column, an 
assessment is made as to whether the Method is applied the same way each 
time – the same process steps are employed each time, the data is collected 
the same way each time, etc. 
   
• Transparent (T) – for each Method reviewed, an assessment is made as to 
whether the application of the Method communicates what Method has been 
used for this work process and a clear record as to how the data is used in 
the Method. 
 
• Accountable (A) – for each Method, an assessment is made as to whether the 
application of Method requires the same qualified people to make the decision 
and the management knows who they are. 
 
The GAPP Analysis™ addressed whether the contractor in each Business Unit 
(BLR=Business Unit Level Review) employed International Best Practice (IBP) in addressing 
which processes met its Project Risk Management needs. (Note: Y=Yes; N=No)  
 
 
Table III.B.8.2  
 
TYPICAL GAPP ANALYSIS™ SUMMARY TABLE 
FOR A MULTI-DIVISION INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTOR 
FOR CIVIL WORKS INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
 
 
Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 WORK 
PROCESS IBP U T A IBP U T A IBP U T A IBP U T A 
Estimating 
Process Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y BLR N N N 
Estimating 
Practice Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y BLR N N N 
Schedule for 
Proposal Y N N Y N N N Y Y N N Y BLR N N Y 
Schedule in 
Execution Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N Y BLR N N Y 
Progress 
Reporting Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y BLR N N Y 
Project Cost 
Control Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y BLR N N Y 
Contingency 
Estimating Y Y N Y Y N N Y N N N Y BLR N N N 
Contingency 
Management Y Y N Y N N N N N Y N Y BLR N N N 
Risk N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y BLR N N N
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The Owner/Employer’s and the contractor’s project management teams have the burden of 
Project Risk Management. In a “mutual mistrust” environment Project Risk Management 
uses all aspects of Contract Administration to protect the bargain each reached when they 
entered into the contract. Additionally, it is the greatest means of using Contract 
Administration for continuous improvement in every aspect of project management.   
 
9.  Procurement Management 
 
Project Procurement Management concerns the processes required to acquire goods and 
services from outside the performing organization. PMBOK states:  
 
“Project Procurement Management includes the processes to purchase or 
acquire the products, services, or results needed from outside the project 
team to perform the work. … Project Procurement management also includes 
the contract management and change control processes required to 
administer contracts or purchase orders issued by authorized team 
members.”59  
 
The Project Procurement Management processes include the following: 
 
1) Plan Purchase and Acquisitions 
2) Plan Contracting 
3) Request Seller Responses 
4) Select Sellers 
5) Contract Administration of Products, Services, and Results  
6) Contract Closure 
From an Owner/Employer’s perspective, every element of a contractor’s works scope which 
is subcontracted away introduces an added layer of risk and complication to a project in 
which the Owner/Employer expected to have a single point of execution responsibility. 
Conversely, a contractor uses subcontractors/vendors to obtain a degree of familiarity that 
comes from a specialist who deals with the type of work. An Owner/Employer sees added 
layers of legal complications in the form of the subcontracts/purchase orders themselves. A 
contractor sees a spreading of the risk and the opportunity to assure scopes of work are 
defined that are not less or more than that for whish it bargained. An Owner/Employer 
identifies added project execution risks, such as, the probability that elements of the total 
scope of work identified within contract will be overlooked or missed in the development of 
the individual subcontracts/purchase orders. The contractor looks to subcontractors/vendors 
to have a “mutual mistrust” philosophy as well, thus he is placed in role of the 
Owner/Employer relative to such subcontractor/vendor, and assures that it gets the benefit 
of the bargain that it received from the subcontract/purchase order. An Owner/Employer is 
concerned that the complex function of coordinating the thousands of activities necessary to 
successfully execute a project is made much more complex and difficult with the addition of 
each subcontractor.  The contractor expects that the Contract Administration function is 
simplified with the subcontractors/vendors coordinating the hundreds of tasks that are 
necessity for the discrete scope of the works, and the contractor can coordinate at a higher 
Management 
Proposal 
Risk 
Management 
Execution 
N Y N Y N N N Y N N N Y BLR N N N 
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level. An Owner/Employer worries that the project cost and schedule will be impacted as a 
result of claims and contract disputes which may arise between the EPC contractor and its 
subcontractors. The contractor will look to the subcontractors/vendors for the “mutual 
mistrust” of both the contractor and the Owner/Employer. Most of all, an Owner/Employer 
fears that the contractor will be unable to exercise the control necessary to ensure that 
multiple subcontractors working under different contracting arrangements, with different 
scopes of work and sometimes competing needs and requirements can be managed in such 
a way as to achieve the Owner/Employer’s cost, schedule and quality goals. The contractor 
protects its bargain with back-to-back contracts – that is, the Conditions of Contract will be 
identical to those the contractor has placed on itself by the Owner/Employer. Thus, to take 
the extreme case, to successfully execute a complex project like a civil works infrastructure 
construction project on the basis of subcontracting the majority of the construction of that 
project, a contractor must establish, staff, and implement a very comprehensive and 
coherent project management system.  
 
For instance, with respect to the individual processes the contractor will typically have the 
following plans in place for the Plan Purchase and Acquisitions process which identifies 
which project needs can best be met by purchasing or acquiring products, services, or 
results outside the project organization. The process involves consideration of whether, how, 
what, how much and when to acquire: the Project Management Plan describes generally 
how the contractor would manage procurement during the execution of the project. Similarly 
the Plan establishes procedures and requirements soliciting bids and purchasing equipment, 
expediting and inspecting equipment. Each step is outlined in detail. It provides a “tentative” 
detailed procurement list, indicating preferred method of procurement for equipment items 
and categories of materials. A Procurement and Erection Specifications set the requirements 
for preparation of equipment specifications, revisions, and issuance under requisition to the 
purchasing group. Such a plan also provides standardized conditions of contract for 
equipment and materials purchases. Similarly, the Plan Contracting process would cover 
specifically the subcontracting needs. The Request Seller Responses process establishes 
the mechanisms for obtaining responses, such as bids, and proposals, from perspective 
sellers on how project requirements can be met. The Select Sellers process is used to 
establish the methods for receipt of bids or proposals, and applies evaluation criteria, to 
select one or more sellers who are both qualified and acceptable as a seller. Contract 
Administration of Products, Services, and Results ensures that both the contractor and the 
other party meet their contractual obligations and that their own legal rights are protected.  
 
This general Contract Administration process ensures the seller’s performance meets 
contractual requirements and that the buyer performs according to the terms of the contract. 
The contractor will maintain records such as the following: 
 
a. Late or incomplete engineering documents to bid or work with; 
b. Engineering field changes and revisions; 
c. Subcontractor product quality; 
d. Incorrect or missing subcontractor submittals for schedule and activity 
sequencing; 
e. Bidding work before isometric and installation drawings were issued by 
engineering; 
f. Slow progress of construction; 
g. Low morale among craftspeople; 
h. Parts and equipment damaged or lost in the receiving and storage areas; 
i. Inability to start work due to activity overlapping with other subcontractors; 
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j. Rework or correction of subcontractors’ mistakes; 
k. Poor labor efficiency; 
l. Labor shortages. 
 
The Contract Closure processes support the project completion process. It involves 
verification that all work and deliverables were acceptable. The Contract Closure process 
also involves administrative activities, such as, updating records to reflect final results and 
archiving such information for future use. Contract closure addresses each subcontract and 
purchase order applicable to the project.  
 
The role of Contract Administration is illustrated by the Author’s evaluation for the 
contractor’s project management team regarding fabrication on the civil works infrastructure 
construction project in Mexico discussed in Project Integration Management above. The 
contractor planned its Procurement deliveries with vendors and subcontracted for 
Fabrication efforts both US and Mexican fabricators. The Owner/Employer’s bid documents 
had a defined installation period that enabled the 909 calendar day project execution period 
to be achieved. Fabrication was initially delayed from the project schedule that reflected the 
Owner/Employer changes from Owner/Employer furnished equipment (OFE) that had forced 
a schedule change to accommodate the initial time impacts partially from the increased 
weights. The Owner/Employer correction of bid document deficiencies and changes did not 
stop with OFE delays and changes. As fabrication was executed, the continued 
Owner/Employer changes from increased quantities and weight and delayed were shown by 
the Contractor’s project management team. The Owner/Employers OFE changes and 
delayed information forced out-of-sequence and delayed fabrication works, which was also 
noticed by the contractor’s project management team. These Owner/Employer performance 
failures necessitated further rescheduling, including acceleration to meet the fabrication 
yard’s commitments on other projects. Despite the contractor’s and subcontractor 
acceleration efforts, fabrication too was additionally delayed by continuing Owner/Employer 
OFE problems. The Author summarized the resulting delay as illustrated the planned versus 
actual durations of the fabrication efforts shown in Figure III.B.9.1. The contractor had 
planned and subcontracted with the fabrication subcontractors based upon the 
Owner/Employer’s information it reasonably relied when it had assembled its bid. That 
information was conveyed by the contractor in its schedule which specifically noted the 
fabrication yards time limitations. The contractor had submitted and the Owner/Employer 
had been put on notice. Further Project delay was avoided from the Owner/Employer causes 
through acceleration that the contractor’s project management team discussed and 
presented monthly.  
 
Figure III.B.9.1 
Planned versus Actual Fabrication Effort Duration 
 
 
Key to the genesis of significant Owner/Employer changes and impacts was the 
Owner/Employer’s decision to not renew the third party Supervisors contract in the middle of 
ID FABRICATION Start Finish Dur
1999 2000 2001
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
1 57.8w5/22/20004/14/1999 - PLANNED
2 109.4w7/11/20016/8/1999 - ACTUAL
Q3 Q4
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the actual fabrication efforts. The Owner/Employer took over the role of the Supervisor with 
personnel who had no “institutional” or “project” knowledge of the directions and technical 
decisions that the prior Supervisor had made. The Owner/Employer in its new role as the 
Supervisor reversed, changed, or expanded prior Supervisor decisions while refusing to 
acknowledge the significant impacts from the changes. Such untimely changes increased 
the significance of impacts from the changes and often forced re-sequencing of the work in 
fabrication, further exacerbating impacts, especially at the yard in the US. These impacts 
included forced rework and some workmanship problems. The fabrication issues were 
shown to have forced the contractor to continue to grow and expand its project management 
team to handle the unforeseen execution conditions and context. Despite all these causes of 
impact to the contractor, the Owner/Employer still would only allow the contractor Cost 
Impact estimates to be based on the Contract Unit Prices, which were shown by the Author 
to have been predicated on the Project execution conditions and contexts presented in the 
actually flawed bid documents.  Additionally, the Supervisor (actually now the 
Owner/Employer) changed several important contract procedures, reporting, etc. that forced 
extended and expanded the contractor’s project management needs, thus increasing indirect 
costs. For example, after 2 ½ years of required submissions in English, the Supervisor 
forced all submissions to be in Spanish. Translators and their support had to be increased, 
and ultimately maintained for nearly 2 additional years.  
 
As with the analysis of the project engineering, the detailed analyses and support for impacts 
were summarized by the Author as illustrated in the following Table III.B.9.1: 
 
 
TABLE III.B.9.1 
FABRICATION IMPACTS CAUSED BY OWNER/EMPLOYER  
X = Directly Related Factor   y = Contributing Factor  
 
Description Increased 
Direct 
Resources 
Increased 
Indirect 
Resources 
Extended 
Indirect 
Resources 
Increased 
Financing 
Scope 
Changes
Special circumstances that were 
outside the control of the 
Contractor 
X X X X y 
Necessary corrections and 
modifications to assumptions 
relied upon by the Contractor that 
defined the scope of work 
y y Y y y 
Inconsistencies between contract 
documents and instructions given 
to the Contractor by the 
Supervisor 
X X X y X 
Discrepancies and divergence 
between contract documents 
X X X X X 
Errors and omissions in 
information included by the 
Owner/employer in the specified 
work 
X X X X X 
Errors in quantity or description, or 
omission in bills of quantity 
provided by the Owner/Employer 
y y Y y y 
Discrepancies in Owner/Employer 
specified requirements 
X   X X 
Owner/Employer bid documents 
forced compliance with its 
requirements which were known 
X X  X  
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TABLE III.B.9.1 
FABRICATION IMPACTS CAUSED BY OWNER/EMPLOYER  
X = Directly Related Factor   y = Contributing Factor  
 
Description Increased 
Direct 
Resources 
Increased 
Indirect 
Resources 
Extended 
Indirect 
Resources 
Increased 
Financing 
Scope 
Changes
by Owner/Employer and/or 
demonstrated deficient, 
incomplete or inefficient 
Unreasonably inaccurate 
approximated quantities, 
particularly in steel tonnage 
estimates provided by the 
Owner/Employer 
y   X y 
Divergence between contractually 
specified work and Supervisor’s 
instructions 
y y Y y y 
Divergence between the 
Contractor’s statement of 
compliance with specified work 
and Supervisor’s instructions 
X  Y y  
Errors and inconsistencies in the 
contract documents 
X y X X X 
Ambiguities and discrepancies 
contained in drawings and 
documents 
X X X y X 
Discrepancies and divergence 
between the contract documents 
and descriptive schedules  
 y Y   
PEP’s requirement to use specific 
vendors and suppliers  
X X X   
Failure of the Owner/Employer to 
carry out work in accordance with 
the active schedule 
X X X X X 
Extra work arising out of variations 
and changes mandated by the 
Owner/Employer 
X X X X X 
The Contractor’s required 
execution of modified and 
additional work 
X X X X X 
Owner/Employer additions, 
omissions and substitutions of the 
work 
X X X X X 
Alterations to standards of 
materials and goods 
X X X X X 
Changes in position and 
dimensions of the fabricated units 
X X X X X 
Changes imposed upon the 
Contractor and its intended 
sequencing of works 
X y X X X 
Failure to provide OFE in 
accordance to contractual dates 
X X X X X 
Failure to ship OFE assembled as 
required by Contract 
X X X X X 
Failure to issue OFE in good 
working order 
X X X X X 
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TABLE III.B.9.1 
FABRICATION IMPACTS CAUSED BY OWNER/EMPLOYER  
X = Directly Related Factor   y = Contributing Factor  
 
Description Increased 
Direct 
Resources 
Increased 
Indirect 
Resources 
Extended 
Indirect 
Resources 
Increased 
Financing 
Scope 
Changes
Failure of the Owner/Employer 
and the Supervisor to reply to 
communication within specified 
time period 
y  Y y  
 
Through the use of the extensive Contract Administration records, the Author recorded 
assumptions upon which the contractor based and the extensive changes/support that the 
contractor gave the Owner/Employer continuously were used in an arbitration that was 
required in resolving disputes by the Conditions of Contract. The Owner/Employer simply 
would not accept the impacts claimed by the contractor when it had paid the impacts on 
changes that had occurred during the engineering period. The results summarized in the 
Table III.B.9.1 described the causation and the type of impact. The Author then 
demonstrated that the Owner/Employer’s project management team then had to respond to 
the actual magnitude of the impacts. 
 
5/2/2007                                                   III-                     Thesis of Kris R. Nielsen (DRAFT)                           93
C. Dispute Resolution and Contract Administration 
 
Ultimately, those matters that can not be resolved in the global market on civil works 
infrastructure construction projects by negotiation enter into realm of a dispute between the 
parties. As has been shown, in a “mutual mistrust” project execution regime, the parties may 
not have a clear understanding of the assumptions and resulting consequences that underlie 
the agreement that both parties signed. Similarly, a party may either exceed or fail to 
perform what was required and upon which the bargain was based. The party claiming it was 
injured may then have a third party determine the compliance of the other party with the 
Conditions of Contract. This party is normally a neutral party, that is, has no relationship to 
either of the parties to the dispute.  The party can apply to the courts of the country whose 
law governs the project, and the judge (and jury in some jurisdictions) will determine what 
the contract requires, the facts that are applicable to the issue, the entitlement or 
responsibility from such determination, and what impacts the party who was injured will 
receive. After all, the use of a judge is available. The global market parties, whether an 
Owner/Employer or a Contractor, however, does not see the use of courts as viable option 
on civil works infrastructure construction projects. A court is part of the government, and the 
government in most cases is the ultimate beneficiary of the civil works infrastructure project. 
Thus, the Conditions of Contract establish alternatives to the court. As long as the matter is 
not against the law, these are provisions which allow the parties to decide as a matter of 
contract how they will have disputes resolved. Thus, disputes can be resolved two ways: 
 
• Adjudication which is the method of turning to the courts. 
 
• Consensual which are established by contract. 
 
The contractually established means normally fall into several types of “Alternative Disputes 
Resolution (ADR)” which fit into one of the following: 
  
• Facilitated negotiation. 
 
• Conciliation. 
 
• Mediation. 
 
• Arbitration.   
 
The first three require the parties to finally agree and accept the decision that is suggested. 
Although arbitration can be “non-binding,” the trend in case of the global market for civil 
works infrastructure construction projects is for the arbitration to be binding on the parties to 
the dispute. This result is accomplished by the pre-agreement to be bound. In addition, most 
Conditions of Contract used in the global market provide that the processes be undertaken 
in a sequential fashion, that is, from the facilitated negotiation to the arbitration. The only 
consistent requirement is the neutrality of the third party. 
 
Under all methods of dispute resolution involving civil works infrastructure construction 
projects in the global market, whether adjudication or ADR, the principle of “mutual mistrust” 
is used. The parties present their respective positions and versions of the facts. The facts 
must be supported. The role of Contract Administration, therefore, is important to the parties 
who will have to depend on their project management teams. The PMBOK requirements as 
global standards that are generally accepted and used thus are expected on civil works 
infrastructure construction projects. In fact, a party typically engages a specialist that reviews 
all the project records that the party maintained, and then compiles the “proof” that is 
presented in the ADR process. These specialists are in essence the compiler and interpreter 
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of the Contract Administration information, including the proofs of divergence from the 
benefits of the bargain; giving notice; providing support; and compliance with the project 
management standards. Thus, it is truly a fact, that Contract Administration is the back bone 
of project management and project management is the back bone of global civil works 
infrastructure construction projects. 
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IV- 1 Kris R. Nielsen
IV. The Japanese Domestic Civil Works Infrastructure 
Construction Industry
A. Japan’s Domestic Civil Works Infrastructure Construction Industry Prior to the Turn of 
the Century
Japan was faced with a problem just before the bubble economy was about to end in the 
early 1980’s. The US economy faced serve economic problems of its own in the 1980’s and 
the then US President, President Regan, “tightened the country’s belt.” He demanded that 
Japan allow US contractors access to the construction industry at the time when Japan 
needed to protect it. In 1986 the US demanded to participation in the Kansai International 
Airport Project in an attempt to cut the huge surplus that Japan enjoyed. Japan finally agreed 
to a bi-lateral treaty with the US in 1988 to open its construction market to US firms. This 
was the called the Major Projects Agreement (MPA). It had two levels. The first level was 
negotiated in 1988 covered certain named projects.1 The MPA was broadened in 1991 to 
include 34 named projects.2
In 1992 Japan signed the World Treaty Organization’s Agreement on Government 
Procurement (AGP) that was presumed to cover the whole of Japan’s civil works 
infrastructure construction industry. The Agreement on Government Procurement sets forth 
rules for non-discrimination between foreign and domestic sources, and for their treatment to 
be the same as Japanese nationals. The AGP was subsequently reviewed on a number of 
occasions, and as a result of negotiations concurrent to those of the Uruguay Round, the 
AGP was amended to
1. Broaden the scope of government procurement (applying to regional 
governments, and to a broader range of government-related entities).
2. Apply the AGP to the procurement of services.
3. Introduce a complaint review system pertaining to procurement procedures.
The revised AGP was signed by 23 countries and went into effect in January 1996.3
The AGP was the world model for allowing global competition for public works construction. 
In September 1995 US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Searing traveled to local 
regions throughout Japan to meet with local government officials. Her objective was to 
encourage these officials to think more openly and to allow greater foreign participation on 
public works projects in their region. Knowing that local governments were obligated under 
the WTO to adopt open and competitive bidding procedures, she urged them to use the 
reform measures outlined in the 1994 Public Works Agreement as a model. In particular she 
emphasized the need to consider a foreign firm's international experience as well as to 
eliminate procurement practices and requirements that are unique to a certain region.4 In 
January 1996 Japan implemented the "Action Plan on Reform of the Bidding and 
Contracting Procedures for Public Works." These measures were signed in an exchange of 
letters between US Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown and Japan's Ambassador to the 
United States, Takakazu Kuriyama. The exchange represented progress toward the 
successful resolution of a longstanding problem between Japan and the US related to 
access by foreign companies to Japan's public works market. The Action Plan:
IV- Kris R. Nielsen                                                                              2
 Ensured that commissioning entities will take a foreign firm's international 
experience into consideration when determining a firm's qualifications.
 Introduced a comprehensive complaint mechanism which applies to all 
aspects of the procurement process.
 Committed the Government of Japan to develop measures to prevent anti-
competitive practices.
 Expanded the universe of opportunities for foreign firms from 34 projects 
under the Major Projects Arrangements (MPA) to all public works projects 
above the WTO thresholds.
 Established a monitoring system on foreign participation in Japan's public 
works market. 
The MPA effectively was replaced by the Action Plan, because the large size projects 
covered by the MPA were included by the coverage of the Action Plan, albeit to a wider 
potential group – all potential foreign competitors.
Japan fully implemented the measures outlined in the AGP on April 1, 1996. These 
measures covered construction-related procurements by central and quasi-governmental 
entities in Japan. It provided for open and competitive bidding procedures to be used when 
these entities conduct procurements for construction, design, and consulting work that are 
valued at or above the WTO government procurement thresholds. In the Action Plan, as 
revised, the prefecture governments and governments in Japan's largest cities were to 
adoptopen and competitive bidding procedures.5
The Government also took steps to legislate the abolition of regional requirement through 
the Action Plan in January 1996. The Action Plan specified thresholds vary according to 
types of contract specified in the WTO AGP. They are based on Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR’s), which are obtained by converting the applied standard values expressed as SDR’s 
into the national currency. For example, the standard values for all types of voluntary 
measures determined by the Committee for Drawing Up and Promoting the Action Program, 
based on Notification No. 37 of the Ministry of Finance, as published in the official gazette 
(Kanpo) dated 25 January 2002, set the standard values for procurement contracts awarded 
between April 1, 2002 and March 31, 2004 as shown in Table IV.A.1
Table IV.A.1
Special Drawing Right (SDR) Equivalency to Japanese Yen
SDR 500 Equivalent to ¥70,000 
SDR 100,000 Equivalent to ¥14 million
SDR 385,000 Equivalent to ¥54 million
SDR 800,000 Equivalent to ¥120 million
SDR 2 million Equivalent to ¥280 million
SDR 5 million Equivalent to ¥700 million
Thus, the Standard Values agreed in the AGP for various classifications at the SDR rates in 
Table IV.A.1 for period April 1, 2002, to March 31, 2004, for the Central Government, Local 
Public Bodies, and Government Related Organizations is shown in Table IV.A.2:
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Table IV.A.2
Japan’s AGP Commitments in Yen and SDR’s
Classification Central Government Local Public Bodies Government-related
Organizations
Products ¥ 19 million 
(SDR 130,000)
¥ 29 million
(SDR 200,000)
¥ 19 million 
(SDR 130,000)
Services ¥ 19 million 
(SDR 130,000)
¥ 29 million 
(SDR 200,000)
¥ 19 million
(SDR 130,000)
Construction 
services
¥ 660 million
(SDR 4.5 million)
¥ 2.22 billion 
(SDR 15 million)
¥ 2.22 billion
(SDR 15 million)
Design consulting
services
¥ 66 million 
(SDR 450,000)
¥ 220 million
(SDR 1.5 million)
¥ 66 million
(SDR 450,000)
The voluntary measures on government procurement determined by the Committee for 
Drawing Up and Promoting the Action Program were modified so that the standard values 
for products and services for the central government and government-related organizations 
was lowered from SDR 130,000 (19 million yen) to SDR 100,000 (14 million yen) consistent 
with the threshold in the Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership. 
The threshold for the procurement of goods and services by the central government and 
public corporations was lowered to 100,000 SDR (¥ 14 mil.). Independent measures (WTO 
plus measures) were established for contracts exceeding 800,000 SDR’s, which were not 
included in the AGP. The changes provided for the a procurement information plan on the 
SDR-level through notices provided prior to tenders (through seminars and the like), 
requests to potential suppliers to submit materials for market surveys, and requests to 
potential suppliers to submit comments on specification proposals.6
The criteria remained a difficult hurdle for foreign companies to handle. It was still onerous 
except for the very largest of foreign competitors. For example, in the past firms were 
required to maintain a place of business in a given region in order to qualify to bid on public 
works projects sponsored by the local government. Thus, as of January 1, 1996, the locality 
requirement was abolished and any qualified firm was able to participate in bidding on a 
local public works project. A construction firm still had to obtain a license and to register with 
the local government in a timely fashion. The registration process became easier. The firms 
no longer had to meet a very tight registration schedule that became available only once 
every two years. The January 1996 legislation allowed contractors, suppliers and 
consultants interested and qualified the right to register with the local government at any 
time. For example, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport’s (MLIT) “Japanese 
Procurement Procedures for Public Works” states that an Open and Competitive Bidding 
procedure was employed for large scale civil works infrastructure projects. The WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement applies to most of these works. Yet, for other public 
works, Designated Competitive Bidding procedure was widely employed.7 It subtly indicated
that other than the largest projects, or the Action Plan and WTO plan projects, civil works 
infrastructure construction projects were handled under the Designated Competitive Bidding 
procedure. Also, a construction company was required to register on a list at each 
commissioning entity in order to participate in public works projects. Also, a single entity 
often had several regional bureaus or subordinate agencies that independently ordered civil 
works infrastructure construction works and separately had their own registration lists for 
contractors. 
Registration was necessary not only to participate in bidding under the Open and 
Competitive Biding system, but also in the other bidding systems mentioned below. 
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Applications for registration were received at any time of the year, although the MLIT
advises that several weeks for processing should be allowed. Each applicant firm was
registered with the entity that would award the contract and was granted a license based on 
its score on the entities’ evaluation. The ability of each firm was a function of the “Business 
Evaluation,” which was a system for evaluating technical, financial, and other abilities of a 
construction company. A company that planned to participate in civil works infrastructure 
construction projects is required by the Construction Business Act to go through the 
Business Evaluation annually and is responsible for registering with every agency from 
which it will seek contracts. For example, if the Tokyo Metropolitan Governor issued the 
License, an application for the Business Evaluation had to be submitted to the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Governor. The Business Evaluation criteria include:
 Annual value of completed construction works by License classification.
 Net worth
 Number of staff.
 Business condition (financial statement analysis).
 Number of technical staff.
 Number of years in business.
 Record of labor compliance with welfare conditions.
 Record of safety performance.
 Number of qualified accounting clerks.
For a Japanese branch of a foreign firm or a majority-owned subsidiary of a foreign firm, the 
value of completed civil works infrastructure construction works overseas and the number of 
personnel resident outside Japan are treated identically with those in Japan by the Business 
Evaluation. Additionally, the size of technical staff and the number of years in business in 
foreign countries of an applicant will be counted, if the MLIT had certified their equivalence 
with those in Japan in advance. Moreover, an applicant could be evaluated jointly with 
closely related foreign group firms on a corporate-group basis upon request. Thus, a
subsidiary of a foreign firm in Japan could be evaluated jointly with its parent firm. 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of civil works infrastructure construction projects still came 
under the “Designated Competitive Bidding” procedure.
There were a number of alternatives allowed, but not used as frequently as the Designated 
Competitive Bidding procedure. In Public Invitation Designated Competitive Bidding, the 
awarding government entity first decides to let the contract for a project, selects the licensed 
firms from which it will request the submission of technical documents, and then publishes 
an outline of the project and the qualifications of firms from which the entity requests the 
submission of technical documents. Firms that were interested in bidding or tendering on the 
project from the designated firms submitted their technical documents. The awarding 
government entity then examined the submitted documents and designated firms for 
participation in bidding or tendering. Reasons that a particular firm had not been selected for 
bidding or tendering were generally provided upon request. The MLIT ordinarily adopted this 
method for civil works infrastructure construction projects with a contract value of ¥ 200-730 
million. For smaller yet civil works infrastructure construction projects in the range of ¥ 100-
200 million, the Project Interest Registration Designated Competitive Bidding procedure is 
used. At the time of registration for the qualification to submit bids or tenders, the awarding 
government entity requests each construction company to indicate what types of 
construction projects it prefers to bid. When it comes time for the bidding or tendering, the 
awarding government entity considers the preferences of each company, and requests 10 or 
20 registered companies to submit technical documents (“provisional selection”). After 
examining submitted documents, final nominees are selected to submit bids or tenders. For 
even smaller civil works infrastructure construction projects (less than ¥ 100 million), under 
Designated Competitive Bidding, an awarding government entity selects construction 
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companies that it wishes to invites to bid on the basis of the track record of each company's 
work and its score in the entity’s construction company ranking system. Ordinarily, a
selection committee at the awarding government entity was in charge of the selection.
Although not common, the MLIT had experimented with other forms of bidding as tests:
 Under the Design-Build system different firms carry out the design and construction 
of civil works infrastructure projects in Japan. A small number of public entities were
beginning to experiment with the design-build system.
 The Value Engineering (VE) system was introduced as a means of improving quality 
and reducing cost of a project. It is adopted at the tendering phase or at the post-
contract phase. In VE in the post-contract phase, half of the cost savings achieved 
through the use of VE is often returned to the contractor. The MLIT and Local 
Housing Supply Corporations were beginning to use this system, and some local 
governments were test using it.
 Under the Technical Proposal Integrated Evaluation System, for a particular civil
works infrastructure project, the awarding government entity calls upon bidders to 
submit technical proposals in addition to price bids or tenders. The awarding 
government entity then evaluates the bid or tender considering both the price and the 
technical proposal, reviewing factors such as quality, speed, design, and safety of 
execution.
The MLIT proudly reports that the time frames for foreign company registration and 
tendering/bidding complaints have been reduced. It reported that the system was used for 
the first time in FY 1998 to award a contract and now used by the MLIT is shown by the 
following diagram:
Figure IV.A.1
Open and Competitive Bidding Procedure (Standard Type)
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For example, Table IV.A.3 compares various country’s commitment levels on government 
procurement available to foreign contractors in comparison to Japan expressed in SDR’s 
under the AGP (before the voluntary changes made by Japan):
Table IV.A.3
Sample Comparative Level of Procurement under the AGP
Classification Japan United 
States
Europe
Union
Canada Korea
Central Government
Goods
Services
Construction Services
Design Consulting Serv.
130
130
4,500
450
130
130
5,000
400
130
130
5,000
130
130
130
5,00
130
130
130
5,000
130
Local Public Bodies
Goods
Services
Construction Services
Design Consulting Serv.
Prefectures,
Designated 
Cities
200
200
15,000
355
37 States
355
355
5,000
355
Regional
Self-Govern
Bodies
200
200
5,000
200
355
355
5,000
355
Provinces,
5 Cities
200
200
15,000
200
Government-Related Orgs
Goods
Services
Construction Services
Design Consulting Serv.
70 Entities
130
130
15,000
450
7 Entities
400
400
5,000
400
Waterways, 
Transport 
Energy
400
400
5,000
400
355
355
5,000
355
23 Orgs
450
15,000
450
The end result was that in the April 1, 1996 to April 1, 2006 period the civil works 
infrastructure construction market was to become fully open to foreign companies after a 
transition period set by the levels in the AGP. 
What has happened? The US Department of Commerce described Japan at the beginning 
of 2003 as still the world’s second largest market (after China). The US Trade 
Representative confirmed that Japan had the second largest global civil works infrastructure 
construction market in 2004 accounting for US$ 190 billion.8 Japan it said:
“continues to lead world construction activity, accounting for more than 33 percent of 
global spending [for construction], according to ENR (Engineering News Record) 
estimates… [however] construction spending in Japan is expected to continue to 
decline over the next few years, as Japan’s economic slump continues.”9
Domestic construction had fallen from ¥81.4 trillion in 1990, of which civil works 
infrastructure construction accounted for 31.6%, by more than a third ¥53.8 trillion by 2003 
and public works construction was ¥23 trillion or 42.8%. despite the decrease in expenditure. 
But the US Department of Commerce also reported that
“competition best describes the current condition of Japan’s public construction 
procurement market. This is due primarily to the shrinking number of large scale 
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public projects. As a result, cost reduction has become an important key to success. 
Japan has begun to study various technologies including project management, 
construction management and value engineering in order to explore new ways to 
increase the efficient use of public funds. These developments create opportunities 
for U.S. firms, which lead the world in these construction technologies. Japanese 
construction firms lag their counterparts in these areas…Apart from price, quality, and 
delivery time are also very important in the Japanese market…Additionally, 
construction scheduling is critical. It is estimated that U.S. construction firms 
succeeded in winning an average of at least $200 - $300 million in public contracts in 
Japan in 1999 and 2000. That translates to less than a 0.1% share for all public 
projects. When considering Action Plan projects, however, U.S. firms faired much 
better, capturing a 1% share. There are at least 100 foreign construction firms active 
in Japan [firms that hold licenses]. U.S. firms account for over half: 6 General 
Contractors. Not needing licenses are the 5 Architectural design firms, and 50 
specialty design/consulting firms. Korean general contractors are the second largest 
contingent.”10
This record was dismal. The Government was forced in the face of a stagnating economy to
commit to open up the domestic civil work infrastructure market to foreign construction 
companies. But the Government was still interested in protecting “its” construction industry, 
just as the ruling party had used civil works infrastructure construction for decades. 
Protecting the civil works infrastructure construction industry was of paramount importance.  
This protection was at the expense of the civil works infrastructure construction industry (the 
small and medium firms particularly), which it was not preparing for opening of the 
construction industry to foreign competition. What little had been done has not met with any 
significant success. 
Japan continued to promote mega infrastructure projects as being open to foreign 
competition as the new century began. They claimed an estimated ¥30 trillion to be spent in 
Chubu region (2000 to 2005), the ¥640 billion Central Japan International Airport, the ¥3.2 
trillion Second Tomei-Meishin Expressway (new 6-lane freeway connecting Tokyo-Nagoya-
Kobe), and the un-priced maglev high-speed train linking Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka.11 But the 
focus was on procurement for materials/equipment, the providing of potential financing 
support, and not construction. Using the figure of one percent which had been achieved, the 
level of ¥3 trillion still would not be exceeded.  
Government agencies also were arguing in 2000 that the historically high 5.5% to 6.5% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for civil works infrastructure construction be maintained as 
the country, it claimed, “Has a considerable appetite for Social Overhead Capital and still 
needs further improvements in its infrastructure.”12 The “social overhead capital” was a 
euphemism for the ten construction stimulus packages noted above that the ruling party 
undertook between the years 1990 and 1999. The Government’s Ministry of Construction 
(the predecessor to the current Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport) wanted more. 
Yet, this level of spending for civil works infrastructure, “social overhead capital,” could no 
longer be maintained. Even for existing infrastructure, the Government predicted that 
Maintenance and Renovation would exceed ¥20 trillion, and admitted “there will be little 
money to spare for new investment in public works” for a few years.13 Even the ten “stimulus 
packages” between 1990 and 1999 did not produce the results that were promoted as 
having as shown in Table IV.A.4:
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Table IV.A.4
Announced versus Actual Levels of Japanese Stimulus Packages, 1993 to 1998
Japan’s Fiscal Stimulus Packages, 1993 to 1998
Date
Announced
Announced
Amount
(¥ trillion)
Actual Stimulus
Expenditure
(¥ trillion)
April 1992 13.2 10.6
September 1993 6.3 5.1
February 1994 15.2 7.2
February 1995 1.6 1.6
April-May 1995 2.7 2.7
September 1995 14.0 7.9-9.0
December 1996 2.7 2.7
December 1997 15.9 2.9
April 1998 16.6 NA
November 1998 24.0 NA
Source: Asahi Nenkan (various issues) and Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 1998
The most important component of these packages was civil works infrastructure 
construction. However, the actual increases in the late 1990’s were rather moderate 
compared to the prominent and headline grabbing role of public works in the stimulus 
packages.
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B. Japan’s Domestic Civil Works Infrastructure Construction Industry 2000 - 2005
There are two reasons that actual civil works infrastructure construction fell short of the 
announced levels. First, the Government assigned roughly two thirds of the increases in 
public works spending to local governments without providing a commensurate increase in 
funding. The capacity of local governments to expand public investment was affected by 
their financial situation. The continued rise in public investment increasingly had been 
financed through local bond issues. The amount of outstanding local government bonds 
increased from 12 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990 to 22 percent in 1997. 
Many local governments surpassed the legally allowed threshold of bonds outstanding and 
were put under bond issuance restrictions by the Government. Also, some of the public 
investment funds provided by the stimulus packages remained unused because of the poor 
implementation. Only 60% to 70% of the packages’ public works had been translated into 
additional civil works infrastructure construction during the late 1990’s.14 Yet, these the 
spending packages over the 1990’s pushed up public debt in Japan to more than 140% of 
GDP – the highest ratio among industrialized nations.15 Many public corporations and local 
governments carrying out civil works infrastructure projects were essentially insolvent. Owing 
to a very weak domestic economy, which lowered tax revenues and raised government 
spending, Japan’s fiscal balance has deteriorated dramatically. By 2000, Japan had the 
largest government debt-GDP ratio among the OECD member countries.16 The debt of 
Japan compared to other countries also establishes the Government inability to continue to 
finance civil works infrastructure construction. The Ministry of Finance reported recently on 
its web site:
“Looking at the percentage of general government financial balances to GDP, many 
other developed countries have been working towards fiscal consolidation and have 
shown steady improvements. However, our country's fiscal deficit has greatly 
increased and exceeded that of other developed countries due to various measures 
aimed for economic recovery.”17
The precarious predicament that the protection of the civil works infrastructure construction 
industry is illustrated by the fact that compared to all developed countries, Japan is moving 
in the opposite direction when debt is taken as a percentage of GDP:
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Figure IV.B.1
Ministry of Finance Reported Levels of Debt Expressed of a Percentage of GDP
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 72 (2002). Figures are calculated on SNA Base and for Japan and the US 
figures are calculated on general government financial balance excluding social security.
As can be seen in the figure, it is twice the levels of any other country that is moving 
upwards (France, Germany, and the US). The amount of potential government bailout is 
15% of the 2000 GDP.18 The Government can no longer use civil works infrastructure 
construction as the vehicle to drive it through the economic slumps that continued to ravage 
Japan.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Japan has been in deflation for almost six years, and 
the Bank of Japan has said it will keep its policy framework until year-on-year changes in the 
core inflation show stable positive growth. Deflation has increased real interest rates and 
debt, leading to defaults that can weaken the financial system. It also has a negative impact 
on investment and wealth. The Ministry of Finance said outstanding debt held by the 
Japanese government hit a fresh high record of ¥751.107 trillion as of the end of December 
2004, and that was up 2.8% from ¥730.985 trillion, the previous high. The government has 
slashed civil works infrastructure construction budgets and spending as is demonstrated in 
the following Table IV.B.1 and Figure IV.B.2 compiled from Research Institute of 
Construction and Economy data:
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* Forecasted in January 2005 by the Research Institute of Construction and Economy
Government spending on Public construction has fallen nearly 30% since FY 2000 and will 
continue to fall, but at a slightly slower rate and remain constant at this reduced level.  
Similarly, Private civil works infrastructure construction, albeit one-fifth the value of public 
civil works construction, has similarly fallen by 25% over the same time. But, it has been 
essentially flat as a percentage of GDP, 1%. The rate of the overall decline in civil works 
construction and private civil works is slowing to a value approximating ¥25 to ¥26 trillion, as 
is shown in Table IV.B.2 and Figure IV.B.1 which follows:
Table IV.B.1
JAPANESE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CIVIL WORKS AND GDP
Fiscal Year19
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
GDP (¥ trillion)
Rate of change from 
previous FY
513,170
1.0
500,968
-1.1%
497,203
-0.8%
501,254
1.9%
504,368
2.0%
506,668
1.4%
Public Construction 
(¥ trillion)
29,960 28,123 25,370 22,970 20,530 20,830
Rate of change from
previous FY -6.2% -5.9% -10.0% -9.5% -10.6% 1.5%
Percent of GDP 5.8% 5.6 5.1% 4.6% 4.1% 4.1%
Private Civil Works
(¥ trillion)
6,616 5,903 5,280 5,190 5,140 4,980
Rate of change from
previous FY 2.5% -10.8% -10.6% -1.7% -1.0% -3.1%
Percent of GDP 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
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In the first quarter of 2005, the Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI) reported that growth was 
only 25% of the levels that they predicted the previous quarter for 2005. MRI cited a “mood 
of adjustment” that was taking hold in 2005, but asserted the economy was unlikely to slip 
into deep recession – the net being GDP growth which was a growing at the nominal GDP 
rate of 1.5%. This situation reflects the situation caused by the increasing (rather than 
decreasing) use of Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) funds to cover the losses 
from public corporations with prior spending on public works. The FILP in Japan collects 
funds through governmental financial institutions (most notably postal savings) and uses the 
funds to finance civil works infrastructure and other projects undertaken by government-
affiliated corporations or to finance government loans to borrowers in targeted areas 
(targeted industries, small firms, mortgage borrowers, etc.). Many countries have 
government-sponsored loan programs. The Japanese program is distinguished by its size. 
At the end of fiscal 2000 (March 2001) the FLIP involved ¥418 trillion, equal to some 82 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and the program’s use of funds statement totaled 
more than the GDP. The postal savings system, the most important source of funds for the 
FLIP, is the world’s largest financial institution. It held ¥250 trillion in deposits (35 percent of 
total household deposits) at the end of fiscal 2000.
The FILP may promote welfare and economic growth by financing projects that have such 
large externalities that private institutions would not undertake them. It also may be an 
impediment to welfare and growth by allowing the government to pursue wasteful projects. 
Historically the program has ignored market information, and its sheer size makes the cost of 
resource misallocation enormous. The FILP accounts are notoriously opaque. Thus, just 
before the restructuring that the Government has undertaken, the data shows that existing 
losses and expected transfers to cover future losses are enormous. These losses are implicit 
claims on the Government (and hence on taxpayers). FILP losses will impede economic 
Figure IV.B.2
The Value of Domestic Construction Works and GDP-Japan
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recovery, especially when taken with restructuring that the Government is being forced to 
undertake.20
The outlook for public works construction (whether national or local government spending) is 
not good.21 Japan may take a long time to adjust precisely because it can afford to do so. 
Japan is a wealthy country with a large current accounts surplus and a large pool of 
domestic savings. Because of the efforts of trying to assuage the sectors of the economy, 
Japan has managed to avoid a major social or political crisis, but this has come at the cost of 
an economy that remains maladjusted and stagnant.22 The controlling party has “mortgaged” 
the future of both the country financial capability and that of the civil works infrastructure 
construction industry. 
The MLIT in 2003 issued a white paper on fulfilling infrastructure needs of the future in light 
of the changing demographics.23 The Government clearly cannot spend money on civil 
works infrastructure projects as “social capital overhead” to stimulate the economy. The 
MLIT completely was refocusing from a mere three years before. The focus was on the local 
prefectures and communities defining what they need in the future and then forming in 
essence, public/private partnerships to fund and execute the infrastructure needs. The 
message was clear: the national government will not and can not fund future projects and 
will no longer build what the Government determines are necessary (despite useful in 
keeping the ruling party in power). This position was a total departure from prior practice. 
Yet, this situation makes the implementation awkward, since the MLIT has been the 
repository of the engineering and management civil works infrastructure expertise for the 
country. It was now located in the MLIT, but it would no longer to be source of funding that 
the party uses for its civil works infrastructure construction contracts. Conversely, the 
Prefectures and Local Governments do not have the contract administration skills necessary 
to oversee large civil works infrastructure projects.
Regarding the “roles of the public, community and private sectors,” the MLIT stated that 
recent “case studies suggest that community development initiatives are originated from:”
voluntary groups, Non Profit Organizations (NPO’s), local government, and community 
development councils. To this end, the MLIT now defined its role as changing policies, etc., 
which are an impediment to achieving the goal, and supplying partnerships of the private 
sector and academia groups with information. As for human resource development, such as, 
in planning, engineering and construction management, the MLIT suggests that it will 
provide support to the prefectures and local governments by offering “professional advice.”  
Then MLIT suggests that business should give “priority to training their employees” and use 
external sources as human resources. As for the future role of the Government, they 
assigned two roles:
1. Ensuring a level playing field for local communities, businesses and 
municipalities to compete.
2. Developing physical and social infrastructure conducive to business.
They were encouraging cooperation and partnerships between municipalities and 
business/academia, for example. The Government, however, said it would provide major 
support for such efforts, if local initiatives are in line with its policies. These policies are 
focused for the foreseeable future also will not be realized because of an inability to provide 
the necessary funding, since FILP cannot guarantee funds anymore.
As 2003 began, the MLIT sought information on how it could supply the necessary personnel 
to meet the changes with which the Government was now faced, since it was no longer the 
main provider of civil works infrastructure projects. The MLIT said:24
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“The present situation of the Japan Construction Industry, which is facing a drastic 
reduction of construction investment, has resulted into a severe price competition 
among contractors. As a result, the number of low price bidding has been increasing 
at all levels of public offices especially cities, towns and villages. In addition, 
engineering officials who are in charge of supervising or inspection etc. in small 
towns and villages are tended to be in sufficient. We really worry that the 
aforementioned facts may have resulted in decline of quality of public works. This is 
why we are particularly interested in the partnering of clients and advisers in public 
construction works in USA….We would like to learn the system more in detail in USA 
if it is possible. The followings are main points that we need to collect information in 
USA.
.
1. Scope of responsibility of a public office (especially for local municipalities) that 
places a contract for public construction works.
2. The number of civil engineering officials who are in charge of public construction 
works for a public office of some particular jurisdictions.
3. The role of civil engineering officials who are in charge of public construction 
works in a public office (especially for local municipalities).
4. How consultants or third parties are engaged to help public office (especially for 
local municipalities) to carry out public construction works from its procurement 
through the completion. We want to know the legal status of those people and 
also the physical arrangement, i.e. location of their offices.
5. Powers, roles, and liabilities of clients, consultants and contractors respectively in 
each case described in item 4.
6. Contracting content (especially role sharing) between an advisers/consultants 
and a public office (especially a local municipalities).”
The information sought was because the Government had never contemplated that the 
Prefectures and Local Governments would ever have to deal with larger civil works 
infrastructure. 
The export-driven industrial sector leads to a different scenario. A potent example of the new 
thinking from change is in area of industrial research & development (R&D) that led to so 
many innovations in the 1980’s. The end of the “Bubble” economy led to a decrease in R&D 
spending and a decrease in traditional measures of R&D productivity, although Japan still 
spends a larger share of GDP than any other nation on R&D. As Japanese industry reached 
technology frontiers, Japanese business has had to reorient R&D efforts from the application 
and refinement of existing, relatively well-developed technology to the creation of more 
fundamental breakthroughs. The shortage of Ph.D.-level engineers and the relative 
weakness of Japanese academic science had inhibited the effectiveness of more 
technologically ambitious R&D in Japan. The Japanese similarly tried large centralized R&D 
labs with consequent lack of focus – something that the US abandoned in the 1980’s. 
Similarly there has been an absence of a venture capital industry and the types of 
institutions that support start-ups. 
These problems are being addressed now in various industries. Most notably has been the 
increase in forging of technological alliances with US firms, which has led to increased 
knowledge flows to Japanese firms. The increased knowledge flows have resulted in 
increased inventive productivity, but still this has not as been the case in the construction 
Industry. The one exception in export industries has been the Japanese electronics industry 
when compared to other manufacturing-export industries. The electronics industry has been 
much more aggressive in establishing technology alliances, despite seeing the same pattern 
of R&D expenditure decline as other manufacturing industries. Successful current R&D 
thinking is a five part strategy: (1) Greater reliance on R&D partnerships outside the
traditional Keiretsu networks within Japan; (2) Greater reliance on foreign (especially US) 
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partnerships and acquisitions of high-tech firms; (3) Greater emphasis on cooperation with 
universities, domestic and foreign, coupled with a de-emphasis on centralized in-house R&D 
and a gradual downsizing of resources invested in central R&D facilities; and (5) increased 
interest and investment in corporate venturing programs. It is not the mere simple licensing 
of US technology which the Japanese has embraced wholeheartedly, it is the forging of 
technology alliances that allow the incorporation of ideas developed outside the firm into a 
firms own R&D efforts. 
The current move towards partial outsourcing of R&D is a conscious imitation of a shift that 
was already underway in the US from the early 1990’s. 25 The following Figure IV.B.3
illustrates the amount of private sector R&D spending in Japan and the US from 1985-1999:
Figure IV.B.3
R&D Spending in Japan and US, 1985-1999
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When the number of patents applications generated by inventors in Japan, the EU and the 
US in their respective countries and world wide between 1987 and 1997 is measured, Japan 
filed twice as many in 1987 to 1989. Japan remained essentially flat during the next eight 
years, however, and, US and the EU each rose to more than three times the number of 
Japanese applications.26 But, significant changes in the R&D arena are being undertaken as 
indicted. Similar changes in thinking have been occurring in the management arena. The 
documented success of a Westerner in turning around Nissan and the recent management 
change in leadership to a Westerner at Sony Corporation, the icon of the 1980’s of Japanese 
innovation, portend the shift that is taking place in traditional Japanese industrial 
management. These are multinational organizations, and when their traditional methods no 
longer work in the global market, they are adapting rapidly. The uses of new ideas that are 
necessitated by a changing economy are forcing change. It is beyond the scope of this 
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thesis, but reform of Japanese engineering curriculum for the Japanese consulting engineers
by P. Galloway is addressing the future role of Japanese consulting engineers in a global 
market.27 Similarly, the approaches being taken by Dr. Gato Kano’s of Kochi University of 
Technology with respect to Entrepreneurial Engineering28 is a shift from tradition-bound 
Japanese thinking. Dr. Kano promotes thinking outside of the structured Japanese way
through cross fertilization of engineering ideas and disciplines. The Japanese export-
oriented industries are to make adjustments that allow them to compete in their domestic 
markets and also in the global market. The export-oriented industries are adjusting to the 
global market, and are doing so with reasonable success.
Such thinking, however, is not the case with the domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction industry. In 20 years the Government has introduced many polices relating to 
the construction industry. All were designed to keep the status quo with regards to foreign 
competition by evidencing change. The policies most recently included:
 February 1986: Construction Industry Vision for 21 Century
 March 1989: Promoting Program for Improvement of Construction Industry System
 April 1995: Construction Industry Policy Codes
 July 1999: Construction Industry Revival Program
 April 2002: Reorganization Plan for Construction Industry
These measures were oriented to further strengthening domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction industry by making more formidable in Japan, but not to preparing it foreign 
competition as the AGP required. For example, the 1995 Construction Industry Policy Codes 
ostensively was intended to the build into the industry the “quality” that Japanese contractors 
“were known for” and in the civil works infrastructure construction to rid the industry of 
perception as “dirty – Kitanai.” The industry had been plagued with issues of quality, the 
exclusion of practices that reduce construction time and cost, bid rigging, and a system that 
obscures transparency.29 Similarly, the MLIT has been promoting various actions, such as,
utilizing Internet Technology (IT), aiming for reforms in public works processes. To realize 
transparency of bidding and contracts, the “Act for Promoting Proper Tendering and 
Contracting for Public Works” was established in order to make the processes of public 
works transparent. Preparation at using systems and work procedures was completed in 
2001. This led to promoting the introduction and spreading of electronic bidding making full 
use IT. The basic principles for appropriateness in bidding and contracting thus began 
implementation the same year. Electronic Bidding has been applicable for civil works
infrastructure construction projects ordered by the MLIT from FY 2003 onwards, as indicated 
earlier. Electronic bidding is to be applied to all civil works infrastructure construction
projects, including local government agencies, by FY 2010.30
In March 2004, the Japanese Cabinet adopted “The Three-Program for the Promotion of 
Regulatory Reform” comprising 762 regulatory reform measures to improve transparency.31
Still the construction industry is not represented in these governmental structural reforms.
The Government is thus going through restructuring in other area of the economy as further 
means of adjusting to the new reality the country faces, yet the Government is still not 
making meaningful changes to the civil works infrastructure construction industry. The same 
ruling party that led the country into the economic problems also is leading the effort to 
restructure government in an attempt to streamline government processes. The once high 
flying and seemingly invincible construction industry, however, is left ill prepared to meet 
foreign competitors in either a reduced domestic market or compete in the global market. 
The civil works infrastructure construction industry still is suffering from practices that 
allowed the long-ruling party to manipulate elections, and its attempts during the 1990’s to in 
a stimulate the economy through the civil works infrastructure construction projects. The 
ruling party had to keep foreign competitors out of the domestic civil works infrastructure 
IV- Kris R. Nielsen                                                                              17
construction market to achieve the results it expected. The WTO pledge by Japan of 
allowing open competition to foreigners took a back seat. There has been little movement in 
the nine years since the AGP went into effect. Foreign firms have approximately 1% of the 
civil works infrastructure construction market. The Government did not make the required the
structural changes, instead it continued to incur huge debt for civil works infrastructure 
construction projects in an ill-fated attempt to stimulate economic recovery. The civil works 
infrastructure construction industry simply is not prepared for a truly open and competitive 
market by April 2006 operating under international rules. The Government has not issued 
changes to laws, procedures, rules and processes.  
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C. The Future Prospects of the Civil Works Infrastructure Construction Industry – 2006 
Onwards
The means for enabling the industry to in effect prepare itself for domestic competition and 
train itself to go forth and similarly compete in the global market place needs to be 
established. The civil works infrastructure construction industry is a function of the 
contracting process that has enabled it to be “manipulated” for so long. Contracting for civil 
works infrastructure projects is under the Japanese Contract and Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works. Yet, the protection that the construction industry has enjoyed for 
over fifty years is based on the same Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for 
Public Works. The domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry is based on the 
Japanese legal principles that underlie contracting for such works in are embodied in the 
Construction Business Law, Chapter 3: Contract for Construction, Section 1: General 
Provisions, Article 18: Principle of Contract for Construction Work which states: “Parties 
executing a contract for construction work shall conclude a fair and equitable agreement in 
mutual good faith.” This principle of “mutual trust” was effectively used by the long ruling 
party (the Government) as the means of staying in power. Thus they had to exclude 
foreigners because they did not have the same legal contractual basis. The western world, 
which has provided construction with the standard conditions of contract, uses a contractual 
system that is founded on the principle of “mutual mistrust”. This approach is contrary to the 
manner in which most of the world’s civil works infrastructure projects are delivered. Further, 
the method of estimation and the qualifications for contractors meant that the contractors 
that bid on civil works infrastructure construction were pre-qualified, in a system that only 
they understood, and which made the Owner/Employer (the Government) the dominant 
contracting party. Thus, the Government had the players and the means of control to use 
civil works infrastructure construction to engage in “pump priming” to stay in power and to 
attempt to resuscitate the flagging economy without interference. It lost on both fronts as 
explained above. Finally, the ruling party began a series of reforms or a restructuring of the 
systems and laws of governance once it regained power. In the future, the Japanese 
Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works must reflect the essence of 
the way the global market executes civil works infrastructure projects. If it is to survive, the 
Construction Business Law, and the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works will prepare the domestic industry to meet the inevitable opening of the domestic 
market to foreign competition, regardless of whether the Government, Prefectures, Local 
Government, or the private sector funds are used for future civil works infrastructure 
construction projects. A corollary benefit will be that the personnel and businesses will 
understand how to engage in civil works infrastructure construction in other markets –
namely the global market.
To address what must change, one must look at the characteristics of the civil works 
infrastructure construction industry as it exists today. In March 2001 the Japanese Research 
Institute of Construction and Economy (RICE) predicted flat growth in public construction 
and private civil works by 2010 and 2020 for two cases. Under case 1 it was assumed that 
investment had a growth rate average per year of 0% over the period 2001 to 2010 and the 
period 2011 to 2020. Under case 2, it was assumed that investment had a growth rate 
average of negative 2% per year over the period 2001 to 2010 and of 0% per year for the 
period 2011 to 2020. The first five years (2001-2005) of the first period (2001 to 2010) 
exceeded a negative 2% per year. It was actually an average of a negative 7%! In constant 
1995 yen, the value of civil works infrastructure construction and private civil works 
construction was projected at an average of ¥ 22.7 trillion in 2010, 2015 and 2020. This level 
is even reduced from the ¥ 25.8 that was expected for 2005. In February 2005 RICE again 
reiterated that the decrease in Government construction investment, other then disaster 
recovery, “is likely to continue,”32 Thus, the civil works infrastructure construction market for 
the next fifteen years will not grow. To analyze the possibilities, however, we must define the 
characteristics of the market today.
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RICE in February 2005 also discussed the concept of investing in and using social 
infrastructure capital to provide a growing basis for the private sector to achieve productivity 
improvements. The Government had used the 1989 hypothesis that David Aschauer, a US 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Senior Economist, published in his article entitled “Is 
Public Expenditure Productive?” as the justification for the ten stimulus packages it 
undertook in the 1990’s. The Government has found from semi-macroeconomic studies in 
the fifteen years since the article was published that the productivity effect differs by region, 
industry and type of infrastructure. RICE concluded that these findings will have “great 
implication for future efficient and focused social infrastructure improvement.” The research 
will affect the planning and the selection of the projects in which Government will invest. 
Nonetheless, the construction industry has a residual of expertise on the part of the 
Government and the contractors. It is “the execution of the social capital infrastructure 
projects.” While there will be a reduction in wholesale contracting by the Government, the 
Construction Industry as a whole has extraordinary expertise and experience for 
constructing civil works infrastructure projects and can offer that expertise to the global 
market.33 The window of opportunity to utilize this expertise is slipping away. So why not use 
it to the advantage of the industry by using it to accomplish the Japanese Government’s 
international aid development goals, for example? 
The domestic Japanese construction industry is currently facing an over supply of 
construction workers. The Government’s reduction in civil works infrastructure construction 
projects has been extreme, but the decline in available and experienced personnel has only 
been moderate. The socially mobile groups (the younger generations) have been the most 
affected. Thus, construction workers in all aspects of the industry from engineers to “muddy 
boots” laborers, whether employed by the Government in their role as the Owner/Employer 
or by the contractors and subcontractors have been affected. This trend as caused the 
number of workers who are aged 50 and above to constitute over 40% of all construction 
workers.34 New workers are not being attracted to the civil works infrastructure construction 
industry because it is known to be a “3K” industry, that is, fatiguing, dirty and dangerous, and 
it is in decline. Many skilled workers are retiring which is creating a serious shortage of 
skilled workers. The “graying” of the construction work force is not only a function of the 
available work. The Japanese population is getting older as well, as shown in the following 
Figure IV.C.1 and Table IV.C.1 (% is the percentage of non-productive population – 65 years 
old):
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Figure IV.C.1 and Table IV.C.1
The Ratio of People Older than 65 Years Old within the Total Population
The data suggests that Japan is growing older at nearly twice the rate as is the US. Japan is 
expected to experience the fastest aging of its population of any country. With a life 
expectancy reaching 88.1 years in 2050, Japan will have 42.4% of its population aged 60 
and over, compared with 32.2% in Canada and 25.5% in the U.S.35 In addition, the total 
population of Japan is declining rapidly as well, as is shown in the following Table IV.C.2:
Table IV.C.2
Projection of Japanese Population
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Population 
Projections for Japan, January 1997
In the next 40 years the total Japanese population will decrease by nearly 20%. In contrast, 
the US population is currently the only industrialized country whose population is 
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increasing.36 Immigrants now account for 11% of US population, and the number of children 
in the school age (5 to 18 years old) is on the increase, setting the highest level ever in 
2004.37 More disturbing for Japan is the productive work force will see the proportion of 
women in the population continue to grow. Forty years from now in Japan, women will out 
number men by nearly 12%. Thus the construction industry, which is the most male 
dominated sector of the Japanese economy, will potentially be affected to a greater extent. 
RICE, in an about face, stated in February 2005 that two phenomenon will keep labor input 
from falling as fast as the productive population – a staggering total of 18% by 2020.38
According to RICE, one quarter of the loss can be made up by:
“…3.85 million women who are potential job seekers, [but who are] currently not 
employed and not applying for jobs, but who are willing to work. [emphasis in the 
original]…[In addition,] the population of senior citizens will increase by 10 million by 
2020, …many of whom will be healthy and willing to work. The decline in labor input 
can be curbed by employing more women and senior citizens.”
This change is a radical because the labor force has had three fundamental aspects: life-
time employment, predominantly male, and a small proportion of immigrants. There are 
three major reasons for the labor force’s lack of diversity historically. The first two are based 
on the Japanese personnel management system and the legal framework that supports it: 
(1) the barriers to interim mobility for career employees, especially older men, and (2) the 
difficulty women face in developing meaningful careers after taking time off to raise children. 
The third impediment is the national reluctance to accept large numbers of immigrants into 
Japan.  Japanese employment has historically had the following characteristics:
1. Unions are enterprise based and are 21% of the labor, but a higher 
percentage on civil works infrastructure construction projects
2. Job tenure for full time employees remains high, especially with the 
Government and the contractors in civil works infrastructure construction 
projects.
3. The interim mobility rates are not high. With the recent decline in funding for 
civil works infrastructure construction, it is not something that for which the 
Government and the contractors have trained employees (see discussion 
below).
4. The low rate of unemployment until recently, which has been replaced by high 
rate of unemployment in the Japanese context -- 5.4% in May 2002.
5. A close relationship between age and compensation is dominant theme in 
compensation.
6. Although the gender pay gap has narrowed for full time employees, the gap is 
still wide between female part-time workers and male full-time workers.
Among the OECD countries, including Korea, only Japan is gender rather 
then occupation, age, or industry the most important determinant of wages.39
Nonetheless, permanent changes that have occurred in the last decade to the historical 
Japanese model portrayed above. The proportion of individuals who are part-time or contract 
workers is increasing. Managerial compensation is being tied to various measures of 
performance. But, despite the trend, the civil works infrastructure construction industry is 
experiencing two countervailing trends that must be addressed, if the RICE February 2005 
assertion is to occur. The trend first must be reversed in young workers quitting or not 
seeking entry because of poor economic conditions and the “3K” image of the industry. The 
skills that exist in older workers are not transferable because of “training differences.” These 
trends, however, create a unique opportunity for the construction industry that can occur only 
with change.
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The two sources of potential employee replacement require a substantial readjustment. A 
survey of Tokyo workers reasons for not wanting to change jobs is presented in the following 
Table IV.C.3. By far the dominant reason was age. It is symptomatic of older Japanese 
workers. When coupled with the second reason, the bars to using the potential of retired 
persons are great. The training that the worker received as a young person entering a work 
force that embraced life time employment where he was “trained” in the approaches that 
where unique to his company. 
Table IV.C.3
The Worker View of the Reasons Changing Jobs Is Difficult
Reason Given Percentage
Giving Reason
I exceed the age limit of the job postings. 40.8
My work experience is not transferable to new companies. 23.4
My return to seniority will be lost and I will suffer a wage loss. 21.8
I do not know how to look for jobs. 19.1
I will lose personal contacts I established through my prior employment 14.1
I will suffer loss in my pension benefits. 13.5
Source: Recruit Works Institute, 2001.
Turning to females, female workers over 30 find it difficult to find attractive job opportunities. 
This is especially true for women re-entering the work force after child birth. For married 
women, barriers also include disincentives in the tax system and the dearth of meaningful 
work. The 2004 Japanese Tax Figure IV.C.2 shows the impact of a spouses tax exemption, 
when the spouses income even a limited amount.
Figure IV.C.2
2004 Income Exemption of Spouses under the Japanese Tax Code
Source: www.mof.go.jp/english/tax/taxes2004e_k.pdf
Given that the number of couples that are not having children, women are potentially a 
sound source of new talent for the construction industry. The percentage of females working 
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full time in Japan, however, is the lowest in industrialized nations. In the following Table 
IV.C.4, by subtracting the part-time participation from the total participation yields 19.8% of 
the female work force is employed full time. This is in contrast to the US where 52.6% of the 
female work force is employed full time:
Table IV.C.4
Percentage Participation in the Work Force of Selected OECD Countries 
Country Participation
(% of females ages 15-64)
Part-time
Participation 
Japan 59.6 39.4
Sweden 76.4 21.4
US 70.8 18.2
United Kingdom 68.9 40.8
Germany 63.2 33.9
France 61.7 74.1
Italy 46.3 23.4
Thus, removing the tax disincentive for spouses will raise the number of women working full 
time. Using the OECD countries and especially the US as a benchmark, the estimate is that 
removal of these barriers would increase the productive labor supply in Japan by 13 to 18 
percent and thus could raise the potential growth rate of the Japanese economy by roughly 1 
percent a year over a ten year period.40 In the following Table IV.C.5 results of a recent 
survey of the Japan Society of Engineers (JSCE) found the following breakdown of female 
members (regarding regular members, there are 30,761 of which only 520 are women or 
2.5%) by the type of employer to be:
Table IV.C.5
Percentage Female Versus Male Engineers by Construction Industry Employer 
Employer Category Percentage of Women Percentage of Men
Private Corporations 19 12
Consulting Engineers 30 24
Construction Companies 12 26
Public Corporations 3 3
Educational Institutions 15 11
Government 4 5
Self Employed 5 4
Other 12 15
Source: JSCE records; statistics presented at the JSCE Women Civil Engineers Round Table, Tokyo, 
June 2, 2004. 
The only areas where the percentage of female was appreciably greater were consulting 
engineers, private corporations, and educational institutions. These findings are consistent 
with the notion that females have greater or at least equal capacity learn and have careers in 
technical areas. The total number of females at 2.5%, however, has to improve dramatically 
in order for women to be a significant factor in replacing the construction industry skills as 
suggested by the RICE study. Thus, the future will be bright for the civil works infrastructure 
construction market, provided that the part-time retired personnel and females are available 
to the civil works infrastructure construction industry. The two groups are ripe for training to 
meet a paradigm shift in the way the construction industry operates. This shift can be 
accomplished through revisions to the Construction Business Law, and Contract and 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works.
The third impediment to a diverse work force is Japan’s historic ban on immigration. This 
option does not appear to be one that the nation appears willing to accept at the moment. 
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Within the civil works infrastructure construction market there are reports of smaller projects 
being taken at low bidders because the contracts are by companies typically owned by multi-
generation Japanese who are of Korean ancestry. Owners of such firms are not given 
Japanese citizenship despite living in Japan for three or more generations. These firms tend 
to use illegal Korean labor as a human resource. The practice is the only appreciable use of 
aliens in the construction industry, but it has been studied very little. The situation is typical 
of how industry has handled shortages of engineers that have occurred since beginning of 
the 1990’s. For example, there is a critical demand in some fields, such as, software 
engineering, where the shortage of engineers with advanced degrees is so acute that there 
have been references to a “soft crisis” since the late 1980’s in Japan. Even in the US, 
demand for software engineers dramatically outstripped supply in the 1990’s – but US 
immigration law allowed the import of hundreds of thousands of foreign engineers to bridge 
the gap.41 Japan will always have shortages without addressing the immigration issue.
That leaves the issue of whether the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction 
industry is prepared to meet the challenges of opening the domestic market to foreign 
competition.
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V. The Appropriate Skills that the Japanese Civil Works 
Infrastructure Construction Industry Sets Will Need in 
the Future 
A. The Japanese Civil Works Infrastructure Construction Market and Foreign 
Competition – Can the Industry Survive?
Can the Japanese domestic civil works infrastructure construction adapt sufficiently to allow 
foreign competition and also prepare itself for the global market? Authorities point out 
regularly that the uniqueness of the Japanese system for civil works infrastructure 
construction lies in the foundation of the Construction Business Law. The Japanese point to 
the samurai code (Bushido 武士道) and the samurai manual (Hagakure葉隠) as underlying 
their ethics, and thus the uniqueness of the civil works infrastructure construction industry.1
The samurai code teaches “never do unto others that which you would not have done to 
you.” As regards to the needs of contracting, disputes resolution, and project management, 
the Japanese are said to be merely following its dictates. Thus, these authorities find that the 
Japanese are embodying the concepts of “mutual trust” in all of the dealings. Meanwhile, 
since most of the global market has as a basis the underlying Western thinking, the concept 
is culturally alleged to be based on the Christian “Golden Rule,” which proclaims “do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.” The difference is one of “not doing” for the 
Japanese, and one of “doing” in the global market. These concepts are only partially true. 
But, in the case of Japan the concept also explains why the ruling party was able to 
successfully use the civil works infrastructure construction industry for its own means for so 
long. Still, the Government is making changes in many sectors which have the same basis in 
Japanese culture. Yet, the Government is not treating the Japanese domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction industry equally.      
To begin with, the Japanese Government (the Owner/Employer) and Japanese Civil works 
infrastructure contactors have been brought up to trust in a security that is represented by 
the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry. It is ostensively Japanese 
thinking: one controls individual desire with a view towards maintaining harmony between 
human beings and nature. It is a security which depends on others recognition of the 
nuances of their observance of the code. Thus, when foreigners are oblivious of all the 
properties that underlie the security, Japanese are at a loss, and they cast about to find 
similar meticulous properties according to which, for example, the others live. When they 
cannot find it, they are at a further loss to understand. The form of Contract and Standard 
Conditions of Contract used in the global market based on “mutual mistrust” is just such a 
situation. Japanese can understand the written word, and make the necessary assumptions 
consistent with their culture. But, for the Japanese domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction industry these factors are required and continually reinforced by the 
Construction Business Law, and the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works. This concept is one that unfortunately has been employed for over five decades in 
the current form, and has been manipulated by the ruling party to control civil works 
infrastructure conduction. As a result, neither a “reformed” Japanese Owner/Employer nor 
the contractors are able to understand the basis of construction based on “mutual mistrust,”
and it compromises their ability to understand the basics of Contract Administration. Neither 
party looks for the differences from what they assumed in either the tendering process or the
bid. It is taken for granted that the Government will take care of them. This situation is 
consistent with the concept of dominance, that is, the parties are not equal, as reflected in 
the Japanese Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works.
The concept of a dispute and its resolution in the domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction market is premised similarly. In legal systems in the global market, the relative 
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absence of recognition of an apology and subservience is related to formal legal processes 
which embody the adjudication of rights and liabilities by litigation or arbitration by 
independent third parties. The International Bar Association (IBA), the global professional 
association of lawyers who represent clients in the international arena, released in 2004 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration. It was prepared by a working 
group representing lawyers from the following countries: Canada, the UK, the US, France, 
Mexico, Belgium, Singapore, Australia, Switzerland, Sweden, Germany, New Zealand, 
South Africa, and the Netherlands – all traditional western countries. The guideline lists 
those situations that give rise to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator’s independence. The 
conclusion of the IBA is that the arbitrator is perceived to be biased “if facts or circumstances 
exist that from a reasonable third person’s view of having knowledge of the facts or 
circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence.”2 The first three guidelines on the IBA’s so called “Red List” which cannot be 
waived by parties, that is, facts the existence of which gives automatic doubt as to the 
arbitrator’s independence, are as follows:
“1. There is an identity between a party and the arbitrator, or the arbitrator is a 
legal representative of an entity that is a party in the arbitration.
2. The arbitrator is a manager, director or member of the supervisory board, or 
has a similar controlling influence in one of the parties.
3. The arbitrator has a significant financial interest in one of the parties.”3
Using these requirements, in the domestic civil works infrastructure construction market 
there is not even a mechanism of demonstrably unbiased Dispute Resolution. The foreign 
contractor in Japan will be forced to file a petition with a Board which is composed of the 
very people that it is asserting a claim against. This requirement is hardly consistent with 
transparency and accountability. The Construction Business Law, Chapter 3-2, prescribes 
the process to be followed for the “Settlement of Disputes Concerning Contracts for 
Construction Work.” The chapter specifies that a “Committee for Adjustment of Construction 
Work Disputes” and will be responsible for executing conciliation, arbitration and mediation 
for construction contracts. Construction Business Law, Article 25-16 (4), provides further that 
the arbitration proceedings of the Adjudication Committee will take place in accordance with 
the Arbitration Law to be supplemented by the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 
provided in the Construction Business Law. It further deems the members who are 
appointed to be public service personnel. The Construction Business Law, Article 25-16, 
requires the three members of a specific Adjudication Committee be appointed by the
Chairman from the List of the Committee members to act as arbitrators. The situation does 
not create a perception of independence, but rather one of close affiliation with the 
Owner/Employers, which is the Government in the case of civil works infrastructure 
construction. This situation is acceptable where the dominant party, the Owner/Employer, 
determines unilaterally “what is a change” under the contract. But, if the contractor does not 
agree, it then has to submit a claim to a biased third party who will be perceived by foreign 
competitors as not being independent.  
The system does not allow what foreign contractors expect, a neutral party having no 
relation to either of disputing parties. This situation is often explained by the relative absence 
of “apology” in the global market and is connected to the historic preoccupation with 
reducing all losses to economic terms that can be rectified in a money judgment. The 
ambiguities of an apology in cultures based on “mutual mistrust” are thought to be intimately 
tied to the uncertainties of human intention and their potential for manipulation. The belief is 
that an apology relies too heavily on inferring from an external act the presence of a state of 
mind – remorse or non-hostility – and therefore seems to be too subject to manipulation by 
deceitful people who say they are sorry and don’t mean it. In cultures based on “mutual 
mistrust,” even when there is no conscious intention to deceive, the formal aspect of the act 
of apology inevitably tends to convert it into a conventional or stereotyped ceremony. By 
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contrast, in the “mutual trust” culture, the Japanese apologize by acknowledging their fault in 
contrast to a statement of explanation or justification of their behavior. Thus, in general, the 
Japanese seem to think it is better to apologize even when the other party is at fault. While 
non-Japanese may blame others even when they know that they are at least partially at 
fault. In the global market the expected norm is to deny wrong doing, to demand proof of 
fault, and seek affirmation from a neutral party. The Japanese express less concern for 
paying the damages and more on repairing the injured relationship between the parties. 
Sincerity therefore becomes less a function of the internal mental state and more a matter of 
performing the correct external acts that reaffirm submission to order. The presence of 
internal ambivalence is expected and accepted as non-threatening. 4 Dispute resolution 
under the Construction Business Law is expected to be accomplished by understanding this 
need for maintaining long term relationships, that is with the Owner/Employer, and relying on 
the sense that the dominant party (the same Owner/Employer) is to be fair. The global 
market does not have such a culture, thus foreign contractors will not act in an acceptable 
manner under the Construction Business Law.
As regards project management development, the characteristics of personnel executing the 
works for the Japanese is based on collective group mentality and not making a decision 
unless it has been blessed by the group or at least reaching a decision that is not against the 
group consensus. This process is again consistent with the Construction Business Law and 
related laws as embodied, so we are told, by the cultural code. Traditional Japanese social 
norms emphasize harmonious interpersonal relationships and group solidarity. Interpersonal
and group conflict can be found in many forms in Japan, but great emphasis is placed on the 
sacrifice of personal needs and individual self expression to avoid confrontation with the 
group. Within a group, maintenance of harmonious and smooth interpersonal relations and 
interdependence, that is, “mutual trust,” are of utmost importance. The more a group 
emphasizes in-group harmony and solidarity, the more intense that out of group enmity can 
be. Japanese are taught to accept such tensions and feelings of frustration as a natural 
consequence of social life, although they may not openly acknowledge the fact.5 There is no 
need to develop Contract Administration skills to make project management better able to 
cope with the process, as these skills are not desirable and are not necessary to provide 
project management for construction under the Construction Business Law, and the Contract 
and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works.
Thus, the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction Industry is not prepared and 
cannot survive in a market that is open to foreign competition, yet continues to operate and 
function as it has for so many years. The Government walks a thin line in committing the 
country to a period of structural change and dealing with the massive debt the country has 
accumulated. This change is being accomplished at the same time Japan is also dealing 
with demographic changes. The Government at the highest levels has committed Japan to 
change. While the changes must be made, the Government has left the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction Industry in an unenviable position. It has to open the domestic 
market to foreign contractors that are accustomed to the global civil works infrastructure 
construction market. 
In Japanese law, the most formal type of international agreements is a treaty. Article 73(3) of 
the Japanese constitution declares that the Cabinet is vested with the power to conclude 
treaties with foreign nations. However, the Cabinet must obtain a prior, or if circumstances 
demand, subsequent, approval of the National Diet when it concludes a treaty with a foreign 
nation. Some important international trade agreements have been approved by the National 
Diet and therefore are international treaties. Prominent examples include the GATT, the IMF 
Treaty, and the World Bank Treaty. The Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the 
GATT was drafted and signed on June 7, 1995, and approved by the National Diet on July 
29, 1995. A majority of the legal commentators in Japan maintain that a treaty should 
override a conflicting domestic law, especially where it is based on socio-economic polices.6
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The GATT led to the WTO agreement and the enabling Agreement on Government 
Procurement, all are treaty obligations and are paramount law in Japan.
But, the Japanese Government’s commitment to the WTO has not opened the domestic civil 
works infrastructure construction market, and the market can no longer be protected. The 
Government has made changes in the way it historically has “done business,” but it has not 
come to “grips” with the characteristics of protection as illustrated in the preceding sections. 
The changes that have been made to date are essentially cosmetic, and have been 
interpreted in such a manner by the very people who have the most interest in the status 
quo. There are about 50 construction companies that historically have worked in the global 
market, but generally it has been for Japanese Owner/Employers or for Japanese 
international aid that does require the use of Japanese products, services or a major 
percentage thereof in return for the aid. Yet, the domestic industry is composed of thousands 
of companies that have no experience with a system of doing business that has global 
market attributes.
In assessing the market, what is required? Generally the WTO and the parties who operate 
in the global civil works infrastructure construction market want transparency in the process, 
a level playing field, and accountability. As discussed, transparency is elusive in an industry 
where there historically have been a limited number of Owner/Employers (the Government) 
who have decided what infrastructure it will fund, and then has a dominant contractual role. 
The Government has made merely cosmetic changes as discussed in the previous sections, 
but it will not be the same Government with whom the contractors have become accustomed 
to dealing. For example, although informal ways of carrying out government policies, such 
as, administrative guidance, are not necessarily unique to Japan, the degree of 
pervasiveness and the importance of administrative guidance in the Japanese governmental 
process is probably unique to Japan. In Japan, economic regulation must ultimately be 
based on legislation (such as, the AGP). However, agencies like the MLIT often choose not 
to use laws to accomplish their policy goals but to utilize the more informal process of 
persuasion when they wish to control the conduct of private enterprises. This informal 
process is called “administrative guidance.” It is based on the concepts of “mutual trust” that 
is inherent in the Construction Business Law. Administrative Guidance is not legally binding. 
Often it is not in writing. Generally, it is used to impose a rule of conduct on the conduct of 
private enterprise. Administrative Guidance is attacked because there is a lack of 
transparency in the process through which it is executed. In the global market, enforcement 
procedures are usually provided for in the law, and everyone can see the process of 
enforcement. In Administrative Guidance there is no clearly defined procedure. Even if the 
Government and the private enterprise compromise on the Administrative Guidance it has 
received, it may affect the interests of outsiders and there is no standard procedure through 
which they may raise their objections.7 The recently enacted European Procurement Law is 
an example that allows stakeholders to raise their objections through a common, open 
procedure. In Japan the public is deprived of an opportunity of knowing what is under 
consideration by the Government and participating in the formulation of policy. 8 Thus, 
“Administrative Guidance” has dominated governmental control of Japanese economic life, 
especially in the case of the Japanese Construction Industry. Since the Government in the 
future is planning to only have a limited role civil works infrastructure construction, there is 
no role for the use of Administrative Guidance. 
The cosmetic changes made effects primarily MLIT (the Government) and major city civil 
works infrastructure construction. The current laws do not make Prefectures and local
government compliant with even the cosmetic changes until 2010. The central Government 
has moved away from providing funding and away from providing complete control of civil 
works infrastructure construction projects, a process that provided little stakeholder 
involvement. Instead the Government will assist in “removing restraints” faced by 
Prefectures, local governments, and NPO’s regarding civil works infrastructure construction.
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The recipients (local governments, and NPO’s) have little training or experience, and the 
Government simply has offered little to assist in their capacity building. 
Therefore under the Construction Business Law, etc., a philosophy of “mutual trust” still 
underlies the civil works infrastructure construction industry. The Prefectures, local
governments, and NPO’s do not have personnel either trained or capable of handling 
significant civil works infrastructure construction projects. On the other hand, the contractors 
have to work under the only basis with which they are familiar. It is a situation that is fraught 
with potential problems, like the potential for the very problems of “dango 談合” that the 
Government has attempted to clean up, but the efforts have primarily been at the Central 
Government level.9 As was discussed earlier, for instance, the World Bank and its affiliates 
assume there is corruption or bribery in financing and execution of projects. The World Bank 
is trying to assure transparency by vigilance and training. Internationally, anticorruption
instruments, such as, the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention and the U.N. Convention Against
Bribery, have demonstrated the international community’s determination to fight fraud and
corruption at all levels. The international funding sources are preparing Owner/Employers to 
have the capacity to assure there are recognizable means to transparency. Thus, as 
Owner/Employers, the Prefectures, local governments and NPO’s are not prepared to serve 
in a role open to foreign competitors. There are those that have attempted to raise warnings 
for years, but scant attention has been paid to their prognostications until recently.10 The 
domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry must receive the same attention that 
other sectors of the economy that promote international trade receive.
One needs only to ask “what will happen if foreign contractors are allowed to really compete 
in the Japanese domestic market?” Foreign firms are accustomed to “mutual mistrust.” 
Under such a philosophical approach, they will take into account all the assumptions that it 
reasonably made on the contract documents as the Owner/Employer seeks bids or tenders. 
Since the Construction Law, and the Contract and Japanese Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Civil Works only requires a price, and not the schedule or programme, the 
foreign contractor will have all the basic Contract Administration information, as illustrated in 
preceding sections should the Owner/Employer change the slightest scope or quality 
requirement, or demand something that was not reasonable inferable form the original scope 
and quality. The foreign contractor will not rely on a benevolence of the Owner/Employer. In 
the first instance, the foreign contractor will expect to have its bid accepted, if it reasonably 
reflected what the Owner/Employer wanted and it was a responsible bidder. It will not be 
satisfied with re-bidding with the exact project (scope, quality, time) until the 
Owner/Employer is satisfied with the bid number. During execution, if the Owner/Employer 
delays the contractor’s performance, using the material it recorded against its assumptions 
and plan, the contractor will file for an extension of time. The Owner/Employer will not have 
experienced personnel or the means to determine if the contractor is right, wrong, or has 
overstated the impact. The schedule or programme and a Bill of Quantities are not a part of 
the contract. The Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works (1995 
Edition), General Conditions, Article 3, states that: “the Bill of Quantities and the Work 
Program [which has to be submitted and approved by the Owner] shall not be binding on the 
Owner or the Contractor.” The Owner/Employer will not even have the latest update to 
provide information of a schedule or programme. For instance, the logic, sequences, and 
durations (which is a function of the resources one applies), require a level skill in order to 
calculate impacts to the specific activities. It is a skill that is not required if you are simply 
scheduling works to achieve or adhere to the completion date for the civil works 
infrastructure construction project. The foreign contractor will take the position it is entitled to 
the impacts to the affected activities, even if it was responsible for later concurrent or project 
delay. But, the Owner/Employer will not accept the latter, and will make a unilateral 
determination. If it is not accepted, the process will not be transparent. The Owner/Employer 
personnel are accountable for its actions and the impacts that occurred. With neither the 
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Owner/Employers nor the contractors prepared, the result is the prospect of a large sector of 
the economy that is potentially is lost to foreign contractors, a crisis in the making.
Other countries are keenly aware of the necessity of meeting the dictates of a global market. 
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, for example, has 
considered their Standard Form of Conditions of Contract for compliance with what is 
considered the prevailing best practice in international construction. This 25 year effort has 
been ongoing through the precedent government agency, the Works Bureau, with the most 
recent effort concluded in early 2001 after the return of Hong Kong to China at the end of 
1999. 11 The report addresses the “allocation and [project] management of risk in the 
procurement of [civil infrastructure] works projects…based on international best practice” in 
regards to the Conditions of Contract. In the global market, the ultimate goal of risk allocation
by means of the Conditions of Contract is to promote project execution regarding time of 
execution and budget without sacrificing scope and quality. The report concluded risks are 
assigned to the party best able to handle them. The Conditions of Contract have a default 
philosophy that when unusual risks occur during project execution they are best borne by the 
party who gains long-term benefit of the project, the Owner/Employer. For civil works 
infrastructure construction projects, there is a need, especially where government entities 
are involved, to protect the public’s financial stake, but in a transparent and accountable 
manner. Therefore both parties, Owner/Employer and contractor, must be adept in accepting 
the challenges that proper risk management places on them, that is, a “mutual mistrust” 
philosophy coupled with proper contractual allocation. A study in the United States has 
shown that 5% of civil works infrastructure construction projects cost may be saved by using 
the most appropriate Conditions of Contract allocating risk in a “mutual mistrust” 
environment. But, the savings assume that adequate project management exercising 
Contract Administration throughout the phases of the project execution in a “mutual mistrust” 
environment. 12 Thus, foreign contractors will expect a “hard nosed” and “above board” 
contracting environment.
Irrespective, foreign construction firms entering the domestic Japanese civil works 
infrastructure construction market will have significant expectations above and beyond just 
the Owners/Employers. Japanese civil works infrastructure construction has a unique 
feature: the materials, equipment and transportation logistics required to execute the 
projects is readily available. General contractors have subcontractors and equipment
/material suppliers with whom they have had a long history or a relationship. General 
contractors can get most equipment and materials it requires for civil works infrastructure 
construction projects within a short period of time. The members of a “keiretsu”, or organized 
relationship, will share in the financial results of a project on which they work together, 
whether negative or positive. The parties to these long standing relationships (at least for the 
key team members) do not work for other general contractors. Thus, the general contractor 
provides the management, construction engineering, and the resources to support the 
protect team. 
Foreign contractors do not have such relationships. The foreign contractor relies on the 
same “mutual mistrust” on its relationships with subcontractors and equipment/material 
suppliers. Subcontractors are monitored in the same fashion for compliance with the 
requirements. If a subcontractor believes that it is being required to perform or supply 
something that was not planned, the subcontractor must practice contract administration to 
the same extent as if it was the contractor, and treat the general contractor as if it was the 
Owner/Employer. Thus, the level of project management with contract administration skill is 
expected and is commensurate with the scope of work inherent subcontracts and 
equipment/material purchase orders. In most global markets these tiers of subcontracts and 
equipment/suppliers are intensely competitive. In the global market these tiers do not have a 
paternalistic general contractor to protect them, and to whom they will look to supply work for 
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them. In the global market these tiers of subcontractors and equipment/material suppliers 
are exceptionally competitive.          
The large Japanese contractors made one significant attempt to enter the global market after 
the collapse of the “bubble economy,” with nearly disastrous results. Damages during 
execution were astronomical losses with which the companies have had to struggle for 
years. 13 To begin with, to successfully succeed in an atmosphere of “mutual mistrust” 
requires project management personnel trained in Project Management and especially a 
culture of Contract Management. At the end of 1994, Kunishima and Shoji published a book 
on project management that compared the practices inherent in Japan with those found in 
the US and Germany.14 It began with the observation that there is little difference in the 
manner in which construction technology is used to complete construction projects in the 
three nations. They suggested that the manner in which the projects were accomplished was 
quite different. This difference was identified as the management techniques that were 
employed. The authors attributed the difference to values based on uniquely Asian values 
for Japan, while those values for the US and Germany were based on western traditions. 
The undeclared aim of the book was to justify and promote the adoption of the Japanese 
project management approach. The book followed an early 1990 report by the JSCE 
President, Kiyoshi Horikawa, in the Volume 29 of the JSCE Journal entitled “JSCE Activities 
in the International Era.” Dr. Horikawa said:
“…international competitiveness is now a serious concern for Japanese enterprises in 
order to compete fairly with others inside and outside Japan. It is needless to say that 
the construction system in Japan has evolved to the present style through a long 
history of custom and tradition in order to accomplish the highly qualified construction 
of various civil engineering structures. However, the present ways and systems in 
Japan seem to be a different from those of other countries, particularly in Europe and 
the U.S.A. That is why Japanese contractors have experienced bitter difficulties 
caused by the cultural differences between Japan and client countries. Since we have 
to open various markets including the construction market in the near future, we 
should adjust ourselves to these new circumstances. Even in such circumstance we 
should maintain a dauntless attitude, and we should stay pliable in order to adjust 
ourselves to different views. In order to reach our ideal circumstances, all of the 
people have to be well grounded in culture and to respect each other. We should 
thoroughly investigate the way of thinking and the mode of carrying out work in other 
countries, and then clearly distinguish the differences among us. Based on the above 
investigations, we should increasingly devote our effort to let the counterparts in 
negotiation understand our thinking.”
Since that time the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction market has severely 
contracted and will not grow again to it former size.  Dr. Horikawa, however, was continuing 
the process of describing the Japanese approach to project management. It was process of 
describing through the use culture, customs, etc., which it was hoped would effectively have 
the Japanese system adopted in Asian markets, as that was the area that held the most 
promise for the future of civil works infrastructure construction (the period just before the late 
1996 melt down of the Asian economies) and justify essentially the status quo in the ongoing 
negotiations over opening the Japanese domestic civil works infrastructure construction 
market to foreign competition.    
To illustrate that North American and European project management is more comparable 
today than it was even then, the following Table V.A.1 is updated form the one that 
Kunishima and Shoji used in 1994. The data on which it was based originally was a 
compilation of Japanese project management practices that had been compiled by the 
Japan Society of Civil Engineers’ (JSCE) Construction Management Committee. The 
Committee had been formed formally in 1985 and it had been collecting data since that time. 
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The 2005 update is based on interviews by the Author of executives from companies who 
set the standard for global practice or are Japanese contractors involved in the global 
market, as well as, the domestic market for civil works infrastructure construction.15
Table V.A.1
Cultural Differences in Europe, the US, and Japan that Impact Project Management
Cultural
Trait
Germany
(1990)
Europe
(2005)
US
(1990)
US
(2005)
Japan
Objectives for 
business 
entity
Continuity and 
social values
Continuity, 
social values, 
and profitability
Profitability Continuity, 
social values, 
and profitability
Permanent 
existence
Basic 
business 
principles
Fair 
competition
Fair 
competition
Fair 
competition
Fair 
competition
Impartial (fair) 
sharing
Characteristic
Features Reliability
Reliability Self-assertion Self-assertion Harmony
Business 
style
Client first 
policy
Client first 
policy
Short-term 
competitive 
relationships 
with long term 
focus
Short-term 
competitive 
relationships 
with long term 
focus
Long-term 
credible 
relationships
Working 
condition
Individual Individual often 
within a team
Individual often 
within a team
Individual often 
within a team
Teamwork
Employment 
form
Improvement 
of position by 
changing jobs
Improvement of 
position by 
changing jobs
Improvement of 
position by 
changing jobs
Improvement of 
position by 
changing jobs
Mostly lifetime 
employment
Employment 
attitude
Employing 
individual
Employing 
individual’s 
skills
Employing the 
individual’s 
skills
Employing the 
individual’s 
skills
Employing 
individual
Principles of 
behavior
Participate, 
create, and 
work skills
Participate, 
create, and 
work skills
Participate in 
education and 
manifestation 
of skill
Participate in 
education and 
manifestation 
of skill
Attend, learn, 
and labor
Wage system Ability, 
achievement, 
and rank
Ability, 
achievement, 
and rank
Ability and 
achievement
Ability and 
achievement
Seniority and 
achievement
Measure of 
business 
achievement
Short-range 
profit
Short-range 
profit
Short-range 
profit
Short-range 
profit
Contracts 
awarded and 
long-range 
profits
Changes to 
business 
entity
Slow Moderately
Rapid
Rapid Rapid Slow
Decision-
making 
process
Discussions 
between 
superiors and 
subordinates
Moving from 
top-down to flat 
team
Moving from 
top-down to flat 
team
Moving from 
top-down to flat 
team
Bottom-up and 
mutual-
agreement
Working 
environment
Individual 
Offices
Individual 
offices and 
spaces
Individual 
offices and 
spaces
Individual 
offices and 
spaces
Large, shared 
offices
Loyalty to 
organization
Medium Medium to 
Little
Little Little Great
Competition 
with 
organization
Avoid Increasing Broad Broad Avoid
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Table V.A.1
Cultural Differences in Europe, the US, and Japan that Impact Project Management
Cultural
Trait
Germany
(1990)
Europe
(2005)
US
(1990)
US
(2005)
Japan
Relations 
between 
colleagues
Friendship Individual with 
movement to 
task teams
Individual with 
movement to 
task teams
Individual in 
association 
with task teams
Sense of 
commonness
Perception of 
work
Responsibility Responsibility Responsibility Responsibility Lifetime 
Employment 
with a 
movement to 
forcing early 
retirement
Decision 
criteria 
tendency
Results-
oriented
Results-
oriented with 
recent process 
orientation 
Ideas, 
philosophy, and 
processes
Ideas, 
philosophy,
And processes
Results-
oriented
Human 
resources
Long-range 
assets
Long-range 
assets
Floating assets Floating assets Fixed assets
Reward Big Big Big Big Small 
(bonuses, 
promotions, 
and salary)
Punishment Relocation or 
dismissal
Relocation or 
dismissal
Dismissal Dismissal Relocation
In-house 
education
Permanent Moving toward 
self-education, 
PMI or other 
certification
Considered 
little, self-
enlightenment  
promoted
Continuing self-
education,
PMI 
certification
Systematic 
and seriously 
taken
Salary 
difference
Medium Medium Big Big Small
The Author found that Europe and the US have become even closer in regards to the 
cultural traits that underlie project management. From the interviews the also Author found in 
the last 15 years that 4 of the 24 cultural traits Europe and the US now have a common 
cultural trait (yellow shading in Table V.A.1). In a further 6 of 24 cultural traits, Europe and 
the US were moving towards commonality (blue shading in Table V.A.1). In 9 of the 24 
cultural traits, Europe and the US had identical cultural traits or had similar cultural traits 
(light gray shading in Table V.A.10. In the same 15 years, the Japanese had pursued a 
process of making cosmetic changes and explaining why their culture, and thus project 
management, is different. But, as Dr. Horikawa said, even those Japanese companies that 
have led the way in the global market “have experienced bitter difficulties caused by the 
cultural differences between Japan and client countries.” The Japanese domestic civil works 
infrastructure market cannot with stand foreign competition and neither can the Japanese 
governmental units that will be the future Owner/Employers nor the Japanese contractors. 
They both have to learn global style Contract Administration and allow the development of 
soundly based project management to create the ability to compete. Merely asserting that 
the style of contracting is in essence different based on code provides little in terms of 
capacity building to handle civil works infrastructure construction projects. The Japanese 
must adapt the Construction Business Law, and the Contract and Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works so that the domestic industry gains experience while it still has 
superb construction technology.
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B. Japanese Project Management in an Environment in which There Is Foreign 
Competition
In the domestic civil works infrastructure construction market, the Japanese contractors have 
had no foreign competition, as been discussed above. As for the global market, the size of 
the Japanese participation has not been significant relative to the overall size of the global 
market for civil works infrastructure construction. Following WWII, Japan began construction 
in the global market in 1954 as part of its war reparations. Works began in the late 1950’s 
on a commercial level. In the late 1970’s in was in primarily in the Middle East (Oil & Gas 
Projects and Expressways). Investment reached ¥1 trillion in FY 1983. The effects of 
Japan’s “bubble” economy affected domestic and global investment. Overseas investment 
and consequently the global construction share fell sharply with the collapse of the “bubble” 
economy. For the next two decades investment focused first on Europe and the US in 
hotels, office buildings and resorts. As the Asian market grew to exceed Europe and the US, 
the Asian market focused on private buildings for Japanese clients and civil works 
infrastructure project development primarily funded by the Japan’s ODA loans, which 
required the use of Japanese contractors. In the early 1990’s, Asia took hold as th OCAJI’e 
primary Japanese overseas market. It rose again to over ¥1.6 trillion in FY 1996, and then 
declined again rapidly as Asia underwent its economic crisis (nearly 20% in the following 
year). Today, Asia still represents two thirds of Japanese orders for construction orders, 
albeit a declining total volume.16
In a 1984 a survey was conducted by the Normura Research Institute regarding activities of 
member companies of the Overseas Construction Association of Japan, Inc. (OCAJI).17 The 
survey was conducted just as the volume of foreign work reached the ¥ 1 trillion level. The 
survey addressed the relative strengths or weaknesses perceived by the s Japanese 
contractor membership in project management in comparison to foreign counterparts in the 
Europe and the US. The OCAJI membership was the 50 or so largest and most 
sophisticated Japanese contractors that worked outside of Japan. The survey found that 
these Japanese contractors felt that they were more advanced in the areas meeting the cost, 
schedule and quality of civil works infrastructure construction projects, the result of serving 
the “demanding” Government client. Of particular relevance, the OCAJI membership 
perceived they were less advanced in negotiation, determination of payment conditions, 
protection against country risks, adapting to the culture or local conditions, logistics, and 
project management overall. 
A book written by F. Hasegawa while at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
concluded relative to Project Management training for civil works infrastructure construction 
projects, that personnel had been trained by the Government as an Owner/Employer and by 
the contractors themselves, and that training had to be specific to the individual contractor.18
There was not a basis of developing a standard for project management, since the 
contractors as a whole served essentially one client, the Government, and the contractors 
had a specific way of dealing with project cost, schedule and quality that met the demands of 
the client, the Government. Therefore, the Government had no experience with alternative 
methods of project delivery for civil works infrastructure construction projects, and 
contractors had no perspective relative to the demands of other Owner/Employers. These 
necessary skills are needed to compete effectively in the global market. Furthermore, there 
was no need in the domestic market to develop contract administration skills which a project 
management team needs in the global market.
In 1993, the lack of skills necessary in global market oriented project management was 
again emphasized by K. Takayanagi in an article in the International Construction Law 
Review.19The project management function has been traditionally assumed as part of the 
overall scope by the Government. The Government and the contractors operating in the 
domestic civil engineering infrastructure construction market have project management 
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expertise well suited to the Construction Business Law and the Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works. As a result, “there never has been encountered any serious 
problems in terms of quality, completion time and cost.” The contractors are left with the 
need for execution expertise and they are well suited to secure the requirements of quality, 
completion time and cost. The results achieved reflect the requirement of “Japanese 
construction laws…that any [civil works infrastructure construction] project works are not 
allowed to commence until the design of such work as a whole is completed and approved 
by the relevant Government authorities.” Thus, the benefits of innovative contracting 
methods and cost savings are not available for the domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction market. 
Japanese project management thus is focused differently than best practice in the global 
market. It has always been, as is demonstrated above. Contract execution is focused on 
Project Cost Management because the process to the Japanese is to manage the project to 
achieve within a time period a target cost with the quality set forth in the specifications in 
conformity with a contract made pursuant to the Construction Business Law. But Project 
Cost Management as a predictive tool has limited application for a competitive domestic 
market or the global market. The only real variable in the Japanese project management is 
total cost and total execution time. When you are near the project completion you apply for 
an “omnibus” change order to cover the extra cost. Therefore, the commonly believed adage 
that Japanese contractors always bring their civil works infrastructure construction projects in 
for a cost, time and quality that are acceptable the Owner/Employer – the Government. 20
But, if you are always measuring against the total, you will not “pick up” variances at a 
discrete level until after the cost has been incurred and reflected in the cost accounting 
maintained. This approach, which is quite detailed in Japanese construction companies, is 
the primary software development by most contractors. As a consequence, they do not have 
skills oriented to project scheduling and the loading of resources on to discrete activities. In 
fact, most contractors, and even the most sophisticated Japanese contractors, use Microsoft 
Project because it is easy to understand and meets the requirements of the Contract and 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works despite its inherent limitations.21 The 
sophisticated contractors have Primavera, which is the most widely used scheduling or 
programming software system used in the global market, but they do not use its capability to 
the fullest because “it is too complicated.”   
For foreign contractors who operate in the global market, the variance in any assumption is a 
potential for recovery, because it goes to the basis of bargain. It is the “life blood” of 
European and US contractors. The concept is to adequately record the assumptions as 
developed with respect to all aspects of the project, and then to regularly record and monitor 
them as part of a vigorous Contract Administration regimen as shown above. Using powerful 
tools, such as, Primavera, to record resources and costs in a relational data base attached 
to individual activities, foreign contractors have recorded the data relative to assumptions in 
a bid and then regularly update the data with “as incurred” data.22 They use Project Risk 
Management at the same time and in addition to monitor a civil works infrastructure 
construction project the likely areas before the variance even occurs. 23 Thus, foreign 
contractors (and Owner/Employers) fashion Contract Administration in a manner that is 
quantitative-based on the most current civil works infrastructure construction project 
information for evidence of variance at discrete levels at its earliest stages of incurring. They 
do not wait until the impact becomes a final. To do so would violate a primary concept of 
“mutual mistrust,” the giving of notice so the other party can attempt to deal with the problem 
that is causing the variance.
S. Kusayanagi wrote in 2004 in one of the latest treatises on Japanese project management 
that,24
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“in European and American countries, contract administration is regarded as one of 
the most important factors of the [project] management techniques, and in the 
educational program of the construction engineering, contracts are taught in the 
special courses. When compared with construction engineers of the foreign countries, 
our Japanese engineers are far behind the levels, as seen in the actual performance 
of international construction projects, in the scope of the recognition of the importance 
of contractual matters and related knowledge…[With experience only with “mutual 
trust” construction contracting,] contract administration is not recognized as one of the 
construction techniques, and the chances of learning them are given to Japanese 
construction engineers neither in the schools nor in the [Japanese civil works 
infrastructure construction] companies…In the near future, the realistic handling of 
contract administration, such as, strict compliance with the construction contracts, 
definitions of the rights and obligations under contracts, will be needed in domestic 
construction projects. In the field of settlement of contract-related issues, the 
qualitative analysis in pursuing ‘existing rights’ and the quantitative analysis clarifying 
the ’magnitude of rights’ will both be required. In the Japanese construction industries, 
such a tendency is strongly prevailing about those who own knowledge of laws and 
contracts only perform contract administration and is not to be done by construction 
engineers as this merely shows the qualitative side of contract 
administration…Contract administration for [civil works infrastructure] construction 
projects need indispensable analysis functions from the qualitative side and from 
quantitative side. Construction administration then can only become practical….”
Kusayanagi then emphasized that the determination of entitlement is the qualitative side and 
the determination of the magnitude of the impacts that resulted is the quantitative side of 
Contract Administration. To continue to use tools that do not provide or allow the necessary 
recording of assumptions and the ongoing data to carry out Contract Administration is relied 
upon by the civil works infrastructure construction industry simply is based on the fact that it 
is not required by the Construction Business Law, and the Contract and Standard Conditions 
of Contract for Public Works. Not teaching the basic rudiments of Contract Administration is 
because of the same reason. Therefore, there is no incentive for developing project 
management skills and they will remain the same unless what is required is changed. 
Thus, changing the Construction Business Law to allow a contract that is not an aberration 
under the Japanese Civil Law is the first step. As has been developed earlier, it permits the 
current contract that is based on a method that is unique to the civil works construction 
infrastructure construction industry and allowed the ruling party to manipulate a whole sector 
of the economy. By integrating “mutual mistrust” and an equality of parties rather than 
allowing a dominant and protective party, the industry will be forced to face conditions that 
are akin to the global market. Such a change would be in line with the steady reforms that 
Japan is making in the substantial revisions that it enacted in the Commercial Code in 2002 
and subsequent codes since then. This result also requires Standard Conditions of Contract 
suited to the Contract, and especially so for “Public Works.” Then the universities will begin 
the courses to “re-orient” and teach the Contract Administration skills necessary. In the 
meantime the civil works infrastructure construction industry must have a viable transition 
plan.
Before addressing suggestions on modifying the Construction Business Law, and the 
Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works, the question must be asked: 
how can Japan acquire the Project Management skills that represent global best practice the 
short term? Without incentive, neither the prefectures, local government entities, and NPO’s 
who will play a significant role in future civil works infrastructure construction projects as the
Owner/Employers nor can the contractors who will contract with them can develop the 
project management skills. The “adjustment” period mandated with Action Plan has been 
squandered away and has not prepared the civil works Infrastructure construction industry 
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for 2006, because only cosmetic changes have been undertaken by the Government to 
change the system. The downsizing of the domestic market does nothing but create a 
desperate market that really does not want foreign competition. The EU faced similar issues 
and problems of imposing uniform procurement regulations, namely The European 
Regulations concerning Public Procurement, have been issued for nearly 35 years. The 
regulations were generally modeled after the French Public Procurement Code. The EU 
regulations that were issued became the subject to the second phase of directives for their 
implementation after two decades, the period for the initial transition. For example, it 
extended the application to private bodies who received concessions for civil works 
infrastructure construction as the awarding authorities.25 After a further 15 years the EU 
effectively superceded the separate national systems, which then forced transparency and 
competition. But, Japan cannot wait 35 years for there to be transparency and competition to 
be achieved. Japan committed to the WTO to do so by 2006.
Other Japanese industries that have fueled the economy have done well in export markets. 
As these industries have expanded they have had to learn. They had to become 
accustomed to and work with forms of contract found in the global market. These industries 
initially lacked expertise that historically there had never been a need to understand. These 
industries then experienced the demands of a legal/contracting system that required 
expertise to survive. The expertise development was aimed at the applying the industries 
technology in broader markets and engaging the required expertise in the short term 
transition period. Frequently the Government made changes in the regulatory regime that 
applied to a sector on the economy, such as, the recent changes in the energy industry.26
The Japanese civil works infrastructure construction contractors could seek merger partners. 
Japanese construction technology for the most part is cutting edge in the use and application 
of materials and equipment to solving civil works infrastructure construction projects issues 
(e.g., the Seiko Bridge with regards to self-conforming concrete, etc.). Although innovation 
has concentrated on the materials and equipment to achieve the possibility of being awarded 
civil works infrastructure construction projects, the contractors can merge with or acquire 
foreign firms focused on project management and Contract Administration. But as an 
industry, and by even Japanese standards, the civil works infrastructure industry has a low 
level of dividend payments because of the need to hold cash (a holdover from the 
revitalization and growth period prior to the 1980’s) which have historically invested the 
funds in low-productivity investments. In other market systems one would expect this to be 
corrected by takeovers, which until recently was very rare in Japan – because of archaic 
laws.27 The merger process could be facilitated by further reforms to the Commercial Code 
than were passed in 2002. But there are still problems despite the Revised Special 
Measures Law for Industrial Revitalization which made exceptions to the Commercial Code 
to allow Mergers and Acquisitions using modern merger techniques, which hampers Direct 
Foreign Investment in Japanese contractors and which also prevents them from acquiring 
necessary technology (the reverse by keeping Japanese from acquiring foreign firms and 
repatriating the technology).28 The US Trade Representative in 2005 urged the Japanese 
Diet to pass legislation in 2005 “to permit certain modern merger techniques, including 
triangular mergers, cash mergers, and short form (squeeze-out) mergers, as part of its 
commercial law revision.”29 These laws provide potential avenues for a transition plan for the 
civil works infrastructure construction contractors not previously available to them. Similarly, 
these same contractors could form partnerships, provided that the Joint Venture provisions 
of the Civil Law are changed as China has dome recently (see discussion below).
The Japanese civil works infrastructure construction contractors and future 
Owner/Employers could go out and hire project management specialists (foreign 
consultants) with the requisite contract administration background. This avenue is a practical 
solution in a transitional context provided that they can obtain such expertise economically. 
In the case of Owner/Employers the time is ripe for using alterative methods for civil works 
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infrastructure Construction. For example, the US is rapidly expanding its use of Design-
Build, Engineer-Procure-Construct contracts for civil works infrastructure construction 
projects. The Design-Build Institute of America even has written a model code for the 
equivalent of local governments.30
Many of the large public or joint public-private infrastructure projects financed with prior 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FLIP) funds generate less revenue than budgeted, 
which implies significant contingent liabilities of the government. 31 Therefore, Japan is 
experimenting with Public Private Partnerships (PPP) or Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
alternatives to providing the funding for civil works infrastructure construction projects.32
Under this concept the government entity would need econometric expertise, and the project 
management expertise would be required by the entity executing the project, which would 
most likely include such a project management specialist. Since Japanese central and local 
governments have been facing financial difficulties under the continuing economic 
conditions, it is difficult for them to carry out civil works infrastructure construction projects. 
The Japanese have used the United Kingdom’s PFI model as a new civil works 
infrastructure construction development model to provide public services while reducing 
public expenditure. PFI incorporates mechanisms to minimize the final project cost charged 
to taxpayers/users to secure long term and stable public service provision by private 
companies, and secure accountability. Most of the legal issues involved in applying PFI in 
Japan have been temporarily addressed by effectively making “private” such “public works” 
projects by means of enactment of the Project Finance Initiative Act (Minkan Shikin-to no 
Katsuyo niyoru Kokyo Shisetsuto nikansuru Horitsu), Law No. 117, (1999). Although PFI is 
touted as an effective scheme for improving the efficiency of civil works infrastructure 
development projects, it is impossible and inappropriate to apply PFI to all of them. On the 
other hand, to carry out future infrastructure development projects in an aging society with a 
falling birthrate, the mechanisms and concepts of PFI could be broadly introduced into the 
civil works infrastructure construction industry. At present, PFI is being used for the 
construction of a limited number of new civil works infrastructure construction projects, 
notably new power plant projects and a waste water treatment plant. The largest single 
impediment to the use of alternative methodologies, however, is the Construction Business 
Law, and the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. 
The global market has adopted PPP and PFI concepts widely. The value of Australia Public 
Private Partnership market, for example, is approximately Aus$ 20 billion.33 One of the most 
successful PPP or PFI has been the “Partnership Victoria” program in the State of Victoria, 
Australia, which was launched in June 2000. This concept was successfully built upon the 
prior governments PPP efforts. As an example, the government has built a toll way 
(completed and in operation), and is building the Multi-use Building/Melbourne Central Rail 
Station, and the Regional Rapid Rail System upgrade.34 This program has met several 
intended goals: value for money, transparency, and competition.
The current set of guidance materials is available to all stakeholders, thus assuring one key 
element: all stakeholders know how the process works, and stakeholders are a part of the 
process. Partnership Victoria states:35
“the public and private sectors have roles to play in building world-class infrastructure 
or Victoria…[by] by uniting the public and private sectors to deliver improved services 
to the community…through innovative solutions, value for money and better 
services…[The policy focus is completely on services for which the construction of 
supporting infrastructure, and thus project management and contract administration, 
is merely a part. Thus, Partnership Victoria] “focuses on the whole-of-life costing of 
infrastructure and related ancillary services, and a full consideration of the benefits of 
risk allocation to the private party….The private sector can often deliver public 
infrastructure services more cost-effectively than government can…There is no 
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presumption that the private sector is invariably more efficient in building and 
operating public assets. Equally, there may be no obvious benefit in holding or 
keeping assets in public ownership if the private sector is better placed to build or 
update them, and services to the community are improved or delivered at a lower 
cost. The key issue is which form of project delivery provides the best value for 
money in meeting government services objectives.”
The retention of what Victoria considers core services is identified on a case by case basis 
guided by the concept that there are certain core public services for which it has clear 
responsibility to service recipients and the community. Transparency is assured by the 
method of evaluating bids. It is based on the use of a “Public Sector Comparator (PSC)” that 
is known to all stakeholders (the process is known, not the evaluation, before contracting). 
The PSC provides a financial benchmark for assessing the value of money of private sector 
bids and includes the value of risk allocation to the private party that occurs under a 
Partnership Victoria approach. Projects are assessed against a public interest test 
comprising probity, transparency and other criteria to protect the interests of the community 
and to ensure that no group is unreasonably disadvantaged by, or denied access to, the 
proposed civil works infrastructure construction project and/or services as a result of the way 
the services are to be delivered. 
The Partnership Victoria program considers the main business of government is to procure 
the services which depend on or are otherwise associated with civil works infrastructure 
construction, which is had been the traditional idea of government’s procurement from the 
private sector. To assure the public interest and transparency are considered, Partnership 
Victoria assesses projects against public interest criteria relating to effectiveness, 
accountability and transparency, equity, public access, consumer rights, security, privacy 
and rights of representation and appeal at the planning stages by affected individuals and 
community. Partnership Victoria considers the following when judging value for money:
 Risk transfer (relieving government of cost of asset-based risks; significant transfer 
of risk to the private sector).
 Whole-of Life Costing (one party responsibility for the upfront cost of design and 
construction; on going service delivery; operational, maintenance and refurbishment 
costs).
 Innovation (innovative solutions for how services requirements are delivered).
 Asset Utilization (developing revenue opportunities for use of an asset by third 
parties which reduce their cost to government).
 Scale (projects: greater than AU$ 10 million).
 Duration (service requirements of up to 30 years).
 Service Focus (clearly definable and measurable output specifications suitable for 
payment for services on a delivered basis).
 Complexity (sufficient complexity and/or other characteristics which invite innovative 
solutions).
 Market Capability and Appetite (existence of genuine business opportunity and 
sufficient private sector parties to assure an effective and competitive bidding 
process).
The value for money principle under Partnership Victoria dictates that government takes 
back some risks which it can manage at a cheaper cost than it would have to pay the private 
party to hold the risk. For example, a government can handle the risk that it will change the 
delivery specification during the period. Thus, for pricing and management reasons, optimal 
risk allocation dictates that the particular risks are allocated in line with capacity to control 
and manage at least cost, whether the government or the bidder.
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Allocation of common risks in a Partnership Victoria Project is handled as suggested below, 
which relies on the concept of “mutual mistrust” consistent with the proper risk allocation that 
was found in the recent Hong Kong study on the Standard Conditions of Contract discussed 
above: 36
“Site Risk is assigned to the private sector (land contamination, acquisition, and 
indigenous issues), but the government may take back or share risks associated with
 Existing government sites (e.g., existing defects, environmental liabilities, etc.)
 Planning and Environmental approvals when is excess of a contractual amount.
 Process expenses as agreed on a case-specific basis.
Design, Construction and Commissioning Risk is assigned to the private sector, 
except for government changes or interferes in the process.
Sponsor and Financial Risk is borne by the government, but mitigation of that risk is 
laid out in the contract (e.g., share in interest rate changes, requiring the bid to have firm 
funding, requiring the government to share in a windfall if interest rates are significantly 
better than bid by the defining certain parameters, not taking the lowest bid based on 
quality of the financing, etc.).
Operating Risk is always allocated to the private sector except that the government will 
bear the costs of government intervention (such as, change in specification) or 
interference.
Market Risk comprises demand and price risk. The extent of demand risk borne by the 
private sector depends on the value for money question and whether the government is 
only service customer. Demand risk to extent possible is assigned to the private sector. 
Price risk is the private sectors, but it can be hedged by setting some measure to 
periodically adjust the price, such as, a benchmark econometric measure.
Network and Interface Risk includes the risk that a complimentary on which the project 
or service depends will be removed or changed, thus altering the demand for the 
service or the quality of government inputs changes beyond certain parameters. To 
achieve optimal government flexibility to the community the network risk is only 
assigned to the government where a change discriminates against the project. The 
interface risk occurs when government action frustrate the standard of delivery of the 
service that is the core of the project. These cases are handled by the government and 
the private sector each bearing the risk that their service has on each other.
Industrial Relations Risk is held by the private sector.
Legislative and Governmental Risk is taken by the government for acts that interfere 
with the private sector ability to perform, and change in law risk is taken by the 
government, but as the Victoria is a state in Australia, the risk of National law change is 
assigned to the private sector (the can insure against it).
Force Majeure Risk which is commercially insurable is assigned to the private sector 
and uninsurable Force Majeure risks are shared provided that there is value for money 
and varying levels of risk assumption are explored.
Asset Ownership Risk is risk is assigned to the private sector, unless it is technology 
dependent, when the risk is shared.
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The process is set forth in Figure V.B.1 in which the Author summarizes the decision
process:
Figure V.B.1
The Partnership Victoria Development and Decision Process
Therefore, there are reasonable transition options available to the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction industry to gain the requisite project management and contract 
administration knowledge to assure their survival while changes in the Construction 
Business Law and to enable the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works to be adjusted. The resulting transition will not be easy, but the suggestions allow the 
industry to change and survive in a domestic competitive market that meets the objectives of 
Japan commitment to WTO.
The Service Need
 Identify service needs
 Focus on outputs
 Consider broad needs, over time
 Allow scope for innovation
Optional Appraisal
 Consider Options
 Consider application of 
Partnership Victoria
 Evaluate Financial impacts, risks 
and other impacts
Business Case
 Confirm the project offers net 
benefits:
o Quantify Risks and Costs
o Commence development of 
PSC
o Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis
 Assess Partnership Victoria 
potential
Terminate if funding 
not available or project 
not approved
Obtain Approval of 
Funding and 
Project
 Develop expressions of 
interest invitation
 Seek approval to issue
Approval to 
issue brief
 Evaluate Responses and 
develop a shortlist
 Develop a project brief 
and contract
 Seek approval to issue 
project brief
Approval to 
seek bid
Project Finalization
 Confirm policy intent met
 Confirm value for money
 Report to Minister
 Advise Treasurer
Final Negotiation
 Establish team to 
Negotiate
 Set negotiation 
framework
 Probity review
 Execute contract
 Financial closure
Contract Management
 Formalize Management 
responsibilities
 Monitor project delivery
 Manage Variations
 Monitor service outputs
 Maintain contract 
integrity
Major Stages in Developing a Partnership Victoria 
Project
 Conduct clarification 
sessions
 Evaluate Bids
Project Development
 Assemble Government 
resources
 Develop a Project Plan
 Further develop PSC
 Develop commercial 
principles
 Consultation  
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C. The Project Management and Contract Administration Skills that Could Be Developed 
Will Enable the Japanese Civil Works Infrastructure Construction Industry to Be a 
Formidable Global Market Competitor
How can the Japanese construction industry acquire the skill sets that it will need to succeed 
in the global market where it has been unable to do so consistently in the past? Japanese 
firms also must look off shore, as other industries have done, because the Government does 
not have the capacity to continue to build civil works infrastructure construction projects. 
With private participation, like PFI projects as a transition period option, for example, the civil 
works infrastructure industry will be prepared to broadly compete with other international 
parties in the global market. Japan’s overseas civil works infrastructure construction, despite 
its still relatively small percentage of the combined domestic and global markets it serves, 
offers some intriguing possibilities. The Government could “sell” its expertise in constructing 
social capital through civil works infrastructure construction projects before it is lost.37 Japan 
has been the largest and a very visible donor regarding the ongoing 2005 Tsunami 
reconstruction of civil works infrastructure in the affected countries surrounding the Indian 
Ocean. Such reconstruction works are a good example of the combined talents of the 
Japanese Government and the civil works construction contractors with these emergency 
works, especially since Japan possesses a civil works infrastructure construction industry 
that arguably uses the finest of construction technology.  
Most global Japanese civil works infrastructure construction, however, is funded by JBIC 
ODA or is related to sectors in which Japanese business is involved. But is it enough to just 
rely on JBIC to provide civil works infrastructure construction industry with projects? Total 
development and recurrent expenses for infrastructure will amount to as much as 5.5 % of 
GNP of the world’s developing countries from 2005 to 2010.38 ODA financing, though, only 
amounts to 10% of this amount, and that is a drop in the bucket.39 As previously noted, JBIC 
in the 2005 revisions to its Handbook for Procurement under JBIC ODA Loans has declared 
that the revisions “will contribute to a transparent and stable operation of the system, 
facilitate procurement procedures, and enhance capacity building in borrower countries.” In 
the recommendations on the Standard Conditions of Contract that are to be used for civil 
works infrastructure projects, JBIC built in the principles of “mutual mistrust” by requiring the 
use of the FIDIC Standard Conditions of Contract. As pointed out, the reasons proffered for 
this use was “to facilitate perusal by bidders and review by JBIC.” Thus, recipient countries 
and global contractors will either know or have to learn about these principles. By far the 
majority of the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry does not have 
sufficient experience. JBIC even goes so far as to state that the full FIDIC Table of Contents 
is to be used as “is,” and then exceptions reflected in a separate section. Obviously, the 
answer to the question is no, Japan cannot just rely on ODA financing. Japan must broaden 
its capability to perform such civil works infrastructure construction, as the level of domestic 
work may never return to previous levels.
As “mutual mistrust” experience is gained, the Japanese can become formidable competitors 
as they have in other industries.  As summarized by the Author in Table V.C.1, according to 
the World Bank from 2005-2010 alone, countries classified as “developing” will require 
US$233 billion (¥23.3 trillion) for civil works infrastructure annually, and annual operation 
and maintenance will require a further US$232 billion (¥23.2 trillion). 
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Table V.C.1
Developing Country Global Market for Civil Works Infrastructure Construction
In the 2005 to 2010 Period
New
Infrastructure
Maintenance
& Operations
New Infrastructure
& MaintenanceRegion40
US$ Bil.
(¥ Tril.)
% Total US$ Bil.
(¥ Tril.)
% Total US$ Bil.
(¥ Tril.)
% Total
East Asia / Pacific 99.906
(9.991)
27.1 78.986
(7.899)
16.5 178.892
(17.889)
21.1
South Asia 28.068
(2.807)
7.5 35.033
(3.503)
7.3 63.101
(6.310) 
7.4
Europe & Central 
Asia
39.069
(3.907)
10.6 58.849
(5.885)
12.3 97.918
(9.792)
11.5
Sub-total 167.043
(16.404)
45.3 172.868
(17.289)
36.0 339.911
(33.991)
40.0
Developing World 
Total
233.139
(23.314)
63.2 231.654
(23.165)
48.3 464.789
(46.479)
54.8
World Total 369.095
(36.910)
100.0 479.624
47.962
100.0 848.719
(84.872)
100.0
* 1 US$ = 100 ¥
In the last 20 years, Japan has concentrated primarily on Asia, but there is a broadly based 
global market. As Table V.C.1 illustrates, East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia have 40% 
of the combined market, over ¥ 34 trillion during the five year 2005 to 2010 alone. Over the 
prior 20 year period, 1985 to 2005, there was a shift in terms of geographical focus by 
Japanese contractors who do work overseas, however, initially concentrating on South Asia 
and gradually shifting to East Asia as the Chinese market has arisen to be the largest market 
in the world. Recently, limited numbers of Japanese civil works infrastructure construction 
contractors have been active in the Eastern European and Central Asian geographic areas. 
The 20-year shift has reflected the economic fortunes of Asian regions, especially over the 
last 10 years. So, why concentrate on East Asia? The US now imports more from China than 
from Japan, while Japan imports more from China than from the US. The expansion of 
trading relationships within the East Asia region will lay the foundation for regional economic 
integration in the future. China’s admission to WTO points to a growing role for China as a 
demand absorber in the future. First, expanding foreign investment will lead to the formation 
of divisions of labor between China and East Asian neighbors (much like has been in 
progress for the US for decades). Second, rising income levels will lead to increased 
demand for imported goods. Third, the need for civil works infrastructure development is 
expanding (as shown by the compilation of World Bank statistics in Table V.C.1), especially 
in the area of non renewable resources. For Japan, the relationship with China is basically 
one of “complementation,” and the challenge will be to raise the level of Japanese industry
involvement while strengthening its interdependence with China.41
The future, however, will be dependent on capacity building in the Asian developing world, 
which is a particular focus of JBIC. Asia is geographically close to Japan, specifically East 
Asia, followed by South Asia, and then Central Asia. Capacity building will be dependent on 
the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry’s ability to demonstrate broadly 
based experience with the global market, both as Owner/Employers and contractors. The 
Government can help in this arena by negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s). If Japan 
delays FTA negotiations and is consequently left in a trading wilderness as FTA’s are formed 
instead of among Asian economies or Asian economies and the US, Japanese will find 
themselves at a disadvantage – a decline in exports, development of production facilities 
overseas, and a deteriorating investment climate.42 Capacity building on the part of the 
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target countries for civil works infrastructure construction coupled with the capacity building 
in “mutual mistrust” environment on the part of the Japanese civil works infrastructure 
construction industry will enable sustained growth for Japan. Sustained benefits can be 
developed by continuing to build experience with PPP (PFI) alternatives, which Japan 
currently is well placed in which to serve a role. 
To emphasize the potential of the East Asian market, for example, the US Department of 
Commerce in late 2003 advised US competitors in the global market on the benefits of China 
as a market.43
“…China construction activity of all types of 'manufacturing, industrial, residential, 
commercial, and infrastructure, both public and private' will remain strong, in part due 
to China's anticipated economic growth stemming from its December 2001 entry into 
the World Trade Organization. U.S. firms seeking work in China face stiff competition 
from Chinese competitors. For these firms, establishing partnerships in China may 
represent the quickest way to enter the Chinese market. However, full 
implementation of China's architectural, engineering, and construction commitments 
'key conditions for China's WTO accession' has now made it possible for U.S. firms 
to open foreign majority-owned joint venture subsidiaries and special-purpose wholly 
foreign-owned construction firms [still not available to Japanese contractor’s in 
Japan], with wholly foreign-owned local design firms permitted by December 2006. 
China's implementation of international rule-of-law principles [“mutual mistrust” 
principles] under the WTO should help to ease U.S. industry concerns about local 
adherence to contract terms and being paid for services rendered.”
Civil works infrastructure construction investment remains a key element of China's 
economic growth strategy. Growth in overall civil works infrastructure construction 
investment continues at double-digit levels, in an effort by China's central government to 
keep national economic growth rates above 7 percent annually, despite pressure to cool off 
the rate of growth in the economy.
The US Commerce Department again reported:
”Perhaps the best known of China's pending infrastructure projects is the $23 billion 
worth of sports, retail, housing, transportation, energy construction, and 
environmental remediation project spending between now and 2008 in preparation 
for the Beijing Summer Olympics. Meanwhile, Shanghai anticipates spending $3 
billion to build venues for Expo 2010, with additional billions to be spent on 
transportation and other expo-related infrastructure projects. Subway construction is 
now under way in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and seven other cities; 8,500 miles 
of railroad is to be added by 2005; and numerous nationally and locally funded dam, 
energy, pipeline, and highway projects are underway across China…
Additionally, power, petrochemical, and environmental projects offer prospects for 
U.S. engineering and construction firms experienced in these sectors…
However, U.S. architects, engineers, and contractors face significant obstacles in 
their efforts to obtain work in China. Financing remains a key issue, even on civil 
works infrastructure projects. While Chinese officials have said they would prefer 15 
to 20 percent of public infrastructure to be financed by foreign sources, this 
represents moving foreign direct investment away from export-oriented private sector 
industrial construction—with relatively easy return on capital available—to projects 
with uncertain return on revenue and long payback periods. U.S. firms face stiff 
competition from…the substantial pool of national and local contractors in China. 
For U.S. firms, profitable participation in Chinese projects will depend on careful 
attention paid to the role the firm will play in local partner-ships, the stability of 
V- Kris R. Nielsen                                                  21
potential return on investment, and the type of competitive advantage the U.S. firm 
will enjoy over its competitors in the Chinese market….”44
The global market can be of real benefit to Japan and to the Japanese civil works 
infrastructure industry, if it too is competitive. Creating project management and contract 
administration skills to effectively compete in the global market is an attractive outlet for 
Japan. 
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D. Chinese Law as an Example of an Asian Country that Has Adopted the Principles of 
“Mutual Mistrust” Relative to Civil Works Infrastructure Construction
As discussed, the Japanese apparently pursued a theory of having their ideas on project 
management and the lack of need for contract administration accepted equally by the global 
market, especially East Asia. Japan thinking apparently assumed: “East Asia has a common 
cultural heritage with the Japanese.” Thus, the Japanese thinking apparently continued: the 
Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry could work in the global market 
using a form of project management that was used in its own domestic market, because 
East Asia, and notably China, contract law was fashioned on similar ideas of Confucianism. 
Unfortunately, that concept has not proved viable, particularly as Chinese Law has 
developed in the last 10 to 15 years. Similarly, where lending is by international institutions, 
including to China, the use of a Contracts and associated Standard Conditions of Contract 
for civil works infrastructure construction must be based on the principles of “mutual 
mistrust.” This requirement has led to the need for project management skills that employ 
contract administration even in the “Asian” market.
To understand the development of Chinese construction law, as with Japan, you cannot 
separate culture from law. But, Chinese history, and particularly the last half century, is quite 
different than that of Japan, despite both having had a ruling party that dominated power for 
most of the time. The understanding of modern Chinese law thus can only be understood 
through an appreciation of the social, cultural, political, and historical aspects of Chinese 
legal traditions. China’s current legal system reflects a vast number of legal traditions over 
the millennia.45 As with Japan, the deeply-rooted philosophies and culture of classical China, 
such as, Confucianism, must be studied. In addition, there are the legal traditions of Daoism 
and Legalism. China’s legal system is also influenced by external forces such as the 
extraterritorial privileges exerted under the treaty system between China and the Western 
powers which, in effect, forced China to adopt Western legal principles that stem from civil 
code countries of Europe (Germany and France) and from the common law countries (US 
and United Kingdom). The influence of treaties was much greater than Japan, because of 
the US relied heavily on the anthropological writings of Ruth Benedict, especially The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, as discussed above, in fashioning Japanese law following 
the surrender of Japan in 1945.46 In 1949, when the Communist Party took control of China, 
Chinese law was based on the political philosophies of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong, 
and the Soviet legal system. Since 1980, China has adopted a laws and enacted regulations 
governing commerce, foreign investment, and Securities regulations, from international 
sources. As China reforms its economy, it is using the legal standards of its trading partners 
to hasten its development efforts, to build the confidence of foreign investors, and to 
accommodate the entrepreneurial capitalism. This latter influence is primarily an influence 
from the US, however, which is its largest trading partner. 
Confucian codes of conduct are clearly defined patterns of obedience have become 
inextricably intertwined in Chinese society and culture just as in Japan. Confucian teachings 
hold that an individual should be guided by “Ii,” that is, virtue or propriety, rather than by “fa,” 
the law.47 Confucianism is an ethical system that seeks to teach the proper way for all 
people to behave in society. The focus is more on the interests and harmony of the family, 
clan, or community rather than the rights of a single person. Confucius taught that most of 
the ills of society happened because people forgot their stations in life and rulers failed to 
practice virtue. The rationale of Confucianism is that society is organized in a hierarchy of 
superior-inferior relationships. If every person performed his or her role, stability and social 
order would be sustained. Confucius emphasized complete obedience and loyalty of the 
inferior to the superior and, at the same time, the benevolence of the superior to the inferior. 
Thus, it is the same philosophical base that Ruth Benedict described relative to the 
Japanese.  
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Confucianism influenced every aspect of Chinese life, including its governmental systems, 
politics, and the law. Confucianism developed during a time of moral chaos, in which 
common values were widely rejected, crime was rampant, rule by war lords was the norm, 
and government was corrupt and distrusted by the people. Before Confucius, China was a 
feudal society on the verge of collapse due to increased population and ongoing war. During 
the Han Dynasty (206 BCE—220 CE), Confucianism was employed as an ideological 
reference point to allow the Han emperors to run China with a reasonable degree of 
efficiency. Since that time, and up to the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Confucius’s 
teachings were a mainstay of curriculum for government officials. A familiarity with Confucian 
canons was the principal requirement for civil service examinations, the bureaucrats kept the 
empire intact for two thousand years. It is the basis for Chinese culture, but since 1980, the 
Confucian values seem to have been receding, as China has moved to entrepreneurial 
capitalism.
Daoism (Taoism), is a second school of thought developed by philosophers Lao Zi (5th 
century BCE) and Zhuang Zi (4th century BCE). Daoism maintains that a person follow the 
Dao, the way, without interference of desires. Daoism advocates inaction, political passivity, 
and spontaneity without human interference. Daoism opposes institutions and organizations, 
moral laws, and governments as human artifices that obstruct the Dao. Daoism taught the 
art of living and surviving by conforming to the natural way of things. Daoism further 
advocates that the best way to govern the world is not to govern it. Daoism encourages 
avoiding public duty in order to search for a vision of the transcendental world of the spirit. 
Daoism viewed a proper government would be one that would not wage war would not be 
complex, would not interfere in people’s lives, would not emphasize luxury, ritual, and 
wealth, and, if practical, would be inactive. The inactivity envisioned would be a government 
that is merely a guide and not one that governs. Daoism believed that the order and 
harmony in nature were far more stable, unified, and enduring than either the power of the 
state or the civilized institutions structured by humans. Although Daoism may be different 
from Confucianism, it is not contradictory.
The third major school of thought that significantly influenced the modern Chinese legal 
system is Legalism, “fajia.” Legalism is based on the teachings of Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE), 
the advisor to Shi Huang Di, the First Emperor of China. Shi Huang Di was regarded as 
abusive and a tyrant by Confucians, although he succeeded in unifying the nation and put an 
end to control by war lords. Legalism advocates rewards and punishments by which to keep 
all people in order. Legalism held that man is evil and selfish, and thus required a draconian 
set of laws that would make the continent easier to control and to avoid social disruption. 
Legalism advocated dismantling feudal privileges, strict accountability for actions, and the 
standardization of individual duties in a manner whereby everyone is bound equally to the 
same standard. Legalism emphasized that the standards do not favor the nobles over the 
common people.
Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism each played a role in developing the legal system of 
China. Buddhism also had an impact on Chinese society, but did not play a significant role in 
development of the Chinese legal system. In addition to the purely internal philosophies, the 
development of China’s contemporary legal system was strongly influenced by a number of 
external legal philosophies. Demands placed on China to reform its legal system as a 
condition to abolish extraterritorial judicial privileges, and the political philosophy of Marxist-
Leninist thought that took hold in China after years of war, foreign interference, and abject 
poverty are the more relevant events.
For centuries, China flourished in isolation from the rest of the world. Codification of the law 
in ancient China, which was primarily penal in nature, was undertaken during the Qin (221—
206 BCE), Tang (618—907 CE), Song (960-1279 CE), Ming (1368-1644 CE), and Qing 
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(1644-1912 CE) dynasties. During these two millennia, jurisdiction over purely commercial 
disputes was settled through either mediation or arbitration because of distrust of legal 
institutions, where the decision making was arbitrary.
During the Qing Dynasty (1644—1912), the Western world approached the Manchu rulers 
for strategic purposes and to open trade. China initially was ambivalent toward the foreigners 
and believed that it had no need for relations with Europe and the United States. As traders 
set up posts in China’s coastal areas, the Manchu rulers allowed the foreigners to govern 
their own affairs, but then they gradually asserted jurisdiction. After the Opium War, the 
Western powers, Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, imposed upon 
China a number of unilateral treaties granting land and trading concessions in various parts 
of China. The result dismembered China and parceled her off into spheres of influence. 
These treaties established a system of extraterritorial privileges under which foreign subjects 
were exempt from local jurisdiction, and, instead, were subject to their own national 
authorities for conduct while physically present in China. Extraterritorial privileges included 
an exemption from jurisdiction of local courts; freedom from arrest by local officials; and the 
right to a criminal or civil trial by consular or national courts. Prior to the establishment of 
extraterritorial privileges, China asserted jurisdiction over foreigners and subjected them to 
local Chinese law. Extraterritorial jurisdiction in China was secured by nineteen countries 
including in chronological order: Russia, United Kingdom, US, France, Sweden, Norway, 
Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Peru, Brazil, 
Portugal, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland. The US, for example, secured its extraterritorial 
privilege in its treaty with China, concluded on July 3, 1844. The China Treaty of 184448
provides that “citizens of the United States who may commit any crime in China shall be 
subject to be tried and punished only by the consul, or other public functionary of the United 
States, thereto authorized, according to the laws of the United States” [and that] “all 
questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between citizens of the 
United States in China, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of and regulated by the authorities 
of their own Government.” The Western powers imposed the system of extraterritoriality 
based upon the perceived imperfections in the Chinese legal system. In response to treaty 
authorization, foreign governments established a multiplicity of courts located physically in 
their territory in China. For example, the US established in China the US Court for China, 
thus a dispute against with an American company by a Chinese company was required to be 
made before the U.S. consular court having jurisdiction.
After the practice existed for over 60 years, and on the demand of the Chinese government, 
the US and UK promised to abolish the extraterritorial system on the condition that China 
establish a legal system consistent with international norms. Article 15 of the commercial 
treaty between the United States and China of 1903 provided as follows:
“The Government of China having expressed a strong desire to reform its judicial 
system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, the United States 
agrees to give every assistance to such reform and will also be prepared to relinquish 
extra-territorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the 
arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in so 
doing.”
In response, the Chinese government took steps to reform its legal system, including the 
establishment of an independent judiciary and codification of its laws. Despite undertaking 
numerous reforms in the first two decades of the 20th century, the foreign powers failed to 
relinquish their extraterritorial privileges. China, despite years of civil war and protracted 
discussions with the foreign powers to abolish the extraterritorial system, continued to reform 
its legal system. In January of 1943, however, the Western powers formally abandoned the 
system of extraterritoriality. China was thereafter allowed to subject foreigners to Chinese 
laws and court system. 
V- Kris R. Nielsen                                                  25
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) abolished all laws and the legal system set up 
by the Republic. In February 1949, the CCP forcefully removed the Guomingdang 
government, including its judiciary and the entire body of laws. The CCP issued a directive 
abolishing the Guomingdang’s six codes, all modeled after European legal codes, including 
the Constitution, Commercial Law, Civil Law, Civil Code of Procedure, and Criminal Code. In 
September of 1949, the CCP issued the Common Program of the Chinese People’s 
Consultative Conference, which became the temporary basic law of China until 1954.49 The 
CCP then pursued a program based upon the concept of historical determinism, which 
provides that the party is the primary means of transforming China from a feudalistic society 
into a Communist utopian society. In order to perfect its unique historical role, the CCP 
pursued a policy of class struggle that involved the destruction of “class enemies.” The hope 
of utopia appealed to the people after years of war had resulted in impoverishment. The 
collective responsibility system of the Communists had its roots in Confucian thought. The 
theory of loyalty under was redirected into loyalty to the CCP and the State. The Confucian 
ideal of virtue under Maoist thought was simply the unequivocal support and practice of the 
CCP’s current political program. The “virtuous” person in Maoist China was a person who 
followed the party line. Further, both Maoism and Confucianism eschewed written law 
entirely in favor of general principles and left it up to the “experts”—cadres in the former and 
the mandarins in case of the latter—to apply the principles to specific cases, and oftentimes 
with punitive results. The recognition of general principles, as opposed to the rule of law, is 
why China, in stark contrast to Japan, had virtually no written law until the 1980. 
Soviet legal scholars taught students in China, and Chinese students studied in the Soviet 
Union. China developed a legal framework that includes the first PRC Constitution in 1954 
and a set of organic laws designed to administer the court and prosecutorial systems. Soviet 
laws and principles were readily adopted as models until a shift in politics led to the Soviet 
Union falling out favor with Beijing in 1957. In May of 1957, Mao Zedong encouraged the 
“blooming of a hundred flowers and the contending of a hundred schools of thought.” Mao
called on intellectuals of China to speak out against the abuses in the CCP. After a period of 
five weeks, the program was terminated and resulted in an “anti-rightist” campaign against 
those that spoke out. The legal profession and the judicial system were affected. Ideological 
repression was followed by a purge of the government and the CCP. The anti-rightist 
movement was followed by an abandonment of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) in 1959 along 
with China organizational structure for the legal profession.
From 1958 to 1965, the country focused its attention on developing policy to rapidly 
transform the country into a world power. During this time period, Mao launched the Great 
Leap Forward movement, which was intended to heighten economic productivity and self-
reliance in China through collectivization of people’s communes and decentralization of 
industrial production. Today the Great Leap Forward is regarded as a failure since the 
government overstated the production and agricultural results, which led to widespread 
famine. The Great Leap Forward set the stage for the next round of revolutionary excesses, 
those of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Development of the law and legal 
institutions took on secondary importance to Mao’s goal of mass mobilization to achieve self-
reliance. During the Cultural Revolution, the few open law schools were closed and the law 
faculties were sent to labor camps. The law libraries and books were destroyed by the Red 
Guard. The legal profession disappeared overnight and almost no laws were enacted and no 
law books published during the Cultural Revolution. Civil disputes were resolved by local 
mediators, and criminal matters were handled in the political arena by the Ministry of Public 
Security, party committee structure, or the state courts that remained open.
The Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 with the death of Mao and the arrest of the “Gang of 
Four.” After ten years of lawlessness during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese 
government took steps to slowly open China to the rest of the world. In 1978, the 
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government instituted the Four Modernizations, a program designed to develop and 
modernize China’s agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. 
Incumbent in this bold plan was the building of a modern legal system as a key element to 
ensure the institutionalization of economic reform, and to gain the confidence of the global 
community. The Chinese government emphasized that the excesses of the Cultural 
Revolution occurred as a result of certain officials taking advantage of China’s incomplete 
legal system to seize power. To guard China from returning to a similar situation, the 
National Party Congress (NPC) stressed the need to develop a legal system that ensures 
the stability and continuity of the laws; guarantees the equality of all the people before the 
laws and to deny anyone the privilege of being above the law; and that the law may be 
revised only through legal procedures and not at the personal whim of a particular leader. In 
the interim, the United States officially recognized the People’s Republic of China on 
January 1, 1979, and several months later the two governments established formal 
diplomatic relations with the opening of respective embassies. In 1972, the United States 
and the PRC opened trade with the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. Since that time, 
the US and China have executed a number of bilateral agreements and that has led to the 
25 years of reforms, including recently, construction laws.
The economic liberalization policies of the 1980s gave rise to consumer expectations by the 
late 1990’s of personal ambition, initiative and wealth. The Chinese government, in 
response, has used the enactment of laws to shape entrepreneurial values and to preserve 
the CCP existence and legitimacy. At the same time, the Chinese government has been, 
and continues to be, under pressure from its trading partners to strengthen its laws, improve 
the enforcement of its laws, allow for greater transparency, and give access to its citizens in 
order to facilitate market access and stability, and more recently to attract foreign 
investment. Inherent in this change is the development of its construction law.
To begin with, the Contract Law50 defines a construction project contract as an agreement 
whereby a contractor performs certain tasks involving the construction, installation, 
demolition or refurbishment of a work of improvement. The Contract Law requires that a 
construction project contract must be in written. The Contract Law provides that a contract 
for the construction of a work of improvement shall contain the following provisions:
1. Scope of Work
2. Construction schedule and time for performance
3. Quality and specifications of works
4. Contract price and budgeting
5. Schedule for delivery of technical information
6. Materials and equipment to be used
7. Inspection and acceptance procedures for the work of improvement
8. Warranty Period
The Contract Law further provides that activity relating to the tender and evaluation of bids
for construction projects must be conducted publicly and fairly. Projects for State agencies 
must follow procedures established by the government and the approved documents for the 
specific project, including feasibility studies, land-use plans, and investment plans approved 
by the national, provincial, and local governments. The contractor may enter into subcontract 
arrangements with the approval of the principal, but is liable for the acts and omissions of 
any subcontractor. An Owner/Employer has the right to enter into contracts with several 
contractors at the same time, and may retain a project supervisor to oversee the work of the 
various contractors. The Owner/Employer has the right to inspect the work progress so long 
as the inspection does not interfere with the rights of the contractor. The contractor has an 
express obligation to notify the Owner/Employer of its progress so that the Owner/Employer 
has time to inspect its work. After the completion of the construction work, the 
Owner/Employer must inspect the work to assure the work is in accordance with the 
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construction drawings and specifications, the acceptance inspection regulations, and quality 
inspections standards promulgated by the government. If the construction is acceptable, 
then the Owner/Employer must accept the construction project and pay the contractor the 
balance of the price as agreed. The contractor is liable to the Owner/Employer, if the works 
fail to meet the terms of the contract or the construction standards set by the government. If 
the quality of the construction work does not comply with the agreed standard due to any 
reason on the part of the contractor, the Owner/Employer may demand that the contractor 
cure the defects within a reasonable time period. If the contractor fails to cure the defects 
within the prescribed time, the contractor is liable for damages for breach of the contract. 
The contractor is also liable for any property damage or personal injuries sustained as a 
result of the contractor’s failure to abide by the terms of the contract or to maintain workplace 
health and safety standards. The Owner/Employer is liable to the contractor for any 
damages resulting from interference, delay, a failure to supply materials, access to work 
sites and technical information, or other reason on the part of the principal. If the 
Owner/Employer changes the specifications or the contract terms, provides inaccurate data, 
or fails to provide necessary working conditions to assist the contractor in completing the 
works, the Owner/Employer is liable for damages to the contractor. In short, the 
Owner/Employer and contractors have all the responsibilities and liabilities that are expected 
in the global market.
The Construction law of the People’s Republic of China (1997) was adopted by the National 
Peoples Congress (NPC) to improve the supervision and administration of construction 
activities, to promote the construction industry, and to ensure that construction projects are 
undertaken in a safe manner. 51 The Construction Law outlines the qualifications for 
contractors, construction project building permits, construction contracts, render process, 
construction project supervision, construction work safety management, construction project 
quality control, and legal liability. Some major municipalities also have similar laws, like the 
Rules of the Shanghai Municipality on the Construction Market (1997 and amended in 1999) 
which covers the qualifications for persons engaged in building activities, general contractor 
and subcontract activities, role of supervisory agencies, project contracts and building cost 
calculations, project quality and safety, and penalties and legal liability.52 The Construction 
Law applies to all parties engaged in construction activities in China, including the 
construction of various types of structures and their auxiliary facilities, as well as the 
installation activities involving related wiring circuits, piping, and equipment. There is no 
separate contract status established under the Construction Law. The contract must be 
consistent with the Contract Law. 
The government also is promoting a greater participation in China’s construction and 
engineering services market by foreign companies. China also has special laws regulating 
foreign contractors involved with road construction,53 and the electric power industry.54 The 
Telecom Regulations, for instance, provide that the construction of public telecommunication 
networks, special telecommunication networks, and radio and television transmission 
networks are required to comply with government planning policies and be approved prior to 
the commencement of construction. Under the Telecom Regulations, any party involved in 
constructing roads, bridges, tunnels, railroads, and other large civil works infrastructure 
projects is required to consult with the local telecommunication authorities before 
commencing construction, and to avoid any disruption of existing telecom cables, lines, or 
facilities.55
Regarding foreign contractor participation, in September 2004, the Ministry of Construction 
released a draft revised version of the Construction Law for public comment which “fine 
tuned” the law with several issues in the global market.56 Even the process of stakeholders 
commenting is a process that is consistent with WTO requirements of transparency. At the 
end of 2002, China adopted regulations that apply to foreign enterprises involved in 
construction, engineering, or construction design in China.57 Foreign investors may also 
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establish a Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE) construction company through reinvestment by 
an existing FIE or by purchasing an equity stake in another construction company. Under the 
FIE Construction Regulations, foreign investors that are approved for work in China may 
engage in multiple projects simultaneously and are not limited to a single contract or project. 
After an enterprise is established, the company is required to apply for a construction 
enterprise qualification certificate from the Ministry of Construction or branch office, and is 
required to abide by the laws and construction standards adopted by China.58
The FIE Construction Implementing Regulations provides that “construction activities” are 
defined to include:
“…new construction, expansion and reconstruction activities in the fields of civil 
engineering, construction engineering, lines, pipelines and equipment installation, 
and refurbishment.”
Thus, the regulations cover the civil works infrastructure construction industry. The 
Construction Law and enabling regulations specifically incorporate Standards Conditions of 
Contract from the global market. The approval procedures under the FIE Construction 
Regulations require that a foreign contractor obtain approval from the Ministry of Commerce, 
and then obtain approval from the Ministry of Construction.59 Thus, any FIE construction 
company can have 75% foreign ownership and can engage in any civil works infrastructure 
construction project.  
By the end of 2006, foreign investors will be allowed to set up Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprises (WFOE) that are engaged in construction and engineering services. As a result, 
foreign construction or construction design companies can establish wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, equity joint venture, or contractual joint venture enterprises. Although WFOE 
construction companies can be established, they will be limited initially to the following types 
of civil works infrastructure construction projects: 
1. A project funded by foreign investment, with foreign donations or with foreign 
investment and foreign donations.
2. Projects funded by international financial institutions that are, pursuant to the 
loan terms, granted through international invitations of bids.
3. Sino-foreign joint construction projects in which the foreign investment 
accounts for 50 percent or more of the total.
4. Sino-foreign joint construction projects approved by the government in which 
the foreign investment accounts for less than 50 percent of the total and due 
to technical difficulties cannot be implemented solely by Chinese or FIE 
construction enterprises.
5. Chinese-invested construction projects approved by the government that due 
to technical difficulties cannot be implemented solely by a Chinese or FIE 
construction enterprises, but may require joint construction by Chinese, FIE 
and foreign construction enterprises.
Civil works infrastructure construction is allowed to be undertaken by majority owned foreign 
construction companies, and wholly foreign owned construction companies on a more 
limited basis. This situation is in stark contrast to what is allowed in Japan. And, the contract 
and the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract that has been used are consistent 
with the global market, and the principles of “mutual mistrust.” As has been indicated, civil 
works infrastructure construction investment remains a key element of China's economic 
growth strategy, and China has adopted a new legal regime which is consistent with “mutual 
mistrust” as used in rest of the global market.
V- Kris R. Nielsen                                                  29
Consistent with the new legal regime, a dramatic increase in the number of disputes 
between foreign and Chinese parties has resulted from increased in foreign investment and 
trade in China. The development and maintenance of a predictable dispute resolution 
system was a critical element for foreign parties in their decisions to invest in China. Thus, 
the global market has demanded, and, China has responded with a means of resolving 
disputes that meets these requirements. Although, the Chinese traditionally prefer to resolve 
disputes in a non-confrontational manner, and, if possible, without the involvement of a third 
party, the Contract Law, Construction Law, and enabling procedures are being revised to 
account for the perspective of global stakeholders. Consultation is simply direct negotiation 
between the disputing parties or their representatives. Consultation is expressly encouraged 
under Chinese law, and, specifically with respect by the Contract Law, Sino-Foreign Co-
operative Joint Venture Law, and Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law. This movement 
toward dispute resolution began with the 1979 Trade Agreement between the US and China, 
which highlighted the importance of consultation and mediation:60
“The Contracting Parties encourage the prompt and equitable settlement of any 
disputes arising from or in relation to contracts between their respective firms, 
companies and corporations, and trading organizations, through friendly 
consultations, conciliation or other mutual acceptable means.” 
But, it is usually the last step prior to initiating a more forceful means of resolving a dispute. 
The Trade Agreement further provides with respect to subsequent Arbitration: 
“If such disputes cannot be settled promptly by [consultation], the parties to the 
dispute may have recourse to arbitration for settlement in accordance with provisions 
specified in their contract or other agreements to submit to arbitration. Such 
arbitration may be conducted by an arbitration institution in the People’s Republic of 
China, the United States of America, or a third country. The arbitration rules of 
procedure of the relevant arbitration institution are applicable, and the arbitration 
rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law recommended by 
the United Nations, or other international arbitration rules, may also be used where 
acceptable to the parties to the dispute and to the arbitration institution.”
Thus, the Chinese have used global market dispute resolution for 25 years, and have 
required the use of perceived impartiality on the part of the arbitrators. More recently, the 
current Arbitration Rules of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC) were adopted in 1995, amended in 1998 by the China International 
Chamber of Commerce, and further amended by CIETAC in 2000.61 CIETAC is responsible 
for the sole commission for resolution of foreign-related commercial disputes. The revised 
2000 CIETAC Rules of Arbitration expand the scope of CIETAC’s jurisdiction over domestic 
business and commercial disputes, including disputes between FIE’s . Under The Arbitration 
Law the government restructured its domestic arbitration system, thus making CIETAC 
independent of any administrative organization. CIETAC’s approved list of arbitrators 
includes a large number of foreign individuals, including legal professionals from the US, 
Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, and various European countries. Although CIETAC’s list of 
arbitrators includes highly qualified and eminent Chinese jurists, lawyers, and professors, 
foreign contractors prefer to appoint an arbitrator of neutral nationality to ensure that the 
tribunal will be impartial. Of the approximately 300 approved CIETAC arbitrators, one-third is 
foreigners or residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Under the CIETAC 
Rules, all approved arbitrators must have professional knowledge and practical experience 
in such fields as law, economics, trade, and science and technology. Chinese is the official 
language of CIETAC, but parties may select the official language of the proceeding in their 
arbitration agreement or at the commencement of the proceedings.
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CIETAC may hear cases involving international and foreign-related disputes between the 
following categories of parties and matters:
1. Disputes characterized as foreign-related or international in nature.
2. Disputes related to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Macao 
Special Administrative Region, and Taiwan.
3. Disputes between foreign-invested enterprises or between a foreign 
investment enterprise and a Chinese legal person, physical person,and/or 
economic organization.
4. Disputes arising from project financing, invitations to tender and bidding 
submissions, project construction, or other activities conducted by a Chinese 
legal person, Chinese individual, and other economic organization that utilizes 
capital, technology, or services from foreign countries, international 
organizations, or from the Hong Kong SAR, the Macao SAR, and the Taiwan 
region.
5. Disputes that may be taken in accordance with special provisions of, or upon 
special authorization from, the laws or administrative regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China. 
In 2000 CIETAC revised its rules to include “domestic disputes” referred by agreement, 
which includes any commercial dispute, including disputes between FIE’s, provided the 
parties have contractually agreed to arbitrate the dispute before CIETAC. Thus, the CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules provide for independent third parties, including disputes involving civil 
works infrastructure construction projects.  
Under the CIETAC Rules, with respect to all foreign-related contracts, the parties may 
choose the law governing the interpretation and enforcement of their agreement. 62
Therefore, while the law applicable to a contract for the formation of a joint venture is 
Chinese law, where that joint venture enters into commercial contracts with other entities, 
the parties are free to select the laws of another jurisdiction to govern their contract. The 
tribunal may also apply the provisions of relevant international conventions to which China 
has acceded, or, where applicable, accepted international practices or customs. 
Thus, for civil works infrastructure construction projects, project management and contract 
administration are based on global practice, and that practice is based on “mutual mistrust.”
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VI. Recommendations for Establishing a “New Japanese 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Civil Works”
The FIDIC Contracts and the associated Standard Conditions of Contract are recognized 
throughout the world as a reference document for the construction of civil works 
infrastructure projects. In recent decades the FIDIC contract documents have become a de 
facto international standard that is known by stakeholders in the global market for civil works 
infrastructure construction. Therefore, in the global market, the expectation is that “everyone” 
is familiar with the FIDIC contract documents. It is from the FIDIC contract documents that 
modifications are suggested and emphasized, so that changes that are being made are 
obvious. As previously indicated, the FIDIC contract documents are based on a philosophy 
of “mutual mistrust.” Therefore, the Author has used the FIDIC contract documents to 
illustrate and contrast the changes that will avoid as crisis in the Japanese civil works 
infrastructure construction industry and to develop and foster project management and 
contract administration skills sets.
One commentator compared the Japanese Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works with the requirements of the Institution Civil Engineers (ICE) standard contract used 
in the United Kingdom in 1992.1 With respect to international construction contracts, the 
following was noted regarding Japanese contractors operating in the global market with the 
1987 FIDIC version of the Red Book, which was an adaptation of the ICE contract and 
conditions of contract:  
“Over the past three decades, Japanese contractors have acquired a lot of 
experience in undertaking international construction projects under the FIDIC 
Conditions [of Contract], but they are still lacking sophistication in functional 
knowledge of the full ramifications of the FIDIC Conditions, and therefore experience 
difficulties in negotiation of, and in dealing with problems of performance in, contracts 
based on those Conditions [of Contract]. The consequence of this situation is often 
additional incurred costs or delay or both, leading to a bad financial result for the 
Japanese contractors. This does not necessarily mean that Japanese contractors 
lack negotiation skills or management capability in general; rather it means that they 
have applied (and many are still applying) the methods and practices of Japanese 
domestic construction contracting to the performance of international contracts… And 
one might think those Japanese forms to be commercially practical…a detailed 
examination…show[s] that these forms definitely are lacking, not only in precision in 
their conditions and the procedural requirements necessary for the proper 
performance of construction contracts, but also a mechanism for dealing with the 
situation in which no agreement is reached by negotiation between the parties, 
especially in respect of extension of time and adjustment to the contract price… 
Commercial [mutual trust] depends upon economics, therefore, economic power fills 
in the vague details in Japanese construction contracts…The Japanese standard 
forms of construction contract together with the bidding system and subcontracting 
system will not work well in the future performance of a contract in a truly competitive 
market, which is demanded, not only by outside pressure, i.e. the involvement of 
foreign nationalities, but also by the economic situation of the Japanese domestic 
market, i.e. persisting recession.”
As has been indicated above, the management skills of project management that is derived 
from contract administration that is necessary in executing projects based on a culture or 
philosophy of “mutual mistrust” is the specific management ability that the domestic civil 
works infrastructure construction industry lacks. 
VI- Kris R. Nielsen                                                                              2
Japanese contractors have tried developing contracts that address ”mutual mistrust” in the 
conditions of contract. The Engineering Advancement Association of Japan (ENAA) in 1986 
published a standard contract and conditions of contract for process plant execution where
the Owner/Employer has a process license from the contractor – the ENAA Form of 
International Contract for Process Plants. In 1992, ENAA revised the standard contract 
documents and issued a new second edition, and added an alternative for process plants 
where the Owner/Employer does not procure a process license from the contractor. In 1996, 
ENAA issued a standard contract and conditions of Contract for power plants – the ENAA 
Form of International Contract for Power Plant Construction. The ENAA forms were intended 
for execution of Lump Sum Turnkey industrial plants. The ENAA forms are primarily used by 
Japanese contractors offering private construction of these industrial plants in the global 
market. Although the ENAA forms have garnered reference by international commentators, 
they are used less often by other global contractors in executing these types of projects in 
the private sector. The projects on which the ENAA forms are used are not normally 
considered civil works infrastructure construction, unless there is a significant process 
requirement or a significant equipment component. Curiously, the timing of the ENAA forms 
development was coincident with the Japanese attempt to have a philosophy of “mutual 
trust” accepted as an option in the global market. The Japanese apparently felt a result 
would be the promotion of a form of project management that did not place a high degree of 
importance on contract administration. The Japanese apparently believed the adoption of 
the ENAA forms would make the requirements of the commitments made to the WTO more 
palatable. Then, Japan did not have to reform the civil works infrastructure construction 
industry and enable it to compete domestically with contractors that were familiar with the 
“mutual mistrust” environment of the global market. The plan has not worked. The ENAA 
forms, however, do demonstrate some areas of what may be acceptable to the Japanese. 
The ENAA Forms are a useful guide in some instances for civil works infrastructure 
construction. 
In 1999 FIDIC began issuing revised contract forms, or the so-called FIDIC “Rainbow Series” 
of contracts. The “Rainbow Series” cover a number of different delivery or execution 
methods. The key contracts involving civil works infrastructure construction projects, 
however, are:
 The traditional “Red” book form which is the “Conditions of Contract for Building and 
Engineering Works Designed by the Employer, 1999.” The World Bank requires the use 
of the prior 1987 fourth edition (1996 Reprint) of the form known as the “Conditions of 
Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construction.” Although the World Bank has not 
adopted the new 1999 edition, there is indication that the changes to the 1987 Edition 
that the World Bank’s Standard Bidding Procedures require be used for global civil works 
infrastructure construction are similar to what FIDIC has published with the 1999 edition.
 The “Silver” Book which encompasses the “Conditions of Contract for EPC Turkey 
Projects, 2nd Edition, 2003,” covers Engineer, Procure, Construct, Design-Build (or 
Turnkey) type contracts. This form of contract covers Lump Sum Turnkey (LSTK) 
contracts where the contractor tenders on a design concept to perform detailed 
engineering and construction for civil works infrastructure construction projects. It is 
being promoted for use on BOT [Build-Own-Transfer] or PPP [Public Private 
Partnerships] civil works infrastructure construction projects. This form of contract that 
would cover the newly evolving method in Japan of executing civil works infrastructure 
construction projects by way of PFI [Private Finance Initiative] schemes.
These are the forms of Contract and the Conditions of Contract that the stakeholders civil 
works infrastructure construction global market are using, and the project management
personnel are today honing their contract administration skills. Below are addressed a 
number of areas similarity with “mutual mistrust” as exemplified by the FIDIC Conditions of 
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Contract and areas where they differ dramatically with “mutual trust,” as exemplified by the 
Construction Business Law, the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works. The laws could be changed to either allow adoption of the FIDIC Red and Silver 
Books, or they can be used to modify the Japanese Construction Business Law and the 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. In the following discussion, the Standard 
Conditions of Contract for Public Works is the latest edition, promulgated on May 23, 1995.
The reason to use standard forms was exemplified by one commentator who said in regard 
to standard contract forms used for construction:2
“The construction lawyer who wished to do a good job for his client first should 
assemble as many of the standard forms as he can, organize them by contact type, 
and analyze them. Next he must make a tentative recommendation for the particular 
transaction for which he has been asked to draft a contract. Prior to making this 
recommendation, the lawyer should consider whether the owner is best served by a 
customized contract or by a standard contract. A customized contract should be 
used in the owner wished to take more interventional role, if the architect or engineer 
is not to perform in the way that design professionals usually perform, and if the 
contract is to be one with a tight fixed price. Also, if the owner does not prefer 
arbitration, as built into the standard contracts, a customized contract is more 
expensive to prepare and requires greater skill. If an attorney does not have the skill 
and cannot justify the time needed to develop or procure a customized, he should 
suggest a standard contract. If no standard contract fits his client’s needs, he should 
recommend that the client retain an attorney with the skill to draft a good customized 
contract.”
The recommendations below are based on great experience as to what the global market 
requires and expects, but as recommendations, they should be merely a starting point. 
Adherence to such recommendations will avoid the crisis that is facing the Japanese civil 
works infrastructure construction industry through the creation of a New Japanese Standard.
VI- Kris R. Nielsen                                                                              4
A. Change is Necessary in the Construction Business Law
The level of similarities and dissimilarities between the FIDIC Conditions of Contract and the 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works is about equal. But, a major difference in 
the Conditions of Contract is the number of conditions that refer to issues being subject to 
“mutual consultation” or “mutual negotiation” (kyogi協議). Thus, what has been referred to 
as the “mutual trust” orientation of the Construction Business Law. The requirement of 
“mutual consultation” in the Standard Conditions of Contract of Public Works often is 
criticized as being contrary to global practice in civil works infrastructure construction 
execution and it is a slightly less of a requirement in the 1995 edition.3
Nonetheless it is still a hold over allowed by the Construction Business Law. The 
Owner/Employer is given a dominant economic position, and “mutual consultation” elevated 
to a almost revered position that is held against foreign competitors because they “don’t 
culturally understand.” The Construction Business Law actually alters the Civil Code
requirements for a “Contract for Works,” and substitutes a contract form not recognized by 
the Civil Law. Thus, much of the genesis is the contract form that the Construction Business 
Law creates is as a result of allowing a form of contract that is an aberration. Further, the 
Construction Business Law has substituted contractual requirements in regards to payment 
terms, liability, warranty, risk of loss, etc., that have allowed civil works infrastructure 
construction to be manipulated in the past. The result has been the industry as it is found 
today. The civil works infrastructure construction industry faces an uncertain and 
troublesome future unless there are changes to allow competition in line with Japanese 
WTO commitments and to prepare for a consequent transition.
1. Form of Contract
First and foremost, the dominant position of Owner/Employers (the Government) must be 
eliminated from construction contracts. Thus, the allowed contract for civil works 
infrastructure construction must recognize the equality of contracting parties, and not 
perpetuate the concept of contracting between a benevolent master (the Government) and 
its servants (the contractors). This one change to the Construction Business Law will make 
the practice of “mutual consultation” less necessary. FIDIC in prior editions of the Conditions 
of Contract required parties as part of the Dispute Resolution process to initially negotiate 
their differences in good faith, but the good faith was from a philosophy of “mutual mistrust.” 
Thus, if the Government felt that “mutual consultation” was still desirable, they could equate 
the practice to negotiation in good faith as a first practicable step, but not make it 
overwhelmingly the “only step.” The issue of equality of the parties only will become a reality 
in the civil works infrastructure construction industry through the procedures, such as, those 
that create the concept of “mutual mistrust.” 
For, as a commentator concluded over a decade ago:4
“The Japanese standard forms of construction contract together with the bidding system 
and subcontracting system will not work well in the future performance of a contract in a 
truly competitive market…”
Japan does not have a tradition of the Engineer typical on projects in the global market, that 
is, the Engineer is not from an independent firm. In Japan pursuant the Construction 
Business Law, the Engineer’s role is fulfilled in construction contracts by the 
Owner/Employer’s project manager supervising the contractor’s performance of the work in 
accordance with the construction contract, and, if such contract is not being complied with, to 
have the contractor rectify it. The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works, article 
9(1), provides that when the Owner/Employer appoints the “project manager,” the 
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Owner/Employer shall inform the contractor of such project manager’s name. Under the 
Construction Business Law and the Public Accounting Act,5 the project manager nominated 
by the Owner/Employer (the Government), whether from the procuring agency’s contracting 
staff for a civil works infrastructure construction project or a hired construction consultant, 
assures the contractor’s performance of the contract obligations.6 The contractor is required 
pursuant to the Construction Business Law to nominate a “Chief Engineer” and a “Managing 
(Supervising) Engineer” of suitable qualifications and inform the Owner/Employer. 7 The 
Construction Business Law has detailed requirements that the assigned Engineers must 
possess to assure that the Owner/Employer has secured the required “Construction 
Technology.” The contractor’s assigned Engineers are required by the Construction 
Business Law to meet the requirements of education and experience, and to have the proper 
certifications. Japanese engineers for civil works infrastructure construction have been 
trained well. Their competence is assured by thorough testing that is required under the 
Construction Business Law. Thus, Engineers who are assigned by contractors engaged in 
civil works infrastructure construction are trained, tested, approved, certified, and 
experienced in the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. Therefore, Japanese 
Engineers thoroughly understand the requirements of a contract that assures the dominance 
of the Owner/Employer that the Construction Business Law imposes. But, the Japanese 
Engineer on civil works infrastructure construction must develop project management skills 
that are consistent with the best practices in the global market, and that requires contract 
administration that they will use with a contract that recognizes “mutual mistrust.”
The Government can use the WTO agreements to accomplish reforms required in a sensible 
and logical fashion by changing the Construction Business Law. If they do not, the contract 
and the methods that flow from the Construction Business Law in Japan will be forced upon 
it by foreign competitors who use global practices. 
2. The Bidding System
The bidding system is not transparent as discussed earlier. The bidding systems does not 
meet what parties who operate the global market expect. One method for changing the 
bidding or tendering procedures could be the use of guidance that is suggested by the 
UNICITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Model Law on
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services as regards the bidding or tendering 
processes. Although the law has been enacted by a few countries, legal commentators are 
in general agreement that the law is generally consistent with the WTO’s Agreement on 
Government Procurement (AGP) that is driving the Japanese Government’s need to allow 
foreign competition in the domestic construction market, and particularly civil works 
infrastructure construction.8 The Model Law is based on concepts of “mutual mistrust” and 
reflects best practices from the global market. The Model Law suggests the following 
regarding:
a. Qualification of Suppliers and Applications for Qualification
To ascertain the qualifications of suppliers or contractors, the Model Law sets out broad 
criteria. The AGP only limits pre-qualification criteria by reference to the need not to 
discriminate. The Model Law requires public notification in named newspapers and for 
tenders in international newspapers. The invitation to bid or tender and invitation to pre-
qualify must contain certain information including the nature and quantity of goods and the 
location of the construction, the timetable for supply and construction, the criteria and 
procedures to be used for evaluating qualifications, and a declaration that suppliers or 
contractors may participate regardless of nationality or, where there is some restriction, what 
that restriction may be. The notice must also make it clear where the documents can he 
obtained, the price range, the currency, language and place and deadline for submission of 
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tenders. The charges for any documents must be no more than cost and any documents 
must clearly set out all the requirements relating to the procurement. These requirements 
are quite detailed and refer to all information likely to be required of a tender, including the 
names of officers who can be contacted in order to provide information and “who are 
authorized to communicate directly ... with contractors . . . without the intervention of an 
intermediary” The documents must also set out the various rights which bidders have under 
the Model Law, including the right to seek review of an unlawful act or decision. The 
qualification criteria adopted by Japan for foreign companies, although cosmetic in nature, 
meets these criteria. These criteria should be adopted for all parties, foreign and domestic. 
b. Non-discrimination
The Model Law would require that criteria for evaluation be published and that any 
evaluation be made in accordance with those criteria. The Model Law expressly prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of nationality or on criteria which are “not objectively justifiable”. 
The AGP is consistent, but the breadth of practice is questioned by some commentators. 
c. Pre-qualification
The rules for pre-qualification proposed in the Model Law require the procuring entity to 
provide considerable detail about the manner and place of submission. The procedures that 
have been established domestically in Japan are consistent with both the Model Law and the 
AGP.
d. Nationality of Suppliers
The Model Law specifically permits suppliers or contractors to participate in procurement 
proceedings without regard to nationality. However, an exception is permitted where the 
procuring entity decides on grounds specified in the procurement regulations, or according to 
other provisions of law, to limit participation in procurement proceedings on the basis of 
nationality. The AGP makes some form of discrimination possible unless parties are 
nationals of countries that have signed the AGP. In Japan, bi-lateral trade agreements 
accomplish the same result, but have effective been used to limit access to domestic 
markets. 
e. Form and Language of Communications and Documentation
The Model Law forbids rules which are discriminatory and propose (as an option) that 
notices be published in a language understood in global market. This is consistent with the 
spirit of the AGP. This language is typically English, and Japan in the last two years has 
been consistent with this requirement. But, it is only projects that fall within the purview of the 
AGP. The Japanese market must become competitive, so opening the civil works 
infrastructure construction market more broadly will accomplish the goals outlined above 
much sooner.
f. Procurement Records
The Model Law requires careful record keeping with respect to all procurement proceedings.  
This requirement is consistent with the AGP, but only with respect to those projects which 
fall under its purview. In the interests of transparency, all decisions on civil works 
infrastructure construction (unless there is a security or related reason that is known to all 
bidders) should be documented and appropriately available for public scrutiny. 
g. Reasons for Rejections of Bids or Tenders
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The Model Law permits the procuring entity to reject all tenders for no reason, but the AGP 
only permits rejection of all bidders or tenders, if such is in the public interest. In this area the 
Government has used the right to reject all tenders for no apparent reason as a means of 
effectively employing the Designated Competitive Bidding on civil works infrastructure 
construction and to obtain a bid for the price that the Government has determined the project 
is worth. Rejection of bids or tenders and the defining the allowed reasons therefore must be 
spelled out in the procedures and be consistent with a revised Construction Business Law. 
The reasons must be limited, recorded in the procurement records, and open for public 
scrutiny, thus lending transparency to the process.
h. Public notices and anti-corruption provisions
The Model Law requires public notice of procurement contract awards, which is consistent 
with the AGP. The Model Law also requires procuring entities to reject tenders where there 
are offers of inducements by suppliers or contractors. The MILT procedures on corruption 
discussed earlier, for example, need to be broadened to cover all Owner/Employers, 
including those under PPP or PFI regimes, and strengthened regarding the offering of 
inducements in the domestic civil works infrastructure construction market.
i. Methods of Procurement
The majority of domestic civil works infrastructure construction is subject to the rules for 
Designated Competitive Bidding, under which many of the abuses described earlier have 
occurred. Thus, Designated Competitive Bidding should be forbidden except where there are 
specifically described situations, such as, emergency construction, etc. The Model Law 
permits restricted tendering in two broad sets of circumstances. The first allowed exception 
is economy and efficiency where the goods, construction or services are available by reason 
of their highly complex or specialized nature only from a limited number of suppliers or 
contractors. Thus, the Designated Competitive Bidding should be limited carefully to such 
circumstances. The second is that the time and cost required to examine and evaluate a 
large number of tenders would be disproportionate to the value of time goods, construction 
or services to be procured, which should accommodate procurement for small civil works 
infrastructure construction, especially by local townships.
j. Submission of tenders
The Model Law recognizes that procuring entities may need to change the date for 
submission of tenders and permits them to do so where one or more suppliers or contractors 
may not be able to submit bids or tenders by the deadline owing to circumstances beyond 
their control. Under the Model Law is a blanket prohibition on the opening of bids or tenders 
received after the deadline. This latter provision is contrary to the provisions of the AGP 
which permit late receipt where this is not prejudicial to the process and where the lateness 
is outside the control of the bidder. The domestic procedures that govern civil works 
infrastructure construction are generally adequate, provided that the use of Designated 
Competitive Bidding is restricted.
k. Opening and Evaluation of Bids or Tenders
The Model Law addresses procedures in some detail. Bids or tenders must be opened at the 
time specified and all bidders are permitted to be present at the opening. The details of each 
tender that are requested in the solicitation must he announced at the opening. Once the bid 
or tender is open the procuring entity may seek clarifications of the tenders in order to assist 
in the examination evaluation and comparison of them, but no change in a matter of 
substance in the bid or tender may be sought, offered or permitted. A bid or tender is not 
regarded as responsive if it does not conform to all the requirements set out in the bid or 
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tender solicitation documents unless the non-conformity is minor and does not materially 
alter or depart from the requirements. A bid or tender which is not responsive may not he 
accepted. These procedures are consistent with the AGP. The broadening of these 
requirements for the domestic civil infrastructure construction market will require a change in 
the requirements of the form of contract allowed through changes in the Construction 
Business Law. 
l. Review and Appeal
The Model Law allows review where a supplier or contractor claims to have suffered or is 
likely to suffer loss or injury due to a breach by the procuring entity. Complaints must be
made first to the head of the procuring entity and must be submitted within a defined period 
of time. The head of the procuring entity is not required to consider a complaint after 
procurement contract has entered into force. If the complaint is not resolved by agreement 
the head of the procuring entity is required within 30 days to issue a written decision 
indicating his reasons and any corrective measures. If he does not issue a decision or the 
complainant is dissatisfied further remedies will be available. The Construction Business 
Law provides for such an administrative review body. But, it is subject to the types of 
transparency conflicts that were criticized above. The administrative review body should 
have a detailed brief, possibly limited to review of such bidding disputes, and not engage in 
any type of conciliation or mediation. Then the administrative review body is not subject to 
abuse, or the perception of abuse. All suppliers or contractors participating in the 
procurement proceedings are entitled to notice of the complaint and any such supplier or 
contractor has a right to participate in the review proceedings. Copies of decisions by the 
head of the procuring entity or the administrative body must be made available to other 
bidders and eventually to the public. Therefore, the use of Administrative Guidance must not 
be used for the domestic civil works infrastructure construction market.
3. Subcontracting
In Japan there are over 550 million licensed construction contractors and 99% of them are 
small and medium-sized firms consisting of unincorporated individual firms and incorporated 
firms with capital less than ¥100 Million. The issue of subcontracting becomes bound up with 
the licensing laws for contractors engaging in civil works infrastructure construction. There is 
a typical hierarchy of subcontractors. Almost all of the licensed contractors are labor only, 
with the contractor generally providing or renting necessary equipment. 9 The work is 
generally negotiated by the contractor with these labor-only subcontractors, after the 
contractor has tendered its bid and the Owner/Employer awarded the contract to it. The 
subcontract agreements are simple, often oral, and provide that the subcontractor undertake 
a specific part of the works with the general contractor responsible in all respects to the 
Owner/Employer. In the case of civil works infrastructure construction, the contractor is 
expected to control cost, quality, safety and the date of completion. Because of the 
Japanese tradition of ”tiered” subcontractors, the contractor’s importance to these dependent 
labor subcontractors is very large, and thus the Construction Business Law extensively 
prescribes responsibilities of contractor and subcontractors with respect payment to 
subcontractors.10 Similar to the global market, the contractor can chose what portion of the 
works it will subcontract, but the contractor is forbidden from subcontracting all of the works
to one or more subcontractors.11
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Nonetheless, the global practice of subcontracting by way of bidding before tender, having 
written subcontracts, etc. will come with foreign competition. The key element is to have 
written agreements with specialist subcontractors. While FIDIC does not provide much 
guidance, it follows that the Conditions of Subcontract should be “back-to-back” with the 
provisions of the 1999 FIDIC Red Book. In other words, the policy of the subcontract
Conditions of Subcontract should be, wherever practicable: 12
a. For the contractor to have, in relation to the subcontract works, the rights and 
obligations (except as to price) of the Owner/Employer.
b. For the subcontractor to have, in relation to the subcontractor works, the 
rights (except as to price) and obligations of the contractor.
Thus, to the extent the Construction Business Law makes a contractor responsible to the 
Owner/Employer, the Construction Business Law should require a subcontractor to be 
responsible to the contractor for its defined scope in the same manner as the contractor is to 
the Owner/Employer (except for price). Furthermore, under the 1999 FIDIC books the 
contractor is to inform the Owner/Employer (or the Engineer) within a prescribed time 
(normally 28 days of the subcontractor commencing work) of its intent to subcontract an 
identifiable scope, the particulars regarding such contractor, and the start date of such 
subcontractor. A comparable provision in the Construction Business Law should require all 
subcontractors to be used on civil works infrastructure construction projects to be identified, 
the scope of the works subcontracted to the specific subcontractor, and information that is 
required of foreign contractors. The issue of project management with contract 
administration between the contractors and subcontractors must be handled commensurate 
with such the change in the contracting philosophy of the Construction Business Law. At the 
very least, the subcontractors will of necessity have to adapt to remain competitive in the 
domestic market, because the role of “Big Brother” to the contractor will not be viable for civil 
works infrastructure construction. 
Specialty subcontractors from the global market who have the skill, equipment, expertise, 
and the labor will seek out market opportunities as the domestic market for civil works 
infrastructure construction is opened to meet Japan’s WTO commitments. The issue of the 
licensing of contractors and subcontractors is beyond the scope of these recommendations, 
but the need to address project management and contract administration skill competency is 
equally as important to subcontractors.
The 1999 FIDIC Red Book does provide for the use of nominated subcontractors, which is 
not recognized by the Construction Business Law. The practice is not endorsed by FIDIC, 
and the origins are asserted by ENAA to be the development of the nomination system in 
use in Europe and the United Kingdom. The traditional problems of the system “are those 
arising where a nominated subcontractor has stopped work because of its insolvency, or has 
repudiated the subcontract before completing the work, or is dismissed by the Contractor for 
incompetence.”13 Clause 5 of the 1999 FIDIC Red Book defines a nominated subcontractor
as one:
a. “who is stated in the contract as being a nominated subcontractor, or
b. when the Engineer, under clause 13 [Variations and Adjustments] instructs 
the contractor to employ as a subcontractor.”
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The contractor is under no obligation to use the nominated subcontractor, if he raises 
reasonable objection by notifying the Owner/Employer or the Engineer. The grounds to 
object are not specified, but the 1999 FIDIC Red Book gives a number of acceptable 
grounds: competence, lack of resources, lack of financial strength, etc. Also, the contractor 
is not required to accept the subcontract, if it is not “back to back” or does not indemnify the 
contractor for non-performance. There are specific payment provisions that are comparable 
to those regarding subcontractors in the Construction Business Law. In the 1999 FIDIC 
Silver Book a subcontractor may only be nominated by the Owner/Employer for Variations. 
The ENAA Model Forms which predated the 1999 FIDIC Books did address the matter of 
nominated subcontractors. ENAA requires in the Model Forms’ provisions regarding 
nominated subcontractors: 
a. A nominated subcontractor must be named by the Owner/Employer before 
entering into the contract, and the terms (including pricing) of the subcontract 
must be specified in the contract documents.
b. The “provisional sum” and “prime cost” concepts are not employed
c. Unless subcontract terms have been agreed before signing the prime 
contract, the contractor is entitled to refuse the subcontract with the 
nominated subcontractor. The contractor can also refuse to enter the 
requested subcontract if the nominated subcontractor declines to undertake 
the contractor’s obligations and liabilities (back to back contract terms) that 
the contractor has with the Owner/Employer; or if in the contractor’s opinion 
the nominated subcontractor is not competent and reliable.
d. In the event of the contractor’s refusal of the original nominated 
subcontractor, the Owner/Employer must name another nominated 
subcontractor, enter into a direct contract with the nominated subcontractor or 
require the contractor to proceed to subcontract the nominated subcontractor 
despite the contractor’s refusal. The third choice, however, entitles the 
contractor to amend its contract with the Owner/Employer, and if 
amendments are not agreed within 30 days of the contractor’s proposal of 
such amendments, then the third choice expires and the Owner/Employer 
must either accept one of the first two options or abandon the nomination 
process.
The net effect of these nominated subcontracting provisions is to give the contractor 
effective control over the process. If a nominated subcontractor is agreed to by the 
contractor, then the subcontract is fixed prior to signing the contract with the owner. The true 
effect of the ENAA Model Forms nomination provisions is to shift most of the risk of 
satisfactory performance by the nominated subcontractor to the Owner/Employer. One 
commentator at the time suggested that: 
“The net effect of these nomination provisions is to give the contractor effective 
control over the nomination process, and if a nominee is agreed, then to fix the 
subcontract relationship (including price and subcontract conditions) prior to signing 
the contract with the owner.”14
This same position is taken by the European International Contractors (EIC) as regards the 
1999 FIDIC Books. The EIC wants provisions similar to that of the ENAA, if nominated 
subcontractors are allowed.15 The practice of nominated subcontractors is not a practice 
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that is accepted universally in the global market. Japan should not change the Construction 
Business Law to allow its usage.  
4. Dispute Resolution
The 1999 FIDIC Red Book defines the process for dispute resolution, which provides in 
Clause 2016 and through the various sub-clauses there under, provides for a multi-step 
process that is conceptually the same as provided in the Construction Business Law. The 
FIDIC concept and that of the Construction Business Law, however, are decidedly different. 
In the FIDIC Red Book the traditional “two-tier” approach has been maintained for Dispute 
Resolution as was contained in the 1987 FIDIC Red Book, 4th edition, except that the role of 
the Engineer as a decider of disputes in the first instance has been replaced by a Dispute 
Adjudication Board (DAB). The 1999 FIDIC Red Book procedure for settlement of disputes 
by a DAB may be broken down into six steps:
a. The DAB procedure applies were there is a dispute between the Contractor 
and the Owner/Employer. The dispute must arise from a claim that has been 
decided and rejected by the Engineer. The Contractor is thus still pursuing the 
claim because the contractor does not agree with the Engineers decision.
For example, the Contractor claims that the Owner/Employer delayed 
Contractor because the Owner/Employer changed the conditions upon which 
the tender or bid was based, and having given timely notice, the contractor is 
claiming reimbursement of its additional costs, profit, and time extension. If 
the Engineer rejected this claim on the basis the scope defining documents 
had shown the intent to include the scope, and the Contractor disagreed, a 
dispute that could be referred to the DAB under Clause 20.
b. The Contractor refers such dispute to the DAB in writing for its decision under 
Sub-clause 20.5.
c. The DAB, which act as a panel of experts and not as arbitrators, must give a 
written decision of its decision to the parties within 84 days. 
d. If either party is dissatisfied with the DAB’s decision, then either the 
Owner/Employer or contractor must notify the other of its dissatisfaction within 
28 days or the decision becomes “final and binding”.
e. Where a party has been given a notice of dissatisfaction within the 28 days, 
both the Owner/Employer and the contractor have 56 days to attempt 
amicable settlement. 
f. Where the DAB’s decision neither becomes final and binding nor amicably 
settled, the dispute is finally settled by arbitration. There is a key difference 
between FIDIC and the Construction Business Law. The members of the DAB 
are final determiner of the “facts,” what is meant practically by the provisions of 
the contract requirements, what factually occurred, etc.
There is no perception of prejudice of any of the DAB members. And transparency is 
maintained because all of their decisions must be in writing. Arbitrations under the 1999 
FIDIC Books tend to become relatively narrow, because no dispute may go to arbitration 
unless it has been through the six steps. Accordingly, if the arbitrators embark on any other 
matters, without the parties’ consent, they will be exceeding their jurisdiction and any award 
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may be set aside, refused recognition and enforcement by a competent court. On civil works 
infrastructure construction projects there are typically a large number of disputes. In each
case, each dispute must have passed through the six-steps. As regards counterclaims, for 
example, it assumes that the Contractor has complied with the six steps and commenced 
arbitration. If the Owner/Employer wants to introduce counterclaims in the same arbitration, 
the Owner/Employer must follow this same procedure with respect to its counterclaims, 
unless it demonstrates that the counterclaim was effectively included in a dispute which had 
already been referred to the DAB for decision.
The purpose of the pre-arbitral DAB procedure is for both parties and, subsequently, any 
arbitration panel to have the benefit of a decision of the DAB on every dispute. A decision of 
the DAB may increase the chance of a settlement and avoid the need to arbitrate the 
dispute. That purpose is subverted if a party is relieved from complying with Clause 20 in 
respect of any dispute merely because the other party has done so with respect to another 
dispute. The test of whether a counterclaim raised by the Owner/Employer must be 
submitted to the DAB for decision should be whether the Contractor had previously 
requested the DAB to decide a dispute which necessarily would have resulted in a decision 
on that counterclaim. If the Contractor had made such a request, then the Owner/Employer 
will able to raise the counterclaim in the arbitration without having to make an independent 
referral of the matter to the DAB under Clause 20. On the other hand, if the Contractor had 
not done so, and the issue raised by the counterclaim had not been encompassed in an 
earlier dispute, then the Owner/Employer submits that issue to the DAB for decision before 
submitting it as a counterclaim in the arbitration. It can take 168 days from the time of 
referral of a dispute to the DAB under Clause 20 before a party can begin arbitration (84 
days for the DAB to make a decision, plus 28 days for the giving of a notice of 
dissatisfaction, plus 56 days for amicable settlement).
The FIDIC Red Book has always has always provided that the Engineer may be called as a 
witness and give evidence before the arbitrators. In the prior editions of the FIDIC Red Book 
the Engineer’s decisions were often the Employer’s first line of defense to the Contractor’s 
claims. Clause 20 in the 1999 FIDIC Red Book does not state expressly that the members of 
the DAB may be called as witnesses in the arbitration, because the primary role of the DAB 
is to decide disputes which are submitted to them and, unlike the Engineer, they would not 
normally have first-hand knowledge of the execution of the works. The earlier editions of the 
Red Book, which had provided that disputes had to be decided by the Engineer, had 
expressly provided that neither party was limited in any arbitration to the evidence or 
arguments put before the Engineer. Accordingly, the current provision is to the same effect 
now that a DAB is in place. The principle is that in arbitration, either party is entirely free to 
present new arguments or evidence in relation to disputes and is in no way limited by what it 
may have said previously. In arbitration, the parties will normally be represented by lawyers, 
which may not have been the case when submissions were made to the DAB. Accordingly, 
legal arguments or evidence which had not been presented to the DAB may be presented 
for the first time at the arbitration. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the arbitrators is 
limited to the disputes which have been previously referred to the DAB and been process
through the six-steps. Any decision of a DAB is admissible in arbitration. As a DAB will 
consist of construction professionals or lawyers who are independent of the parties and who 
have been chosen with their consent, its decisions are likely to be fairer than those of the 
Engineer under prior FIDIC Red Books.
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The contractor may not suspend or slow down work on the grounds that it has brought to 
arbitration and the Owner/Employer may not withhold payment from the contractor on such
grounds either. As a practical matter, it may be very difficult for either the Owner/Employer or 
the contractor to simultaneously execute the works and engage in arbitration. Arbitration 
demands attention from management and staff. For this reason, both parties tend to wait 
until after completion of the works before beginning arbitration. But, they still will have to 
meet the notification timing and six steps timing requirements.
The DAB is similar in nature to the Dispute Resolution Board (DRB) which originated in the 
United States in the late 1970’s. Generally, three independent and qualified individuals meet 
regularly on site during project execution and make recommendations in relation to any 
disputes as these arise. Through the 1990’s the use of DRB’s were specified for large civil 
works infrastructure construction projects in the global market, and DRBs enjoyed 
considerable success in resolving and avoiding major disputes without the need to seek 
recourse to arbitration or litigation with the consequent expenses.17 The problem with a DRB 
was that their decisions were not binding, despite the fact that their decision could be used 
by either party in any subsequent arbitration. Dissatisfied parties could just ignore the DRB’s 
decision and their decisions became just another tier of the decision making in the dispute 
resolving process that was not binding and enforceable. As the 1999 FIDIC Red Book has 
been used increasingly on civil works infrastructure construction in the global market, the 
DAB is replacing the prior voluntary use of DRB’s.18 The FIDIC Contracts Guide (FIDIC 
Guide),19 covering the 1999 FIDIC Books, notes in regards to the 1999 FIFIC Red Book that 
it is preferable that the DAB visit site on a regular basis, even if there is, at that time, no 
dispute. Under this approach the members of the DAB would be in a relatively informed 
position to assist and prevent major disputes arising. The perception and the belief of the 
parties of the independence of the DAB is thus crucial to its success.
The overall requirements may appear to be burdensome. Through sound project 
management that uses contract administration both parties are expected to engage in 
protecting their own interests – the bargain that each reached. Thus, the dispute resolution 
under the 1999 FIDIC Red Book embodies a philosophy of “mutual mistrust” that forces both 
parties to develop project management practices and contract administration processes that 
reflect global best practices.
In contrast to a DAB or a DRB, the current practice in Japan relative to disputes, the parties 
to a contract, except those subject to the Construction Business Law may elect one of the 
following methods of resolving disputes:
 Mediation/conciliation by an independent third party appointed by the contracting 
parties’ agreement, which conclusion does not bind the disputing parties unless 
accepted by both of them, but such accepted conclusion is not enforceable like a 
court judgment.
 Civil conciliation at the Court under the “Civil Conciliation Act,”20 whereby the 
court conciliator’s proposed settlement, if accepted by the disputing parties, 
becomes final, binding and enforceable.
 Arbitration under the Arbitration Law, revised in 2003,21 and the Code of Civil 
Procedure which provides that an arbitral award becomes final and binding, and 
is enforceable.
 Litigation under the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that all final 
judgments are binding and enforceable.
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 Amicable Settlement or compromise outside of the Court which is settlement that 
reflects the practice wherein the parties reach a new agreement, which is 
becomes binding, but not enforceable, per se, under the original agreement.
The latter is the only dispute resolution method that does not involve an independent, third 
party to make judgments. Generally, this is consistent with global practice. With respect to 
civil works infrastructure construction industry, however, contracts are governed by the 
Construction Business Law, and the Owner/Employer is the Government. In virtually all 
cases of civil works infrastructure construction, the Adjudication Committee as established 
by the Construction Business Law engages in dispute resolution. The Construction Business 
Act stipulates three methods of construction dispute resolution.  Mediation is defined as a 
system whereby a member of the Adjudication Committee appointed by its Chairman gives 
the relevant parties an opportunity to amicably settle construction disputes by means of 
negotiation. 22 Conciliation is defined as a system whereby construction disputes are 
mediated by three members of the Adjudication Committee appointed by its Chairman to 
settle the disputes. The Adjudication Committee may prepare a conciliation plan and 
recommend the same to the disputing parties for acceptance.23 In such conciliation process, 
if the Adjudication Committee deems it necessary, a hearing will be held. 24 Yet, the 
Adjudication Committee is composed of the same personnel who are called upon to 
undertake the final step, arbitration.
The Construction Business Law, Article 25-16 (4), provides that the arbitration proceedings 
of the Adjudication Committee take place in accordance with the Arbitration Law,
supplemented by the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise provided in the Construction 
Business Law. The dispute resolution process is dependent on the “mutual trust” that flows 
from the unique contract that is required by the Construction Business Law. In reality the 
vast majority of cases any disputes are settled by conciliation undertaken by the Adjudication 
Committee under the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works, if and when the 
contractors use such provisions. As noted above, in reality civil works infrastructure 
construction projects, the Owner/Employer (the Government) settles most disputes 
unilaterally in a non-open forum by means that are not written and are contrary to the 
methods that are used in the global market. There has been no reported case for such 
mediation/conciliation or arbitration by the Adjudication Committees under the Construction 
Business Law. With the necessary change to the Construction Business Law recommended, 
the methods of dispute resolution should be changed to mirror what the global market 
requires, and generally is in line with the rest of the laws. 
Even the ENAA Forms provide in Clauses 6.1 and 6.2 for a two tiered process similar the 
prior editions of the FIDIC Red Book. First, a decision must be made by the “Expert” who is 
named in the agreement, may be appointed by the parties’ agreeing, or appointed under the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) Rules for Expert Determination. Under the ICC 
Rules, the Expert determination is a mandatory step prior to the second step. 
Although no binding effect is given to such Expert decision, even during a provisional period 
until the arbitration award is rendered pursuant to the second step. The second step, should 
a party or both parties be dissatisfied with the Expert’s decision, is binding arbitration in 
accordance with the ICC Arbitration Rules. The ENAA Forms, however, were written before 
the FIDIC rainbow series. Nonetheless, it demonstrates recognition of the importance of 
using independent third parties for dispute resolution when the market has parties that are 
accustomed to the global market.25
The changes that the 1999 FIDIC Books make to the dispute resolution process are nearly 
identical to those that the World Bank requires be made the FIDIC Red Book, 4th edition, in 
its SBDW (Standard Bidding Document for Works) Procedures, and specifically in the 
associated Conditions of Particular Application (COPA). But unlike the World Bank which 
requires borrowers (Owner/Employers) to consider whether the provisions should be 
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included in the contract documents, the provisions in the 1999 FIDIC Books apply by default 
in the contract documents unless altered or removed through the Particular Conditions of 
Contract.26 The major similarities between clause 67 (Dispute Resolution) in the required 
World Bank revisions to the FIDIC Red Book, 4th edition, and clause 20 in the 1999 FIDIC 
Red Book are that:
 The DAB procedure applies to all disputes under the contract.
 Where there are to be three members of the DAB (which is compulsory under 
clause 67 of the COPA), one member is selected by the contractor, one by 
the employer and these two members select the third member (who acts as 
chair).
 Either party may submit the DAB’s decision to arbitration if dissatisfied.
 The DAB is established at the start of a civil works infrastructure construction 
project and therefore available at short notice throughout the project 
execution to rule on matters.
 If neither party gives notice of dissatisfaction with set timeframes (56 days 
under the COPA, 28 days under the 1999 FIDIC Red Book), the DAB’s 
decision is “final and binding” upon both parties. However, 1999 FIDIC Red 
Book requires both parties to promptly give effect to the decision “unless and 
until it shall be revised in an amicable settlement or an arbitral award”, the 
SBDW provides that the DAB’s recommendation becomes final and binding 
on the Owner/Employer and contractor, if no notice of intention to commence 
arbitration has been given.
With respect to PPP or PFI contracts for civil works infrastructure construction projects, the 
DAB is identical in concept, but it is an optional step in the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book and the 
1999 FIDIC Yellow book. The World Bank is considering adopting the 1999 FIDIC Silver 
Book for PPP or PFI type projects.27 It’s use is relevant where financiers are involved and 
require certainty of outcomes. The World Bank is considering reservations expressed by the 
European International Contractors association 28 and the ORGALIME federation. 29
Nonetheless, the composition of the DAB is crucial, and the as the FIDIC Guide asserts, the 
success of the dispute resolution procedure depends on the parties’ confidence in the 
individuals who will serve on the DAB. However, in the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book suggests that 
the DAB is only appointed after a party gives its notice of intention to refer a dispute to the 
DAB and the DAB will expire after it gives its decision on the dispute.30 Thus, contractors of
civil works infrastructure construction in the global market usually seek to amend the 1999 
FIDIC Silver Book so that a DAB is set up at the outset for the duration of the project, despite 
the extra cost this may cause. The contractors assert the DAB appointment only after the 
dispute has occurred seems completely to detract from the DAB’s original purpose. As 
regards the use in Japan of the PPP or PFI execution method, the Construction Business 
Law changes should incorporate the contract forms used and not rely on the totally separate 
Project Finance Initiative Act, Law No. 117, enacted in 1999 to create an exception to the 
Construction Business Law.
5. The Role of the Engineer
Typically in the global market there is an Engineer employed by the Owner/Employer for the 
design civil works infrastructure projects and to also act as the Owner/Employer’s agent 
during the execution of civil works infrastructure construction. As regards the Engineer’s role 
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in civil works infrastructure construction, in the prior FIDIC Red Book, 4th edition, the
Engineer was required to act as the Owner/Employer’s agent during execution of the 
contract for the works. The Engineer was also adjudicator of the disputes between the 
Owner/Employer and the contractor. The Engineers decision was binding on the parties 
unless a party sought arbitration, then the Engineers decision prevailed until a final and 
binding decision is awarded by the arbitration panel. When the Engineer acted for the 
Owner/Employer, it was obligated to act impartially. In the 1999 FIDIC Red Book such 
impartiality is not required of the Engineer. The 1999 FIDIC Red Book actuality assumes de 
facto that the Engineer is a biased agent. The Engineers decision is still required, but where 
the Engineer is required to obtain the approval of the Employer before issuing an instruction, 
the requirement must be stated in the Particular Conditions of Contract, thus acknowledging 
the presumed bias.31 In the absence of such acknowledgement, where the Engineer issues 
an instruction without first obtaining the Owner/Employer’s approval, the Owner/Employer is 
still deemed to have given its approval, except as to the changing the contract.32 The 
Contractor thus is relieved of a need to establish any limitations on the Engineer’s powers. 
The Owner/Employer must insert affirmatively, however, language that the Engineer will 
render opinions “fairly” and pursuant to the contract, in lieu of “impartially,” in situations such 
as the where the World Bank the requires use of its SBDW (Standard Bidding Documents for 
Works). Even so, this is still implicit recognition of the Engineer’s bias. 33 As one 
commentator said of the requirement:
“The FIDIC engineer is not a perfect role, and the people who fill the role are not 
always perfect people, but the system has a success rate which far exceeds its 
failure rate—and when we are faced with failure, we always have our friends the 
lawyers to fall back on.”34
The ENAA Forms, however, do not define a role for an Engineer. The Owner/Employer 
names a representative to act on the Owner/Employer’s behalf, but in that role the 
representative receives all notices, instructions, information and other communications to be 
given by the contractor to the employer.35 The 1999 FIDIC Silver Book uses the format of an 
Owner/Employer’s representative in lieu of an Engineer as well. The Owner/Employer 
ultimately assumes the obligation of making a decision, but he first is required to consult with 
the contractor. If the contractor is dissatisfied with the decision, the six steps leading to a 
DAB decision outlined above become operative, except that the DAB is constituted for that 
dispute, unless the parties agree otherwise. 
The common element in the global market is that decisions are ultimately made by a
perceived independent third party, if the parties do not agree. There is not such a party for 
civil works infrastructure construction projects in Japan, as indicated earlier. The 
Owner/Employer of civil works infrastructure projects in Japan has been the Government. In 
1959, the Ministry of Construction (today the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport) 
issued a Circular entitled “Methods of Contracting for the Design of Civil Engineering Works,”
which issued instructions regarding the both design consulting and construction consulting. 
The circular established the principle of separation of civil works infrastructure design from 
its construction execution.36 The Government has historically planned and designed civil 
works infrastructure projects and fulfills the agent’s role during their construction. The 
Government was responsible for the design adequacy of civil works infrastructure 
construction projects, and the contractor provided engineers who execute the projects 
accordingly. The Construction Business Law, indicated above, must be changed regarding 
civil works infrastructure construction projects. Such a change will have the corollary benefits 
of fostering a Japanese consulting engineering industry similar to what is found in the global 
market place, provided that Japanese engineers are trained in contract administration and a 
full scope of project management, such as, discussed earlier. 
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A further role is required where a PPP or PFI approach is used. There must be an 
independent party to which the Owner/Employer, the Concessionaire, Engineer, and the 
Contractor can have requirements and their fulfillment judged. The 1999 FIDIC Silver Book 
does not address this issue because of its lack of an Engineer that the 1999 FIDIC Red 
Book recognizes. For example, in the case of the Partnership Victoria process used in 
Melbourne, Australia, discussed above, PPP concession agreements contain a mechanism 
under which the government entity and the concession company appoint an independent 
technical adviser (with names, such as, independent verifier, independent certifier, etc.) to 
monitor the project on behalf of the government, and to carry out valuation and certification 
roles (including for extensions of time, variations, and the like).37 The decisions of these 
independent technical advisers are agreed to be final and binding with limited dispute rights
by any party. Therefore, the contract requires the Owner/Employer, the concessionaire and 
the engineer/contractor to agree to adhere to the decisions of the independent technical 
advisers. This actually is more than the role of a DAB under the FIDIC Books, in that there 
independent role only comes into play when the parties have a dispute. Here, the 
independent technical advisor determines all parties’ compliance generally with the “benefits 
of the bargain” and any impact by a party’s claimed infringement of that bargain. 
If Japan is to allow its civil works infrastructure construction industry to adapt to a market 
with foreign competitors, the Construction Business Law must address the issue of the role 
of an Engineer that is consistent with a global market contract. Currently, Japan is generally 
inconsistent in concept and dissimilar with in that the role of the engineer and the contracting 
philosophy. Since the Government is no longer able to afford the luxury of funding 
approximately 99% of civil works infrastructure projects as in the past, the ultimate 
responsibility and obligations for design and superintendence of civil works infrastructure 
construction must be made compatible with practices in the global market. The Standard 
Form of Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Civil Engineering Services for 
Public Works, also issued by the MILT 1995, must be addressed in a manner that is 
consistent with the recommended changes to the Construction Business Law, the Contract 
and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works that flow form the Law. 
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B. Change is Necessary in the Standards Conditions of Contract for Public Works
The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works must be changed to allow for the 
absorption of the concepts of the global market into the domestic civil works infrastructure 
construction market as it is opened to foreign competition pursunt to the WTO. But what is 
the real meaning of globalization for the domestic civil works infrastructure industry? As 
discussed earlier, globalization for the domestic civil works infrastructure industry means to 
accept “mutual mistrust” as the the basic philosophy of project execution. From such 
changes the resulting system demands will mean that engineers will have to change and be 
trained in the procedures of executing civil works infrastructure construction industry with 
project management and contract administration that meets global standards. Through 
contract administration, the terms to which every stakeholder in the industry are established 
when they are defining the “bargain” for which they bid or tender, and then are the “rules” by 
which execution is judged, evaluated, and monitored. In order for the industry to gain 
experience to enable it to compete domestically with parties from the global market, and to 
successfully become a major competitive factor in the global market. To be practical and 
effective Japan must either adopt a form similar to the FIDIC forms for civil works 
infrastructure construction, or adopt clauses that are comparable. While Japan could adopt 
FIDIC, there is a much that is comparable in the current Standard Conditions of Contract for 
Public Works provided that the form of Contract used for civil works infrastructure 
construction is changed as recommended. Thus, the discussion that follows is with respect 
to several major provisions of such Standard Conditions of Contract in concept. Other 
clauses will be acceptable by changing the manner in which some clauses are interpreted in 
light of a revised or new Construction Business Law. The suggested changes must of 
necessity be viewed with the suggested changes to the Construction Business Law which 
the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works is the means of implementing the 
change that will foster both development of project management and contract administration 
skills. The domestic Conditions of Contract for Public Works must reflect what the parties will 
need to record, maintain, and monitor, because it will train both Owner/Employer and 
contractor personnel to adequately compete with foreign competition and function in the 
global market. Therefore, the recommendation is to meet the 1999 FIDIC Books terms of 
concept. As regards specific wording of the requirements, it is not necessary to use the 
exact FIDIC language, but wording should not deviate extensively, because that will again 
make Japan’s civil works infrastructure construction industry unfamiliar with the global 
market.
1. Contract Price and Payment
Inherent in the 1999 FIDIC Books is the concept that details of the tendered or bid price are 
provided to the Owner/Employer, as requested, and incorporated into the contract on civil 
works infrastructure construction projects.38 The provisions are somewhat different for each 
of the 1999 FIDIC Books, but in general reflect this philosophy. This requirement includes 
providing detail relative to the Quantity Survey (or Bills of Material) and any Provisional 
Sums that the contractor must include in the arriving at the lump sum it is tendering or 
bidding. In the case of the Quantity Surveys required under the 1999 FIDIC Red Book, if the 
final measurement of a specific quantity is between 90% and 110% of that specified, then 
the Owner/Employer will pay the tendered unit price times the actual quantity. If the quantity 
falls outside this range, and the parties cannot agree, then the dispute resolution procedure 
is followed to determine actual quantities and the pricing.39 This situation is good example of 
the importance of the contract administration that is required the part of both parties. The 
project management teams of both the Owner/Employer and the contractor are required to 
monitor the conditions under which the one party specified what was desired and the other 
offered in its tender or bid. The party that documents and gives timely notice will be in the 
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best position to establish what is different than what it had assumed and the basis of the 
assumptions, the reasonableness of the assumptions, and the required performance. All the 
project management teams are then expected to monitor whether the work was included or 
not included within the intent of the items that are the subject of the difference.  
The contrast of what is required by the 1999 FIDIC Books and what is required in a tender 
under by the Japanese Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works is stark. See, for 
example, the prior discussion on bidding procedures. Under FIDIC, the global market for civil 
works infrastructure construction projects expects to produce careful recordation of 
assumptions, monitoring, and proof.    
Assuming that PPP or PFI approaches to funding civil works infrastructure construction 
projects, the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book, for example, highlights the careful recordation of what 
was assumed in tendering for a civil works infrastructure construction project. The contract 
price is defined as: 
“…the agreed amount stated in the Contract Agreement for the design, execution 
and completion of the Works and the remedying of any defects, and includes 
adjustments (if any) in accordance with the Contract…The Contractor shall be 
deemed to have satisfied himself as to the correctness and sufficiency of the 
Contract Price…Unless otherwise stated in the Contract, the Contract Price covers 
all the Contractor’s obligations under the Contract (including those under Provisional 
Sums, if any) and all things necessary for the proper design, execution and 
completion of the ‘Works and the remedying of any defects.”40
The Contractor is deemed to have satisfied itself as to the correctness and sufficiency of its 
tendered or bid price. The 1999 FIDIC Silver Book still contains numerous exceptions, 
however, to its obligations that allow the contractor to request an increase in the contract 
price. For example, circumstances that go the assumptions that were made in the lump sum 
tender or bid include:41
a. Costs to the contractor caused by the Owner/Employer’s failure to give the 
contractor access to or possession of the site within the time stated in the 
Particular Conditions.
b. Unforeseeable work accommodations to Owner/Employer’s personnel or 
public authorities causing the contractor to incur additional cost.
c. Costs caused by the Owner/Employer’s instructions to the contractor 
regarding archaeological remains discovered on the site.
d. Changes in the host country’s technical standards and regulations for which 
the contractor’s compliance causes additional costs.
e. Additional costs caused by the Owner/Employer’s instructions to vary the 
location or details of any tests or to perform additional tests.
f. Additional costs caused by the contractor’s compliance with the 
Owner/Employer’s instruction to suspend work to the extent the suspension 
was not due to the contractor’s fault.
g. Additional costs caused by the Owner/Employer’s interference with the tests 
on completion.
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h. Additional costs of tests required after the correction of any defect or damage 
to the works to the extent the defect or damage was not attributable to the 
contractor.
i. Additional costs incurred by the contractor when instructed by the 
Owner/Employer to search for a defect in the works not attributable to the 
contractor.
j. Additional costs to the contractor caused by any unreasonable delay by the 
Owner/Employer to the tests after completion.
k. Additional costs as a result of any unreasonable delay by the 
Owner/Employer in permitting access to the works or plant by the contractor, 
either to investigate the causes of a failure to pass a test after completion or 
to carry out any adjustments or modifications.
l. Additional costs caused by a change in the laws of the host country.
m. Price adjustments for increases or decreases in the cost of labor, goods and 
other inputs to the works, if so provided in the Particular Conditions.
n. Financing charges for delayed payments.
o. Additional costs resulting from the contractor’s suspension of work for the 
Owner/Employer’s failure to provide evidence of its ability to pay or non-
payment.
p. Costs of termination by the Owner/Employer for its convenience, that is, 
without fault.
q. Cost to the contractor of rectifying any loss or damage due to an 
Owner/Employer’s risk event.
r. Payment by the contractor of insurance premiums for which the 
Owner/Employer is responsible and the amount of any insurance payment 
that would have been received upon the occurrence of an insurable event 
absent Owner/Employer failure to maintain insurance.
s. Costs resulting from the occurrence of a Force Majeure event (see the 
discussion below).
t. Costs incurred in connection with termination of the contract after a Force 
Majeure event.
u. Costs incurred in connection with termination of the contract due to the 
occurrence of an event making it impossible or unlawful for either party to be 
released from further performance.
v. Variations (see discussion below).
Each of these items has various assumptions of what the Owner/Employer or the contractor 
must define in establishing the bargain that each expects. The contractor thus will seek 
payment that results from an alleged change with which the Owner/Employer will agree or 
disagree. In general, the risk of an increase in construction costs will be borne by the 
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contractor on the theory that the contractor is best placed to control this risk by virtue of 
having considered all available information that would affect its tender and having provided 
an appropriate contract price in consideration of all labor and materials necessary for the 
design and execution of the works. Consequently, the contractor will generally be unable to 
seek a price increase in the event of changes in the cost of labor or materials unless the 
assumptions that it reasonably assumed and recorded were different in each of the above 
situations.
Correspondingly, in the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book the contractor is exposed to the 
Owner/Employer where the conditions of execution that it assumes were different. For 
example, the contractor may incur additional financial liability beyond the contract price in 
the following circumstances:
a. Changes in applicable country standards which might reduce the cost to the 
contractor and be subject to a claim for price reduction by the 
Owner/Employer.
b. Additional costs incurred by the Owner/Employer from the rejection and 
retesting of part of the works.
c. Additional costs incurred by the Owner/Employer for performing remedial 
work for which the contractor is responsible.
d. Additional costs incurred by the Owner/Employer employer relating to any 
revised programme or schedule necessary to ensure an appropriate rate of 
progress in the completion of the works.
e. Liquidated damages payable by the contractor to the Owner/Employer for 
each day after the time for completion until the issuance of the Taking-over 
certificate.
f. Additional costs paid by the Owner/Employer for carrying out the tests on 
completion upon the contractor’s failure to do so within the time allotted.
g. A reduction in contract price due to failure of the works to pass test or 
performance tests on upon completion (see discussion below).
h. Cost incurred by the Owner/Employer of remedying any defects (see 
discussion below).
i. Decrease of cost resulting from a change in the laws of the host country.
j. Adjustment of contract price for a decrease in the cost of labor, goods or other 
inputs to the works, if provided in the Particular Conditions.
k. Retention money held by the Owner/Employer for work not in accordance with 
the contract or other failure of the contractor to perform.
l. Costs incurred by the employer related to any termination for the contractor 
for fault.
m. Cost of any loss or damage to the works for which the contractor is 
responsible.
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n. Payment by the Owner/Employer of insurance premiums for which the 
contractor is responsible and the amount of any insurance payment that 
would have been received upon the occurrence of an insurable event absent 
the contractor’s failure to maintain insurance.
Likewise, the Owner/Employer will generally be unable to seek recovery of costs from the 
contractor, for example, unless it can establish a causal connection to a failure of the 
contractor, and the costs incurred were reasonable. These examples require the recordation 
and monitoring. Currently, the Owner/Employer (the Government) is not requiring such 
information be maintained, or even providing the means for doing so, through the 
Construction Business Law and the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works.  
All of the 1999 FIDIC Books have provisions with respect to advance payment and monthly 
progress payments by the Owner/Employer to the contractor. The 1999 FIDIC Red Book and 
the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book differ regarding terms of monthly invoices. The 1999 FIDIC Red 
Book requires submission to the Engineer first and the Engineer passes it on to the 
Owner/Employer. Under the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book monthly invoices go directly to the 
Owner/Employer.
In Japan regarding the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry, little 
significance is placed on written records, as discussed earlier. Rather, the domestic 
Japanese civil works infrastructure construction market is founded on dependent 
relationships; contractor with the Owner/Employer, contractor with subcontractors, etc.42 The 
Owner/Employer (the Government) for civil works infrastructure construction makes an 
advance payment and installment payments to enable a contractor to procure materials, hire 
labor and establish an operating fund.43 While it is common for contractors to be paid each 
month for the performance of the previous month, the problems with such a system and the 
differences form the global market were presented earlier. With the change in the contract
allowed by the Construction Business Law, a change in what the contract requires is 
necessary as suggested earlier with respect to contract price and the breakdown that may 
be required. The real difference between Japan and the global market is with respect to 
Variations. With respect to payment, there is little difference from what the global market 
expects. 
2. Variations
Almost every construction contract for civil works infrastructure construction used globally
has a variation clause which allows the employer to order variations at his convenience. The 
1999 FIDIC Books, clause 13, Variations and Adjustments, allows the Owner/Employer to 
order a variation at any time before the works is taken over by the Owner/Employer and is 
reasonably consistent with the design of the works. The contractor may offer “value 
engineering” changes, if acceptable, to the Owner/Employer. Also, the ENAA Forms, clause 
39, provides similarly conditions. In case of extra work on Japanese civil works infrastructure 
construction projects, the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works reflects a 
contract that establishes the dominant position of the Owner/Employer (the Government) 
and the practices that it engenders. The contractor is reimbursed after it has executed such 
extra work, because of a “work first and pay later” philosophy that the Government has 
demanded and continues to enforce. The contractor is thus placed in a relatively unfavorable 
cash-flow position. The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works require Bills of 
Quantities to be submitted and approved in situations “when…a large number of uncertain 
factors, etc.” exist, but they are not “binding” on the either party. 44 Furthermore, the 
Japanese Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works, what is required is monitoring 
the after-the-fact cost consequences and then making an appeal the Owner/Employer who 
makes a unilateral determination in the case of disagreement.45 This unilateral practice is 
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unique to the Japan and not accepted in the global market. The practice only can be 
sustained because of the contract conditions allowed by the Construction Business Law. 
With the recommended change in the contract suggested earlier, minor adjustment in the 
unchanged provisions of the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works would be 
necessary with respect to when and how changes are handled, whether instigated by 
Owner/Employer or the contractor, such as, the manner in which a change is submitted and 
evaluated. Either the approach reflected in the 1999 FIDIC Books or the approach of the 
ENAA Forms would be acceptable as they are virtually identical.
Variations by their nature affect the scope, quality, time of performance, or cost, or a 
combination of any of them. Global best practices in project management and contract 
administration, as illustrated earlier, are driven by assuring a party achieves the benefits of 
the bargain that it entered into but for the variations, changes, or other interferences that the 
other party caused. The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works therefore must 
specify the timing parameter for notices and resulting actions on the part of the 
Owner/Employer, the contractor, and the Engineer (assuming that Japan establishes its
engineers in a role similar to the global market). Therefore, Japan must pay careful attention 
to all the timing requirements required, which should be reflective of those found in the 
global market. 
When a PPP or PFI approach is used, there are additional considerations that are 
recommended be incorporated in the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. The 
1999 FIDIC Silver Book addresses most risks and requirements of the contract for a civil 
works infrastructure project. The Owner/Employer, however, does continue to bear some 
risks under terms of the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book which may not satisfy the lenders.46 The 
lenders may wish to see additional financing for cost overruns, for example. The financing of 
the Owner/Employer must take into consideration potential cost overruns from Variations. 
This result can he done either through increasing the amount of financing by an amount to 
account for a reasonable contingency (e.g. 5%—10%) or by providing for a stand-by line of 
credit, with or without a cap, generally from the sponsors of the civil works infrastructure 
project if it is different than the Owner/Employer. This stand-by credit can also be provided 
by the contractor (in the form of an additional completion guarantee), although this will 
generally not occur unless the contractor is also one of the civil works infrastructure 
construction sponsors.
The Conditions of Contract should also deal with the situation where lenders may also want 
to implement step-in/step-out rights, which allow the lenders to step into the contract and 
take the place of the Owner/Employer under certain circumstances. Such Conditions of 
Contract give the lenders the right to step in to the contractor’s obligations under the 
contract, but do not require them to do so. The lenders will also be allowed to step out of the 
contract where they have stepped in, but no longer want to maintain the obligations they 
have assumed. The Conditions of Contract typically provide that the lenders will give a 
notice, after which the contractor’s termination tights are suspended. The lenders will then 
appoint an additional party that is bound to satisfy the project company’s obligations under 
the contract until completion. The contractor will then be bound to this additional party for the 
period of its presence as the step-in entity.
3. Time of Performance and Project Delay
In the global market, as discussed earlier, the Owner/Employer’s (or the Engineer’s) project 
management personnel and the contractor’s project management personnel are expected to 
utilize the schedule or programme submitted by the contractor. Thus, the 1999 FIDIC Books 
all require essentially the same data. In the global market, project management teams for 
both parties to civil works infrastructure construction projects employ the management of 
time to record the assumptions that define the bargain. In then monitoring the schedule or 
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programme regularly, variances from plan can be identified, alternative means for achieving 
what constituted the bargain can be planned, forced divergences caused by the other party 
can be measured, and required notices can be given. The 1999 FIDIC Books require the 
parties’ project management teams to use the schedule or programme proactively. There 
are specific requirements to monitor progress, measure performance, etc.47 For instance, the 
1999 FIDIC Books requires the parties to accomplish activities such as:
a. The Owner/Employer (or its Engineer) evaluating the contractor’s schedule or 
programme submitted to assure that it meets all the contract requirements, 
including the Owner/Employer’s (of its Engineer’s deliverables or reviews), 
and that the contractor has a plan that accomplishes project. Thus, for 
example, the 1999 FIDIC Red Book requires various tests that must be 
undertaken.
b. The contractor submitting a schedule that corrects the deficiencies that the 
Owner/Employer (or its Engineer) found in the contractors schedule or 
programme. 
c. The contractor submitting a schedule or programme that details all expected 
deliverables or reviews required of the Owner/Employer.
d. The submittal by the contractor on a periodically as set forth the Particular 
Conditions of Contract schedule or programme status, indicating, for example, 
such events or circumstances that may or are delaying the works.
e. The Owner/Employer (or its Engineer) reviewing the submitted periodic 
schedule data to assure the progress is meeting plan, etc.
f. The contractor submits when required current and future events or 
circumstances which may impact progress according to the approved plan.    
Then, the 1999 FIDIC Books allow the parties to seek time extensions to the project 
completion date, if they are warranted. Generally, the 1999 FIDIC Red Book generally allows 
extensions to the civil works infrastructure construction project time for causes, such as:
a. Variations, for example, where quantities required in execution, or the quality, 
etc. are changed.
b. Delay by the Owner/Employer or the Engineer under the following clauses:
1.9.1 Delayed Drawings or Instructions
2.1 Right of Access to the Site
4.7 Setting Out
4.12 Unforeseeable Physical Conditions
4.24 Fossils
7.4 Testing
8.9 Consequences of Suspension
10.2 Taking Over Parts of the Works
10.3 Interference with Tests on Completion
11.8 Search for a Contractor to Remedy Defect (Not Responsibility 
of the Contractor)  
12.3 Evaluations Related to Measurement and Rates
12.4 Omissions
13.2 Value Engineering
13.7 Changes in Legislation
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16.1 Suspension of Work]
17.4 Consequences of Employer’s Risks
c. Productivity issues, etc.
d. Acceleration order by the Owner/Employer (or its Engineer), provided the 
contractor was not the cause.
e. Force Majeure events (see the discussion below)
But, the requirements are significant and to meet them is difficult if the contract 
administration is has not been used through out the execution of the civil works infrastructure 
construction project, as the examples earlier attest. Where the Owner/Employer or the 
Engineer order acceleration, for example, because the contractor is not making the 
progress, the Owner/Employer’s or the Engineer’s contract administration will have to prove 
that contractor was the cause of the delay, not itself. Where a party believes it is entitled to 
an extension of time or the must maintain the time for completion, the other party can 
recover cost impacts, but the proofs are extensive. Also as indicated earlier, the result is that 
project management personnel from both the Owner/Employer and the contractor become 
exceedingly skilled in the contract administration that is necessary in the global market for 
civil works infrastructure construction projects. 
The ENAA Model Forms do not require as extensive a scheduling or programming 
requirement as the 1999 FIDIC Books. The ENAA Model Forms, however, address typical 
problems found with industrial plant construction projects that may be found also with certain 
types of civil works infrastructure construction projects, namely performance, and partial 
taking over. ENAA suggests, for instance, various ways in which the partial taking over or 
completion is to be accomplished.48
In contrast, under the Construction Business Law and the Standard Conditions of Contract 
for Public Works, “the Japanese are not used to increases in budget, they’re not used to 
extensions of schedules or programmes, and they’re not used to people saying what they
mean.”49 Once a Japanese contractor has committed itself to the completion date for a civil 
works infrastructure construction project, the Owner/Employer expects the contractor to 
achieve it. If for any reason those committed objectives seem threatened the contractor is 
unlikely to raise this with the client. The Owner/Employer expects that contractor’s problems 
in completing the project are to be resolved by the contractor. Under the contract of 
dominance provided by the Construction Business Law, if the contractor’s problems are 
caused by the Owner/Employer (the Government), it is to be resolved by an agreement 
reached with respect thereto, but it is resolved because the Government makes a unilateral 
decision thereto. The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works require a schedule 
or programme to be submitted, but it is not binding on either party. Owner/Employer and 
contractor personnel thus have no need to engage the contract administration or project 
management practices related to a schedule or programme as a result. The contractors are 
focused only on the completion in a timely manner, and must incur the costs first.
The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works do have provisions for Liquidated 
Damages payable to the Owner/Employer for failure of a contractor to meet the completion 
date, as do the 1999 FIDIC Books. The differences concern the level on the limitation on the 
amount Liquidated Damages that can be charged. The ENAA has a controversial provision 
that combines all liabilities with a provision that limits them to 50% of the contract amount. 
Limitation will be discussed under Defect Liability below. Thus, no changes are 
recommended.
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Under the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book the contractor bears the risk of delays in completion. This 
allocation of risk is based on the principle that the contractor will best be able to regulate the 
timing of the construction work to satisfy its schedule or programme and meet the contract 
completion date. In essence, this principle is followed for civil works infrastructure 
construction in Japan. The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works require little 
adjustment once the form of contract for civil works infrastructure construction to be financed 
or executed pursuant to PPP or PFI methods is harmonized with that used in the global 
market. Additional requirements, however, may be required by lenders who provide 
financing.50 Thus, for example, the contractor’s commitment to completion date for a civil 
works infrastructure construction project is essential to the lenders. Late completion can 
cause loss of production, loss of market share, damages in relation to other related 
agreements, and can result in additional finance charges. The 1999 FIDIC Silver Book 
generally satisfies the lenders’ requirement, but the contractor on the civil works 
infrastructure construction project is entitled to an extension of time for delay caused by: 
• The Owner/Employer’s failure to give the contractor access to or possession 
of the site within the time stated in the Particular Conditions.
• The Owner/Employer’s instructions to the contractor regarding archaeological 
remains discovered on the site.
• Changes in the host country’s technical standards and regulations which 
cause the contractor’s delay.
• The Owner/Employer’s instructions to vary the location or details of any tests 
or to perform additional tests.
• Unforeseeable delays or disruptions by the public authorities of the host 
country.
• The contractor’s compliance with an Owner/Employer’s instruction to suspend 
work to the extent the suspension was not due to the contractor’s fault.
• The Owner/Employer’s interference with the tests on completion.
• A change in the laws of the host country.
• The contractor’s suspension of work for the Owner/Employer’s failure to 
provide evidence of its ability to pay or for non-payment.
• The occurrence of an employer’s risk set out in the Particular Conditions of 
Contract.
• The occurrence of a Force Majeure event.
The Owner/Employer’s project management personnel and the contractor’s project 
management personnel still have a large proof burden that only the use of detailed contract 
administration can provide. So, while the principle is comparable, the adoption by Japan of 
the recommended changes is still appropriate to foster project management skills that come 
from such contract administration. 
Also, under PPP and PFI approaches, the concession agreement typically obliges the 
Concessionaire to meet completion dates the concession agreements with specified with 
limited extension of time entitlements. Thus, the concessionaire, as the Owner/Employer,
may have less limited commitments in the contract for the civil works infrastructure project 
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construction. In back-to-back agreements, contractor will only be entitled to an extension of 
time, if the Owner/Employer as the concessionaire is granted an extension of time under the 
concession agreement. Where a breach is solely caused by the Owner/Employer and as the 
concession company is not entitled to an extension of time under the concession agreement, 
the Owner/Employer and the contractor will need to agree on alternative forms of 
compensation. The changes in the Construction Business Law recommended should 
accommodate such an eventuality, allowing additional money to cover acceleration costs, 
and relief from liquidated damages in lieu of an extension of time (as the concession 
company will not be able to extend the completion deadlines under the construction contract 
beyond the completion deadlines under the concession agreement). The contract 
administration required is certainly much more extensive than the Japanese civil works 
infrastructure construction industry has had to learn and practice domestically.
Regarding Force Majeure, the concept essentially is recognized by all laws, whether in the 
global market or Japan. 51 The 1999 FIDIC Books provide Force Majeure in terms of 
Owner/Employer risks, which provide that:52
a. The contractor is required to take full responsibility for the care of the civil 
works infrastructure construction project, regardless of the extent of 
completion, including materials and plant from the contract start until 
completion. It also defines “Goods,” which includes the contractor’s 
equipment, whether on or off the civil works infrastructure construction site; 
and “Contractor’s Documents,” which includes computer software and 
documents of a technical nature supplied by the contractor.
b. If any loss or damage happens to the to such project works, materials and 
plant, other than due to Owner/Employer’s Risk (as defined), the contractor 
must “rectify” this loss or damage at the contractor’s cost.
c. Owner/Employer’s Risks are generally events or circumstances over which 
neither party will have any control, for example, war, hostilities, etc., or events 
or circumstances caused by the Owner/Employer, directly or indirectly.
The 1999 FIDIC Red Book includes specific Owner/Employer Force Majeure risks that are
limited. The ENAA Model forms take a more extreme position, defining essentially anything 
that is beyond the control of the contractor as Owner/Employer Risks. The law in Japan is 
not easily construed, but generally it is consistent with FIDIC. The Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works defines Force Majeure Risks provides the following definition of 
“disasters”:
“…wind storms, heavy rains, floods, tidal waves, earthquakes, landslides, cave=ins, 
fire, riots and disturbances, and any other natural and artificial phenomena, for which 
neither of the parties is responsible.”
Compensation is likewise different, but such differences are primarily tied to the definition of 
Force Majeure. The 1999 FIDIC Books provide that if the civil works infrastructure 
construction project suffers loss or damage and/or delay due to an Owner/Employer’s Risk, 
the contractor must rectify the loss or damage to the extent required by the Owner/Employer 
or its Engineer. Relative to such rectification, and the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs 
additional cost, the contractor is entitled to an extension of time and to the cost of 
rectification. Thus, the respective project management teams must prove what the scope 
requiring rectification was part or not respectively of its assumed bases of its bargain, that 
such scope was destroyed or damaged by the event, and the delay and/or cost was 
reasonable. Regarding the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book, issues of Employers Risk are more 
limited, because the contractor is responsible for engineering, procurement and construction. 
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There still may be issues between the Owner/Employer in its role as the concessionaire 
under the PPP of PFI concession agreement and its role under the construction contract. 
Both delay and compensation under the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works 
would become a source of dispute, unless the Construction Business Law is changed. 
Because there is nothing submitted that is binding on either of the parties, and the 
Owner/Employer (the Government) unilaterally decides extent of delay and/or cost if the 
contractor does not agree. Thus, unless the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works seems to match global market practice, it will not prepare the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction industry as it is currently constituted without adopting global 
market Conditions of Contract.      
4. Defect Liability and Limitations of Liability
The 1999 FIDIC Books all make the contractors liable for defects in the civil works 
infrastructure construction project. The type of defect has some relevance and it is subject to 
the legal requirements identified as the substantive law governing the contract. Thus, there 
may be issues, such as, whether and the extent to which patent defects or latent defects 
(those were not found by tests, etc.), are present and have to be corrected or rectified. 
Clause 17.6 limits the contractor’s liability, but the amount of such liability is subject the 
following:   
a. Exclusion of the Contractor’s and Owner/Employer’s liability for loss of use of 
the civil works infrastructure construction project, loss of profit, loss of any 
contract, indirect or consequential damage, etc. which is incurred by the other 
party as a result of the defect.
b. Inclusion in the limitation of liability Liquidated Damages for delay and for 
failure to the performance guarantees.
c. Setting a monetary limit on the Contractor’s total liability.
The monetary limit is not specified, however, and the default limit is the total contract 
amount. With respect to such limit, The FIDIC Contracts Guide, 1st Edition, 2000, suggests 
that the appropriate limit varies depending, among other things, on the nature and 
importance of the civil works infrastructure construction project, the risks involved and the 
extent of the contractor’s obligations. Thus, the limit may be set anywhere between nothing 
and the contract value. The 1999 FIDIC books require the Owner/Employer to afford a 
contractor the opportunity to remedy or rectify the defect, but limit the time frame for such to 
24 months from the commencement of the warranty period (following completion). The 1999 
FIDIC Books also require that the parties consider a broad range of insurance, either 
required of the Owner/Employer or the contractor.53 In practice, the extent of these insurance 
policies can provide the civil works infrastructure construction project and the parties that 
protect their respective financial interests in the event of the items that are subject to the 
monetary limit.    
The ENAA Model Forms, in 1992, actually first brought the issue of limits on the liability of 
contractor’s in the global market to the attention of commentators.54 The World Bank in 1993 
was concerned about the ENAA Contracts limiting the total liability to 50%, and including in 
the coverage of the limitation Liquidated Damages for delay and performance guarantee 
failures, defects liability, and patent (for the particular process) liability.55 The 1999 FIDIC 
Books reflect the situation that now is followed in the global market. Other provisions of the 
ENAA Model Forms are quite consistent with the global market. 
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The Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works reflects the requirements of the Civil 
Law in this instance, rather than the Construction Business Law, regarding defects liability.56
The Civil Law imposes a strict liability on contractors, but that liability is limited by time. Thus, 
the concepts are in practice consistent with the global market, but imposes a potentially a 
larger definition of defect on contractors and different timing. The issue regarding civil works 
infrastructure construction projects is practice, and especially so under the circumstances of 
a sharply decreased volume of civil works infrastructure construction. With the Government 
historically essentially being the sole party contracting for civil works infrastructure 
construction, and given the non-equal status under the Construction Business Law, 
contractors had to rely on the Government for work. The practice has been to remedy or 
rectify and defects in civil works infrastructure projects. Using the ENAA Model Forms as an 
indication of what Japanese contractors find acceptable in locations elsewhere in global 
market, the “practice” in the domestic civil works infrastructure construction market will have 
to meet global practice in a globally competitive market. Inherent is this change is a concept 
of providing insurance. As long as the extent (scope) of the defect liability is limited to an 
amount that is certain, and the time limitations maintained, the Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works, would not have to be changed except with respect to a limit. The 
amount certain should be limited to the contract amount at the least. With the reform that is 
currently underway in the domestic insurance industry, products will become available.57
By way of assuring best global practices in project management consistent with contract 
administration, the process with respect to defect liability is one of training. The domestic 
industry for civil works construction must have parties that have personnel who will protect 
the bargain reached under the contract, but also the assets of the entities they represent. 
The processes regarding defect liability envisaged must ensure that the process is fair and 
reasonable.
Under PPP and PFI approaches, the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book does reflect global defect 
practice as far as it goes. The 1999 FIDIC Silver Book, however, does not reflect any special 
provisions in the concession agreement with respect to Owner/Employer’s defect liability 
exposure. Concession agreements typically limit the concessionaire’s right to claiming 
revenue loss from the acts of the Government. For example, most concession agreements 
have a “fitness for purpose” warranty clause, and under the 1999 FIDIC Silver Book makes 
the contractor responsible for the design of the work and for the accuracy of the 
Owner/Employer’s requirements, including design criteria and calculations. 58 The 
Owner/Employer is not responsible for any error, inaccuracy or omission in setting out 
exactly what it is buying and the civil works infrastructure project could serve. Most 
concession companies, however, under the concession agreement are usually obliged to 
provide a fitness for purpose warranty to the government entity for performance of the civil 
works infrastructure projects. While the contractor is responsible for the “initial” state of the 
civil works infrastructure project that it designed and constructed, the facility must be 
appropriately maintained, and where necessary, upgraded to ensure that it continues to be 
fit for its intended purpose throughout the length of the concession period. If the contractor is 
not responsible for the maintenance and any capital upgrades, it will not give a “blanket” 
fitness for purpose warranty of lengthy or unspecified duration. The Owner/Employer’s 
requirements and the projected usage, for example, are a common source of dispute, and 
claims of defects, and defense by contractors to such claims. As indicated earlier, the 
contractor may of necessity need the assurance that back-to-back agreements are 
appropriately required. The changes in the Construction Business Law recommended should 
accommodate should meet this need.
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C. Risk Management as a Perspective
Although discussion has focused on recommended revisions to the Construction Business 
Law and the associated Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works, the 
fundamental issues that will force change, and then force change in the methods of doing 
business, is the manner in which the parties perceive their risk. The Japanese domestic civil 
works infrastructure construction industry has a distorted view of what is required to 
successfully do business. The best project management practices of the domestic industry 
now focus only on the manner in which they have to satisfy an Owner/Employer that 
unilaterally sets what it perceives what is needed; what civil works infrastructure project will 
fulfill the need; at what the project cost, schedule, and quality; and then dictates the outcome 
of any disputes. Contractors have developed contract administration skills that allow it to 
excel in this environment.59 Change what is required and the means of successfully meeting 
what is required will change. 
The recommendations are suggestions to consider in revising the Construction Business 
Law, and the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. Great attention 
must be paid the concepts of Project Risk Management discussed and illustrated above. 
Risk will be new or much different in the future to the parties to the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction industry. Risk is both a potential condition and a specific element 
or event which may result in that condition that will affect scope, schedule, quality, and cost.
Thus, as described earlier, the management of such risk is by way of systematic processes
by which risk elements or conditions may be identified, evaluated and avoided, mitigated or 
eliminated, in order to preserve the achievement of a civil works infrastructure construction 
project’s cost, schedule, and quality goals. Thus, the primary goal of the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction industry, both the Owner/Employers and the contractors, must be 
the achievement of project management and contract administration skills that provide them 
with the ability to identify risks, determine characteristics of risk emergence, measurement 
through control systems, and application of enhanced project management methods for 
improved achievement of project and stakeholder goals.60 Through project risk management 
processes becoming a growing part of successful project management processes, 
stakeholders must identify and use risk management tools that are applicable to the risks 
faced and assure effective return in managing those risks should the potential risks actually
begin to affect the project. Without risk there will little incentive to change. 
Also, plans for privately financed civil works infrastructure construction projects are a fact of 
life in the global market, and now include tests projects in the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction market. Like Japan, host governments must provide modern
infrastructure, but they cannot afford the initial cost of providing it. The development of PPP 
of PFI schemes has the potential to become the “norm” in the future, including in Japan’s 
domestic civil works infrastructure market. As Japan experiments with this methodology in 
providing civil works infrastructure, they should use the opportunity to introduce the domestic 
civil works infrastructure construction industry to change that will allow it to develop suitable 
project management and contract administration skills that will enable it to become a 
formidable competition in any market.  
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the global economy of today, a measure of a country’s economic success is its willingness 
to subject its domestic industries to the vigor of foreign competition. To do so says to all 
stakeholders that its industries are able to compete on an equal footing with the rest of the 
developed world. In fact, that is what Japan did in 1996 by committing to the World Trade 
Organization that among other things its domestic civil works infrastructure construction 
market would be open to foreign competition. This willingness was the result of having a 
highly skilled civil works infrastructure construction industry that had developed a world class 
reputation for technical excellence and quality in its implementation. The engineering and 
construction techniques Japan developed in constructing its civil works infrastructure are
admired throughout the global market. This result reflected the strong hand of Government
and the uniqueness of Japanese culture. It also had allowed Japan to rapidly develop in less 
than half a century, so that by the late 1980’s it was a leading economy in the world. 
This result also followed a development pattern that has been repeated throughout modern 
history, albeit in approximately one half the time of the United States, for example. This 
pattern was assured by the government taking a strong hand in the development of 
infrastructure that then allows the rest of industry to thrive and develop. For countries that 
move forward from an economic category of “under developed” to an economic category of 
“developing,” the government must take necessary steps to protect its capability to build 
capacity in its civil works infrastructure construction industry. Thus, Japan used the 
Construction Business Law which was based on the societal and cultural concept of “mutual 
trust” to develop and protect the industry that it needed. Once established, Japan then 
developed an industry that uniquely met requirements and practices that the use of the 
“mutual trust” necessitated. Competitors from “developed” countries they could not compete
under such unique requirements and practices, because such foreign competition simply 
could not understand them.
When a country continues the historical development pattern, it moves from an economic 
category of “developing” to an economic category of “developed. When it has done so, a 
country no longer has to protect its civil works infrastructure construction industry. Japan 
thus made a commitment to the WTO when its economy had reached the “developed”
category status. Japan thought that the civil works infrastructure construction industry could 
adapt and be prepared to compete with the world in its domestic market. Japan has enacted
minor changes in the ten years that Japan envisioned that a transition period would be 
required. It did not contemplate, however, that such an “open” market would require a much 
different way of project management and contract administration skills. As a result, the 
Government (the MILT) undertook various action plans in the past ten years aimed at 
restructuring the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry. These laws 
addressed various issues of quality, project transparency, but kept intact basic framework 
with which it had protected the civil works infrastructure construction industries. The 
Government did not address the key management competencies that are necessary to be
global players. The results are quite different in actuality then what was expected. The 
Government actions are not resulting in change and capacity building for either 
Owner/Employers (the Government) or contractors. Specifically, the lack in understanding 
and vision of what such management competencies encompass has not prepared the civil 
works infrastructure construction industry to compete with global competitors either in the 
domestic or global markets.
In studies reported herein, the author chose to address the question of why the Japanese 
have not succeeded in the development of needed levels of management competency or 
establish the counter measures necessary to prepare the industry – specifically the 
creation“contract administration” skills necessary to perform project/construction 
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management. Contract administration is the key function that is required of engineers to 
succeed in project/construction management and succeed in the global market. The author
studied the social backgrounds of the Japanese market and the global market, the laws that 
underlie civil works infrastructure construction, and the standard conditions of contract that 
effectuate such laws. The author then developed how the global market’s principle of 
“mutual mistrust” requires parties to develop these management competencies and the 
Japanese market’s principle of “mutual trust” does not. This approach has never been used 
to address how the civil works infrastructure construction industry should be restructured in 
Japan. 
The author found the following as result these studies:
 Japan has developed formidable international competitors in many industries, 
and has done so in industries that it has opened to foreign competitors 
domestically as well as in the global market.
 Japan as a result has developed management skills that enable its personnel 
to compete in their domestic markets for such industries.
 Japan has not developed into formidable international competitors in the civil 
works infrastructure construction industry, either in the domestic market or the 
global market.
 The Japanese Government and civil works infrastructure construction 
contractors have not developed contract administration skills and thus the 
project/construction management skills required of competitors in the global 
market for civil works infrastructure construction.
 The global market for civil works infrastructure construction is based on the 
presumed equality of the parties and the stakeholders are expected to 
operate with a principal of “mutual mistrust.”
 Under the principle of “mutual mistrust” both parties to a civil works 
infrastructure construction contract proceed under the assumption that the 
other is trying to obtain a better position than that for which it bargained, and 
no one is better placed than itself to protect the benefits of such bargain.
 The principal of “mutual mistrust” is established by the contract and conditions 
of contract used throughout the global market for civil works infrastructure 
construction.
 Although Japanese laws appear to be an amalgamation of Civil Codes with a 
bit of Common Law thrown in, Japan interprets its laws and their apparent 
conflicts based upon the principle of “mutual trust.”
 “Mutual trust” is unique to the Japanese and stems in part from their belief in 
the dominance and benevolence at the same time of their leaders or 
superiors.
 The Japanese are capable of integrate new and different concepts into the 
governance of their daily lives and thus change their way of thinking, 
especially as regards management as shown in many industries over the last 
two decades, but the Japanese have not done so in the civil works 
infrastructure construction industry.
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 The domestic civil works infrastructure industry is based on the Construction 
Business Law and the form of contract that it establishes which is an atypical 
form not recognized by its Civil Law.
 Under the Construction Business Law, the Owner/Employer (the Government) 
is given a dominant position and the stakeholders are expected to operate 
within a principal of “mutual trust” and the Owner/Employers dominance and 
benevolence.
 The civil works infrastructure construction industry can grow and benefit form 
the development of project management skills that are based on competency 
in contract administration.
 These competencies in turn will create efficiencies and larger returns from 
operations that the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry
does not and cannot produce when they operate under the principle of 
“mutual trust.” 
 The domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry is increasingly 
criticized by the public for a lack or transparency and accountability as it 
continues using the protections required when Japan still was a “developing” 
country.
 Transparency and accountability are a condition of continued participation in
the World Trade Organization, and other Japanese industries have found
such transparency and accountability essential as they have transitioned to 
remain major stakeholders in global markets.
 The Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry does not just 
face a crisis, but it is in a crisis that can be remedied and be turned around 
through the adaptation the way in which it does business.
 Since the country can no longer afford to protect the domestic civil works 
infrastructure industry, the industry will become in the future just a minor 
sector of the economy, less important to Japan, and will be absorbed by other 
industries, except for the smallest of stakeholders.
 A New Japanese Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works must be 
developed by incorporating practices that are consistent with the principle of 
“mutual mistrust,” and that cannot happen successfully until it changes the 
requirement that the civil works infrastructure construction be performed 
pursuant to a contract is based upon a principle of “mutual trust,” a current 
condition of the Construction Business Law.
 The author has written a New Construction Business Law and New Japanese 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works that is presented in 
Appendix A.
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Summary 0f Dissertation Entitled:
“Avoiding a Crisis in the Construction Industry: Guidelines for 
Internationalizing the Japanese Standard Conditions of Contract for 
Civil Works” by Kris R. Nielsen, Ph.D.
In Japanese society, the law historically has a limited function. It becomes one small part of 
the mechanisms for social control. For example, where there are conflicts and/or disputes, 
societal resort to formal law and institutions is not usually the first course of action of the 
Japanese. Today, however, there is an astonishing amount of change afoot, and a 
considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the future. The Japanese Government and 
companies generally have become major players in global markets. The Japanese 
managers of companies go forth and strive to become masters of the cultures in which they 
compete. The Japanese people have become world travelers. They are regularly exposed to 
different ideas and cultures. Communications, the great equalizing influence of the new 
century, has led to a blending of cultures at an increasing and irreversible rate. Now that 
Japan is facing economic problems, a questioning and re-evaluation of the practices that it 
has cherished has commenced in a manner and depth that it never occurred before.
The author extensively studied the characteristics of the Japanese domestic market and the 
global market for civil works infrastructure construction. The contract and conditions of 
contract which govern the execution of civil works infrastructure construction projects in each 
market generally are thought to be a reflection of the industry practices. These practices in 
turn drive and shape the skill sets engineers must learn and practice daily in order to fulfill 
the requirements demanded in such execution successfully.       
Japanese civil works infrastructure is arguably the most extensive per capita in the world. It 
is civil works infrastructure that reflects the highest of technological and engineering 
competency. The construction contracting for civil woks infrastructure projects is governed 
by the Construction Business Law. Under that Law, the Government contracts with 
contractors using the Contract and the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. 
These contract documents are said to reflect the philosophy of the Japanese legal system,
and the contracting approaches that it embraces. In order to understand and evaluate the 
Japanese civil works infrastructure construction market, the author studied the Japanese 
social, cultural and historical developments that have shaped the legal bases therefore and 
to understand what makes Japan and the Japanese market unique.
The legal foundation of Japan is based on Civil Codes of France and Germany, and the 
Common Law of the US (and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom). Europe, Australia, the 
Americas, Africa, and the rest of Asia generally have one or the other of these same legal 
foundations. Yet, civil works infrastructure contractors from these seemingly disparate legal 
traditions can compete against each other and function acceptably in the global market for 
civil works infrastructure construction projects.  Japan’s contractors, however, cannot 
compete in such a global market because the domestic market has a basic difference. 
Japan has created a form of industry practice that is based on the Construction Business 
Law that creates an exception to the basic forms of contract that are allowed under its Civil 
Code. The Construction Business Law recognizes the dominance of the Owner/Employer—
the Government for essentially all of the civil works infrastructure construction market. The 
Construction Business Law requires the use of a written contract that incorporates the 
principle that: “parties executing a contract for construction work shall conclude a fair and 
equitable agreement in mutual good faith” –-a concept of “mutual trust” in the fairness of the 
dominant Government as Owner/Employer. The Construction Business Law gives the 
Government the authority to determine the outcome disputes unilaterally, but in practice the 
Owner/Employer frowns upon disputes in the civil works infrastructure construction industry. 
The Construction Business Law requires the contractors to engage in the subterfuge of 
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pointing out changes and then awaiting the unilateral determination of Owner/Employer as to 
the value and time consequences of such changes. This principle has allowed the 
Government to manipulate the industry to its own ends, and in return it has protected the 
industry from foreign competition. Faced with the need to rebuild the Japanese economy 
recently, the Government now has embarked on a program of legal restructuring in most 
sectors of the economy to better prepare Japan to better meet the situation and conditions 
that it now faces. It is doing so through changes in the laws that govern economic sectors,
except for the civil works infrastructure construction that is subject to the Construction 
Business Law from which almost all of the current issues originate.
The Japanese Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works are based on 
and reflect the Construction Business Law. The Contract and Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works have been used for over fifty years. The basic provisions have 
been altered only eight times, but the revisions have been relatively minor and reflect minor 
revisions. The efforts that the Government has made in the last decade to comply with the 
commitments under the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government 
Procurement have been cosmetic, and the Government has not changed the Construction 
Business Law. The current Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works 
are used to protect the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry from foreign 
competition still. The Government and the domestic civil woks infrastructure construction 
industry are “casting about” and bemoaning their future and that of the industry. The 
Government and the civil works infrastructure construction industry are attempting to use a 
varied composite of ideas that are used in various European and US infrastructure 
construction markets, but it is achieving little success. To define the problem, some of the 
issues that are characteristic of Japanese civil works infrastructure construction, which are at 
odds with the rest of the world, were explored. Japan’s response to the challenges and 
changes that began twenty years ago was first one of retreat and denial. Then it was of 
pragmatic utilization of new rules and circumstances to continue policies of promotion and 
protection. Today it is one of accepting global standards and policies in general, but it is not 
doing so in the civil works infrastructure construction industry. The manner in which the 
domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry can change will be dependent on 
revisions Construction Business Law, and the Contract and the Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works to reflect global standards and policies. Such change will avoid a 
crisis and can lead to results which will provide the domestic construction infrastructure 
construction industry with a future it so desperately needs.
Given this legal foundation, the Construction Business Law and the promotion activities of 
the Government that it accommodates, are out of sync with the rest of the Civil Code.  
Today, the public questions the “transparency” of the civil works infrastructure construction 
process because of decades of ruling party abuse. As has been stated by the authorities, the 
dominant and patronizing Owner/Employer for civil works infrastructure allowed by the 
Construction Business Law assumes: “The Employer is always clean, fair, and right….[The 
Government] is far from being involved with collusion affairs of contractors.” The 
Construction Business Law requires the Owners/Employers (the Government) and the 
contractors to deal in a cooperative manner, that is, because it is believed that the 
Owner/Employer (the Government) has “to make a fair and right selection, because [the 
Owner/Employer (the Government)] is bound by the logical restriction of actions or laws and 
regulations which always force the most suitable obligations and answers.” This contracting 
approach is supposedly a furtherance of the concept of “giri” that Ruth Benedict portrayed in 
her classic anthropological text, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, used to fashion
Japanese law following the surrender of Japan in 1945. In practice it has resulted in the 
abuses that are a part of the history and practice of the Japanese civil works infrastructure 
construction industry for the past fifty years.
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In practice, hiding behind the concepts of dominance and a patronizing superior, the 
contractors do not submit claims based on allegations that the Owner/Employer (the 
Government) is demanding something for which the contractor has not bargained. Instead 
the letters or petitions appeal to the pride and the defined role of authority to do what is 
“right.” Typically the petitions are couched in terms of suggested or offered changes to what 
the Owner/Employer (the Government) originally intended or desired. In essence, claims in 
the domestic civil infrastructure construction market are “design changes”. The reason why 
contractors use a “design change” is to convey to the Owner/Employer (the Government)
that it changed the original design unilaterally and it needs to give the contractor the 
additional cost (and a time extension, if necessary). Thus, there are not claim documents 
submitted. The Owner/Employer (the Government) then calculates the value of time and 
cost for such acceptable changes according to its own unilateral figures and notifies the 
contractors accordingly. Thus all matters are settled on or before the final payment is made 
when the contractor formally “delivers” the executed project. The contractors are “forced to 
accept” this payment given the “design changes” that resulted from the contractor’s 
“proposed changes.” Despite the Construction Business Law, and the Contract and 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works providing that the Government and 
contractor will “mutually agree,” must cases of civil works infrastructure construction actually 
are one-sided and settled by “the intentions” of the Government, and the contractors are 
seldom invited to participate in an official negotiation processes. Everyone usually is 
“satisfied” with the result, especially, since the Owner/Employer (the Government) is the 
source of 99% of civil works infrastructure construction.
The author found that a unique contracting status bestowed by Construction Business Law 
allowed the Government to use the Contract and Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works to fashion a civil works infrastructure construction industry that has developed 
characteristics that are different from the global market. The Japanese Contract and the 
Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works, however, has not enabled the 
construction industry to develop either:
 An extensive understanding of construction execution for civil works 
infrastructure in the global market place.
 The project management skill sets (for example, contract administration to 
support a viable disputes resolution process) necessary to fully integrate the 
Japanese civil works infrastructures construction industry into the global 
market construction works.
 A domestic market that meets the criteria for entry to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
The result has been the development of an “insulated” domestic construction industry for 
civil works infrastructure that Japan can sustain no longer. The current status of the 
domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry is one of crisis. The crisis is the 
result of the Construction Business Law, the Contract and the Standard Conditions of 
Contract for Public Works and the realities of Japan today that do not meet:
 The intent of the legal changes that the Government is enacting.
 The demand of the electorate for the transparency in the process of awarding 
and executing civil works infrastructure construction projects.
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 The commitment that the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction 
market will become a part of the global civil works infrastructure construction 
market. 
Most countries have socio-economic systems that embody some form of Western legal 
philosophy. These systems have been adopted or forced on countries all over the world. 
Most of the revolution that has globalized commerce in the last two centuries is based on 
Western legal principles. When the global community or individual countries have funded or 
financed civil works infrastructure projects, contracts and conditions of contract are similarly 
based on principles that underlie Civil Law and Common Law. One can immerse himself or 
herself in the idiosyncrasies in the study of comparative law between the laws of one country 
that is based on the Civil Law and of another country that is based on the Common Law. 
There is certainly a role for those who do so. But to work in the global market and engage in 
commerce does not require an understanding of such idiosyncrasies. In most countries of 
the world, civil works infrastructure construction is governed by the contracts and conditions 
of contract which are based on Civil Law and Common law. Although there are differences 
in the manner that Civil Law and Common Law jurisdictions reflect the legal principles, there 
really are few differences that are meaningful, and contracts based on one or the other are 
recognized and administered the same. Thus, these principles have shaped the manner in 
which Owner/Employers and contractors expect the other to act. A body of practice and 
expectations has developed for civil works infrastructure construction, and has evolved into 
“industry standards.”
There are a number of principles that underlie contracts and conditions of contract for civil 
works infrastructure construction. A fundamental one is that the parties to a contract are 
recognized as equal. One party is not more dominant than another. It underlies all contracts, 
particularly contracts for construction. Even where one of the contracting parties is a 
government, the contractor is recognized as being equal. Unlike the Japanese Construction 
Business Law, the one party is not superior to the other. One party is not to “dominate, and
also be patronizing” at the same time.
The fundamental basis of contracts in global market is a concept if “mutual mistrust.” What is 
meant by “mutual mistrust” is the Owner/Employer believes that the contractor inherently will 
try and execute and deliver some less than that for which is obligated; that is, the contractor 
will provide less scope or quality and/or take longer. The contractor believes that 
Owner/Employer will demand more than the contractor has agreed to execute and deliver; 
that is, the owner wants more scope or quality and/or delivery in less time. The 
Owner/Employer and contractor are expected to “protect” the benefit of their “bargain,” as 
there is not “anyone who will do so for it.” The allegedly injured party has an obligation to the 
offending party to give reasonable notices of its failure or the presumed failure to “live up to 
the bargain.” The noticed party can agree, negotiate a solution, or dispute the assertion. 
Because the Owner/Employer and the contractor may have different interpretations of what 
each committed in the consummation of their bargain, there is a presumption that the 
allegedly injured party may go to courts to recover the benefit of its bargain. When a party 
does so, it is entitled to the bargain to which it agreed, nothing more or nothing less. The civil 
works infrastructure construction industry, however, has substituted for “resort to the courts” 
various alternative means of resolving such disputes, whether that is negotiation, 
determination, mediation (conciliation) and/or arbitration. Also, there is often means in the 
contract and conditions of contract of guaranteeing the other party is capable of living up to 
its bargain, such as, performance and payment guarantees.
The legal principle of “mutual mistrust” is thus inherent in the global market, essential to 
international commerce, and fundamental to civil works infrastructure construction. In 
addition the principles of “transparency” enable abuses in the global civil infrastructure 
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construction market to be minimized by adherence to codes of conduct and the 
empowerment of stakeholder to challenge the processes that are used. The required use of 
Standards Conditions of Contract that are based on legal principles of “mutual mistrust” in 
turn require users to become familiar with the processes and skill sets which enable parties 
to function under terms that are familiar. It forces parties, whether owner/employers or 
contractor, to behave in an expected manner. Where there are variances from that bargain 
reached, parties must learn to measure change and how to present a case for resolution.
“Conditions of Contract” thus force the parties to be always alert to what the other party is 
doing with respect to its obligations and commitments. A party must protect its bargain at all 
times or it suffers the consequences. Vigilance is mandatory. The timing and associated
actions are mutual and equal. The Owner/Employer and the Contractor is each assumed to 
be knowledgeable and capable to protect its interests. The “Conditions of Contract” thus 
create an actual execution context of “mutual mistrust.” The financing and execution of civil 
works infrastructure globally is undertaken through the use of various types of contracts and 
standard conditions of contract that are understood and accepted by stakeholders that 
operate in the global market. For example, the most widely used forms of contract and 
conditions of contract for executing civil works infrastructure globally is the suite of contracts 
that is promulgated by Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC), and it 
incorporates the philosophy of “mutual mistrust.”
The author identified the skill sets that are required in the global market. The author found 
that when the “Conditions of Contract” are standardized, then both parties are aware of the 
“mutual mistrust” obligations from experience with the forms. Both parties can train 
personnel in the means of monitoring, controlling, and executing its performance to assure it 
receives the benefits of the bargain made. Also, the same is true in monitoring and notifying 
the other party of its failure to live up to the bargain, whether inconsequential or significant. 
The question then becomes: “given the requirements of ‘mutual mistrust,’ what are the 
proper skill sets for personnel in either the employ of the Owner/Employer or a Contactor to 
possess?” In order for a party to monitor its bargain, the party must record the definitions 
and/or assumptions that its bargain represents in the contract that was consummated. The 
contract documents and/or the “source” documents that were “rolled up” must establish what 
it intended. The standards are recognized internationally by the parties that are active in the 
global market, so that there is a metric against which performance is measured. The 
Contractor equally must have standards. They exist in the global market, are recognized 
internationally and are a basis for measurement or a “metric.”
Once the bases of the bargain are recorded, then the process of executing the project 
begins. The systems of monitoring for conformance or change from that which either party 
defined or assumed must then be used during project execution to monitor the other parties 
performance. This monitoring becomes a metric for measuring the deviations from the 
project in a timely manner that is the essence of “mutual mistrust.” It also becomes the 
means for providing timely notice that is built into most civil work infrastructure project 
Conditions of Contract. Collectively, these two steps of preparing a base and monitoring are 
known as Contract Administration and they are the backbone of project management. Every 
project involves dynamic tension between parties. Each party enters the project with a 
preconceived set of assumptions, demands and expectations as to its own role in the 
project. Each party also enters a project with a preconceived idea of the roles that others will 
play in that project. These internal and external expectations tend to be somewhat 
competitive in nature. These competing demands and expectations must be kept in balance,
if the project is to fulfill the expectations of any of the parties involved.
Contract Administration is fundamental to successfully operating under the principle of 
“mutual mistrust” which is required in the global market. For example, standardization must 
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follow a uniformity of a body of knowledge that can be employed in accomplishing suitable 
education and practical training, and most importantly project execution. The benefits of 
standardization are continued development of Contract Administration and project 
management knowledge, education, training and execution based thereon. There is, 
however, another tangible result is achieved. Parties of diverse cultural and commercial 
backgrounds develop common understandings and common execution-performance 
expectations. Both understandings and expectations lead to anticipatable management 
approaches, communication, and efforts. Ultimately, improved project management leads to 
reduced risk of execution problems and disputes. Management and commercial decision 
making becomes reasonably prudent and vastly improved. The result: Projects are 
successful and parties meet their goals.
For contractors who operate in the global market, the variance in any assumption is a 
potential for recovery, because it goes to the basis of bargain. It is the “life blood” of 
European and US contractors. The concept is to adequately record the assumptions as 
developed with respect to all aspects of the project, and then to regularly record and monitor 
them as part of a vigorous Contract Administration regimen. They use Project Risk 
Management at the same time and in addition to monitor a civil works infrastructure 
construction project the likely areas before the variance even occurs. Thus, foreign 
contractors (and Owner/Employers) fashion Contract Administration in a manner that is 
quantitative-based on the most current civil works infrastructure construction project 
information for evidence of variance at discrete levels at its earliest stages of incurring. They 
do not wait until the impact becomes a final. To do so would violate a primary concept of 
“mutual mistrust,” the giving of notice so the other party can attempt to deal with the problem 
that is causing the variance.
The process of protecting the benefits of a bargain begins with the project management 
personnel using the tools and the data to record and develop the assumptions for execution 
and for management of the project. Contract Administration under a culture of “mutual 
mistrust” is a process of continuously evaluating and trending of “how the project is doing” 
when measured against the plan. When the project if found to be trending or deviating from 
plan, the project management team must identify the potential causes and the party 
responsible. For example, if the Owner/Employer’s project management team through its 
Contract Administration efforts finds the cause and responsible party to be the 
Owner/Employer, then it is up to the project management team to identify and implement 
actions to minimizes the impacts, that is, manage the result. It is the function of Contract 
Administration to spot the trend or the issue as early as possible. If the application of 
Contract Administration leads the Owner/Employer project management team to conclude 
the Contractor is causing and is responsible for the potential impacts, proper notice as 
required by the Conditions of Contract, must be timely given to the Contractor. Further, the 
Owner/Employer’s project management staff must prepare analyses that demonstrate the 
non-compliance with the Owner/Employer’s requirements – the benefits of its bargain. The 
converse is equally true of the Contractor’s project management team. Therefore, a primary 
responsibility in the global market for civil works infrastructure construction projects is 
Contract Administration throughout the project duration. The author specifically, identified 
and illustrated the project attributes that define project scope and quality, time of 
performance, and cost of performance, and project risk management as the primary
elements of contract administration.
The author then evaluated the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry’s 
need to learn and use the project management skills under the current Construction 
Business Law, the Contract and the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works. The 
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Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry does not have to record and share
their respective assumptions as to the bases from with it defined the very foundation of the 
tender it requires or the tender that it is making. Only in the area of quality does Japan have 
standards that the rest of the global market recognizes. The area of cost of performance is 
well developed on the part of Japanese contractors, but to a specific contractor’s 
requirements. The areas of planning and time projection, productivity measures, and scope 
definition are not demanded by the market, thus are not well understood or used. There is no 
incentive for the stakeholders to demand, to monitor or to analyze and project specific items 
of variance from the assumptions that underlies the bargain that either party thought it made.
The author thus found the Japanese civil works infrastructure construction industry severely 
limited in the areas of scope management, time management and risk management.
Additionally, the author also found the subcontracting (vendors and subcontractors) process
(the organized groups under primarily a single general contractor) and the process of 
independent third party dispute adjudication to be out of sync with the global market.
The author also analyzed a comparable Asian market. China has elements of social and 
cultural development that are alleged to be similar to those of Japan. Yet, the Chinese have 
enacted recently laws that will allow it to develop the skill sets that stakeholders employ in 
the global market for civil works infrastructure construction and allow foreign competition in 
their domestic market. The author found that in order to understand the development of 
Chinese construction law, as with Japan, you cannot separate culture from law. But, Chinese 
history, and particularly the last half century, is quite different than that of Japan, despite 
both having had a ruling party that dominated power for most of the time. The understanding 
of modern Chinese law thus can only be understood through an appreciation of the social, 
cultural, political, and historical aspects of Chinese legal traditions. China’s current legal 
system reflects a vast number of legal traditions over the millennia. As with Japan, the 
deeply-rooted philosophies and culture of classical China, such as, Confucianism, must be 
studied. In addition, there are the legal traditions of Daoism and Legalism. China’s legal 
system is also influenced by external forces such as the extraterritorial privileges exerted 
under the treaty system between China and the Western powers which, in effect, forced 
China to adopt Western legal principles that stem from civil code countries of Europe 
(Germany and France) and from the common law countries (US and United Kingdom). The 
influence of treaties was much greater than Japan, because of the US relied heavily on the 
anthropological writings of Ruth Benedict, especially The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, as 
discussed above, in fashioning Japanese law following the surrender of Japan in 1945. In 
1949, when the Communist Party took control of China, Chinese law was based on the 
political philosophies of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong, and the Soviet legal system. 
Since 1980, China has adopted a laws and enacted regulations governing commerce, 
foreign investment, and Securities regulations, from international sources. As China reforms 
its economy, it is using the legal standards of its trading partners to hasten its development 
efforts, to build the confidence of foreign investors, and to accommodate the entrepreneurial 
market capitalism. This latter influence is primarily an influence from the US, however, which 
is its largest trading partner. Thus, China’s construction law incorporates a philosophy of 
“mutual mistrust.”
The author demonstrated the changes to the processes the Government has made in nine 
years since opening the domestic civil works infrastructure market to foreign competition 
have been cosmetic in nature. The changes have not led to development of effective counter 
measures and have not led to development of a culture of contract administration that will 
enable the industry to succeed. The author demonstrated that the industry will be changed in 
a haphazard manner without such changes and explored the possibility of surviving a further 
period of transition beyond 2006. For example, Japanese firms might look off shore, as other 
industries have done, because the Government does not have the capacity to continue to 
build civil works infrastructure construction projects. With private participation, like PFI 
projects as a transition period option, for example, the civil works infrastructure industry will 
S- Kris R. Nielsen 8
be prepared to broadly compete with other international parties in the global market. Japan’s 
overseas civil works infrastructure construction, despite its still relatively small percentage of 
the combined domestic and global markets it serves, offers some intriguing possibilities. The 
Government could “sell” its expertise in constructing social capital through civil works 
infrastructure construction projects before it is lost. Japan has been the largest and a very 
visible donor regarding the ongoing 2005 Tsunami reconstruction of civil works infrastructure 
in the affected countries surrounding the Indian Ocean. As “mutual mistrust” experience is 
gained, the Japanese can become formidable competitors as they have in other industries.
The FIDIC Contracts and the associated Standard Conditions of Contract are recognized 
throughout the world as a reference document for the construction of civil works 
infrastructure projects. In recent decades the FIDIC contract documents have become a de 
facto international standard that is known by stakeholders in the global market for civil works 
infrastructure construction. Therefore, in the global market, the expectation is that “everyone” 
is familiar with the FIDIC contract documents. It is from the FIDIC contract documents that 
modifications are suggested and emphasized, so that changes that are being made are 
obvious. As previously indicated, the FIDIC contract documents are based on a philosophy 
of “mutual mistrust.” Therefore, the Author used the FIDIC contract documents to illustrate 
and contrast the changes that will avoid as crisis in the Japanese civil works infrastructure 
construction industry and to develop and foster project management and contract 
administration skills sets.
Ultimately, the author found that in the global economy of today, a measure of a country’s 
economic success is its willingness to subject its domestic industries to the vigor of foreign 
competition. To do so says to all stakeholders that its industries are able to compete on an 
equal footing with the rest of the developed world. In fact, that is what Japan did in 1996 by 
committing to the World Trade Organization that among other things its domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction market would be open to foreign competition. This willingness 
was the result of having a highly skilled civil works infrastructure construction industry that 
had developed a world class reputation for technical excellence and quality in its 
implementation. The engineering and construction techniques Japan developed in 
constructing its civil works infrastructure are admired throughout the global market. This 
result reflected the strong hand of Government and the uniqueness of Japanese culture. It 
also had allowed Japan to rapidly develop in less than half a century, so that by the late 
1980’s it was a leading economy in the world. 
This result also followed a development pattern that has been repeated throughout modern 
history, albeit in approximately one half the time of the United States, for example. This 
pattern was assured by the government taking a strong hand in the development of 
infrastructure that then allows the rest of industry to thrive and develop. For countries that 
move forward from an economic category of “under developed” to an economic category of 
“developing,” the government must take necessary steps to protect its capability to build 
capacity in its civil works infrastructure construction industry. Thus, Japan used the 
Construction Business Law which was based on the societal and cultural concept of “mutual 
trust” to develop and protect the industry that it needed. Once established, Japan then 
developed an industry that uniquely met requirements and practices that the use of the 
“mutual trust” necessitated. Competitors from “developed” countries they could not compete 
under such unique requirements and practices, because such foreign competition simply 
could not understand them.
When a country continues the historical development pattern, it moves from an economic 
category of “developing” to an economic category of “developed. When it has done so, a 
country no longer has to protect its civil works infrastructure construction industry. Japan 
thus made a commitment to the WTO when its economy had reached the “developed” 
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category status. Japan thought that the civil works infrastructure construction industry could 
adapt and be prepared to compete with the world in its domestic market. Japan has enacted 
minor changes in the ten years that Japan envisioned that a transition period would be 
required. It did not contemplate, however, that such an “open” market would require a much 
different way of project management and contract administration skills. As a result, the 
Government (the MILT) undertook various action plans in the past ten years aimed at 
restructuring the domestic civil works infrastructure construction industry. These laws 
addressed various issues of quality, project transparency, but kept intact basic framework 
with which it had protected the civil works infrastructure construction industries. The 
Government did not address the key management competencies that are necessary to be 
global players. The results are quite different in actuality then what was expected. The 
Government actions are not resulting in change and capacity building for either 
Owner/Employers (the Government) or contractors. Specifically, the lack in understanding 
and vision of what such management competencies encompass has not prepared the civil 
works infrastructure construction industry to compete with global competitors either in the 
domestic or global markets.
The author chose to address the question of why the Japanese have not succeeded in the 
development of needed levels of management competency or establish the counter 
measures necessary to prepare the industry – specifically the creation of “contract 
administration” skills necessary to perform project/construction management. Contract 
administration is the key function that is required of engineers to succeed in 
project/construction management and succeed in the global market. The author studied the 
social backgrounds of the Japanese market and the global market, the laws that underlie 
civil works infrastructure construction, and the standard conditions of contract that effectuate 
such laws. The author then developed how the global market’s principle of “mutual mistrust” 
requires parties to develop these management competencies and the Japanese market’s 
principle of “mutual trust” does not. This approach has never been used to address how the 
civil works infrastructure construction industry should be restructured in Japan.
Thus with respect to the Construction Business Law, and the Contract and Standard 
Conditions of Contract for Public Works, the author created a New Conditions of Contract for 
Civil Works that incorporated his findings including:
 First and foremost, the dominant position of Owner/Employers (the Government) 
must be eliminated from construction contracts. Thus, the allowed contract for civil 
works infrastructure construction must recognize the equality of contracting parties, 
and not perpetuate the concept of contracting between a benevolent master (the 
Government) and its servants (the contractors). This one change to the Construction 
Business Law will make the practice of “mutual consultation” less necessary. The 
issue of equality of the parties only will become a reality in the civil works 
infrastructure construction industry through the procedures, such as, those that 
create the concept of “mutual mistrust.”
 Japan does not have a tradition of the Engineer typical on projects in the global 
market, that is, the Engineer is not from an independent firm. In Japan pursuant the 
Construction Business Law, the Engineer’s role is fulfilled in construction contracts by 
the Owner/Employer’s project manager supervising the contractor’s performance of 
the work in accordance with the construction contract, and, if such contract is not 
being complied with, to have the contractor rectify it. The contractor’s assigned 
Engineers are required by the Construction Business Law to meet the requirements 
of education and experience, and to have the proper certifications. Although 
Japanese engineers for civil works infrastructure construction have been trained well, 
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Engineers who are assigned by contractors engaged in civil works infrastructure 
construction are trained, tested, approved, certified, and experienced in the Standard 
Conditions of Contract for Public Works. Therefore, Japanese Engineers thoroughly 
understand the requirements of a contract that assures the dominance of the 
Owner/Employer that the Construction Business Law imposes. But, the Japanese 
Engineer on civil works infrastructure construction must develop project management 
skills that are consistent with the best practices in the global market, and that 
requires contract administration that they will use with a contract that recognizes 
“mutual mistrust.” Thus, project execution can become a three-party system instead 
of the two-party system that it is today.
 The introduction of a Competitive Bidding system. The bidding system is not 
transparent as discussed earlier. The bidding system does not meet what parties 
who operate the global market expect. The majority of domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction is subject to the rules for Designated Competitive Bidding, 
under which many of the abuses described earlier have occurred. Thus, Designated 
Competitive Bidding should be forbidden except where there are specifically 
described situations, such as, emergency construction, etc.
 Thus, to the extent the Construction Business Law makes a contractor responsible to 
the Owner/Employer, the Construction Business Law has to be changed to require 
subcontractors to be responsible to the contractor for its defined scope in the same 
manner as the contractor is to the Owner/Employer (except for price). Contract terms 
have to be “back to back.”
 With the necessary change to the Construction Business Law recommended, the 
methods of dispute resolution must be changed to mirror what the global market 
requires, and generally is in line with the rest of the laws.
 Minor wording and interpretive changes necessary to allow interpretation of the
Construction Business Law and the coincident Conditions of Contract to enable a 
workable system. 
The author concluded, the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public Works must be 
changed to allow for the absorption of the concepts of the global market into the domestic 
civil works infrastructure construction market as it is opened to foreign competition pursuant 
to the WTO. But what is the real meaning of globalization for the domestic civil works 
infrastructure industry? Globalization for the domestic civil works infrastructure industry
means to accept “mutual mistrust” as the basic philosophy of project execution. From such 
changes the resulting system demands will mean that engineers will have to change and be 
trained in the procedures of executing civil works infrastructure construction industry with 
project management and contract administration that meets global standards. Through 
contract administration the “bargain” is established, and become the “rules” by which 
execution is judged, evaluated, and monitored. In order for the industry to gain experience to 
enable it to compete domestically with parties from the global market, and to successfully 
become a major competitive factor in the global market. Although Japan is culturally and 
socially unique with a set of business practices that have worked for over half a century, the 
resulting will enable Japan to avoid the crisis that is facing the domestic civil works 
infrastructure construction industry.
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APPENDIX
SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE JAPANESE STANDARD CONDITIONS OF 
CONTRACT FOR PUBLIC WORKS
TO CREATE A
NEW STANDARD CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
Consistent with the suggested revisions to the Standard Conditions of Contract for Public 
Works that are contained in the body of this dissertation, the Author presents a suggested 
New Standard Conditions of Contract. These Conditions of Contract anticipate as a 
predicate that the Constructions Business Law will be modified or interpreted to allow the
use of a contract that is based on principles of “mutual mistrust.” The current Contract 
Agreement form, for example, still must be a “fair contract,” but both parties actually must be
recognized as being “equal,” both in words (as the actual contract currently says) and in 
actual practice. As such, the New Standard Conditions of Contract will not need extensive 
revision but rather interpretation consistent with the suggestions previously made.
Furthermore, most civil works infrastructure construction, whether funded by the government 
or through some form of Public Private Partnership (PPP)/Private Finance Initiative (PFI), will 
require essentially a complete design or a standard means of defining the scope to enable 
the works to be bid uniformly. 
The translation from Japanese to English of the current Standard Conditions of Contract for 
Public Works is unofficial, but there is not an official English version. The New Standard 
Conditions of Contract have used this translation, and have supplemented it with the 
suggested revisions that may be distinguished by the italics print. Also there are notes with 
respect to various matters that are offered to users of the New Standard Conditions of 
Contract. Thus, I have used English as the language of the New Standard Conditions of 
Contract as this is the language used with such forms throughout much of the global market.
In addition, consistent with standard conditions of contract in use throughout the world, the 
New Standard Conditions of Contract reflects the use of “General Conditions” supplemented
by “Particular Conditions of Contract,” wherein the user supplements or changes the 
“general conditions” to accommodate the particular needs of the construction project.
The New Standard Conditions of Contract shall not be used for contracts less than ¥ 10 
million, but the spirit reflected therein should be considered, as is appropriate.
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NEW STANDARD CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
PART A – GENERAL CONDITIONS
ARTICLE 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.1 Based collectively on the Contact Documents, namely the Contract Agreement, the 
New Standard Conditions of Contract Part A – General Conditions and Part B –
Particular Conditions (hereinafter referred to as “Contract Form”), the 
Owner/Employer and the Contractor shall, in accordance with the Drawings and 
Specifications (hereinafter, this means the attached drawings, specifications, 
incorporated by reference documents, regulations, letter of acceptance, the tender 
documents, bills of quantities, time schedules, and other documents that the Owner
and its Engineer or contractor are required to submit prior to the commencement of 
the project or during execution of the project), execute this contract in strict 
observance of the laws and regulations of Japan.
1.2 The Contractor shall complete and deliver to the Owner the construction works 
stipulated in the Contract Documents (herein after referred to as “Works”) within the 
Construction Period stipulated in the Contract Agreement; and the Owner shall pay 
the amount specified as the Contract Price to the Contractor.
1.3 The Contractor shall select and determine methods of temporary work, methods of 
work, and all other means and methods necessary to complete the Work Objects 
(hereinafter referred to as “Work Methods”) as the Contractor submitted in the 
Tender Documents or submitted during the project execution and accepted by the 
Owner or its Engineer at the risk of the Contractor, except as otherwise explicitly 
specified in the Contract Documents.
Note: The Owner and/or the Engineers acceptance of the Work Methods is merely for 
information and monitoring and does not constitute or limit the risk of the Contractor. 
The Contractor may change the Works Methods provided that it is first submitted to 
the Owner or the Engineer as specified in the Contract Documents. 
1.4 Any information concerning the Contract obtained by the Owner, the Engineer or the
Contractor or by any person employed by the Owner, the Engineer or the Contractor 
in connection with the Contract is confidential and shall not be used or disclosed by 
the Owner, the Engineer or the Contractor or by any such person except as provided 
by law. None of the parties shall be forced to divulge to the other information that is 
not a requirement of the Contract Documents.
Note: This clause requires interpretation and public access to the extent that they are given 
access by the law, but contemplates that Administrative Guidance, for instance, is a 
practice that is abolished and forbidden by the Construction Business Law. Public 
access to information is a key transparency issue for compliance with the WTO.
1.5 All communications specified in the Contract Documents shall be submitted in writing
and communicated officially as provided in the New Standard Conditions of Contract 
Part B – Particular Conditions.
1.6 The language to which the parties are subject concerning all communications shall 
be the English language, but execution of this contract can be the Japanese
language provided that any the named individuals in the Contract Documents have 
sufficient fluency in English to administer the contract.
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Note: The use of English is essential for contract administration and the key personnel of 
each party, since English is the language that is recognized in the global market, For 
contracts under ¥ 10,000,000 unless otherwise stated in the New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
1.7 The currency applicable to this Contract is Japanese yen unless otherwise stated in 
the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
.
Note: Any portion of the contract that is allowed to be in a different currency should be 
sufficiently defined in the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular 
Conditions.
1.8 Except for those items otherwise explicitly specified in the New Standard Conditions 
of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, the units of measurement applicable to 
this Contract between the parties are the units of measurement stipulated by the 
Measurement Act (Law No. 51, 1992).
1.9 Except for those items otherwise explicitly specified in the New Standard Conditions 
of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions the method of counting time periods 
applicable to the Contract Documents is the method stipulated in the Civil Code (Law 
No. 89, 1896) and in the Commercial Code (Law No. 48, 1899).
1.10 This Contract shall be governed by the laws and regulations of Japan.
1.11 The competent court of the Government of Japan shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
over any and all litigation concerning this Contract provided that all matters are first 
subject to the provisions of Article 52.
1.12 When the Contractor is a joint venture, the Owner shall execute all action under this 
Contract vis-à-vis the representative of the joint venture; and all action executed by 
the Owner in accordance with this Contract vis-à-vis the representative of the joint 
venture shall be deemed as action vis-à-vis all the constituent members of the joint 
venture; moreover, the Contractor shall execute all action under this Contract vis-à-
vis the Owner via the representative of the joint venture.
1.13 The order of the precedence of the Contract Documents shall be: The Contract 
Agreement, the Letter of Acceptance, the Tender Documents, Regulations, the New 
Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, The New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part A – General Conditions, the Specifications, the 
Drawings, Bills of Quantities, Time Schedules, and other documents that the Owner 
and its Engineer or contractor are required to submit prior to the commencement of 
the project or during execution of the project.
1.14 The Owner owns the documents prepared for the Works, whether issued by the 
Engineer or it, and represented by the Contract Documents as issued for the tender, 
as modified during execution, and including all notices, communications, submittals, 
whether generated by either party, and the contractor shall maintain two copies of all 
such documents have the right to use such documents to execute the Works.
1.15 The Contractor shall create or cause to be created the documents it is required to 
prepare by the Contract Documents and shall maintain such documents in the place 
designated in the Specification at all times until the Works are completed and/or 
submit the documents as indicated in the Specifications and shall give the Owner
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and the Engineer unrestricted access to the records maintained in accordance with 
both Article 1.14 and this Article.
1.16 The Contractor shall indicate in any Time Schedules to be submitted by it pursuant 
to the Specifications, all information or instructions that is required by the Contract 
Documents to be provided by the Owner and/or the Engineer or it requires to 
complete the Works and when, which shall be reasonable, if not specified; shall give 
the Owner and Engineer timely notice of the potential time and/or cost impacts and 
the Owner may be liable for such cost and/or time impacts pursuant to Article 21 that 
result from delay in such information or instructions; and the Owner shall be liable for 
such costs or delay; provided that the Contractor is not the cause for such needed 
information or instruction.
1.17 Either party shall notify the other and the Engineer of any omission or error in the 
Contract Documents as soon as it became aware or reasonably could have become 
aware of such omission or error, and may result in a Variation and/or Time Extension 
request pursuant to Articles 19 and 21 respectively.
Article 2 - COORDINATION OF OTHER WORKS
2.1 The Owner shall, if the Owner deems necessary, have the Engineer or a third party 
coordinate the execution of the Works to be implemented by the Contractor under 
this Contract with the execution of other, closely related works as identified in the 
New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions and executed by 
a third party, or as determined during the execution of the Works upon notice by the 
Owner to the Contractor. In this case, the Contractor shall abide by all coordinating 
arrangements made by the Owner, or its Engineer or third party, and the Contractor 
shall cooperate with Owner, or its Engineer or third party, so that the works executed 
by others shall proceed in a smooth and orderly way.
2.2 The Contractor shall give the Owner, and the Engineer or third party, timely notice of 
the potential time and/or cost impacts and the Owner may be liable for such cost 
and/or time impacts pursuant to Articles 19, 21, and/or 24 that result from the 
Owners notice during the Works execution of the need to coordinate with the 
execution of other, closely related works, and the Owner shall be liable for such cost 
and/or delay; provided that the Contractor is not the cause for such needed 
coordination. 
Article 3 - BILLS OF QUANTITIES AND WORK PROGRAM
3.1 Based on the Contract Documents, the Contractor shall prepare prices for each of 
the quantities specified in the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B –
Particular Conditions and this Bills of Quantities (hereinafter referred to as “BQ”) shall 
include all the Contractor’s costs related to an individual items and when each item 
costs are added together they reflect the total cost of the Tender for the Works, and 
the Work Program that meets the requirements established in Article 3.2, and submit 
the Work Program to the Owner or its Engineer as provided in the New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions. The BQ and the Work Program 
shall be approved by the Owner.
Note: The BQ is normally submitted by the Contractor with its Tender. The Owner’s 
approval is meant to provide the Owner with assurance that the Contractor as 
provided the full scope and quality that it requires and provide the Contractor with 
assurance that it has included the full scope of the Works in its Tender. If the BQ 
contains provisional sums, such quantities are to be used. The submission of the 
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Work Program shall be in conformance with the Tender, and, if required, as provided 
in the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
3.2 The Work Program shall conform with the requirements and timing established in the 
New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
3.3 The BQ and the Work Program shall be binding on the Owner or the Contractor, and 
shall not be altered without approval of the Owner. The BQ and the Work Program 
shall be the basis for measuring all Variations, Changes and/or Extensions of Time
as provided in these Contract Documents.
Article 4(A) - CONTRACT GUARANTEE
4.1 The Contractor shall submit one of the following five Items to the Owner as a 
Contract guarantee immediately upon the conclusion of this Contract. However, if the 
Contractor elects to secure the Performance Bond Insurance (Item v.), the Contractor 
shall entrust the Performance Bond Insurance Policy to the Owner promptly after the 
Performance Bond Insurance Contract is concluded, but not more than 10 calendar 
days after the Notice to Proceed.
i. Deposit of the Contract Guarantee Money.
ii. Deposit of negotiable securities or other negotiable instruments as collateral 
in lieu of the Contract Guarantee Money.
iii. A written guarantee from a bank or other financial institution approved by the 
Owner covering any and all damages that may arise from the default on its 
obligations under this Contract.
iv. A guarantee covering any and all damages that may arise from the default on 
its obligations under this Contract in the form of Public Works Performance 
Bond Certificate.
v. Conclusion of the Performance Bond Insurance Contract covering any and all 
damages that may arise from the defaults on its obligations under this 
Contract.
4.2 The amount of the Guarantee Money or the amount of the guarantee or the 
insurance specified in Article 4.1 (referred to as the “Guaranteed Amount” in Article 
4.4) shall be no less than [ ]-tenth(s) of the Contract Price.
4.3 When the Contractor submits the contract guarantee in the form of negotiable 
securities or a written guarantee from a financial institution (as specified in Items ii.
and iii. of Article 4.1), these Items shall be deemed as collateral submitted in lieu of 
the deposit of the Contract Guarantee Money. When the Contractor submits the 
contract guarantee in the form of the Public Works Performance Bond or the 
Performance Bond Insurance (as specified in Items iv. and v. of Article 4.1), the 
Contract shall be deemed exempt from the obligation for deposit of the Contract 
Guarantee Money.
4.4 In the event of an increase in the Contract Price, the Owner may claim an increase in 
the Guaranteed Amount, provided that the Guaranteed Amount shall be no more 
than [ ]-tenth(s) of the new Contract Price.
Note: Article 4(A) should be incorporated into the General Conditions where a monetary 
guarantee is required. The figure “1” could, for example, be inserted into the sections 
marked by the blank symbol [ ], and should be specified in the New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
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Article 4(B) - CONTRACT GUARANTEE - ALTERNATIVE
4.1 The Contractor shall submit to the Owner a guarantee for the performance of the 
Contractor’s obligations under this Contract in the form of Public Works Performance 
Bond Certificate (said certificate shall be backed by exclusive collateral warranty) as 
a contract guarantee immediately upon the conclusion of this Contract.
4.2 The amount of the contract guarantee specified in Article 4.1, shall be no less than
[ ]-tenth(s) of the Contract Price.
4.3 In the event of an increase in the Contract Price, the Owner may claim an increase in 
the amount of the contract guarantee, provided that the amount of the contract 
guarantee shall be no more than [ ]-tenth(s) of the new Contract Price. In the event 
of a decrease in the Contract Price, the Contractor may claim a decrease in the 
amount of the contract guarantee, provided that the contract guarantee shall be no 
less than ( )-tenth(s) of the new Contract Price.
Note: Article 4(B) should be incorporated into the General Conditions where a job 
guarantee is required: the figure “3” could, for example, be inserted into the sections 
marked by the blank symbol [ ], and should be specified in the New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
Article 5 - TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
5.1 The Contractor shall not transfer or convey any of the rights or obligations arising 
under this Contract to any third party without a prior written approval of the Owner.
5.2 The Contractor shall not transfer, lend or lease, mortgage or pledge, or otherwise use 
as collateral to any third party the Work Objects or the Construction Materials 
(hereinafter including manufactured products) that have passed inspection as 
stipulated in Article 13.2 or that have been confirmed for partial payments as 
stipulated in Article 37.3 without prior written approval of the Owner.
Article 6 - PROHIBITION OF ENTIRE SUBCONTRACT
The Contractor shall not assign or subcontract the entire Works, or the primary parts 
of the Works, or the entire works for any structure that functions independently from 
the rest of the Works, to any third party without a prior written approval of the Owner.
Article 7 - NOTIFICATION OF SUBCONTRACTOR
The Contractor shall notify the Owner of the trade names, names, and other 
necessary information about any and all of the subcontractors.
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Article 8 - PATENT RIGHTS
When the Contractor utilizes the Construction Materials and the Work Methods 
covered by patent rights, utility model rights, design rights, trademark rights, or any 
other rights belonging to the third party protected by the laws of Japan (hereinafter 
referred to as “Patent Rights”), the Contractor shall bear any and all responsibility 
concerning the utilization of the such Construction Material or the such Work 
Methods. However, when the Owner stipulates the utilization of the such 
Construction Materials or the such Work Methods are subject to the Patent Rights, 
and when the Contractor is unaware that the such Construction Materials or the such 
Work Methods are subject to the Patent Rights, the Owner shall bear all costs and 
expenses involved in the utilization of the such Construction Materials or the such 
Work Methods.
Article 9 – THE OWNER’S ENGINEER
9.1 The Owner shall assign an Engineer to manage the Works. The Owner shall notify 
the Contractor of the name of the Engineer. Whenever the Engineer is changed, the 
Owner shall notify the Contractor of the name of the new Engineer.
9.2 In addition to those powers specified elsewhere in the Contract Documents and to 
any powers vested to the Owner in accordance with the Contract Documents that the 
Owner deems necessary to entrust to the Engineer, the Engineer shall have the 
following powers as stipulated in the Drawings and Specifications.
i. Instructions, approvals, and consultations with the Contractor or the 
Superintendent of the Contractor regarding the execution of this Contract.
ii. Preparation and delivery of detailed drawings, etc. for the execution of the 
Works based on the Drawings and Specifications, or approval of detailed
drawings, etc. prepared by the Contractor.
iii. In accordance with the Drawings and Specifications, management and 
observation of the process of the Works; inspection of the execution of the 
Works; and testing, inspection (an approval) of the Construction Materials.
9.3 If the Owner assigns two or more Engineers to manage the Works and divides the 
powers stipulated in Article 9.2, the Owner shall notify the Contractor of the content 
of the powers entrusted to each of the Engineers; and if the Owner entrusts any of
the powers vested to the Owner in accordance with these Contract Documents to the 
Engineer(s), the Owner shall notify the Contractor of the content of the powers that 
have been entrusted to the Engineers(s).
9.4 Instructions and approvals by the Project Manager as stipulated in Article 9.2 shall be 
made in writing.
9.5 If the Owner assigns an Engineer, aside from those items expressly stipulated in the 
Contract Documents, all claims, requests, notifications, reports, offers, approvals and 
termination specified in this Contract Form are to be conveyed to the Owner via the 
Engineer. In this case, the date upon which such items are received by the Engineer
shall be treated as the date upon which such items are received by the Owner.
9.6 If the Owner does not specify an Engineer, all powers that are vested in the 
Engineer, as stipulated in the Contract Documents shall revert to the Owner, 
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provided that those functions requiring a licensed Engineer pursuant to the 
Professional Engineering Act, April 2000, are fulfilled by a licensed engineer.
Note: Additionally, while not addressed herein, the current Professional Engineering Act 
applicable to both government engineers, as well as engineers working for 
corporations and consulting engineering companies, and that both are required to
abide by its mandates. Thus, the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part A -
General Conditions reflect that civil works infrastructure construction will have an 
“Engineer” and that such engineer, whether “in house” or “retained,” is suitably 
recognized under the Construction Business Law. The Engineer will be a licensed 
professional that is held accountable for the quality and efficacy of design, and can 
make all required technical decisions. 
Article 10 – THE CONTRACTOR’S SUPERINTENDENT AND ENGINEERS
10.1 The Contractor shall assign the following personnel to the Construction Site, and in 
accordance with the Drawings and Specifications, shall notify the Owner of the 
personnel’s names and other necessary information. The Contractor shall also notify 
the Owner whenever there is a change in said personnel.
i. Superintendent.
ii. (A) [ ] Chief Engineer
(B) [ ] Supervisory Engineer.
iii. Special Engineer (hereinafter, referred to as an Engineer stipulated in Article 
26.2 of the Construction Business Act).
Note: Item (B) should be incorporated into the General Conditions within the purview of 
Article 26.2 of the Construction Business Act, and Item (A) should be incorporated 
into the General Conditions outside the purview of Article 26.2 of the Construction 
Business Act. When the Works fall within the purview of Article 26.3 of the 
Construction Business Act, the phrase “Resident” should be inserted into the blank 
[ ]. However, when the Works fall within the purview of Article 26.4 of the 
Construction Business Act, the phrase “Resident Supervisory Engineer who has 
been properly issued a supervisory certificate” should be inserted into the blank [ ].
10.2 The Superintendent shall be resident at the Construction Site, and shall be 
responsible for managing and supervising the Works regarding the execution of this 
Contract. The Superintendent may exercise all powers vested to the Contractor 
under this Contract, except for powers to adjust the Contract Price, to claim and to 
receive payments for the Contract Price, to receive claims under Article 12.1, to 
determine and notify as stipulated under Article 12.3, and to terminate this Contract.
10.3 Regardless of the stipulations of Article 10.2, when the Contractor intends to exercise 
certain powers vested to the Contractor directly, without entrusting said powers to the 
Superintendent, the Contractor shall, beforehand, notify the Owner of powers which 
the Contractor shall exercise directly.
10.4 The Superintendent may also serve as the Chief Engineer (Supervisory Engineer) or 
the Special Engineer.
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Article 11 - PROGRESS REPORT
In accordance with the Contract Documents, the Contractor shall report to the 
Engineer periodically in conformance with the New Standard Conditions of Contract
Part A - Particular Conditions regarding the execution of this Contract. Failure to 
make complete and timely submissions and periodic reporting shall entitle the Owner 
to withhold progress payments to the Contractor until it has complied with the 
requirements. 
Article 12 - CLAIMS ON ACTION REGARDING SUPERINTENDENT, ENGINEER, CHIEF 
ENGINEER, SUPERVISORY ENGINEER AND SPECIAL ENGINEER
12.1 When the Owner deems that the Superintendent (who may also be serving as the Chief 
Engineer) is conspicuously incapable of exercising the duties, the Owner may claim in 
writing with the reasons for the claim, that the Contractor shall take whatever action is 
necessary.
12.2 When the Owner or the Engineer deems that the Chief Engineer, the Supervisory 
Engineer, or the Special Engineer (when these individuals are not also serving as the 
Superintendent), or other subcontractor, laborer, etc. employed by the Contractor is 
conspicuously incapable of executing or managing the Works, the Owner or the Project 
Manager may claim, in writing with the reasons for the claim, that the Contractor take 
whatever action is necessary.
12.3 When the Contractor receives a claim pursuant to Articles 12.1 or 12.2, the 
Contractor shall determine response to the claim and notify the Owner of the said 
determination within ten days after receiving the said claim.
12.4 When the Contractor deems that the Engineer is conspicuously incapable of 
exercising the duties, the Contractor may claim, in writing with the reasons for the 
claim, and the Owner take whatever action is necessary.
12.5 When the Owner receives a claim pursuant to Article 12.4, the Owner shall determine 
response to the claim and notify the Contractor of the said determination within ten 
days after receiving the said claim.
Article 13 - QUALITY AND INSPECTION OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
13.1 The quality of all Construction Materials shall be in accordance with the Contract
Documents. When the quality of any Construction Materials is not expressly 
stipulated in the Contract Documents, than such Construction Materials shall be of 
medium quality.
13.2 When the Contract Documents specify that certain Construction Materials are subject 
to the inspection, including approval by the Engineer, the Contractor shall use the 
Construction Materials that have passed the inspection by the Project Manager for 
the said Construction Materials. In this case, the direct costs involved with the 
inspection shall be borne by the Contractor.
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13.3 When the Contractor requests that the Engineer inspect certain Construction 
Materials stipulated in Article 13.2, the Engineer shall comply with the request within 
10 days after the request is made or as specified in the New Standard Conditions of 
Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
13.4 The Contractor shall not remove any Construction Materials that have been carried 
into the Construction Site outside the Construction Site without the approval of the 
Engineer.
13.5 Regardless of the stipulations of Article 13.4, the Contractor shall remove any and all 
Construction Materials that have failed the inspection to outside of the Construction 
Site within [ ] days after receiving the notification of the inspection.
Article 14 - OBSERVANCE BY ENGINEER AND WORK RECORDS SUBMITTED TO THE 
ENGINEER
14.1 When the Contract Documents specify that certain Construction Materials shall be 
prepared in the presence of the Engineer, or that samples of the such prepared 
Construction Materials are subject to the inspection by the Engineer, the Contractor 
shall use Construction Materials that have been prepared in the presence of the 
Engineer or Construction Materials whose samples have passed the inspection by 
the Engineer.
14.2 When the Contract Documents specify that certain works shall be executed in the 
presence of the Engineer, the Contractor shall execute the said works in the 
presence of the Engineer.
14.3 In additions to Article 14.1 and 14.2, when the Owner deems specially necessary, 
and when Construction Materials are being prepared or construction works are being 
executed for which the Contract Documents require preparation of records such as 
samples and work photographs, the Contractor shall prepare the such records in 
accordance with the Contract Documents, and shall, upon the Engineer’s request, 
submit said records to the Engineer within [ ] days after receiving the request.
14.4 When the Contractor requests the presence of the Engineer or requests that the 
Engineer inspect samples of certain Construction Materials as stipulated in Article 
14.1 or Article 14.2, the Engineer shall comply with the request within [ ] days after 
receiving the request.
14.5 If the Engineer, without any justifiable reasons, does not comply with the request 
form the Contractor specified in Article 14.4 within [ ] days after receiving the 
request, and this hinders the continued progress of the scheduled Works, upon 
notifying the Engineer, the Contractor may then proceed with the preparation of the 
Construction Materials or the execution of the said works without the presence of the 
Engineer or the inspection of samples by the Engineer. In this case, the Contractor 
shall prepare records, such as samples and work photographs to document that the 
preparation of the pertinent Construction Materials or the execution of the pertinent 
works have been properly conducted and, upon the Engineer’s request, shall submit 
the such records to the Engineer within [ ] days after receiving requests.
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14.6 All direct costs and expenses involved in the inspection of samples and in the 
preparation of records, such as samples and work photographs specified in Article 
14.1, Article 14.3, and Article 14.5 shall be borne by the Contractor.
Article 15 - SUPPLIED MATERIALS AND FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
15.1 Regarding Construction Materials that the Owner supplies to the Contractor 
(hereinafter referred to as “Supplied Materials”) and construction equipment that the 
Owner lends to the Contractor (hereinafter referred to as “Furnished Equipment”) to 
the Contractor, the item names, quantities, quality, and specifications or functions of 
the Supplied Materials and the Furnished Equipment, as well as the delivery time and 
delivery place shall be as stipulated in the Contract Documents.
15.2 The Engineer shall inspect the Supplied Materials and the Furnished Equipment in 
the presence of the Contractor at the Owner’s expense, when delivering the Supplied 
Materials and the Furnished Equipment to the Contractor. In this case, as a result of 
the said inspection, if the Contractor finds that the item names, quantities, quality, or 
specifications or functions of the Supplied Materials and the Furnished Equipment 
differ from the stipulations in the Contract Documents or are not suitable for the 
Works, the Contractor shall immediately notify the Owner to this effect.
15.3 Within [ ] days after receiving the Supplied Materials of the Furnished Equipment 
the Contractor shall submit a receipt of the Supplied Materials or a rental document 
of the Furnished Equipment to the Owner.
15.4 If, sometime after the delivery of the Supplied Materials or the Furnished Equipment, 
the Contractor finds some latent defects in the Supplied Materials or Furnished 
Equipment that were difficult to discover during the inspection stipulated in Article 
15.2, and determines that the Supplied Materials or the Furnished Equipment are not 
suitable for the Works, the Contractor shall immediately notify the Owner to this 
effect.
15.5 When the Owner receives the notification from the Contractor pursuant to Article 15.2 
or Article 15.4, the Owner shall, if necessary, either deliver other Supplied Materials 
or Furnished Equipment to the Contractor as substitutes; or make changes to the 
item names, quantities, quality, or specifications or functions of the Supplied Material 
or the Furnished Equipment; or request in writing with the reasons, that the 
Contractor used the Supplied Materials or Furnished Equipment.
15.6 In addition to the stipulations of Article 15.5, if the Owner deems necessary, it may 
change the items, quantities, quality, or specifications or functions of the Supplied 
Materials and Furnished Equipment, or change the deliver time and delivery place.
15.7 Under the conditions stipulated in Article 15.5 or 15.6, the Owner shall adjust the 
Construction Period or the Contract Price, if necessary, and shall bear damages 
incurred by the Contractor, if any.
15.8 The Contractor shall manage the Supplied Materials and the Furnished Equipment 
with due care of a good manager.
15.9 In accordance with the Contract Documents, the Contractor shall return the Supplied 
Materials and the Furnished Equipment that are no longer necessary to the Owner 
because of the completion of the Works or changes to the Contract Documents.
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15.10 If the Contractor destroys or damages any of the Supplied Materials or the Furnished 
Equipment due to either bad faith or negligence, or if it becomes impossible to return 
the Supplied Materials or the Furnished Equipment in original state to the Owner for 
any reason, the Contractor shall return substitute Supplied Materials or the Furnished 
Equipment to the Owner within time period specified in the New Standard Conditions 
of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, or the Contractor shall restore the 
Supplied Materials or the Furnished Equipment to its original state and then return 
the Supplied Materials or the Furnished Equipment to the Owner or the Contractor 
shall pay monetary compensation for the damages at rates specified in the New 
Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions to the Owner in lieu of
returning the Supplied Materials or the Furnished Equipment to the Owner.
15.11 When the methods of using any of the Supplied Materials or the Furnished 
Equipment are not clearly specified in the Contract Documents or could not 
reasonably determined by the Contractor when the Supplied Materials or the 
Furnished Equipment were delivered, the Contractor shall notify the Owner of 
deficiency as soon as the Contractor is aware of such deficiency, and shall notify and 
follow the Engineer’s instructions concerning the use of the Supplied Materials or the 
Furnished Equipment.
Article 16 - ACQUISITION OF LAND FOR WORKS
16.1 The Owner shall acquire or otherwise secure the use of all land to be used for the 
Works and of any other land necessary for the execution of the Works (hereinafter 
referred to as “Land”) as specified in the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B 
– Particular Conditions by the date(s) indicated in the New Standard Conditions of 
Contract Part B – Particular Conditions. (When a date is explicitly specified in the 
New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, this shall be 
deemed as the date necessary for the execution of the Works).
16.2 The Contractor shall manage the Land with due care of a good manager.
16.3 When the Land is no longer necessary for the execution of the Works because of the 
completion of the Works or changes to the requirements of the Contract Documents, 
the Contractor shall remove within the time required the New Standard Conditions of 
Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, all Construction Materials, construction 
equipment, temporary structures, and other items owned or controlled by the 
Contractor (hereinafter, also including items owned or controlled by subcontractors) 
from the Land; restore, clean up, and otherwise place the Land into good order; and 
vacate and deliver the Land to the Owner.
16.4 If the Contractor does not move pertinent items or does not properly restore or clean 
up the land as stipulated in Article 16.3 within the time required by the New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions and without justifiable reasons, 
the Owner may dispose of the pertinent items and restore and clean up the Land 
directly in place of the Contractor. In this case, the Contractor may not petition for 
objections to the Owner’s disposal or restoration or cleaning of the Land and shall 
bear all the costs and expenses incurred by the Owner in the said disposal, 
restoration and cleaning, or the Owner may retain an amount sufficient to cover the 
expense from the payments due to the Contractor.
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Article 17 - RECONSTRUCTION AND DESTRUCTIVE TESTING
17.1 The Engineer may request that the Contractor reconstruct any parts of the Works 
that are not in conformity with the Contract Documents, and the Contractor shall 
comply with any such request, unless the Contractor believes that such request is 
unreasonable. In such event, the Contractor shall follow the procedure in Article 52.
In this case, if the lack of conformity is due to the fault of the Owner’s or the
Engineer, the Owner may be liable for any adjustment of the Works Program and/or
the Contract Price if necessary. 
17.2 If the Contractor is in violation of the stipulations of Article 13.2, Article 14.1, Article 
14.2, or Article 14.3, the Engineer may, if necessary, conduct destructive testing on 
pertinent parts of the Works.
17.3 In addition to the stipulations of Article 17.2, if the Engineer reasonably judges that a 
part of the Works is not in conformity with the Contract Documents, after notifying the 
Contractor of these reasons, the Engineer may, if necessary, conduct destructive 
testing on the pertinent part of the Works, minimizing the destruction from such 
testing as much as possible.
17.4 When destructive testing is carried out in accordance with Article 17.2 or Article 17.3, 
the Contractor may be liable for all the direct costs and expenses involved with the 
testing and the pertinent restoration works, subject to determination pursuant to 
Article52.
Article 18 - DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS
18.1 If the Contractor finds any of the following facts during the execution of the Works, 
the Contractor shall promptly notify the Engineer to that effect, and request that the 
Engineer confirm the said facts.
i. The Contract Documents and/or written responses to the explanatory 
documents are inconsistent, and such inconsistency is not solved by the 
order of precedence established in Article 1.13.
ii. The Contract Documents contain errors or omissions.
iii. The Contract Documents contain ambiguous or unclear expressions.
iv. The actual natural or artificial conditions, such as, but not so as to limit the 
generality of the foregoing, land configuration, nature of soil, ground water, 
and limiting factors for the execution of the Works at the Construction Site are 
different from those expressed in the Contract Documents.
v. Unforeseeable special situations occur in the conditions that are not specified 
in the Contract Documents.
18.2 When the Engineer is requested to confirm certain facts stipulated in Article 18.1, or 
when the Engineer finds such facts by itself, the Engineer shall conduct surveys in 
the presence of the Contractor within 14 days. However, if the Contractor does not 
agree to be present at such surveys, the Engineer may conduct such surveys without 
the presence of the Contractor.
18.3 After hearing the options of the Contractor, the Engineer shall formulate a survey 
result (including instructions for any necessary measures based on the survey result, 
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if any) and shall notify the Contractor of the results of the aforementioned surveys 
within 14 days after the surveys are completed. 
Note: If the Engineer is unable to comply with the number of days, the Engineer should 
notify the Contractor before the expiration of the time period specified, including the 
reasons therefore. 
18.4 When the results of the surveys stipulated in Article 18.4 confirm any of the facts 
listed on Article 18.1, the Contract Documents shall, if necessary, be revised or 
changed as stipulated below.
i. If it is necessary to revise the Contract Documents because of the facts listen 
in Article 18.1, items i., ii., or iii., the revision shall be made by the Engineer 
and confirmed in writing by the Owner.
ii. If it is necessary to revise the Contract Documents and the Work Objects 
because of the facts listed in Article 18.1, items iv. or v., the change shall be 
made by the Engineer promptly and they shall be confirmed in writing by the 
Owner.
iii. If it is necessary to change the Contract Documents without changing the 
Work Objects because of the facts listed in Article 18.1, items iv. or v., the 
changes shall be made by the Engineer promptly and they shall be confirmed 
in writing by the Owner, all within 14 days.
18.5 When the Contract Documents are revised or changed in accordance with Article 
18.4, the Owner shall adjust the Construction Period or the Contract price, if 
necessary, and may be liable for damages incurred by the Contractor, if any, subject 
to determination pursuant to Article 52.
Article 19 - CHANGES AND VARIATIONS TO THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
19.1 The Engineer may, when the Owner deems necessary, make any Changes or direct 
Variations to the Contract Documents, subject to (a) notifying the Owner unless such 
change falls outside any limitations on its authority in the New Standard Conditions 
of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, in which case the Owner shall direct the 
Engineer is issue the Change or Variation, and (b) notifying the Contractor of the 
details of the Changes and Variations. The Owner shall adjust the Construction 
Period or the Contract Price, if necessary, may be liable for damages incurred by the 
Contractor, if any, subject to determination if the Contractor does not agree pursuant 
to Article 52, that the Contractor shall execute the directed Change or Variation while 
such determination is being made. 
19.2 Variations may include Works Program alterations, provided that such alterations are 
not necessary because of causes for which the Contractor is responsible.
19.3 The Contractor can submit in writing to the Engineer at any time Value Engineering 
suggestions, provided that the suggestions result if accepted by the Owner and 
results in either/or:
i. An acceleration of the Works Completion Date;
ii. Reducing the cost of executing, maintaining or operating the Works;
iii. Improving the value of the completed Works;
iv. Otherwise is of benefit to the Owner.
But nothing obligates or requires the Owner to accept any Value Engineering 
suggestion. The Contractor will submit all information that the Engineer reasonably 
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requires to enable evaluation of the Value Engineering suggestion, and shall not 
proceed until the Value Engineering suggestion is accepted by the Owner.
19.4 The Engineer may also request a proposal to execute a Change or Variation. The 
Contractor shall not execute the Change or Variation until it is accepted by the 
Engineer.
Article 20 - SUSPENSION OF WORKS
20.1 If it is determined that the Contractor cannot execute the Works because the Land 
cannot be secured, or because the Work Objects have been damaged or the site 
conditions have been differed by violet storms, torrential rainfall, flooding, flood tides, 
earthquakes, landslides, land subsidence, fires, riots, civil unrest, or any other acts of 
God or man (hereinafter referred to as “Disasters”) that is beyond the Contractor’s 
control, the Engineer shall order the Contractor to temporarily suspend all or any part 
of the Works. In this case, the Engineer shall notify the Contractor of the details of 
the suspension.
20.2 Without prejudice to the stipulations under Article 20.1, the Engineer, when the 
Engineer deems such necessary and with the concurrence of the Owner, also may 
order the Contractor to temporarily suspend all or any part of the Works. In this case, 
the Owner shall notify the Contractor of the details of the suspension.
20.3 If the Engineer orders the Contractor to temporarily suspend the Works in 
accordance with Article 20.1 or Article 20.2, the Owner shall, if necessary, adjust the 
Construction Period of the Contract Price, and may be liable for damages, such as, 
additional costs and expenses, if any, incurred by the Contractor in compliance with 
the suspension of the Works, including, but not limited to, costs and expenses to 
maintain the Construction Site, to keep laborers and construction equipment in 
preparation for the resumption of the Works, and any other damages incurred by the 
Contractor.
Article 21 - EXTENSION OF CONSTRUCTION PERIOD
21.1 If the Contractor is unable to complete the Works within the Construction Period 
because of Disasters as defined in article 20.1, Changes or Variations, delay for 
which the Owner bears responsibility, or for reasons not due to the Contractor’s 
liability, the Contractor may claim an extension adjustment of the Construction Period 
against the Owner, subject to timely notification and submission of the required 
proofs relating to the Works Program contained in the New Standard Conditions of 
Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
21.2 If no agreement is reached within 28 days after the date of notice on an Extension to 
the Contract Period, the Engineer shall determine the amount of Extension that is 
required with in 14 days thereafter, and if the Contractor is not in agreement, the 
Contractor upon notification may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
21.3 The approved Works Program for the Remaining Construction Period and any 
adjustment necessary to the approved BQ shall be made to reflect the Time 
Extension.
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Article 22 - ACCELERATION OF CONSTRUCTION PERIOD
22.1 If the Owner deems it necessary to complete the Works before the date for 
completion, the Owner through the Engineer may order an acceleration adjustment of 
the Construction Period and the Contractor shall comply.
22.2 In cases where the Engineer should extend the Construction Period in accordance 
with other Articles of these Contract Documents, the Owner may, for special reasons, 
assert that the Construction Period be adjusted to a time period shorter than that 
which would normally be considered necessary.
22.3 If the Construction Period is accelerated in accordance with Article 22.1 or Article 
22.2, the Owner shall adjust the Contract Price, if necessary, and shall bear 
damages incurred by the Contractor, if any.
Article 23 - PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION PERIOD
23.1 Any adjustment of the Construction Period sought by the Contractor shall be 
determined through the procedures established regarding the Works Program 
contained in the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
23.2 When the parties cannot reach agreement with respect to suspect to a request from 
the Contractor within 28 days after submission of the request or as set forth in the 
procedures established regarding the Works Program contained in the New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, the Engineer shall decide the 
amount of adjustment within 14 days thereafter, if any. If the Contractor is dissatisfied 
with the Engineer’s decision, the Contractor upon notification may seek a 
determination pursuant to Article 52.
23.3 The approved Works Program shall be adjusted in accordance with the provisions in 
the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions. 
Article 24 - PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT PRICE
24.1 The BQ and the Works Program shall be used to determine the value of Changes or 
Variations to adjust the Contract Price if a quantity is provided for the item and 
provided that the final quantities are between [ ] percent and [ ] percent of the 
quantities the BQ approved by the Engineer pursuant to Article 3.1.
Note: Usually the percentages to be used in shall be between 90% and 110% of the 
quantities that are specified in the BQ. If the BQ contains provisional sums, they are 
shall be used in determining the Contract Price at the time of Award to the 
Contractor.
24.2 Where the quantity for an item covered by the BQ falls outside of the range 
established in Article 24.1, the price for the Change or Variation shall be adjusted 
from the amount established by the BQ, but in the event that agreement is not 
reached in 28 days, the Engineer shall decide the value within 14 days thereafter, if 
any. If the Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s decision, the Contractor upon 
notification may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
24.3 If the item is not covered by the BQ, the parties shall agree upon a value or cost 
provided that the Contractor substantiates the costs or damages that it has incurred
in conformance with the Public Accounting Law, Law No. 35, 1947), but in the event 
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that agreement is not reached in 28 days, the Engineer shall decide the 14 days 
thereafter, if any. If the Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s decision, the 
Contractor upon notification may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
24.4 Upon adjustment of the Contract Price, the BQ shall be updated to reflect the new 
Contract Price and the addition of any items.
Article 25 - ADJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT PRICE DUE TO PRICE LEVEL CHANGE
25.1 If, at least twelve months have passed since the date upon which this Contract is 
concluded and within the Construction Period, the Owner or the Contractor deems 
that the Contract Price is no longer appropriate because of change in the prevailing 
wage level or price level in Japan, either the Owner or the Contractor may claim 
adjustment of the Contract Price against the other party.
25.2 When the Owner of the Contractor receives a claim as stipulated in Article 25.1, the 
party receiving the claim shall agree to adjust the Contract Price by the portion of the 
Difference that exceeds 1.5 percent of the Price of Remaining Works before such 
wage level or price level Change (hereinafter as used in Article 25, the Change). The 
Price of Remaining Works before Change is defined as the total Contract Price minus 
the corresponding price to the parts of the Works that have been completed at the 
time said claim is made. The Price of Remaining Works after Change is defined as a 
recalculated price on the Price of Remaining Works before Change on the basis or 
the prevailing wage level and price level after the change. The Difference is defined 
as the difference between the Price of the Remaining Works before Change and the 
Price of Remaining Works after Change.
25.3 The Price of Remaining Works before Change and the Price of Remaining Works 
after Change shall be determined between the Engineer and the Contractor based on
(A) The BQ and [ ] at the time the claim is made.
(B) The BQ and price indices, etc. at the time the claim is made.
However, if an agreement is not reached within 28 days, the Engineer shall decide 
within 14 days the Price of Remaining Works before Change and the Price of 
Remaining Works after Change, and notify the Contractor of these Prices. If the 
Contractor is dissatisfied with the Owner’s decision, the Contractor upon notification 
may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
Note: The name of the pertinent document(s) (such as periodic, public documents prepared 
by the Japanese government or by Japanese quasi-governmental entities) should be 
inserted in the blank denoted by the symbol [ ].
25.4 After adjustment has been made to the Contract Price in accordance with Article 25, 
further claim may be made in accordance with Article 25.1. In this case, Article 25.1 
to Article 25.3 shall apply, replacing the phrase “the date upon which this Contract is 
concluded” in Article 25.1 by the phrase “the date which served as a standard day for 
the most recent adjustment of the Contract Price under this Article.”
25.5 Without the prejudice to the rights of the Owner and the Contractor stipulated in 
Article 25.1 to Article 25.4, the Owner or the Contractor may claim adjustment of the 
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Contract Price when the Contract Price is no longer appropriate because of extreme 
change in the prevailing price levels of the primary Construction Materials in Japan 
within the Construction Period due to special factors.
25.6 If an extreme inflation or deflation is caused in Japan during the Construction Period 
by unforeseeable special conditions, and consequently the Contract Price is clearly 
no longer appropriate, the Owner or Contractor may, regardless of the above 
stipulations of Article 25.1 to Article 25.5, claim adjustment of the Contract Price.
25.7 The adjustment of the Contract Price in accordance with Article25.5 and 25.6 shall as 
provided in Articles 25.2 and 25.3.
25.8 The date on which the adjustment stipulated under Article 25.3 or Article 25.7 is
effective shall be the date upon which the claim is delivered to the other party as set 
forth in Article 1.5.
25.9 The BQ shall be adjusted for Remaining Work accordingly for all remaining 
quantities to reflect any adjustment made.
Article 26 - EMERGENCY WORK
26.1 When the Contractor deems that a certain work is necessary for the prevention of 
Disaster or for other purposes, the Contractor shall implement such work. In this 
case, if the Contractor deems necessary, the Contractor shall ask the opinion of the 
Engineer beforehand, unless urgent and unavoidable reasons exist.
26.2 If the Contractor implements the work stipulated in Article 26.1, the Contractor shall 
promptly notify the Engineer of details of the said work.
26.3 If the Engineer deems the work especially necessary for Disaster prevention or 
otherwise regarding the execution of the Works, the Superintendent may request the 
Contractor to implement necessary emergency work.
26.4 When the Contractor implements emergency work in accordance with Article 26.1 or 
Article 26.3, the Owner shall bear the costs and expenses of any such work, provided 
that such costs and expenses should not appropriately be borne by the Contractor 
within the scope of the Contract Price.
Article 27 - GENERAL PROVISION FOR DAMAGES
27.1 Prior to the possession of the Work Objects, the Contractor shall bear the costs and 
expenses of any damages that occur to the Work Objects or to the Construction 
Materials and of any other damages that occur during the execution of the Works 
(except for those damages specified in Article 28.1, Article 28.2, or Article 29.1), 
provided that such damages do not exceed an amount specified in the New 
Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions.
27.2 The Owner shall bear any damages due to the Owner’s liability among such 
damages (except for damages covered by the Insurance stipulated in Article 51.1).
27.3 If the Owner and the Contractor cannot agree on the responsibility or the allocation 
of damages within 28 days after notice to the other, the Engineer shall decide within 
14 days. If the Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s decision, the Contractor 
upon notification may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
A- Kris R. Nielsen                                                              19
Article 28 - DAMAGES UPON THIRD PARTY
28.1 When any damages are inflicted upon the third party related to the execution of the 
Works, the Contractor shall indemnify such third party against such damages. 
However, the Owner shall bear any damages due to the Owner’s liability among 
such damages (except for damages covered by the Insurance stipulated in Article 
51.1).
28.2 Regardless of Article 28.1, when damages are inflicted upon the third party by 
normally unavoidable events under construction, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, normally unavoidable noise, vibration, land subsidence, the interruption of 
ground water, the Owner shall bear any such damages. However, the Contractor 
shall bear any damages that are caused by the Contractor’s failure to exercise due 
care of a good manager related to the execution of the Works, among such 
damages.
28.3 When any disputes arise within the third party stipulated in Article 28.1 or Article 28.2 
or otherwise regarding the execution of the Works, the Owner and the Contractor 
shall cooperate in settling such disputes.
ARTICLE 29 - DAMAGES FROM FORCE MAJEURE
29.1 Prior to the possession of the Work Objects, if the Disasters (for those items with 
standards specified in the Contract Documents, this is limited to forces exceeding the 
pertinent standards) that are beyond control of the Owner and the Contractor 
(hereinafter referred to as “Force Majeure”) cause any damages to the Work Objects, 
to temporary structures, or to the Construction Materials or construction equipment 
that has been brought onto the Site, the contractor shall notify the Engineer of the 
actual conditions of such damages promptly after such damages occur.
29.2 When the Engineer receives the notification stipulated in Article 29.1, the Engineer
shall promptly, but no less than 7 days after the notification, conduct an inspection to 
confirm the actual conditions of the pertinent damages (hereinafter in this Article, 
except for damages cause by the Contractor’s failure to exercise due care of a good 
manager and damages covered by the Insurance stipulated in Article 51.1) and notify 
the Contractor of the results of said inspection within 14 days of such inspection.
29.3 When the actual conditions of the damages have been confirmed in accordance with 
Article 29.2, the Contractor may claim that the Owner bear the said damages.
29.4 When the Engineer receives the claim from the Contractor for the said damages 
stipulated in Article 29.3, the Owner shall bear a portion of the Total Damage Amount 
(hereinafter, this means a sum of the amount of the said damages that occurred to 
the Work Objects, to temporary structures, to the Construction Materials and 
construction equipment that have been brought onto the Site, and that may be 
confirmed by inspection , on-site inspection, or the Contractor’s work records under 
the stipulations of Article 23.2, Article 14.1, Article 14.2, or Article 37.3 plus the 
amount necessary to clean up from the said damages) that exceeds one percent of 
the Contract Price to the Contractor.
29.5 The amount of the said damages shall be calculated for each of the following types of 
damaged items as stipulated below based on the then current BQ.
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i. Damages to the Work Objects: The amount of the damages to the Work 
Objects shall be valued as the corresponding part of the Contract Price to the 
Work Objects that have suffered damages, deducting the appraised residual 
value, if any, of the damaged Work Objects.
ii. Damages to the Construction Materials: The amount of the damages to the 
Construction Materials shall be valued as the corresponding part of the 
Contract Price, and shall be limited normal costs of the damaged Construction 
Materials, deducting the appraised residual value, if any, of the Construction 
Materials.
iii. Damages to Temporary Structures and Construction Equipment: The amount 
of the damages to temporary structures and construction equipment shall be 
valued at (total depreciation costs allocated for the said Works) minus (any 
depreciation costs corresponding to the said Work Objects at the time that the 
damages occurred), and shall be limited to normal costs of the damaged 
structures and equipment. However, when the functions of any of these 
structures and equipment may be repaired, and when the costs of such 
repairs are less than the aforementioned value, the amount of the damages to 
these structures and equipment shall be valued as equal to the costs of 
repairing these structures and equipment.
29.6 When the Total Damage Amount becomes cumulative due to repeated damages 
from the Force Majeure, from the second time of the such damages, Article 29.4 shall 
apply, replacing the phrase “the cumulative amount of the said damages”, the 
phrase, “the amount necessary to clean up from the said damages” with the phrase: 
the cumulative amount necessary to clean up from the said damages”, and the 
phrase “the Total Damage Amount” in the first paragraph with the phrase “the Total 
Damage Amount minus whatever payments for the damages have already been 
made.”
Article 30 - ALTERNATIVE TO ADJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT PRICE
30.1 When the Owner shall increase the Contract Price or bear certain costs, expenses or 
damages in accordance with Article 8, Article 15, Article 17 through Article 22, Article 
25 through Article 27, Article 29 or Article 33, and the Owner has special reasons, it 
may change the Contract Documents as an alternative to increasing the Contract 
Price or as an alternative to bearing said costs, expenses or damages in whole or in 
part. In this case, the details of the changes in the Contract Documents shall be 
determined through agreement between the Engineer and the Contractor. However, 
if an agreement is not reached within 28 days after notification the Engineer shall 
determine the Price of Remaining Works before Change and the Price of Remaining 
Works after Change, and notify the Contractor of these Prices within 14 days. If the 
Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s decision, the Contractor upon 
notification may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
30.2 The date on which the consultations stipulated in Article 30.1 are initiated shall be the 
date the Engineer notifies the Contractor of the Owner’s intention.  However, if the 
Engineer does not notify the Contractor of this date within 10 days after the date on 
which the conditions to increase the Contract Price or to bear certain costs are met, 
the Contractor shall chose the date on which the consultations shall be initiated, and 
notify the Owner of this date.
Article 31 - INSPECTION AND POSSESSION
31.1 When the Contractor has completed the Works, the Contractor shall notify the 
Engineer to that effect.
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31.2 When the Engineer has received notification stipulated in Article 31.1, the Engineer
shall, within 14 days after receiving the said notification, in the presence of the 
Contractor, and in accordance with the Contract Documents, complete an inspection 
to confirm an appropriate completion of the Works and notify the Contractor of the 
results of this inspection. In this case, the Engineer may, if necessary, conduct a 
minimal amount of destructive testing to the Work Objects, provided that the Owner 
notifies the Contractor of the reasons for conduction such testing.
31.3 Under the case stipulated in Article 31.2, the Contractor shall bear direct costs and 
expenses of the testing and the pertinent restoration work.
31.4 After the Engineer has confirmed to the Owner and the Contractor that the Works 
have been completed through the inspection stipulated in Article 31.2, and the 
Contractor has requested that the Owner take possession of the Work Objects, the 
Owner shall promptly take possession of the Work Objects.
31.5 If the Contractor does not request possession of the Work Objects stipulated in 
Article 31.4, the Engineer on behalf of the Owner may request that the possession of 
the Work Objects be taken to the Owner simultaneously with the completion of 
payments of the Contract Price. In this case, the Contractor shall immediately comply 
with the request.
31.6 If the Works do not pass the inspection stipulated in Article 31.2, the Contractor shall 
promptly conduct repairs to the Works and undergo an additions inspection by the 
Engineer. In this case, the completion of the repairs shall be treated as the 
completion of the Works, and Article 31.1 through Article 31.5 shall then apply.
31.7 The Engineer and the Contractor shall agree on the inspection results, and, if the 
Contractor and the Engineer cannot agree completely within 28 days after the 
inspection, the Engineer shall decide within 14 days. If the Contractor is dissatisfied 
with the Engineer’s decision, the Contractor upon notification may seek a 
determination pursuant to Article 52.
Article 32 - PAYMENTS
32.1 The Contractor may claim the full payment of the Contract Price when the Works 
have passed the inspection specified in Article 31.2.
32.2 When the Owner has received the claim specified in Article 32.1, the Owner shall 
complete payments within 40 days (the “Agreed Period” hereinafter) after receiving 
said claim.
32.3 When the Engineer, by reasons due to the Engineer or the Owner, fails to conduct 
the inspection within the terms stipulated in Article 31.2, the number of days by which 
the Engineer is late in conducting the said inspection shall be deducted from the 
period for the payments of the Contract Price (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreed 
Period”) specified in Article 32.2. In this case, if the number of days by which the 
Owner is late in conducting the said inspection is greater than the Agreed Period, the 
Agreed Period shall be considered as expired on the date that the number of days by 
which the Engineer is late in conducting the said inspection exceeds the Agreed 
Period.
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Article 33 - USE PRIOR POSSESSION
33.1 The Owner may use the Work Objects in whole or in part prior to the full possession 
of the Work Objects as specified in Article 31.4 and Article 31.5 upon notification to 
the Contractor.
33.2 If the Owner uses a part of the Work Objects in accordance with Article 33.1, the 
Owner shall use the said part of the Work Objects with due care of a good manager.
33.3 If the Contractor suffers any damages from the Owners use of the Work Objects in 
whole or in part in accordance with Article 33.1, the Owner shall bear such damages. 
Article 34 - ADVANCE PAYMENTS
34.1 The Contractor may claim advance payments against the Owner not to exceed [ ]-
tenth(s) of the Contract Price, provided that the Contractor concludes a guarantee 
contract (hereinafter referred to as the “Advance Payment Guarantee Contract”) as 
defined in Article 2.5 of the Act Concerning Surety Business for Advance Payments 
in Public Works (Law No. 184, 1952) with a surety company (hereinafter referred to 
as “Surety Company”) as defined in Article 2.4 of the same Act, with a guarantee 
period until the date for completion stipulated in the Contract Agreement, and 
entrusts the certificate to the Owner.
Note: The Advance Payment percentage shall be disclosed in the New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, taking into account the nature, 
conditions, and size of the contract.
34.2 When the Owner receives the claim stipulated in Article 34.1, the Owner shall make 
advance payments to the Contractor within 14 days after receiving the said claim.
34.3 If the Contract Price has been substantially increased, the Contractor may claim 
advance payments against the Owner, not to exceed [ ]-tenth(s) of the increased 
Contract Price minus any advance payments that have already been received. In this 
case, Article 34.2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
34.4 If the Contract Price has been substantially decreased, and if the advance payments 
that have been received exceed [ ]-tenth(s) of the decreased Contract Price, the 
Contractor shall return the difference between the advance payments and ( ) tenth(s) 
of the decreased Contract Price to the Owner within 30 days after the Contract Price 
has been decreased.
34.5 If the said difference stipulated in Article 34.4 is substantially large, and if returning a 
whole amount of the difference is recognized as distinctly inappropriate considering 
the conditions of how the advance payment has been used, a portion of the 
difference to be returned to the Owner shall be determined through consultations 
between the Owner and the Contractor. However, if an agreement is not reached 
within [ ] days after the Contract Price has been decreased, the Owner shall 
determine the said portion, and notify the Contractor of the said portion.
NOTE: The number to be inserted into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] may, for 
example, be equal to the rate specified in Article 8 of the Act Concerning Surety 
Business for Advance Payments in Public Works (Law No. 184, 1952) to prevent 
delay of payments for Government Contracts.
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Article35 - REVISION OF ADVANCE PAYMENT GUARANTEE CONTRACT
35.1 When the Contractor claims additional advance payments, aside from advance 
payments which it has already received, in accordance with Article 34.3, the 
Contractor shall conclude a revised Advance Payment Guarantee Contract 
beforehand, and entrust a revised certificate to the Owner.
35.2 When the Contract Price has been decreased, and revision has been made to the 
Advance Payment Guarantee Contract, the Contractor shall promptly entrust a 
revised certificate to the Owner.
35.3 When the Construction Period has been adjusted without change in the amount of 
advance payments, the Contractor shall, in place of the Owner, promptly notify the 
Surety Company to that effect.
Note: Article 35.2 should be incorporated into the General Conditions when the Owner 
specifies that the Contractor shall represent the Owner in making notifications 
regarding adjustment of the Construction Period to the Surety Company.
Article 36 - USE OF ADVANCE PAYMENTS
The Contractor shall not use advance payments for expenditures other than 
necessary costs for the Construction Materials, labor costs, rental costs of machinery 
and tools, purchase costs of machinery (limited to the part of the purchase price that 
shall be depreciated for the execution of the Works), power costs, transportation 
costs, repair costs, temporary work costs, workers’ compensation insurance 
premium, and surety payments for the execution of the Works.
Article 37 - PARTIAL PAYMENTS
37.1 In accordance with Article 37.2 to Article 37.7, the Contractor may claim, prior to the 
completion of the Works, partial payments equivalent to less than or equal to [ ]-
tenth(s) of corresponding price of the Contract Price (hereinafter and this Article, 
referred to as “Corresponding Contract Price”) to parts of the Works that have been 
completed and to the Construction Materials that have been brought onto the Site 
[and to manufactured products that are located at the manufacturing plant]. For those 
items that shall be inspected by the Superintendent under Article 13.2, this refers to 
items that have passed the said inspection by the Superintendent. For those items 
that do not have to be inspected by the Superintendent, this refers to items that are 
subject to partial payments in accordance with the Contract Documents. However, 
the claim for partial payments shall not be made more than [ ] times during the 
Construction Period.
Note: The number”9” may, for example, be inserted into the section marked by the blank 
symbol [ ] denoting the percentage of the corresponding price of the Contract Price 
to the parts of the Works that have been completed. When there are no 
manufactured products that are subject to partial payments, the phrase inside the 
brackets [ ] should be deleted. The number to be inserted into the section marked by 
the blank symbol [ ] denoting the number of times that partial payments may be 
demanded should be an appropriate number based on due consideration of the 
Construction Period and the Contract Price.
A- Kris R. Nielsen                                                              24
37.2 When the Contractor claims partial payments, the Contractor shall, beforehand, 
request that the Engineer confirm the pertinent parts of the Works that have been 
completed or the Construction Materials that have been brought onto the Site [or 
manufactured products that are located at the manufacturing plant].
Note: When there are no manufactured products that are subject to partial payment, the 
phrase inside the brackets [ ] should be deleted.
37.3 When the Engineer receives the claim stipulated in Article 37.2, the Engineer shall, in 
all the presence of the Contractor and in accordance with the Contract Documents, 
conduct an inspection for the confirmation stipulated in Article 37.2 and notify the 
Contractor of the results of the said inspection within 14 days after receiving such 
claim from the Contractor. In this case, the Engineer may, if necessary, conduct a 
minimal amount of destructive testing on the pertinent parts of the Works that have 
been completed, provided that the Owner notifies the Contractor of the reasons for 
conduction the testing.
37.4 If the testing is conducted in accordance with Article 37.3, the Contractor shall bear 
all direct costs and expenses of the testing and the pertinent restoration work.
37.5 The Contractor may claim partial payments after the Engineer has confirmed in 
accordance with Article 37.3. In this case, the Owner shall remit the pertinent partial 
payments within 14 days after receiving the said claim from the Contractor.
37.6 The amount of the partial payments shall be calculated in accordance with the 
following formula: P≤C X {( )/10)-A/T} where:
P=the amount of the Partial Payments;
C=the Corresponding Contract Price;
A=the amount of Advance Payments; and
T=the amount of the total Contract Price.
In this case, the Corresponding Contract Price shall be determined in accordance 
with the approved BQ.
Note: The number to be inserted into the section mark by the blank symbol ( ) denoting the 
number of days should be less than “10”. The number to be inserted into the section 
marked by the blank symbol [ ] in the formula should be the same number inserted 
into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] in Article 37.1 denoting the 
percentage of the Corresponding Contract Price.
37.7 After the partial payments have been made in accordance with Article 37.5, and 
when the Contractor claims additional partial payments, the phrase “the 
Corresponding Contract Price for Partial Payments” in Article 37.1 and Article 37.6 
shall be replaced by the phrase “the Corresponding Contract Price for Partial 
Payments minus any partial payments that have already been made to the 
Contractor”.
Article 38 - PARTIAL POSSESSION
38.1 When the Contract Documents specify that the Owner is to take possession of 
certain parts of the Work Objects prior to the completion of the entire Works 
(hereinafter referred to as “Specified Parts”), and when work on the pertinent 
Specified Parts is completed, the phrase “Works” in Article 31 shall be replaced by 
the phrase “works relating to the Specified Parts, the phrase “Work Objects” shall be 
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replaced by the phrase “Contract Price” in Article 31.5 and in Article 32 shall be 
replaced by the phrase “Price for Partial Possession” and the above-mentioned 
Article shall apply mutatis mutandis.
38.2 When a claim for payments is to be made in accordance with Article 32.1 applied 
mutatis mutandis by Article 38.1, the Price for Partial Acceptance shall be calculated 
in accordance with the following formula: P=C X (1-A/T) where:
P=the price for Partial Possession
C= the corresponding price of the Contract Price to the Specified Parts;
A=the amount of the Advance Payments; and
T=the amount of the total Contract Price.
In this case, the corresponding price of the Contract Price to the specified Parts shall 
be determined in accordance with the approved BQ. However, if an agreement is not 
reached within 14 days after the Engineer receives a claim stipulated in Article 32.1
applied mutatis mutandis by Article 38.1, the Engineer shall determine the said 
corresponding price of the Contract Price to the Specified Parts, and notify the 
Contractor.
Article 39 - SPECIAL PROVISION FOR CONTRACTS WITH LONG TERM CONTRACT 
AUTHORIZATION
39.1 When the Contract involves the Long Term Contract Authorization, the maximum 
contract Price that shall be paid during each fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as 
“Maximum Payable Amount”) shall be as follows:
Fiscal Year: Yen
Fiscal Year: Yen
Fiscal Year: Yen
39.2 The Projected Value of Completed Works corresponding to the Maximum Payable 
Amount for each fiscal year is as follows:
Fiscal Year: Yen
Fiscal Year: Yen
Fiscal Year: Yen
39.3 The Owner may change the Maximum Payable Amount specified in Article 39.1 or 
the Projected Value of Completed Works specified in Article 39.2 based on budgeting 
factors or as otherwise necessary, provided that the Owner is liable for damages 
sustained by the Contractor, if any.
39.4 The Remaining Construction Period shall the adjusted accordingly and the approved 
Works Program and the approved BQ shall be adjusted correspondingly with the 
revised Long Term Contract Authorization.
39.5 The Engineer and the Contractor shall agree on the amount of such damages, if any, 
within 28 days of the Contractor’s notification. However, if an agreement is not 
reached within 28 days after notification, the Engineer shall determine the amount of 
damages, if any, and notify the Contractor of these Prices within 14 days. If the 
Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s decision, the Contractor upon 
notification may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
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Article 40 - SPECIAL PROVISION FOR ADVANCE PAYMENTS UNDER LONG TERM 
CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION
40.1 For the executions of advance payments under the contract with Long Term Contract 
Authorization, in Article 34 the phrase “the date for completion stipulated in the 
Contract Agreement” shall be replaced by the phrase “the date for completion 
stipulated in the Contract Agreement (for fiscal years other than the final fiscal year, 
at the end of each fiscal year)” and in Article 34 and Article 35 the phrase “the 
Contract Price” shall be replaced by the phrase “the Projected Value of Completed 
works for the pertinent fiscal year [when the Corresponding Contract Price at the end 
of the previous fiscal year exceeds the Projected Value of Completed Works by the 
previous fiscal year, and when partial payments have been rendered at the beginning 
of the pertinent fiscal year, the such excess payments shall be subtracted from the 
Projected Value of Completed Works for the pertinent fiscal year]” and the above-
mentioned Article shall apply mutatis mutandis. However, in fiscal years other than 
the fiscal year in which this Contract is concluded (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Initial Fiscal Year”) the Contractor shall not claim advance payments before such 
time as the budget can come into effect.
40.2 Under the stipulations of Article 40.1, when the Contract Documents stipulate that no 
advance payments shall be made during the Initial Fiscal Year, regardless of the 
stipulations of Article 34.1 as amended under the stipulations of Article 40.1, the 
Contractor shall not claim advance payments for the Initial Fiscal Year.
40.3 Under the stipulations of Article 40.1, when the Contract Documents stipulate that the 
advance payments for the Initial Fiscal Year shall include the advance payments of 
the Fiscal Year following the Initial Fiscal Year, regardless of the stipulations of 
Article 34.1, as amended under the stipulations of Article 40.1, the Contractor may, in 
the Initial Fiscal Year, claim advance payments (within [ ] yen) for the next fiscal 
year of the Initial Fiscal Year in addition to advance payments for the Initial Fiscal 
Year.
40.4 Under the stipulations of Article 40.1, when the Corresponding Contract Price at the 
end of the previous fiscal year is less than the Projected Value of Completed Works 
by the previous fiscal year, regardless of the stipulations of Article 34.1 as amended 
under the stipulations of Article 40.1, the Contractor shall not claim advance 
payments for the pertinent fiscal year until such time as the Corresponding Contract 
Price equals the Projected Value of Completed Works by the previous fiscal year.
40.5 Under the stipulations of Article 40.1, when the Corresponding Contract Price at the 
end of the previous fiscal year is less than the Projected Value of Completed works 
by the previous fiscal year, the guaranty period for advance payment shall be 
extended until such time as the Corresponding Contract Price equals the Projected 
Value of Completed Works by the previous fiscal year. In this case, the stipulations of 
Article 35.3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 41 - SPECIAL PROVISION FOR PARTIAL PAYMENTS UNDER LONG TERM 
CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION
41.1 For the partial payments under a contract with the Long Term Contract Authorization, 
when the Corresponding Contract Price at the end of the previous fiscal year is less 
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than the Projected Value of Completed Works by the previous fiscal year, the 
Contractor may claim partial payments for such excess (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Excess over Projected Value”) at the beginning of the pertinent fiscal year. However, 
in fiscal years other than the Initial Fiscal Year, the Contractor shall not claim partial 
payments before such time as the budget can come into effect.
41.2 Under this Contract, regardless of the stipulations of Article 37.6 and Article 37.7, the 
amount of partial payments when advance payments have been received shall be 
calculated in accordance with the following formula: P≤[C X ( )/10]-[P1 + P2] – [C-
(Pr1 + E)] X A/Pr2: where
P = the amount of the Partial Payments;
C = the Corresponding Contract Price;
P1 = the amount of payments made by the previous fiscal year;
P2 = the amount of the Partial Payments for the pertinent fiscal year;
Pr1 = the Projected Value of Completed Works by the Previous Fiscal Year;
Pr2 = the Projected Value of Completed Works for the Pertinent Fiscal Year;
E = the amount of an excess of completed Works over Projected Value; and
A = the amount of Advance Payments for the Pertinent Fiscal Year.
Note: The number to be inserted into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] should be 
the same number inserted into the blank symbol [ ] denoting the percentage of the 
Contract Price in Article 37.1.
41.3 The number of times in which partial payments may be claimed in each fiscal year is 
as follows.
Fiscal Year: Time(s)
Fiscal Year: Time(s)
Fiscal Year: Time(s)
Article 42 - RECEIPT OF PAYMENTS BY THIRD PARTY
42.1 Upon gaining the Owner’s approval, the Contractor may appoint a third party to serve 
as the Contractor’s proxy in receiving payments of the Contract Price, in whole or in 
part.
42.2 When the Contractor has appointed a third party to serve as the Contractor’s proxy in 
accordance with Article 42.1, the Owner shall render payments to said proxy for the 
pertinent invoices issued by the Contractor, when the Contractor has clearly stated 
on the invoices that said third party shall serve as its proxy, in accordance with Article 
32 (including Article 32 applied mutatis mutandis by Article 38) and Article 37.
Article 43 - SUSPENSION OF WORKS AGAINST DELAY PAYMENTS
43.1 If the Owner is late in rendering payments in accordance with Article 32 applied 
mutatis mutandis by Article 34, Article 37 or Article 38, and despite the fact that the 
Contractor requested said payments giving an appropriate period of time for 
payments the Owner still does not render payments for the invoiced amount, the 
Contractor may temporarily suspend the execution of the Works in whole or in part. 
In this case, the Contractor shall notify the Owner within seven (7) days to that effect 
in writing, specifying the reasons for the temporary suspension.
43.2 If the Contractor temporarily suspends the execution of the Works in accordance with 
Article 43.1, the Owner shall, if necessary, adjust the Construction Period or the 
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Contract Price, and shall, if any, bear additional costs and expenses incurred by the 
Contractor accompanying the suspension of the Works including but not limited to 
costs and expenses to maintain the Construction Site and to keep laborers and 
construction equipment in preparation for the resumption of the Works, and any other
damages incurred by the Contractor.
Article 44 - LIABILITY FOR DEFECTS
44.1 If there are any defects in the Work Objects, the Owner may claim that the Contractor 
repair said defects within an appropriate period of time, or claim indemnity payments 
from the Contractor in place of, or in addition to, the repair of said defects. However, 
when the defects are not serious, and when the repair of such defects would require 
excessive costs, the Owner may not claim that the Contractor repair such defects.
44.2 The claim for the repair of, or indemnity payments for, defects stipulated in Article 
44.1 shall be made within [ ] years after the Owner’s possession of the Work 
Objects stipulated in Article 31.4 or Article 31.5 (including Article 31.4 or 31.5 applied 
mutatis mutandis by Article 38). However, when the effects are due to the 
Contractor’s bad faith or serious negligence, the period within which the said claim 
may be made shall be [ ] years.
Note: In principle, the number to be inserted into the section marked by the first blank 
symbol [ ] should be “1” for construction works for wooden structures, etc.; “2” for 
construction works for concrete structures, civil engineering works, and other 
infrastructure works, and “1” for construction works for facilities and equipment , etc. 
The number to be inserted into the section marked by the second blank symbol [ ]
may, for example, be “10”.
44.3 Regardless of the stipulations of Article 44.1, if the Owner knows that there are some 
defects in the Work Objects at the time that the Owner takes possession of the Work 
Objects, and if the Owner does not promptly notify the Contractor to the effect, the 
Owner may not claim any repairs of, or indemnity payments for, the said defects 
thereafter, unless the Contractor is aware of the said defects.
44.4 When the Owner suffers damage or loss because of defects in the Work Objects as 
stipulated in Article 44.1, the Owner shall exercise his rights in accordance with 
Article 44.1 within the period stipulated in Article 44.2 or within 6 months period from 
the time that said damages or loss occurs, whichever occurs earlier.
44.5 The stipulations of Article 44.1 shall not apply if the defects in the Work Objects are 
due to the nature of the Supplied Materials or to the instructions of the Project 
Manager or the Owner, unless the Contractor was aware that said Supplied Materials 
or instructions were inappropriate and did not notify of this fact.
Article 45 - LIQUID DAMAGES FOR ARREARS
45.1 If the Works cannot be completed within the Construction Period by reasons due to 
the Contractor’s liability, the Owner may claim indemnity payments from the 
Contractor.
45.2 (A) The amount of the indemnity payments stipulated in Article 45.1 shall be 
calculated at an annual rate of [ ] percent for the number of delayed days applied to 
a sum equal to the Contract Price minus the corresponding price of the Contract 
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Price to parts of the Works that have been completed prior to the expiration of the 
Contract Period.
Note: The number to be inserted into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] may, for 
example, be equal to the rate specified in Article 8 of the Act to Prevent the Delay of 
Payments for Government Contracts.
45.2 (B) The amount of the indemnity payments stipulated in Article 45.1 shall be 
calculated at an annual rate of [ ] percent for the number of delayed days applied to 
a sum equal to the Contract Price minus the corresponding price of the Contract 
Price to parts of the Works which the Owner has taken possession prior to the 
expiration of the Construction Period.
Note: 45.2 (B) should be applied when the Owner expects beforehand to suffer a 
substantial loss from the delay in the completion of the Works. The number to be 
inserted into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] may, for example, be equal 
to the rate specified in Article 8 of the Act to Prevent the Delay of Payments for 
Government Contracts.
45.3 If the Owner is late in rendering the payments of the Contract Price as stipulated in 
Article 32.2 (including Article 32.2 applied mutatis mutandis by Article 38) by reasons 
due to the Owner’s liability, the Contractor may claim payments of interest for arrears 
against the Owner to be calculated at an annual rate of [ ] percent of a sum equal to 
the unpaid part of the Contract Price for the number of days the payment is late.
Note: The number to be inserted into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] may, for 
example, be equal to the rate specified in Article 8 of the Act to Prevent the Delay of 
Payments for Government Contracts.
Article 46 - PUBLIC WORKS PERFORMANCE BOND CERTIFICATES
46.1 While the Contractor has submitted a guarantee for the execution of the Contractor’s 
obligations under this Contract to the Owner in the form of a Public Works 
Performance Bond Certificate under the accordance with Article 4.1, and the 
Contractor falls under one of the conditions specified in Article 47.1, the Owner may 
claim the guarantor to arrange for the completion of the Works by another contractor 
in accordance with said Public Works Performance Bond Certificate.
46.2 When another contractor that has been selected by the guarantor and that has been 
recognized as appropriate by the Owner in accordance with Article 46.1 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Substitute Contractor”) has notified the Owner that the Substitute 
Contractor shall take over the rights and obligations vis-à-vis the Owner under this 
Contract from the Contractor as specified below, the Contractor shall let the 
Substitute Contractor take over said rights and obligations.
i. Rights to claim the Contract Price (except for parts of the Contract Price that 
have already been paid corresponding to advance payments, partial 
payments and partial acceptance).
ii. Obligations to complete the Works.
iii. Obligations under the warranty for defects in the Work Objects (except for 
obligations concerning defects in the parts of the Work Objects that have 
already been completed by the Contractor).
iv. Rights to terminate this Contract.
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v. All other rights and obligations under this Contract (except for obligations for 
indemnity payments for damages inflicted upon third parties related to the 
execution of the Works executed by the Contractor stipulated in Article 28.
46.3 Upon receiving the notification from the Substitute Contractor specified in Article 
46.2, the Owner shall accept that the Contractor’s rights and obligations as specified 
in Article 46.2 are transferred to the Substitute Contractor.
46.4 When the Contractor claims in accordance with Article 46.1 and when surety money 
has been paid to the Owner by the guarantor in accordance with the stipulations of 
the pertinent Public Works Performance Bond Certificate, the Contractor’s obligations 
to render indemnity payments to the Owner and all other obligations to bear costs 
and expenses under this Contract (including penal payments that arise after the 
payments of the said surety money) shall be terminated if the said obligations are 
less than the amount of said surety money.
Article 47 - TERMINATION BY OWNER FOR CAUSE
47.1 The Owner may terminate this Contract by notification to the Contractor seven (7)
days of the date of termination when the Contractor falls under one of the conditions 
specified below:
i. When the Contractor fails to commence the execution of the Works without 
justifiable reasons, even after the date to commence the execution of the 
Works has passed.
ii. When the Contractor, by reasons due to the Contractor’s liability, fails to 
complete the Works within the Construction Period, or when it is determined 
that there is evidently no prospect that the Contractor will complete the Works 
within an appropriate period of time after the expiration of the Construction 
Period.
iii. When the Contractor fails to assign the personnel specified under Article 
10.1(88).
iv. In additions to those conditions specified in items i., ii, and iii, when the 
Contractor is in violation of this Contract, and when it is deemed impossible to 
realize the goals of this Contract because of any such violation.
v. When the Contractor requests the termination of this Contract for any reasons 
other than those specified in Article 49.1.
47.2 When this Contract is terminated in accordance with Article 47.1, the Contractor shall 
make penal payments equivalent to [ ]-tenth(s) of the Contract Price within a time 
period to be specified by the Owner.
Note: The number to be inserted into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] may, for 
example, be “1”.
47.3 When penal payments are to be paid in accordance with Article 47.2, and when the 
contract guarantee has been secured in the form of deposit of the Contract 
Guarantee Money or submission of collateral in lieu of the Contract Guarantee 
Money in accordance with Article 4, the Owner may appropriate said Contract 
Guarantee Money or collateral for the penal payments.
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Note: Article 47.3 should be incorporated into the general conditions that also incorporate 
Article 4(a).
47.4 The Engineer and the Contractor shall agree on the responsibility or the damages 
within 28 days after notice to the other, the Engineer shall decide within 14 days. If 
the Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s decision, the Contractor upon 
notification may seek a determination pursuant to Article 52.
Article 48 - TERMINATION BY OWNER WITHOUT CAUSE
48.1 In addition to the stipulations of Article 47.1, if the Owner deems necessary, the 
Owner may terminate this Contract until such time as the Works are completed upon 
twenty-eight (28) days notice to the Contractor.
48.2 If the Owner inflicts any damages on the Contractor from the termination of this 
Contract in accordance with Article 48.1, the Owner shall compensate the Contractor 
for said damages.
48.3 The Engineer and the Contractor shall agree on the responsibility or the damages 
within twenty-eight (28) days after notice to the other, the Engineer shall decide
within fourteen (14) days. If the Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s 
decision, the Contractor upon notification may seek a determination pursuant to 
Article 52.
Article 49 - TERMINATION BY CONTRACTOR
49.1 The Contractor may terminate this Contract under any of the following conditions
upon twenty-eight (28) days notice to the Owner..
i. When the Contract Price has decreased by at least two-thirds because of 
changes to the Contract Documents stipulated in Article 19.
ii. When the Works have been suspended in accordance with Article 20 for a 
period of longer than [ ]-tenth(s) of the Construction Period (or [ ]-months 
when [ ]-tenth(s) of the Construction Period is longer than [ ]-months); 
however, when said suspension applies only to a part of the Works, when the 
suspension has not removed at least [ ]-months after all other parts of the
Works have been completed.
iii. When the Owner is in violation of this Contract, and when it is impossible to 
execute this Contract because of any such violation.
49.2 The Engineer and the Contractor shall agree on the responsibility or the damages 
within twenty-eight (28) days after notice to the other, the Engineer shall decide
within fourteen (14) days. If the Contractor is dissatisfied with the Engineer’s 
decision, the Contractor upon notification may seek a determination pursuant to 
Article 52.
Article 50 - MEASURES AFTER TERMINATION
50.1 When this Contract has been terminated, the Engineer shall conduct an inspection of 
all parts of the Works that have been completed, take possession of the pertinent 
parts of the works that pass said inspection and of the Construction Materials that 
have been the subject of partial payments, and upon taking possession the Owner 
shall pay the Contractor for that part of the Contract Price corresponding to the 
delivered items. In this case, the Engineer may, if necessary, conduct a minimal 
amount of destructive testing on the pertinent portions of the Work Objects, provided 
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that the Engineer notifies the Contractor within seven (7) days of the inspection of the 
reasons for conducting such testing.
50.2 Under the case stipulated in Article 50.1, the Contractor shall bear all direct costs and 
expenses of the testing and the pertinent restoration work.
50.3 Under the case stipulated in Article 50.1, and when advance payments have been 
made in accordance with Article 34 (including Article 34 applied mutatis mutandis by 
Article 40), the amount of any such advance payments (when partial payments have 
been made in accordance with Article 37 or Article 41, this excludes any advance 
payments that have been covered by said partial payments) shall be deducted from 
the part of the corresponding price of the Contract Price to the completed parts of the 
Works stipulated in Article 50.1. In this case, if this Contract has been terminated in 
accordance with Article 47, the Contractor shall return this excess amount together 
with interest to be calculated at the annual rate of  [ ] percent of the number of days 
between the date of the pertinent advance payments and the date upon which the 
excess is returned to the Owner. Moreover, if this contract has been terminated in 
accordance with Article 48 or Article 49, the Contractor shall return this excess 
amount to the Owner.
Note: The number to be inserted into the section marked by the blank symbol [ ] may, for 
example, be equal to the rate specified in Article 8 of the Act To Prevent the Delay of 
Payments for Government Contracts.
50.4 When this Contract has been terminated, and when there are Supplied Materials, the 
Contractor shall return all Supplied Materials to the Owner, except for those Supplied 
Materials that have been used for any part of the Works that has been completed 
and passed inspection in accordance with Article 50.1. In this case, if any of the 
pertinent Supplied Materials have been destroyed or damaged due to the bad faith or 
negligence of the Contractor, or used for parts of the Works that have been 
completed but have not passes inspection, the Contractor shall deliver substitute 
materials to the Owner, or restore the Supplied Material to their original condition and 
then deliver the Supplied Materials to the Owner, or restore the Supplied Materials to 
the original condition and then deliver the Supplied Materials to the Owner, or the 
Contractor shall pay monetary compensation for the damages to the Owner in lieu of
returning the Supplied Materials to the Owner.
50.5 When this Contract has been terminated, and when there is Furnished Equipment, 
the Contractor shall return all Furnished Equipment to the Owner. In this case, if any 
of the pertinent Furnished Equipment has been destroyed or damaged due to the 
bad faith or negligence of the Contractor, the Contractor shall deliver substitute 
equipment to the Owner, or restore the Furnished Equipment to the Owner, or the 
Contractor shall pay monetary compensation for damages to the Owner in lieu of 
returning the Furnished Equipment to the Owner.
50.6 When this Contract has been terminated, the Contractor shall remove all 
Construction Materials, construction equipment, temporary structures, and other 
items owned or controlled by the Contractor (hereinafter in this Article also including 
items owned or controlled by the subcontractors) from the Land, restore, clean up, 
and otherwise place the Land into good order; and vacate and deliver the Land to the 
Owner.
50.7 If the Contractor does no remove the pertinent items or does not properly restore or 
clean up the Land as stipulated in Article 50.6 within an appropriate period of time 
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and without justifiable reasons, the Owner may dispose of the pertinent items and 
restore or clean up the Land directly, in place of the Contractor. In this case, the 
Contractor may not petition for objections to the Owner’s disposal of the pertinent 
items or restoration or cleaning of the Land, and shall bear all costs and expenses 
incurred by the Owner in said disposal and restoration or cleaning works.
50.8 The appropriate time periods and methods whereby the Contractor shall return 
supplied Equipment or Furnished Materials to the Owner as specified in Article 50.4 
and Article 50.5 shall be determined by the Engineer when this Contract is 
terminated in accordance with Article 47 and notification given to the Contractor
when this Contract is terminated in accordance with Article 48 and Article 49. The 
appropriate time periods and methods whereby the Contractor shall return substitute 
Supplied Equipment or Furnished Materials or their equivalent to the Owner as 
specified in Article 50.4 and Article 50.54 and for the actions specified in Article 50.6 
shall be determined by the Engineer.
Article 51 - FIRE INSURANCE
51.1 The Contractor shall in accordance with the Contract Documents, take out 
appropriate insurance such as fire insurance and contractor’s all risks insurance 
(hereinafter in this Article including equivalents) covering the Work Objects and the 
Construction Materials (hereinafter in this Article including the Supplied Materials).
51.2 When the Contractor concludes insurance contracts in accordance with Article 51.1, 
the Contractor shall promptly present the pertinent certificates or equivalents to the 
Engineer.
51.3 When the Contractor insures the Work Objects and the Construction Materials by 
means other than the types of insurance stipulated in Article 51.1, the Contractor 
shall promptly notify the Engineer to that effect.
Article 52 - CLAIM, DISPUTES AND ARBITRATION
52.1 If the Contractor considers any action, decision, or failure to make a decision 
required by Contract Documents to be in error or the Contractor and the Engineer 
are unable to agree within the time provided by the Contract Documents, the 
Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer of the Contractors claim, describing the 
event or circumstance give rise to such claim. The notice shall be given as soon as 
practicable, if not otherwise specified in the Contract Documents, but not later than 
28 days after the Contractor becomes aware, or should have become aware, of the 
event or circumstance. If not provided in the Contract Documents, the Engineer shall 
render his opinion within a further fourteen (14) days. If the Contractor agrees with 
the Engineer, then the matter will be the subject of a Change Order or Variation 
pursuant to Article 19 and 20, whichever is appropriate or both to the matter.
52.2 If a dispute of any kind whatsoever arises between the Owner and the Contractor in 
connection with or arising out of the Contract Documents, or the execution of the 
Works, including issues that are required to be determined by the Engineer and the 
Engineer has rendered the required determination and either party objects, then 
either Party may refer the dispute in writing to the Disputes Adjudication Board 
(DAB) that has been constituted pursuant to the Contract Documents for its decision, 
with copies to the other Party and the Engineer, provided that a party gives notice to 
the other within twenty-eight (28) days after the Engineer’s determination, if required, 
or the issue or event is known or should have been known by the party, the party
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making the claiming a dispute shall serve notice to the Engineer and the other party 
of the dispute within twenty-eight (28) days.
52.3 The parties shall each appoint one member of the DAB at the time of Tender (the 
Owner in the Bid Documents and the Contractor with his Tender) who shall become 
noticed to the other party as the date of the Contract Agreement. The other party 
shall provide written acceptance of the proposed member within a further fourteen
(14) days of the Notice to Proceed. Once accepted by the other party, and in 
consultation with the parties, a third member of the DAB shall be chosen within a 
further fourteen days (14) days. Failure of a party to object to an appointment within 
the periods provided shall constitute acceptance. The Parties shall enter into a 
contract with each DAB member within seven (7) days of the acceptance of the 
appointment by both parties and shall each equally and jointly pay for the DAB’s 
services.
52.4 Proposed members of the DAB shall be independent and not have any affiliation of 
any nature with one of the parties in the preceding five years. Proposed DAB 
member shall have demonstrated experience with the type of Works over a period of 
at least ten (10) years, or meet the criteria established in the Tender documents. If 
both parties agree, a member of the DAB may be replaced. If a member of the DAB 
can no longer serve or is dismissed, the parties shall use the same approach as 
specified for the appointment of the third member.
52.5 If the opposing party does not accept a proposed DAB member, the other party 
shall propose a alternate within seven (7) days of the rejection, and the objecting 
party shall have a further seven (7) days to accept or reject the alternative proposed 
member. If after two proposed members by one party, the other party has not 
accepted the proposed DAB member, the entity specified in the Contract Documents
in the New Standard Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions for such 
purpose shall appoint the member(s) within twenty-eight (28) days of the last allowed 
rejection by either party. 
52.6 Both Parties shall promptly make available to the DAB all such information, further 
access to the Site, and appropriate facilities, as the DAB may require for the 
purposes of making a decision on such dispute. The DAB shall be deemed to be not 
acting as arbitrator(s). Within 84 days after receiving reference of such dispute, or 
within such other period as may be proposed by the DAB and approved by both 
Parties, the DAB shall give its decision, in writing which shall be reasoned and 
reference appropriate sections of the Contract Documents. The decision shall be 
binding on both Parties, who shall promptly give effect to it unless and until it is 
revised in an amicable settlement or an arbitral award as described below. Unless 
the Contract has already been abandoned, repudiated or terminated, the Contractor 
shall continue to proceed to construct the Works in accordance with the Contract
Documents.
52.7 If either Party is dissatisfied with the DAB’s decision, then either Party may, within 28 
days after receiving the decision, give notice to the other Party of its dissatisfaction.  
If the DAB fails to give its decision within the period of 84 days (or as otherwise 
approved) after receiving reference of a dispute, than either Party, within 28 days, 
after this period has expired, may give notice to the other Party of its dissatisfaction.
If the DAB has given its decision as to a matter in dispute, and no notice of 
dissatisfaction has been given by either Party within 28 days after receiving the 
DAB’s decision, then the decision shall become binding and the Engineer shall issue 
a Change Order or Variation pursuant to Article 19 and 20, whichever is appropriate 
or both to the matter. When notice of dissatisfaction has been given under this 
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Article, both Parties shall attempt to settle the dispute amicably before the 
commencement of arbitration. However, unless both Parties agree otherwise, 
arbitration may commence after the 56th day after the day of which notice of 
dissatisfaction was given, even if no attempt at amicable settlement has been made.
52.8 If either party is dissatisfied, the dispute shall be finally settled by way of arbitration 
under the Arbitration Law, revised in 2003 (Chusai Ho, Law No. 138, 2003). The 
arbitral decision is final and binding, and can be enforced under the Code of Civil
Procedure.
.
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NEW STANDARD CONDITTIONS OF CONTRACT
Part B – Particular Conditions
The Particular Conditions must be completed for every project and customized for the 
specific Works and for anything that has a special Requirement. Part A – General Conditions 
requires that further information at least be provided the following Articles:
1.3
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.1
3.1
3.2 – A sample of the text for this Article to be included in Part B follows.
4(A).4
4(B).3
13.3
15.10
16.1
16.3
16.4
19.1
20.1
23.1
23.2
23.3
27.1
34.1
The following Article contains the suggested language for the Works Program, etc.:
ARTICLE 2 WORKS PROGRAM
2.1 Summary
A. Scheduling of Work shall be performed by the Contractor in accordance with 
requirements of this section.
1. Development of schedule, cost and resource loading of the schedule, 
monthly payment requests and project status reporting requirements 
of the Contract shall employ computerized Critical Path Method 
(CPM) scheduling.
2. The Contractor shall employ the latest version of the computerized 
Primavera Project Planner CPM software, or an equivalent system, 
provided the Contractor first obtains the Engineer’s permission and 
supplies a copy of the complete software system to the Owner and 
the Engineer.
3. The Works Program CPM Schedule shall be cost loaded, based on 
the BQ as approved by the Engineer. 
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B. Upon Award of Contract, the Contractor shall immediately commence 
development of Initial CPM schedules to ensure compliance with CPM 
schedule submittal requirements.
2.2 Qualifications
A. The Contractor shall employ experienced scheduling personnel qualified to 
use the latest version of Primavera Project Planner. The experience level 
required is set forth below. After bid opening, the apparent bidder shall 
provide the Engineer written verification that the Contractor has the required 
personnel under its employ.  
1. The verification shall identify the individual(s) who will perform CPM 
scheduling.
2. The capability and experience shall be verified by a description of the 
construction projects on which the individual(s) has successfully 
applied computerized CPM scheduling using the Primavera Project 
Planner system.
3. The required level of experience shall include at least two projects of 
similar nature, scope and value not less than three-fourths the Total 
Bid Price of this Project. The written statement shall provide contact 
persons for referenced projects with current telephone and address 
information.
B. The Engineer reserves the right to approve Contractor’s scheduler, and the 
right to reject him or her at any time. The Engineer also reserves right to 
refuse replacement of Contractor’s scheduler, if it believes such replacement 
will negatively affect Contract.
2.3 General
A. The Progress Schedule shall be based on and incorporate milestone and 
completion dates specified in these New Standard Conditions of Contract Part 
B – Particular Conditions.
B. Overall time of completion and time of completion for each Milestone shown 
on Progress Schedule shall adhere to times in these New Standard 
Conditions of Contract Part B – Particular Conditions, unless an earlier 
(advanced) time of completion is requested by the Contractor and agreed to 
by the Engineer. Any such agreement shall be formalized by a Change Order 
pursuant to Article 19 of New Standard Conditions of Contract Part A –
Particular Conditions.
1. The Engineer is not required to accept an earlier (advanced) 
schedule, i.e., one that shows early completion dates for the Contract 
Period.
2. The Contractor shall not be entitled to extra compensation in event 
agreement is reached on an earlier (advanced) schedule and the 
Contractor completes its work for whatever reason, beyond 
completion date shown in the earlier (advanced) schedule, but within 
the original Contract Period.
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3. A schedule showing the work completed in less than the Contract 
Period, which has been accepted by the Engineer, shall be considered 
to have Project Float. The Project Float is the time between the 
scheduled completion of the Works and the original Contract Period.  
Project Float is a resource available to both the Owner and the 
Contractor.
C. Float Ownership: Neither the Owner nor the Contractor owns the float. The 
Project owns the float. As such, liability for delay of the Works Completion 
Date and any interim milestone date rests with the party, whose actions, last 
in time, actually cause delay to such date(s).
1. For example, if Party A uses some, but not all of the float, and Party B 
later uses remainder of the float, as well, as additional time beyond 
the float, Party B shall be liable for the time that represents a delay to 
such date(s).
2. Party A would not be responsible for the time since it did not consume 
all of float and additional float remained; therefore, the Works 
Completion Date was unaffected.
D. The Progress Schedule shall be the basis for evaluating job progress, 
payment requests, and time extension requests. Responsibility for 
developing Contract CPM schedule and monitoring actual progress as 
compared to Progress Schedule rests with Contractor and his onsite 
scheduling personnel.
E. Failure of Progress Schedule to include any element of the Work or any 
inaccuracy in Progress Schedule will not relieve the Contractor from 
responsibility for accomplishing the Work in accordance with the Contract.  
The Engineer’s acceptance of schedule shall be for its use in monitoring and 
evaluating job progress, payment requests, and time extension requests, and 
shall not, in any manner, impose a duty of care upon the Engineer or the 
Owner, or act to relieve the Contractor of its responsibility for means and 
methods of construction.
F. Contractor shall transmit electronically the Works Program files and reports 
required herein in the form produced by Primavera Project Planner, unless 
the report required is narrative in nature, to the Engineer according to the 
periods that are required herein.
2.4 Initial CPM Schedule
A. An initial CPM Schedule shall be submitted for review at the pre-construction 
conference shall serve as the Contractor’s schedule for up to sixty (60) 
calendar days after the Notice to Proceed.
B. Indicate detailed plan for the Works to be completed in first sixty (60) days of 
the Contract Period; including details of planned mobilization of plant and 
equipment. Show the Works beyond ninety (90) calendar days in summary
form.
C. Initial CPM Schedule shall be time-scaled.
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E. The Engineer and Contractor shall meet to review and discuss the Initial CPM 
Schedule within five (5) working days after it has been submitted to the 
Engineer.
1. The Engineer’s review and comment on the initial schedule shall be 
limited to Contract requirements, sequencing, coordination, and 
milestone requirements.
2. The Contractor shall make corrections to schedule necessary to 
comply with Contract requirements and shall adjust schedule to 
incorporate any missing information requested by the Engineer. The 
Contractor shall resubmit Initial CPM Schedule, if requested, to the 
Engineer.
F. If during the first sixty (60) days after Notice-to-Proceed, the Contractor is of 
the opinion that any of the Work included on its Initial CPM Schedule has 
been impacted, the Contractor shall submit to the Engineer a written Time 
Impact Evaluation (TIE) in accordance with Clause 2.9. The TIE shall be 
based on the most current update of the Initial CPM Schedule.
2.5 Baseline CPM Schedule
A. Submit a detailed proposed Original Baseline CPM Schedule to the Engineer 
for review and approval presenting an orderly and realistic plan for completion 
of the Work, in conformance with requirements as specified herein.
B. The Engineer and Contractor shall meet to review and discuss the Original 
Baseline CPM Schedule within five (5) working days after it has been 
submitted to the Engineer, which submittal shall be no later than the first fifty 
(50) days of the Contract Period.
1. The Engineer’s review and comment on the Original Baseline CPM 
Schedule shall be limited to Contract requirements, sequencing, 
coordination, and milestone requirements.
2. The Contractor shall make corrections to schedule necessary to 
comply with Contract requirements and shall adjust schedule to 
incorporate any missing information requested by the Engineer. The 
Contractor shall resubmit Original Baseline CPM Schedule, if 
requested, to the Engineer.
C. Progress Schedule shall include or comply with following requirements:
1. Time scales, cost and resource (labor and major equipment) loaded 
CPM schedule.
2. No activity on schedule shall have duration longer than fifteen (15) 
workdays, with the exception of submittal, approval, fabrication and 
procurement activities, unless otherwise approved by Construction 
Manager. Activities should generally range in duration from 3 to 15 
work days each.
3. The start and completion dates of all items of Work, their major 
components and milestone completion dates, if any.
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4. Owner-furnished and Contractor-furnished materials and equipment, if 
any, shall be identified as separate activities. 
5. Activities for maintaining Work Record Documents.
6. Dependencies (or relationships) between activities.
7. Processing / approval of submittals and shop drawings for all required 
material and equipment in these Contract Documents. Activities that 
are dependent on submittal acceptance or material delivery shall not 
be scheduled to start earlier than expected acceptance or deliver 
dates.
a. Include time for submittals, resubmittals, and reviews by 
Construction Manager and Architect / Engineers. Coordinate 
with accepted schedule for submission of shop drawings, 
samples and other submittals. Submittal review times shall be
scheduled at 30 calendar days.
b. Contractor shall be responsible for all impacts resulting from 
re-submittal of shop drawings and submittals.
8. Procurement of major equipment, through receipt and inspection at 
jobsite, identified as separate activity.
a. Include time for fabrication and delivery of manufactured 
products for the Work.
b. Show dependencies between procurement and construction.
9. Activity description; what Work is to be accomplished and where.
10. The total cost of performing each activity shall be the total of labor, 
material, equipment, and allocation of overheads and profit of 
Contractor. Overhead and profit of the General Contractor shall be 
shown as a single separate activity in the schedule. The sum of all 
costs for all activities shall equal total Contract value.
11. Resource required (labor, materials and major equipment) to perform 
each activity.
12. Responsibility code for each activity corresponding to Contractor or 
Subcontractor responsible for performing the Work.
13. Identify the activities which constitute the controlling operating or 
critical path. No more than 15% of the activities shall be critical or 
near critical. Near critical is defined as float in the range of one (1) to 
ten (10) work days.
14. Fifteen (15) workdays for developing punch list(s), completion of 
punch list items, and final clean-up for the Work or any designated 
portion thereof, for each element of the Works. No other construction 
activities shall be scheduled during this period.
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15. Interface with the work of other contractors, pursuant to Article 2 of the 
New Standard Condition of Contract Part A – General Conditions, 
shall be shown.
16. Show detailed Subcontractor Work activities. In addition, furnish 
copies of Subcontractor schedules upon which CPM was built.
a. Also furnish for each Subcontractor, as determined by the 
Engineer, submitted on Subcontractor’s letterhead, a 
statement certifying that Subcontractor concurs with 
Contractor’s Original Baseline CPM Schedule and that 
Subcontractor’s related schedules have been incorporated, 
including activity duration, cost and resource loading.
b. The Subcontractor schedules shall be independently derived 
and not a copy of Contractor’s schedule.
c. In addition to Contractor’s schedule and resource loading, 
obtain from the electrical, mechanical and plumbing 
Subcontractors, and other Subcontractors, as required by the 
Engineer, productivity calculations common to their trades, 
such as, units per person per day, feet of pipe per day per 
person, feet of wiring per day per person, and similar 
information. 
17. Activity durations shall be in work days.
18. Submit with the schedule a list of anticipated non-work days, such as, 
weekends and holidays. The Progress Schedule shall exclude in its 
work day calendar all non-work days on which Contractor anticipates 
critical work will not be performed.
19. Training for the Owners personnel of not less than 15 calendar days 
prior to Works Completion or parts as contained in the Contract 
Documents.
20. Each O&M submittal review will be allocated not less than 21 calendar 
days.  
21. Commissioning, checkout, and performance testing of systems and 
equipment as specified in the Contract Documents.
22. The Contractor’s Progress Schedule shall be formulated with written 
allowance for adverse weather conditions as specified in the Contract 
Documents. The weather days shall be shown on the schedule, as a 
single weather activity, on the critical path, and the last activity before 
the Completion Date and any interim milestone dates. If the weather 
activity duration is not consumed for the prescribed month, it will 
become float at the end of the project schedule.
25. Constraints, with the exception of the Project completion date and 
Contract milestones will not be allowed without the Engineer’s prior 
approval.
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26. Sixty days prior to estimated completion of the Works or any interim 
milestone dates, the Contractor will provide a detailed closeout 
schedule of all activities to be completed including instructions, O&M, 
testing, training, inspection, clean-up, etc., yet to be completed.
C. Original Baseline CPM Schedule Review Meeting: Contractor shall, within 
thirty (30) days from the Notice to Proceed Date, meet with the Engineer to 
review the original Baseline CPM Schedule submittal and the details of these 
requirements.
1. Contractor shall have its Superintendent, Project Scheduler, and key 
Subcontractor representatives, as required by the Engineer, in 
attendance. The meeting will take place over a continuous one-day 
period.
2. Review will be limited to submittal’s conformance to Contract 
requirements, including, but not limited to, coordination requirements.  
However, review may also include:
a. Classifications of Contract Requirements.
b. Directions to include activities and information missing from 
submittal.
c. Requests to Contractor to clarify its schedule.
3. Within five (5) days of the Schedule Review Meeting, the Contractor 
shall respond in writing to all questions and comments of the Engineer 
at the meeting.
2.6 Adjustments to CPM Schedule
A. Adjustments to Baseline CPM Schedule: Contractor shall have adjusted the 
Baseline CPM Schedule submittal to address all review comments from 
baseline CPM Schedule review meeting and resubmit network diagrams and 
reports for the Engineer review within 10 days.
1. Within ten (10) days from date that Contractor submitted revised 
schedule, the Engineer will either:
a. Accept the schedule and resource loaded activities as 
submitted.
b. Advise the Contractor in writing to review any part or parts of 
schedule which either do not meet Contract requirements or 
are unsatisfactory for the Engineer to monitor the Works 
progress, resources and status or evaluate monthly payment 
requests by Contractor.
2. The Engineer may accept schedule with conditions that the first 
monthly CPM schedule update be revised to correct deficiencies 
identified.
A- Kris R. Nielsen                                                              43
3. When schedule is accepted, it shall be considered as the “Baseline 
CPM Schedule” which will then be immediately updated to reflect the 
current status of the work.
4. The Engineer reserves right to require the Contractor to adjust, add to, 
or clarify any portion of schedule which may later be discovered to be 
insufficient for monitoring of Work or approval or partial payment 
requests. No additional compensation will be provided for such 
adjustments, additions, or clarifications.
B. Acceptance of the Contractor’s schedule by the Engineer will be based solely 
upon schedule’s compliance with Contract requirements.
1. By way of the Contractor assigning activity durations and proposing 
sequence of Work, Contractor agrees to utilize sufficient and 
necessary project management resources and other resources to 
perform work in accordance with the schedule.
2. Upon submittal of a schedule update, the updated schedule shall be 
considered the “current” CPM schedule.
3. Submission of the Contractor’s schedule to the Engineer shall not 
relieve Contractor of total responsibility for scheduling, sequencing, 
and pursuing the Works so as to comply with requirements of the 
Contract Documents, including any adverse effects, such as, delays 
resulting from ill-times work.
C. Submittal of Baseline CPM Schedule, and subsequent schedule updates, 
shall be understood to be the Contractor’s representation that the Schedule 
meets requirements of Contract Documents and that the Works shall be 
executed in sequence on the schedule.
D. The Contractor shall distribute Baseline CPM Schedule to Subcontractors for 
review and written acceptance, which shall be noted on Subcontractors’ 
letterheads to Contractor and transmitted to the Engineer for the record.
2.7 Monthly CPM Schedule Update Submittals
A. Following acceptance of the Contractor’s Baseline CPM Schedule, the 
Contractor shall monitor progress of Work and adjust schedule each month to 
reflect actual progress and any anticipated changes to planned activities.
1. Each schedule update submitted shall be complete, including all 
information requested for the Baseline CPM Schedule submittal.
2. Each update shall continue to show all work activities including those 
already completed. These completed activities shall accurately reflect 
“as built” information indicating when activities were actually started 
and completed.
B. A meeting will be held on approximately the twenty fifth (25th) of each month 
to review schedule update submittal and progress payment application.
1. At this meeting, at a minimum, the following items will be reviewed:  
Percent complete of each activity; Time impact evaluations for 
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Change Orders and Time Extension Request; actual and anticipated 
activity sequence changes; actual and anticipated duration changes; 
and actual and anticipated delays.
2. These meetings are considered a critical component of overall 
monthly schedule update submittal and Contractor shall have 
appropriate personnel attend. At a minimum, these meetings shall be 
attended by Contractor’s Superintendent and Project Scheduler.
C. Within three (3) working days after monthly schedule update meeting, 
Contractor shall submit the updated CPM Schedule update electronically and 
in hard copy.
D. Within three (3) work days of receipt of above noted revised submittals, the 
Engineer will either accept or reject monthly schedule update submittal.
1. If accepted, percent complete shown in monthly update will be basis 
for the Application for Payment by the Contractor. The updated 
schedule shall be submitted as part of the Contractor’s Application for 
Payment.
2. If rejected, update shall be corrected and resubmitted by Contractor 
before the Application for Payment is submitted.
E. Updating, changing or revising, if any report, curve, schedule or narrative 
submitted to the Engineer by Contractor under this Contract, nor the 
Engineers review or acceptance of any such report, curve, schedule or 
narrative shall not have the effect of amending or modifying, in any way, the 
Works Completion Date or milestones dates or of modifying or limiting, in any 
way, the Contractor’s obligations under this Contract.
2.8 Schedule Revisions
A. Updating the Schedule to reflect actual progress shall not be considered 
revisions to the Schedule. Since scheduling is a dynamic process, revisions 
to activity durations and sequences are expected on a monthly basis.
B. To reflect revisions to the schedule, the Contractor shall provide the Engineer 
with a written narrative with a full description and reasons for each Work 
activity revised. For revisions affecting the sequence of work the Contractor 
shall provide a schedule diagram which compares the Baseline sequence to 
the revised sequence of work. The contractor shall provide the written 
narrative and schedule diagram for revisions two (2) working days in advance 
of the monthly schedule update meeting.
C. Schedule revisions shall not be incorporated into any schedule update until 
the revisions have been reviewed by the Engineer. The Engineer may  
request further information and justification for schedule revisions and 
Contractor shall within three (3) days, provide the Engineer with a complete 
written narrative response to the Engineers request.
D. If the Contractor’s revision is still not accepted by the Engineer and the 
Contractor disagrees with the Engineers position, the Contractor shall 
proceed as provided in Article 52 of the New Standard Conditions of Contract 
Part A – General Conditions.
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E. At the Engineer’s discretion, the Contractor can be required to provide 
subcontractor certifications of performance regarding proposed schedule 
revisions affecting said subcontractors.
2.9 Recovery Schedule
A. If the Schedule Update shows a Works Completion Date twenty-one (21) 
calendar days beyond the Works Completion Date, the Contractor shall 
submit to the Engineer the proposed revisions to recover the lost time within 
five (5) work days. As part of this submittal, the Contractor shall provide a 
written narrative for each revision made to recapture the lost time. If the 
revisions include sequence changes, the Contractor shall provide a schedule 
diagram comparing the Baseline sequence to the revised sequence of work.
B. The revisions shall not be incorporated into any schedule update until the 
revisions have been reviewed and approved by the Engineer.
C. If the Contractor’s revisions are not accepted by the Engineer, the Engineer 
and the Contractor shall follow the procedure in Article 2.8.C, 2.8.D and 2.8.E 
above.
D. At the Engineer’s discretion, the Contractor can be required to provide 
subcontractor certifications for any revisions affecting said subcontractors.
2.10 Time Impacts Evaluation for Change Orders and Other Delays
A. When the Contractor is directed to proceed with changed work, the 
Contractor shall prepare and submit, within fourteen (14) calendar days from 
the direction to proceed, a Time Impact Evaluation (TIE) which includes both 
a written narrative and a schedule diagram depicting how the changed work 
affects other schedule activities. The schedule diagram shall show how the 
Contractor proposes to incorporate the changed work in the schedule, and 
how it the current change impacts the current critical path. The diagram must 
to explain any tie to the main sequence to the critical path of the schedule to 
enable the Engineer to evaluate the impact of changed work to the schedule 
critical path.
B. The Contractor shall be required to comply with the requirements of 
Paragraph 2.9.A for all types of delays, such as, but not limited to, Contractor 
/ Subcontractor delay, adverse weather delays, strikes, procurement delays, 
fabrication delays, etc.
C. The Contractor shall be responsible for all costs associated with the 
preparation of Time Impact Evaluations, and the process of incorporating 
them into the current schedule update. The Contractor shall provide the 
Engineer with 4 copies of each TIE.
D. Once agreement has been reached on a TIE, the Contract Period will be 
adjusted accordingly. If agreement is not reached on a TIE, the Contract 
Period may be extended in an amount the Engineer allows, and the 
Contractor may resort to determination pursuant to Article 52 of the New 
Standard Conditions of Contract Part A – General Conditions.
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E. The Contractor acknowledges and agrees that delays to non-critical activities 
(those with float) will not be the basis for a time extension. Non-critical 
activities are those activities which, when delayed, do not affect the Works 
Completion Date.
2.11 Time Extensions
A. The Contractor is responsible for requesting time extensions for time impacts 
that, in the opinion of the Contractor, impact the critical path of the current 
schedule update.  
B. Where an event for which the Engineer is responsible impacts the projected 
Works Completion Date or Interim Milestone Date, the Contractor shall 
provide a written mitigation plan, including a schedule diagram, which 
explains how (e.g., increase crew size, overtime, etc) the impact can be 
mitigated. The Contractor shall also include a detailed cost breakdown of the 
labor, equipment and material the Contractor would expect to mitigate the 
time impact caused by the Engineer. The Contractor shall submit its 
mitigation plan to the Engineer within fourteen (14) calendar days from the 
date of discovery of said impact. The Contractor is responsible for the cost to 
prepare the mitigation plan.
C. Failure to request a time extension, a TIE or provide the required mitigation 
plan will result in the Contractor waiving its right to a Time Extension and 
costs to mitigate the delay.
D. The Engineer or Owner will not be obligated to consider any time extension 
request unless requirements of these Contract Documents are compiled with.
E. Failure of the Contractor to perform in accordance with the current schedule 
update shall not be excused by submittal of Time Extension requests.
F. If the Contractor does not submit a TIE within fourteen (14) calendar days for 
any issue when it knew or reasonably should have known it was causing 
impact, it is mutually agreed that the Contractor does not require a Time 
Extension for said issue.
2.12 Schedule Reports
A. Submit four (4) copies and an electronic file, of the following reports with the 
Initial CPM Schedule, the Baseline CPM Schedule, and each monthly 
Schedule update.
B. Required Reports
1. Two activity listing reports: one sorted by activity number and one by 
total float. These reports shall also include each activity’s early/late 
and actual start/finish dates, the Baseline Schedule and remaining 
durations, float, responsibility code and the logic relationship of 
activities.
2. Cost reports sorted by activity number, including each activity’s 
associated cost, percentage of Work accomplished, earned value to-
date, previous payments and amount earned for current update 
period.
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3. Schedule plots presenting time scaled network diagram showing 
activities and their relationship with the controlling operations or critical 
path clearly highlighted.
4. A Cash Flow report calculated by early start, late start and indicating 
actual progress. Provide an exhibit depicting this information in 
graphic form.
5. Planned versus actual resource (for example, labor, major pieces of 
equipment, etc.) histogram calculated by early start and late start.
C. Other Reports
In addition to the above reports the Engineer may request, from month–to-
month, any two of the following reports. Submit four (4) copies of all reports 
and an electronic file.
1. Activities by early start.
2. Activities by late start.
3. Activities grouped by subcontractors or selected trades.
4. Activities with scheduled early start dates in a given time frame, such 
as fifteen (15) work days or thirty (30) work days look ahead.
5. Any other report producible from the Primavera Project Planner 
scheduling software.
2.13 Project Status Reporting
A. In addition to submittal requirements for CPM scheduling identified in this 
Article, the Contractor shall provide a monthly project status report (i.e., 
written narrative report) to be submitted in conjunction with each CPM 
Schedule as specified herein. Status reporting shall be in a form specified 
below.
B. The Contractor shall prepare monthly written narrative reports of status of the 
Works for submission to the Engineer. Written status reports shall include:
1. The status of major Works components and Interim Milestone Dates 
(percent complete, amount of time ahead or behind schedule) and an 
explanation of how Works will be brought back on schedule if delays 
have occurred.
2. Progress made on critical activities indicated on Updated CPM 
Schedule.
3. Explanations for any schedule changes, including changes to logic or 
to activity durations.
4. Explanations for any lack of work on critical path activities planned to 
be performed during the preceding month.
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5. List of critical activities scheduled to be performed next month.
6. Status of major material and equipment procurement.
7. Any delays encountered during reporting period.
8. Contractor shall provide a report indicating actual versus planned 
resource loading for each trade and each activity. This report shall be 
provided on a weekly and monthly basis.
a. Actual resource shall be accumulated in field by the 
Contractor, and shall be noted on the Contractor’s daily 
reports. These reports will be basis for information provided in 
computer generated monthly and weekly printed reports.
b. The Contractor shall explain all variances and mitigation 
measures.
9. The Contractor may include any other information pertinent to status 
of the Works. The Contractor shall include additional status 
information requested by the Engineer at no additional cost.
10. Status reports, and the information contained therein, shall not be 
construed as claims, notice of claims, notice of delay, or requests for 
changes or compensation.
2.14 Weekly Schedule Report
At a Weekly Progress Meeting, the Contractor shall provide and present a time 
scaled two week look ahead schedule that is based and correlated by activity number 
to the Current CPM Schedule (i.e., Initial, Baseline CPM, or Schedule Update). The 
weekly scheduling reports shall be derived from the most recent Works schedule and 
utilize Primavera Project Planner scheduling software. In addition to the graphic 
representation, the weekly update shall depict the associated activity numbers, float 
values and resource loading.
2.15 Daily Construction Reports
A On a daily basis, the Contractor shall submit a daily activity report to the 
Engineer for each workday, including weekends and holidays, when worked.  
Contractor shall develop the daily construction reports on a computer 
generated data-base capable of sorting daily Work, manpower, and 
manhours by Contractor, Subcontractor, area, sub-area, and change order 
work. The Contractor shall furnish the Engineer the software and data for this 
database within 30 calendar days of the Notice to Proceed and weekly data 
on the Tuesday following a week. The Contractor shall obtain the Engineer’s 
written approval of daily construction report date base format prior to 
implementation.
B. The Contractor shall include at least in the report:
1. Project name and Project number.
2. Contractor’s and each subcontractor’s name and address.
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3. Weather, temperature and any visual site conditions.
4. A brief description and location of the day’s scheduled activities and 
any special problems and accidents, including the work of 
Subcontractors. Descriptions shall be referenced to CPM scheduled 
activities.
5. Worker quantities for its own Work force and for Subcontractors of any 
tier.
6. Equipment, other than hand tools, utilized by Contractor and 
Subcontractors.
